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2AB STRACT
Based mainly on the records of the London Chamber of
Commerce, the study explores the role of the City in the
promotion of a form of British nationalism and the
pressure for an expansion of the British Empire and navy
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
In its propagation of a free-trade form of imperial
federation, the City struggled with protectionists within
the Imperial Federation League, at the Congresses of the
Chambers of Commerce of the Empire convened by the London
Chamber of Commerce, and by forming the British Empire
League. The City's concern to consolidate the existing
Empire, together with a demand for its expansion, was
presented as a 'National Commercial Policy' and justified
with rhetoric which included economic nationalism, the
civilising mission of the British, and free trade.
The close relationship between the City and the State
is revealed to have had two aspects: the one consciously
kept hidden and which admitted the political and specific
economic realities involved; the other publicly
performed, which denied the hidden aspect and was played
in general language to various audiences at home and
abroad, who were composed of interests which competed
politically or economically with the City. The activity
of committee members of the trade sections of the London
Chamber of Commerce for West Africa, South Africa, and
East India and China provide examples of this
relationship, and details of the economic interests of
those City businessmen involved are recorded.
3The City's often-ignored, leading role in the
pressure for a continuous and rapid expansion of the navy
during this period is demonstrated, in particular by the
activities of the Naval Defence Standing Committee of the
London Chamber of Commerce which brought together the
politicians, naval officers and businessmen who formed the
centre of the movement in the 1890s.
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8INTRODUCTI ON
Amid the welter of vague political abstractions to
lay one's finger accurately upon any 'ism' so as to
pin it dowf and mark it out by definition seems
impossible.
The difficulties involved in studying nationalism and
imperialism have been recognised for a hundred years 2 and
there is still no general agreement on the nature of the
subject. 3 Approaches have varied. The problem is not
greatly simplified by limiting studies to a definition of
'nationalism' or 'imperialism', 4 because not only do the
meaning of words change over time, 5 but they may have a
number of meanings simultaneously. 6 Moreover, a meaning
or concept is often dependent upon related terms or ideas
for its particular sense. Other approaches aimed at
simplifying the task for the historian have included the
1. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (1938), 1.
2. Sir FI.J.S. Maine, PopuI.r_Goyrnment (1886), 27,
pointed out that 'Nobody can say exactly what
nationalism is'.
3. R. Owen & B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies_in_flTheor
of Imperialism (1972), 3, 'For one thing there is no
general agreement about the meaning of the word
itself, or about the phenomenon it is meant to
describe'. N. Ethrington, 'Theories of Imperialism
in South Africa revisited', Afrcan_Affairs (1982),
387, has referred to the theoretical discussion of
imperialism as 'the misconceived debate kept alive by
the hidden agendas of historians'.
4. For an example of such work, see R. Koebner & H.
Schmidt, Imperialism (Cambridge, 1964).
5. 'Nationalism' originally referred to a concept of
popular sovereignty in France, see K.R. Minogue,
Nationalism (1967); C.J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism
(New York, 1926); The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Nationalism (Oxford, 1939);
L.L. Snyder, The Meaning of_NationIism (1954); H.
Seton-Watson, Nations and States (1977T
6. Patricia Knight, 'British Public Opinion and the Rise
of Imperialist Sentiment' (Warwick University, Ph.D.,
1968).
9proposal of an unchanging essence of nationalism,' or the
bringing together of a number of different terms on the
grounds that they are aspects of an underlying,
unchanging patriotism. 2 These methods lead to an
ahistorical explanation of the terms: it is a small step
from them to the assumption that nationalism is latent in
the souls of human beings, 3 and so beg the question
altogether in the same way as Hobbes avoided addressing
the complexities of human conflict.4
'Nationalism' and 'imperialism' in the late
nineteenth century were terms or concepts which were
related to other ideas and derived their significance from
the fact that they constituted part of the political
debate of the period. They formed part of the argument or
language with which particular policies were promoted,
justified or opposed. 'Free trade', 'protectionism', and
'imperial federation' were some of the related terms for
which it is equally difficult to provide a single
definition. When the popularity of a specific policy was
1. Seton-Watson, op.cit., 445, defined the essence of
nationalism as 'the application to national
communities of the enlightenment doctrine of popular
sovereignty'. The use of the concept of essences by
historians has been well criticised by Quentin
Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas', History and Theory viii (1969), 3.
2. Hugh Cunningham, 'The Language of Patriotism',
History Worksho, xii (1981), 8.
3. M.D. Blanch, Nation, Empire and the Birmingham
Working Class, 1899-1914' (Birmingham University,
Ph.D., 1975), 385.
4. 'Hobbes inquires, For what reason do men go armed
if they be not naturally in a state of war? But is
it not obvious that he attributes to man before the
establishment of society, what can happen but in
consequence of this establishment, which furnishes
them with motives for hostile attacks and self-
defence', Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit f_th
Laws (University of California Press, 1977), 102.
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in question, its supporters often invoked 'public opinion'
in its defence. 1
 It has been suggested that , if it is
possible for an historian to use the term 'public opinion'
at all, it should be used in a literal sense to mean the
opinion of the public; and a starting point for a study
of public opinion in this sense would be the different
opinions promoted consciously by various interest groups.2
The same method may be assumed appropriate for an analysis
of the language with which particular policies were
addressed in the public arena. An examination of the
arguments of one of the groups - in this study the
business community of the City of London - will constitute
one piece of the jig-saw of public opinion, and contribute
to a less rhetorical, more realistic appraisal of the
1. The terms has its own history which has not yet been
studied, a hint of its origins was provided by
Disraeli in his book Endymion (1880) i, 12-13, where
'public opinion' is treated as a new term to cover
support for the government provided by the
newspapers, Dissenters, Whigs and others, as distinct
from the Church and the landed.
2. This was advocated by Pauline R. Anderson, The
Background to Anti-English Feelings in Germany, 1890-
1902 (Washington, 1939), xiv, 'It is necessary to
distinguish between the public opinion of different
groups, to relate the opinion of a group to its own
particular interests and to allow for the
extravagance of professional chauvinists,
nationalists, and their opponents. Public opinion,
moreover, does not always proclaim frankly the
interests which it represents, but appeals to the
"general welfare" or to "national interests". Thus
at times the arguments of ardent nationalists and
patriots, however unintentionally, conceal special
interests.' A different approach to public opinion
has been suggested by A. Porter, The Origins of the
South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplo-
macy o_ImperiaIism (Manchester, 1980), x, where it
is defined as that opinion which can make itself
politically effective. This latter approach would
not seem to allow for the frequent rhetorical use of
the term.
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extent of support for particular policies in the period
covered by this thesis.
Political debate adds to the complexity of the study
of nationalism or imperialism, for within the political
arena speeches and activities were likely to be well-
considered before being carried out; arguments were
assembled with an eye to possible counter-proposals and
the existing popularity of concepts and meanings.
Political activity was fashioned to take account of the
prevailing climate and the position taken by opposing
groups - political or economic - both domestic and
international. Battles for particular terms or meanings
were an essential part of the debate.'
Interest groups had specific economic or political
objectives. These were translated into arguments or
concepts which could be used in the political arena to
advance the underlying aim, yet the ideas or language
employed did not directly allude to the interests which it
was hoped would be furthered by the policies proposed.
Thus there are three aspects to be studied if nationalism
1. Most significantly, 'nationalism' was retained by the
Irish, and even the term 'national' could not be used
in the 1880s for this reason; see, for example, Lord
Rosebery's explanation of this restriction at the
inauguration of the City branch of the Imperial
Federation League, Imperial Federation, 1 Dec. 1889,
274. During the 1890s, The Times seemed to make a
bid to regain the term. At the end of January 1896,
for example, the puffing up of 'the patriotism of the
race' and 'the patriotic spirit' was deflated by
Morley's speech in which he appreciated 'the force
and value of the spirit of (Irish) nationality'.
The Times from then on was more cautious in its
language, Te_! 24, 28, 30, 31 Jan. & 1 Feb.
1896.
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or imperialism are to be fully understood: ideas and
arguments; the employment of them in political debate;
and the essential interests which these activities were
designed to promote and protect. Studies of nationalism
or imperialism are sometimes limited either to
terminology, or to political decision-making, or to
underlying interests; and they sometimes lose themselves
in a meandering, unconscious movement between these three
interrelated areas. This study seeks to address all three
aspects of the problem by examining the publicly expressed
opinion of a particular interest group, its specific
attempts to influence government policy, and the
underlying interests - in this case economic - which
motivated the associated political activity.
The City of London provides an important example at
all three levels of study. As a community it is usually
associated with the persistence of a concept - free trade
- which was used to oppose protective tariffs or 'national
economics'.' The political activity of City men with
business interests abroad in support of imperialism was
such that contemporaries believed that a rational
explanation of the British policy of new imperialism was
to be found by a careful analysis of the relations between
business and politics. 2 Attention is also directed at the
1. Frederich List's Das nationale System der Politischen
Oekonomie, written in the mid-century, was published
in English in 1885.
2. Hobson, op.cit., 47. E.R. Faraday made a similar
point to the British Association in 1898, quoted by
Norman Etherington, 'The capitalist theory of
capitalist imperialism', History of Political Economy
xv (1983), 667.
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City by the findings of studies of German and French
imperialism which suggest that wealthy businessmen in
those states were involved in the promotion of empire.'
The City was the wealthiest centre of British
business, 2 and during the nineteenth century the City
rapidly became the most important international business
centre. From the time of the battle of Waterloo, City
interests abroad included the issue of foreign loans, 3 and
the formation of colonial or imperial banks followed the
general increase in overseas investment. 4 From 1860
onwards, sterling became an international currency on a
large scale. 5 The joint stock company legislation of
1. Richard V. Pierard, 'The German Colonial Society,
1882-1914' (University of Iowa, Ph.D., 1964) seeks to
dispute the view that high finance and heavy industry
were the dominating influence in the Deutsche
Kolonialverein and the Kolonialgesellschaft, on the
grounds that such interests, although present in the
organisations were not the most active members. He
does agree, however, that big business supported the
German Navy League, a point made by Franz Neumann,
Behemoth (1943), 172. Pierard also describes the
establishment of the Kolonialrat, appointed by the
Chancellor in October 1890 to advise on imperialist
matters, which had business representatives on it.
For French imperialism, Henri Brunschwig, French
Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities 1966),
123, describes the Union Coloniale Francaise - which
formed in 1893 and was comprised exclusively of
businessmen - as the wealthiest and most active of
French colonial leagues and associations. More
recently, see L. Abrams & D.J. Millers, 'Who were the
French Colonialists? A Reassessment of the Parti
Colonial, 1890-1914', Historical Journal xxix (197J
685-725.
2. W.D. Rubinstein, 'The Victorian Middle Classes:
Wealth, Occupation and Geography', Economic History
Review xxx (1977), 602-23.
3. L.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital To 1875
(1927), Ch.2.
4. A.S.J. Baster, The Imperial Banks (1929), 123.
5. C.R. Whittlesey & J.S.G. Wilson (eds.) Essayin
Money and Banking (Oxford, 1968), Ch.12.
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1858, 1862, and 1879 was accompanied by a rapid
proliferation of joint stock companies.' Despite the
Overend Gurney crisis of 1866, between 1860 and 1882 the
number of banks, private or public, which carried on
business as London bankers was more than doubled, and
those carrying on business mianly with foreign countries
and the colonies increased more than fourfold. 2 The rise
of bill-broking, particularly the business in foreign
bills, was indicated by the establishment of large
discount houses. 3 Joint stock banks became huge as they
amalgamated and expanded. 4 The larger merchant houses
also expanded and it became difficult to distinguish
wealthy merchants from the 'finance houses' (or merchant
banks as they were later known). The merchants' City
offices handled the exchange and financial side of the
business, and it has been suggested that there was a
general trend throughout the nineteenth century for
wealthy merchants to become merchant bankers. 5 Any
business which was sufficiently large and wealthy would be
likely to become, at least in part, a dealer in the
commodity of money. 6 The era of 'capital' was described
1. Ellis T. Powell, The Evolution of the Money Market,
1385-1915 (1915), 537 (hereafter Money Market).
2. F.J. Hilton, A Handbook of London_Banks (1861 &
1883). It is Hilton who distinguished between 'banks
carrying on business as London bankers' and the rest.
3. W.M. Scammell, The_London Discop_rket (1968),
160-1;	 see also W.T.C. King, The History of the
London Discount Market (1936), Ch.7.
4. King, op.cit., 272-3, between 1872 and 1881 the
number of bank branches increased by 35 per cent to a
total of 2,413;	 see also W.F. Crick & J.E.
Wadsworth, 0ne_Hundred_Yers of Joint Stock Banking
(1936), 37.
5. S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), 124.
6. Gurney referred to himself as a 'merchant of money',
quoted by Marcello de Cecco, Money and Em2ire
(Oxford, 1974), 79.
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as being replaced by the powerful organisation of
'finance' .
From the time of the Overend-Gurney crisis onwards
the modern Money-Power has been gradually centrali-
sing the entire financial control of the world - and
this of deliberate purpose, knowing its own aim.2
'The City' became synonymous with 'business'. 3 The
range of businesses which constituted the City in 1885 was
recorded for the Royal Commission on the Depression of
Trade by the London Chamber of Commerce:
The wholesale and distribution trade, comprising
Merchants, Brokers and dealers of all sorts probably
covers the largest area and employs the largest
capital and the most labour in the City . . . Next
in importance to this, the Banking interest with its
allies the bill brokers, bullion dealers, exchange
agents . . . Next local manufacturers . . .
If the wealthiest interests alone are examined, the
merchant and banking interests do not appear to have been
discrete groups. The very wealthy merchants tended
towards banking. 5 The private bankers were involved in
the foreign and colonial business; they acted as London
bankers for colonial or exchange banks; 6 they held the
bill-broking accounts of merchant bankers; 7 became
directors of the new railway and telegraph companies;8
1. H.T. Easton, Money, Exchange and Banking (1905), 279.
2. Powell, Money Market, 244.
3. Ellis T. Powell, Mechanisms of the City: An Analyti-
cal Survey of the Business Activities of the City of
London, (1910), 3.
4. CCJ Dec. 1885 Supplement.
5. See p.244 below.
6. For example, P.C. Glyn - the London and Brazilian
Bank; M.R. Smith - the Bank of Australasia; Sir
C.W. Mills - the Union Bank of Australia, and the
Imperial Ottoman Bank.
7. The Rothschilds, for example, kept an account at
Smith, Payne and Smiths, H.T. Easton, The History of
a Banking House (1903), 76.
8. Jervoise Smith - the Dunaburg and Witepsk lines;
M.R. Smith - the San Paulo (Brazil) Railway; F.H.
Norman - the Quebec Central Railway; J.H. Tritton -
the Indo-European Telegraph.
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and served on the boards of the companies formed during
the period of new imperialism. 1 'The City' was one
community united through the activities and interests of
its wealthier members. It was a huge and intricately
organised community, whose very complexity makes it
difficult to comprehend as a whole; but from 1882 onwards
the City came to be represented by the London Chamber of
Commerce, and it is the records of the activity of this
organisation which provide the basis for the present
study.
The London Chamber of Commerce was formed to produce
a united City opinion, a City voice, at a time of change
and challenge for the City's rapidly increasing power and
wealth. 2 The organisation was representative and
successfully promoted the interests of its members. Not
only did it have elected members on its Council from all
the various City business interests, but all the existing
City organisations - including banking, shipping and
insurance interests - sent official deputies to sit on the
Council as their representatives.
This study begins in 1880, the year in which informal
discussions were taking place about the possibility of
reviving the idea of a chamber of commerce for the City.
City businessmen were becoming acutely aware of the
seriousness of competition from abroad; negotiations for
the renewal of the commercial treaty with France were in
1. R.B. Martin - the British North Borneo Company; Sir
C.W. Mills - the Royal Niger Company.
2. See the first section of chapter one for examples
ar,d details of the considerations mentioned in this
paragraph.
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progress; the possibility of an increase in tariffs was
in the air; the importance of the Empire - as a consumer
of goods and services - was thrown into relief at a time
when the issue of colonial tariffs had to be faced; and
protectionism was being revived as a political question at
home. These were the circumstances in which the need for
a chamber of commerce for the City was mooted, and these
the considerations which ensured that when the suggestion
was first officially and publicly put to City businessmen
by the Lord Mayor at the beginning of 1881 it was
enthusiastically received. The organisation was
established within twelve months.
For convenience the thesis is divided into chapters
dealing with three aspects of the City's activities, as
refracted through the London Chamber of Commerce:
firstly, the City's general views and related activity
regarding the promotion of imperial federation,
imperialism, a form of economic nationalism and free
trade; secondly, specific examples of attempts to
influence the government's foreign and colonial policy by
particular businessmen through the agency of the Chamber
with details of the economic interests involved; and,
finally, the arguments and action taken to engineer the
expansion of the British navy. All three of these aspects
of the City's drive to survive and expand in the face of
increasing competition abroad were interrelated: naval
defence was part of the debate about imperial federation,
as well as a necessary condition for the expansion of the
Empire and of business interests outside the Empire;
particular appeals for a forward government policy were
18
justified in the context of the more general arguments
shaped to promote imperialism and imperial federation;
and the City united both general and particular demands
for imperialism and imperial federation with the question
of naval expansion when giving its views as to which
course would best protect its expanding interests
throughout the world.
The interrelated topics as outlined here are divided
into chapters so that each can be explored in detail; and
in order to retain a sense of simultaneity, the thesis is
split into two sections each covering a decade. The
City's vigorous promotion of ideas and policies in the
three interconnected areas are examined for the 1880s and
then for the 1890s. This division into sections also has
some justification in that during the 1880s the City was
working for the establishment of naval expansion and
imperialism against an initial inertia of indifference,
whereas in the 1890s the momentum of the naval acts and
the rapid spread of the Empire was to be maintained
through the formation of bodies such as the Naval Defence
Standing Committee and the British Empire League.
The study ends with the century, when many of the
objectives which the City had promoted had been
accomplished, though the City was not uniquely responsible
for bringing them about. The Empire had been vastly
expanded, naval strength hugely increased, the state had
publicly committed itself to supporting British business
interests abroad, and free trade had been maintained. In
the new century new questions arose, and the same
questions appeared in different or more challenging
19
guises. The second South African war, the adoption of
imperial preference by Chamberlain, and the growth of the
German navy constituted some of these changes and
challenges.
The ideas, concepts and meanings fashioned and
maintained by the City during the last two decades of the
century are explored in chapters one and four. Where
there were divisions, as over the sugar and silver
questions, 1 the arguments were constituted so as to
further the economic interests of those involved, just as
they were on the questions which united the City -
imperialism, imperial federation, naval expansion and
freedom from state interference. The arguments were
pressed with a view to facilitating profit-taking but did
not directly reflect the economic reality which they were
promoting as they were formulated with particular
audiences in mind - domestic, colonial and foreign. For
example, protectionism at home and within the Empire, as
well as that instituted by other powers, was feared,
consequently the maintenance of 'free trade' was a major
aim of City propagandists. This did not mean, however,
that the trade or business which was being justified by
the term was necessarily free or open to all: far from
it.
On the other hand, opinions in favour of Empire were
not all in favour of free trade. The movement for
imperial federation received part of its momentum from
protectionists, and the City constituted its own arena -
1.	 See the section Within the City in Ch. 1, and the
sections on Silver and Sugar in Ch. 4 below.
20
the Congresses of the Chamber of Commerce of the Empire -
in which to battle for a free-trade interpretation of
imperial federation which would ensure the continued and
increased economic dominance of the City over the Empire.
The protectionist element in the imperial federation
movement was temporarily vanquished by the mid-nineties
and this success was consolidated by the City's
organisation of the British Empire League to replace the
defunct Imperial Federation League.
The general ideational task of the City was to bring
the moral stance of a civilising mission and the mid-
century theory of political economy together with the
economic nationalism of social Darwinism) This was
accomplished in an uneasy fashion which sometimes seemed
to lack conviction.
Those States, which are most energetic in preventing
by tariffs the free sale of British merchandise on
its merits, are the first to appeal, and often
successfully, to British financiers to assist them in
promoting competition with British industries.
British machinery is systematically financed with
British capital to establish producing industries in
foreign countries, with the result that home
productions are displaced. Foreign land, foreign
railways, foreign shipping, foreign building-trades,
foreign labour are thus promoted by us, in
competition, it might almost be said, with ourselves.
Economically this is, no doubt, but the expression of
that law of supply and demand, which, rising superior
to the trammels of fiscal law, takes the smaller
profit where it cannot obtin the larger, in
preference to no profit at all.
This difficult and contradictory position in which
the London Chamber of Commerce found itself was apparent
1. For 'Social Darwinism', see Burrow, op.cit., 20. The
term 'survival of the fittest' was adopted by the
City, see for example CCJ Nov. 1882 'New Markets',
and June 1884 'Foreign Colonial Activity'.
2. CCJ July 1889.
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even in the first edition of its Journal. The front page
proclaimed a cosmopolitan free-trade aim - to unite
through the Journal all chambers of commerce of all
nationalities by the regular exchange of information - but
inside could be found a description of the 'egotism' and
the fearful 'threat' which the French represented. 1 A
perusal of later issues would have informed an inquisitive
Frenchman of the danger to British preeminence which the
Latin-Union had posed before it was temporarily destroyed
by the Franco-Prussian war. 2 The City preached
cosmopolitan free trade and criticised the economic
nationalism of other states whilst promoting British
economic nationalism as a justification for British
imperial federation and the new British imperialism. From
such an awkward ideational stance it hoped to maintain the
growth of business and profits at a time of competition
and depression.
Dealing with all three interrelated aspects of City
involvement in the pressure for British imperialism has
the advantage of bringing out the way in which the
arguments and actualities of the consolidation and
expansion of the Empire and the navy were interwoven. By
presenting the City's views and efforts in this direction
as a whole it becomes easier to see the way in which
economic considerations were at the basis of the City's
'opinion'. The disadvantages of this approach, however,
must also be mentioned. Essentially they emanate from the
fact that little room is left to put the City's attempts
1. CCJ Mar. 1882.
2. CCJ July 1882.
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to influence Government policy in the larger context of
the way in which policy decisions were arrived at. This
study does not address the wider questions which have been
covered in a number of works on the period. Rather it is
concerned with the specific case of the City's role and
its interaction with government on particular issues.
There is no general agreement about the extent to
which pressure groups were able to influence government
and colonial policy at this time. On the one hand, there
is the argument that the governmental decision-making
process was almost autonomous.' On the other there is the
deterministic view that political decision-making,
whatever the political decisions in question, even the new
imperialism itself, was undertaken in vain because it
would have little effect in stemming the economic decline
of the U.K. owing to the fundamental contradictions in the
nature of society and the economy. 2 Nevertheless, from
the activity of the City described in this thesis, it is
clear that, at the time, it was understood that pressure
from the City did influence policy, and that similar
pressures could be exerted by others. This latter point
is well-demonstrated by the care the City took in
constructing its public statements so as to meet the
arguments presented by rival organised groups. The fact
that the City involved itself in gladiatorial battles for
dominance in the arena of ideas suggests that the City
1. Most recently, Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind
Diplomacy; Background Influences on British External
Policy, 1865-1980 (1981), 59-61.
2. Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-
1982: Delusions of Grandeur (1983).
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felt that by successfully influencing state decision-
makers it would, and did, positively affect the profit-
making of City business interests for the better. The
formation of the London Chamber of Commerce is the most
conspicuous proof of this belief.
The vigorous efforts made by the City in the last two
decades of the century, as shown below, also challenge a
deterministic view of British economic activity, or one
which assumes that all British businessmen were oblivious
to, and could not respond rapidly and energetically to
political and economic changes abroad, within the Empire,
and at home. A contrast between rhetoric and reality does
not necessarily imply, as has been suggested, 1 the
adoption of a deterministic approach. Rather the
difference between the two may be understood in terms of
the disparity between public statements and private
opinions; a discord which reflects the importance of
particular groups in the political arena, be they foreign
governments, colonial electorates, or domestic interest
groups. Such an interpretation is indicated by the
behaviour of the City in the late nineteenth century. It
must be emphasised that it is the City's activities which
are being examined here, and there is no attempt to
address the question of the influence on policy by the
City relative to that exerted by other domestic economic
or political groups.
Two recent studies on the political activity of
chambers of commerce regarding the new imperialism have
differed over the importance of trade depressions in
1.	 B. Porter, op.cit., xi-xii.
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motivating or timing the British imperialism of the late
nineteenth century. 1
 However, both studies agree that
businessmen were asking for state support, that foreign
competition was a significant factor involved, and both
recognise feelings of 'fear and insecurity' or 'economic
panic' amongst the British business community. 2
 This
study of the City's chamber of commerce bears out the view
that City businessmen realised that threats to their
interests, often taking the form of foreign competition,
demanded that the state should support them more
enthusiastically and publicly. Whilst demands for
imperialism were not necessarily limited to periods of
trade depression, 3
 it would be difficult to claim that the
formation of a well-organised business lobby, certainly in
the case of the City, was not partly a reaction to the
depression in trade, 4
 or that foreign competition was not
related to the trade depressions.
The anxiety of businessmen was based on a variety of
causes and there seems no convincing reason for excluding
any particular one, rather it is important to rank them
according to their significance. The close relationship
between business interests and states has been described
1. W.G. Hynes, The Economics of Empire (1979), and B.M.
Ratcliffe, 'Commerce and Empire: Manchester
Merchants and West Africa, 1873-1895' Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History vii (1978-91, 293-
320.
2. For a reference to 'economic panic', see Hynes,
op.cit., 141; for a reference to 'feelings of fear
and insecurity', see Ratcliffe, op.cit., 307.
3. Hynes, op.cit., ix, attempts to demonstrate that the
pattern of economic motivation behind late Victorian
expansionism was decisively influenced by crises in
'the British economy'.
4. Ratcliffe opposes Hynes' view by claiming that
Manchester pressure for imperialism resulted from the
formation of a merchants' lobby.
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as a general feature of the great depression, 1 and
requires the greatest emphasis. The relationship between
the City and the State is examined in chapters two and
five, largely through the detailed demands for state
support for City business: by expanding the Empire, for
example the annexation of Upper Burma; by officially
supporting business initiatives to other governments, for
example in China; or by lending political authority to
business companies by means of royal charters, such as the
Royal Niger Company or the British South Africa Company.
Given the variety of such activity, this study will
consider imperialism to mean the wide spectrum of state
activity which extended the power of the British state in
the world. This ranged from occasional visits by warships
to various parts of the globe, to the subsidy of shipping
and communications, and the granting of royal charters;
through the formation of protectorates, increases in the
number of visiting or permanent British Residents,
Consuls and police, military expeditions and campaigns;
to the outright annexation and administration of
territory.
The close relationship between City and State does
not necessarily imply harmonious relations between the
two, but it does imply an overlapping of economic and
political interests in most circumstances. The power of
the State and the wealth of the City are treated in this
study as interdependent allies around the world. To ask
whether a particular piece of diplomacy or imperialism was
1. Hans Rosenberg, 'Political and Social Consequences of
the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in Central Europe'
Economic History Review xiii (1943), 65.
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economically or politically based, would be like asking
which came first, the chicken or the egg. In any case the
general question of what caused the new imperialism of the
late nineteenth century is not addressed in this thesis,
rather it is concerned with the contribution which the
arguments and activities of the City at this time might
make as part of the overall picture. Even then the full
range of the economic activity of the City could not be
included in this work. The huge outpourings of capital
into South America and Australia in the second half of the
1880s, for example, are not examined. Attention is
focused in chapters two and five on the activities of
three major trade sections of the London Chamber of
Commerce - the West Africa, South Africa, and East India
and China sections.
The contrasting official and unofficial sides of the
City's relationship with decision-makers and their
advisers are analysed in these chapters. Examples of the
detailed demands for state support by economic interests
have been chosen to illustrate the activity of particular
businessmen in London, and their private and public
relations with political decision-makers. No attempt has
been made to give a comprehensive picture of British and
foreign interests in the regions cited. This is an
unfortunate limitation, but as this thesis is designed to
cover as broad a section of City activity as possible, it
is necessary to give a number of examples and there is
little space for an appreciation of all the possible
factors in a particular region. This should be borne in
mind if City interests seem at times in this work to have
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been operating in a vacuum, or in isolation from other
interests and activities.
The importance of the navy to British business
interests abroad is often ignored when imperialism is
discussed. Chapters three and six below trace the way in
which the City, in conjunction with a handful of important
naval officers who were critical of the state of the navy,
began a persistent campaign which was designed to keep a
series of ever-larger naval programmes rolling. The navy
was presented as a form of insurance for British business
abroad, even to the point where an exact insurance risk -
based upon the amount of public funds spent on the navy
per ton of trade carried by British shipping - was
calculated. Publicly, the City was often in favour of
peace and frowned on the arms race in Europe, but this did
not preclude it from advocating ware ir action which had
the effect of accelerating the European arms race, if the
expansion of its interests were at stake)
In revealing the City's promotion of naval expansion
this study does not seek to present the City as the sole
agent of the movement to create a larger navy, any more
than to imply that the City was the sole private influence
1. Kennedy, op.cit., 27, suggests that the City was
consistently peace-loving but he only provides two
examples to support this contention. Opposing
examples such as the attitude of The Economist in
1896 might be cited, see p.233 below. The danger for
the historian is to mistake the City's public
arguments for its private beliefs; in the same way
as it could criticise the economic nationalism of
other powers whilst promoting British economic
nationalism, so it could criticise the expansion of
arms abroad whilst leading the promotion of the
expansion of British arms. Kennedy, like almost all
historians, also takes the City's promotion of free
trade at face value, see p.243, footnote 2 below.
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on decision-makers, or the sole propagator of the movement
for a larger Empire. What this thesis does seek to
demonstrate is the hitherto largely-unacknowledged,
leading role which the City played in these movements;
the great effort it made to influence government
decisions; and the fact that in the process it employed
arguments which involved a particular form of nationalism.
At a more general level, the interdependence of economic,
political and ideational activity is made apparent in this
study. The dangers for the historian of taking public
language at its face value are exposed. The study as a
whole is an appeal for a broader view of history, in which
concepts such as nationalism are analysed in conjunction
with associated policies, such as imperialism, and both
are examined for a particular country in terms of the
economic or political groups which promoted them.
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SECTION ONE: 1880-1890
National morality, as anyone may perceive who gives
the least attention to the legislative ideals of
successive generations, depends very largely upon the
balance of forces and interests within the social
fabric. Let a new class emerge from obscurity and
obtain political power, or let an old dominant class
decay, or let mere mechanical inventions alter the
distribution and habits of the population, and there
will certainly follow real and effective, though
possibly not obtrusive, changes in the public way of
regarding social and national questions.
The Times, 26 Feb. 1892
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CHAPTER ONE: City Opinion
We appear to leave trade, in far too many instances,
in the matter of supply to its own resources .
unless we provide better for trade extension than we
appear to do, we should be prepared for trade
dullness and contraction; . . . in the export trade
we do not seem to be enterprising enough . . . while
there is too much reason to believ1 that in this way
we neglect the colonies altogether.
The need to be more diligent in searching for con-
sumers, which the Bankers' Magazine warned was necessary
in 1880, became urgent as the predicted trade depression
of the early 1880s deepened. The total amount of bills,
cheques and other transactions cleared by the Bankers'
Clearing House during the 1883-4 financial year showed a
decrease of more than £350m when compared with the pre-
vious year. Payments on stock exchange account days in
particular were down by £l64m. 2 This was a trend which
continued into the middle of the decade. Banking and
Stock Exchange business was falling of f, 3 and the price of
money was falling along with the price of commodities.4
The profits of the leading City banks reflected this state
of affairs. 5 The economic conditions were ascribed to
'overproduction' and contrasted with the 'overconsumption'
which had been the case ten years before.6
The reason for the overproduction was not hard to
find. Britain was no longer the only workshop in the
1. BM 1880, 457.
2. E. Garnet Man, The Present Trade Crisis Critical
Examined (1885), 10.
3. BM 1886, 778 'The Coming Revival'.
4. BM 1886, 465 'The Depression of Trade'.
5. EM 1886, 778.
6. EM 1883, 790 'The Present Condition of Trade'.
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world and the chill of foreign competition was making
itself felt with increasing severity. The main point
which the Chamber of Commerce Journal, the monthly
magazine of the newly-formed London Chamber of Commerce,
hammered home in the early 1880s was the existence of
foreign competition.
England is entering upon a new period of competition
against the whole world, and the whole world is as
well-organised, if not better, than we are. We no
longer are the sole capitalists; railways,
telegraphs, and steamships are owned elsewhere than
within British boundaries. Metals, coals, and
machinery are produced independent of us. Europe has
grown out of our leading-strings, she has passed her
apprenticeship, and if we continue longer on the old
lines of laissez-aller we shall be outstripped in
most trades as Bradford lready is in combed-wool
cloths. This must not be.
Competition was taking place in the context of
increasing tariff-rates both in the British Empire and in
Europe. Germany already had a tariff system, and the
commercial treaty negotiations with France were going so
badly for Britain in 1881 that the British Commissioners
withdrew. 2 In 1879 Canada had raised its tariffs in order
to increase revenue and to retaliate against the United
States. 3 This increased tariff also applied to British
trade. It was in the context of this change that The
Economist set out in 1880 to show what good customers the
British colonies were, and what potential they possessed
1. CCJ Mar. 1882, 2 'Minister of Commerce'; see also
Apr., 21 and May, 66.
2. Econ. 7 Jan. 1882, 3.
3. B.H. Brown, The Tariff ReformMovement in Great
Britain, 1881-1895 (New York, 1943), 14.
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for the further expansion of British business. In a
series of articles in the autumn the attractions of the
Australias, British South Africa, and Canada were
described in detail from an economic point of view,
we regard these possessions of ours as a first-rate
field, if properly cultivated, for the utilisation of
British surplus capital and population, and it is the
main object of these comments to direct both where
they may be employed to the best advantage.1
The importance of the colonies to the City was well-
demonstrated during the ensuing depression. It was estima-
ted by the Bankers' Magazine that in 1883 more money had
been subscribed to colonial loans and colonial enterprise
than ever before. 2 Excluding India, the total lent to
colonial governments was put at over £23m, of which £17m
went to Australia. A further LiOm went on colonial city
and harbour works, railways, mortgages, banking and the
like. India took a further £4m. The Economist estimated
that half of all the subscriptions made in the City in
that year had been to colonial loans or colonial enter-
prise and predicted that the rate of growth was bound to
continue. 3 Huge amounts were scheduled to be raised for
Australian and Indian railways in the following year, £28m
for India 4 and £30m for Australia. 5 By 1885 the expansion
of British colonial banks was so rapid as to cause comment
in the Bankers' Magazine.6
1. Econ. 27 Aug. 1881, 1073; see also 17 Sept., 1156, 8
Oct., 1244, & 22 Oct., 1305.
2. BM 1884, 18 'Colonial Borrowing'.
3. Econ. 16 Feb. 1884, 196. This was one of three
articles on 'The Extent of Our Colonial Investments',
see also 9 Feb., 160, & 23 Feb., 223.
4. Econ. 28 June 1884, 776.
5. BM 1885, 22.
6. BM 1885, 463.
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The Formation of the London Chamber of Commerce
Other major cities of the United Kingdom had formed
chambers of commerce a century earlier,' and an attempt to
form a chamber of commerce for the City in the second
decade of the nineteenth century apparently foundered on
the rocks of government disapproval. 2 Between 1850 and
1880, thirty British chambers of commerce were estab-
lished 3 and particular interest groups also organised
themselves into representative bodies 4 , including the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders in 1873 and the
Institute of Bankers in 1879 in the City. Suggestions
were again made in the late 1860s that a chamber of
commerce be formed in the City on the grounds that the
Corporation of London no longer sufficiently represented
business interests. 6 Nothing came of that proposal or of
another put forward at a meeting in the City of London
Tavern in the following decade. 7 The reason for the delay
on the latter occasion was the refusal of a number of
influential City firms to lend their support8.
1. A.R. Illersic & P.F.B. Liddle, Parliament of Commerce
(1960), 246-8 Appendix C. Glasgow, Dublin and Belfast
formed chambers in 1783, Edinburgh in 1785, Manchester
in 1794, Birmingham and Plymouth in 1813, Tyneside in
1815, Bristol in 1823 and Liverpool in 1850.
2. Charles E. Musgrove, The London Chamber of Commerce
1881-1914 (1914), 1.
3. Illersic & Liddle loc.cit..
4. The Chamber of Shipping in 1878, the Association of
Country Bankers in 1874, the Association of Chambers
of Commerce of the United Kingdom in 1868.
5. The Institute spoke for London bankers, Edwin Green,
Debtors to their Profession:	 A History of the Insti-
tute of Bankers, 1879-1979 (1979).
6. Benjamin Scott, Suggestions for a Chamber of Commerce
for the City of London (1867). A copy is to be found
in the City of London Record Office.
7. Musgrove, op.cit., 2.
8. The Times 27 July 1881, 4, see Samuel Morley's speech.
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By 1881, however, the few opposing major firms were
persuaded of the need for a representative body to speak
out for the City because there were threats to the
continued expansion of City interests on three fronts,
domestic, foreign, and imperial. 1
 Foreign competition
was increasing and the commercial negotiations with the
French marked a major stage in this movement. The
enactment of the Canadian tariff was followed by a
meeting in London between Canadian businessmen,
represented by the Dominion Board of Trade of Canada (a
sort of chamber of commerce), and representatives of
British business at which the question of a uniform
customs duty for the Empire was discussed. 2 The outcome
of this conference on inter-colonial trade tariffs was the
foundation of the British and Inter-colonial Trade Tariff
Union Association. 3
 This event encouraged the British
protectionists, an unrepresentative group of northern
businessmen and some agricultural interests, to link their
protectionist aims with the prospects of imperial
federation. The coming negotiations with France
crystallized the protectionist movement into the National
Fair Trade League.4
 The City faced the possibility of
protectionism at home, abroad and from the Empire just at
a time when foreign competition was becoming more severe.
1. The Times 27 July 1881, 4, a speech by the Lord
Mayor. For details of the formation of the chamber
see S.R.B. Smith 'The Centenary of the London
Chamber of Commerce: its origins and early policy'
The London Journal, viii (1982), 156-170.
2. The Colonies & India 18 Dec. 1880, 12.
3. The Colonies & India 16 Apr. 1881, 9.
4. Brown, op.cit., 23.
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The process of creating a chamber of commerce for
the City was begun in January 1881 when the Lord Mayor
put the idea to a large gathering of leading bankers and
merchants.' The suggestion was well-received and a few
months later 800 circulars were distributed which
convened 'a very large and influential meeting
representing the whole banking, mercantile and trading
interests of the City of London.' 2 An organising commit-
tee was appointed, and in October an application for
incorporation under the Companies Act was granted by the
Board of Trade. The provisional committee, having read a
report on the methods of establishment of French, German
and Belgian chambers of commerce and the various City
organisations already in existence, resolved to adopt the
Liverpool Chamber as its model. 3
 The attractive charac-
teristic of this chamber of commerce was the composition
of its council which not only had elected members but also
gave places to representatives of existing interest groups
and associations. The Times approved of the choice while
stressing the difficulty of the task before the City - 'to
raise a very bulky vehicle out of the rut' - with
references to the reigns of the Plantagenets, Tudors and
Stuarts when London was doubly represented commercially by
its municipal authority and by its guilds and companies.4
1. The Times 29 January 1881, 9 'A Chamber of Commerce
for London'.
2. The Times 27 July 1881, 4.
3. The Times 19 Sept. 1881, 4.
4. The Times 20 Sept. 1881.
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Drawing upon his own experience as a City banker and
director of the Bank of England, G.J. Goschen contrasted
the influence that the new representative organisation
would have on the government and public with the old
method of raising City opinion.
What is the one great object of the association? It
is to influence public opinion and the Legislature,
and to bring about reforms which individual efforts
would scarcely be powerful enough to achieve.
Before these associations were formed, there was, to
my mind, an unsatisfactory way of attempting to
achieve similar results, and that was by petitions.
I am rather an old member of Parliament, and I know
how petitions are brought about. I know how busy
men in their offices in the City, when they are
opening or reading their letters, are interrupted by
the entrance of two gentlemen, who request them to
sign a petition, say with regard to bankruptcy.
What happens is this. The gentleman who has got the
petition presents it at the breast of the partner
sitting there, and he says, "Your name or an
argument". The question is asked, "Who have given
their names? Have Barclay, Bevan, and Tritton done
so?" "Yes." "Then put down our names and let us be
rid of the argument".'
The Times was also impressed by the representative nature
of the new organisation and felt that it would have a
very considerable influence upon the ministerial
selection of measures 'to be pressed at all hazards'.2
The elected members of the first Council of the
London Chamber of Commerce demonstrated the wide spread
of interests which the organisation represented and the
general meaning given to the term 'commerce'. There were
fifteen merchants, six brokers of various sorts, five
owners of wholesale warehouses (who described themselves
as 'warehousemen'), three private bankers, two
1. The Times 25 Jan. 1883, 10. The speech was given at
the first annual general meeting of the Chamber.
2. The Times 25 Jan. 1883.
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shipowners, two stationers, one manufacturer and a
brewer. The titles which such prominent businessmen gave
themselves give no real indication of the extent and
variety of their interests and connections. The term
'merchant' covered a wide range of activity; at this
time, for example, the Rothschilds described themselves
as merchants. More informative is a list of the
directorships held by these businessmen which reveals a
network of interconnecting interests. Half a dozen of
the merchants sat on the boards of banks and insurance
companies. The bankers had interests in shipping and
insurance. Both bankers and merchants had seats on
railway, telegraph and mortgage companies, as did the
shipowners. Nearly the whole board of the London & St.
Katherine Dock Co., including the chairman and his
deputy, had been elected to the Council. Such a splendid
array of wealthy and important businessmen connected with
so many different interests testified to the significance
which the City attached to the formation of the Chamber.
The representatives of existing City organisations
which were given places on the Council were equally
illustrious. The Institute of Bankers was represented by
its president, Richard Biduiph Martin) The General
Shipowners' Society, and the Steamship Owners' Associa-
tion delegated James Dixon 2 and William Conway Morgan
1. Deputy chairman of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders, a director of the Sun Fire Office, the
Sun Life Assurance Socity, the British North Borneo
Co., and a partner in the private banking firm of
Martin & Co..
2. President of the Chamber of Shipping in that year,
and a partner in Messrs. Harris & Dixon, coal
factors, insurance agents and steamship brokers.
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respectively. Nevile Lubbock 1 took the place allocated
for the West India Committee, and George Martineau 2 that
of the London Sugar Refiners' Association. The London
Jute Association was represented by James T. Ritchie 3 , the
General Produce Brokers' Association sent W.H. Peat 4, and
the Institute of British Carriage Manufacturers chose G.N.
Hooper 5 . These men were in many cases permanent figures
on the Council during the period under discussion. Other
associations such as the London Cotton Brokers'
Association and the London Corn Trade Association tended
to change their representatives annually. The only major
organisation not represented on the Council in its early
years was Lloyd's, a deficiency which was remedied in the
early 189Os.
The first President of the Chamber was Charles
Magniac of Matheson & Co., a man active in the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, on the board of the
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, and as chairman of the
National Bank of New Zealand 6 . The chairman of the
Council was Samuel Morley of the wholesale warehousing
1. Chairman of the West India Committee at this time,
brother of Sir John Lubbock, and a director of the
Colonial Bank, the Royal Exchange Assurance, and the
London & St. Katherine Dock.
2. A partner in Messrs. David Martineau & Sons, sugar
refiners.
3. A partner in Messrs. William Ritchie & Sons,
merchants, jute spinners, and manufacturers. He was
the elder brother of the first Lord Ritchie of
Dundee and was Lord Mayor 1903-4.
4. A partner in Messrs. Lewis & Peat, colonial brokers.
5. A partner in Messrs. Hooper & Co., carriage
manufacturers.
6. J. Herbert Tritton became president in 1886.
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firm J. & R. Morley, 1 and his deputy was J. Herbert Tnt-
ton2 of the private banking firm Barclay, Bevan, Tritton &
Co., who had been secretary of the provisional committee
which had arranged the formation of the Chamber. William
Fowler, who had chaired the abortive meeting in the City
of London Tavern in 1873, was the Chamber's treasurer.3
The immediate success of the London Chamber of
Commerce was demonstrated by its rapid growth and the
vigour of its magazine, the Chamber of Commerce Journal.
By the end of its second year the Chamber had a larger
membership and a greater income than any of the other
major but more ancient British chambers of commerce 4 , and
was given two seats on the Association of the Chambers of
Commerce of the U.K. as a mark of this distinction. The
Journal appeared within months of the formation of the
Chamber, was welcomed and had the support of other
chambers, and had a long life in contrast to earlier
attempts to establish such a publication. 5 It was an
outstanding example of the way in which the City organised
itself at a time when the rapid expansion of its economic
1. He was regarded as an authority on trade by both
sides of the House of Commons, resigned his seat as
MP for Bristol in 1885, but refused a peerage from
Gladstone which was offered to him as a non-
conformist at the same time as one was offered to
Rothschild. Samuel Hope Morley of the same firm was
a director of the Bank of England.
2. Vice-president of the Institute of Bankers, secretary
of the London Clearing Banks, chairman of the General
Steam Navigation Co., a director of the Indo-European
Telegraph and the Marine and General Mutual Life
Assurance.
3. A director of the National Discount Co..
4. CCJ, Jan. 1884, 8, London had 1,386 members and
£3,124 a year.
5. In 1868 The Chambers of Commerce had a short life,
and in 1876 The Chambers of Commerce Chronic!e had
an equally brief existence.
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interests and power in the world was being countered by
foreign economic competition abroad and political
competition at home.
Imperial Federation: 'The Old Manchester School is dead"
A notable feature of the new Journal of the City's
chamber of commerce was the way in which it joined its
voice to those of the existing City publications in pro-
moting the economic importance of the Empire. Under the
title of 'Colonial Federation' it warned its readers of
the dangers of neglecting such valuable customers as the
colonies and looked for an expansion of such possessions.
We have expressed the opinion, in former numbers of
the Journal, that the British nation has not, of
late years, taken that leading position in the
creation of new markets which used to be a leading
feature of its Colonial policy. We trust that the
correctness of the assertion will be duly recognised
and, that, quite apart from the spirit of annexation
which appears to have developed amongst continental
powers, we shall in our peaceful, practical way,
proceed with the civilisation and commercial
education of countries and tribes, which, though
poor and savage today, may, under our guiance, be
tomorrow well-to-do and friendly customers.
The Journal kept up a steady demand for action on the
part of the British state to rectify the situation and
help create new markets. The days of laissez-aller were
considered to be past. It had been the habit of
government to follow the merchant's lead, supporting him
only when vested interests had become established. This
was acceptable in the past because consumers had been
more numerous than producers and new markets had been
1. CCJ Aug. 1886 Supplement, the words of Tritton, then
president of the Chamber, in his opening remarks as
chairman of the first Congress of Chambers of the
Empire which was convened by the London Chamber.
2. CCJ Dec. 1882 'Colonial Federation'.
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easy to secure'. In the 1880s however, the state was
being asked to formulate and adhere to 'a national
commercial policy', and it was to the absence of such an
organised scheme that the difficulties facing business in
the early 1880s were attributed. 2
 Thought had to be given
to 'the future of the Empire' and the formation of a
federation which would 'bind together, for a few centuries
at least, the markets which British blood and capital have
created' 3 . The continued supremacy of Britain depended
upon the Empire.
A brief review of European history since the
sixteenth century shows how Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Holland have risen into importance and then
settled down into the comparative oblivion of
second-rate powers in direct ratio to the growth and
blight of their mercantile navies and the
development and loss of their colonies . . . If the
U.S. and Russia continue to develop economically at
their present rate of progress, we, without our
colonies, should find ourselves dwarfed and
surpassed in the industrial race, just as
irresistibly as we have gradually outgrown the
maritime and colonial power of Spain, France and
Holland .
The term 'imperial federation' was first introduced
into the London Chamber of Commerce in a memorial from a
number of important City textile firms who requested that
the Chamber use its influence with the government to urge
the necessity of 'some scheme of Imperial federation
which will unite the whole of our possessions under one
flag in a powerful and sympathetic trading community'.4
The memorial was presented to the Council by David
1. CCJ Oct. 1883 'Necessity for a national commercial
policy'.
2. CCJ Nov. 1883 'The Future of the British Empire'.
3. Ibid..
4. Ibid..
5. CCJ Jan. 1884, 18.
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Evans.' Later in 1884 a propaganda body called the
Imperial Federation League was constituted and a number of
important businessmen were prominent on its executive and
general committees.2
The I.F.L. had first been conceived by a group of
members of the Royal Colonial Institute 3 , many of whose
founder members were businessmen associated with the
Australia trade who had been part of the short-lived
General Association for the Australian Colonies. 4 Men
such as Sir William McArthur and William Westgarth were
active in the formation of all such associations, as well
as the London Chamber of Commerce. The first session of
the R.C.I. had opened with a paper by Westgarth on 'The
Relations of the Colonies to the Mother-Country' and
similar papers read at the society's meetings made clear
the value of the colonies as a source of food supply and
of raw materials for industry; as a market for
manufactured goods; as a field for enterprise, profits and
the investment of capital; and as providing active
employment for shipping. 5 Thus the relationship between
1. A member of the textile trade section of the London
Chamberof Commerce,and of the firm David Evans& Co..
2. The executive included Sir William McArthur, P. Ralli,
William Mackinnon and Donald Currie; the general com-
mittee included Sir John Lubbock, William Westgarth,
Samuel Morley, S.B. Boulton and J. Goldsmidt.
3. A. Folsom, The Royal Empire Society (1933); T.R.
Reese, The History of The Royal Commonwealth Society
(1968); James R. Boose, Memory Serving (1928); and
two theses, R.A. McMillan Shields, 'The Quest for
Empire Unity' (University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.,
1961), M.D. Burgess, 'The Imperial Federation Movement
in G.B.' (University of Leicester, Ph.D., 1976).
4. Labilliêre, op.cit., 12.
5. Folsom, op.cit., 175-6. For example the paper given
by Simmonds in 1874 Proceedings of the R.C.I., v, 13-
70.
43
British capital and the need for imperial federation,
apparent from W.H. Smith's speech to the conference at
which the I.F.L. was founded in July 1884, was not itself
new; the novelty lay in the prominence given to the
importance of the connection.
I have no claim whatever to appear at a Federal
meeting like this, for my connection with the
colonies is exceedingly slight. It consists only of
that connection which, I believe, all Englishmen have
- a connection of interests, a connection of invest-
ment, and therefore I can only speak from the point
of view of an Englishman desirous of seeing the
interests of his country and the interests of the
Colonies whic1-i are identified with England, promoted
and advanced.
The extent to which British money was invested in the
Empire was not left to vague impressions in the minds of
politicians. In its three articles at the beginning of
the year The Economist had estimated the amount of British
capital invested in colonial securities 2 , the amount of
interest paid annually by each colony 3, and the ability of
the different colonies to bear such a drain on their
resources. 4
 Most capital was said to be invested in
India, £250m, of which £lOOm was in government loans and
another £lOOm in railways, harbours, gas and local
projects. Australia came a good second with £200m, £105m
of which was in government loans and another £50m in
banking, mortgage and agency investment. Canada provided
a substantial third field for British capital with £ll2m
spread between government loans (3Om), and railways,
harbours and the like (C55m). The Cape was far behind in
1. Report of the Conference, an I.F.L. pamphlet, in the
Prothero Collection.
2. Econ. 9 Feb. 1884, 160.
3. Econ. 16 Feb. 1884, 196.
4. Econ. 23 Feb. 1884, 227.
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fourth place with a total of £30m, £20m of which were in
government loans. Returns on all these investments varied
according to the type of investment. Government loans
averaged 4.375 per cent, India doing a little worse and
sending only £4m on the £lOOm invested. Loans to
provincial authorities, railways and the like did better
averaging 5.25 per cent while India returned £6m on the
£lOOm invested. Banking, mortgage and agency investments
produced the highest return of 6.25 per cent, Australia
doing particularly well with a £3.5m return on the £50m
invested. Australia in fact gave the best return overall.
It worked out at an astonishing £3.8s.4d per capita a year
against India's return on the same basis of lid.
The Economist explained that this was acceptable as the
respective per capita exports for the two populations were
£15.14s., and 6 shillings.
During 1885 the London Chamber of Commerce continued
its own promotion of imperial federation. Its third
annual report described imperial federation as a question
which had no superior in its importance for the
development of the future business of London and the
A petition from the City which urged the Government to
consult colonial governments on the question of imperial
federation was sent to the CO in the spring 2 , and in May
the Journal imitated the statistical endeavours of The
Economist and the Bankers' Magazine, and produced figures
1. CCJ Feb. 1886.
2. CCJ Feb. 1886, 49, the idea was put to the Council in
January, Sir William McArthur moved the resolution at
the February Council meeting, CCJ Mar., and the seal
was affixed at the following Council meeting, CCJ
Apr. 1885, 108.
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for the per capita import of British goods into various
countries and the colonies.' As might have been expected,
this method did not present the jewel of the imperial
crown, India, in a very good light, but other colonies
came out well. Australia was put at over £10 a head a
year; the Cape and Natal did well at £6; Canada, Guinea,
and the West Indies managed £2 for each member of their
populations. The European powers were low on the list at
less than 10 shillings a head, with the surprising
exception of Holland which bought more than £2.lOs. a head
of British goods a year. Apart from Holland the only
other area of the world which compared favourably with the
Empire was South America.2
Perhaps the most concise, official statement of the
views of the City on the necessity for the consolidation
of relations between Britain and the Empire as a means to
stimulate the continued growth of City business abroad was
elicited by the Royal Commission on the Depression of
Trade in 1885. The commission sent out a questionnaire
to all chambers of commerce and similar representative
bodies. The executive of the London Chamber decided that
each trade section should provide an individual reply on
1. CCJ May 1885 'Our Best Customers'.
2. Ibid., Uruguay rated over £3.lOs. and the Argentine
nearly £2.
3. The idea of such an inquiry had been rejected by the
ACCUK early in 1885 by a vote of 42 to 27, CCJ Mar.
1885 Supplement. When it was clear that such a
commission was to be appointed the London Chamber
tried to get a City MP on the body and sought the
advice of the statistician and economist Sir R.
Giffen for statistical information, RMB 2, executive
meeting 15 July 1885.
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the state of their trade', and an overall reply would be
sent from the chamber as a whole. 2 The general reply
rejected the notion of a business depression on the
grounds that fluctuation was the rule not the exception in
City business. 3 Whereas the gross value and net profits
of business had diminished and trade could be described as
'unprofitable' or 'unremunerative', the volume of trade
was considered to be holding firm, and capital was in
large supply, returns on it being lower than ever before.4
Question number thirteen1 which asked for suggestions
on how to improve the condition of business, was divided
into two sections, the first for proposals which would
require legislation and the second for those which did
not. Imperial federation had originally been placed on
the London Chamber's draft reply under the first section,
along with a suggestion that the Emigration Bureau be re-
established, 5 but the executive made final alterations6
before the draft was laid before the Council, and imperial
federation was removed to the second section. The final
reply to question thirteen, section B, from the London
Chamber of Commerce had five main points:
1. An increased and continuous recognition on the part of
the Government of the great commercial interests of
the country both at home and abroad.
1. RMB 2, executive meeting 16 Sept. 1885. For the
trade sections deliberations on the topic, see RMB 2
throughout Sept. and Oct..
2. Trade section replies were returned to the executive
by late October, RMB 2, 29 Oct. 1885. The general
reply was shaped in meetings on the 12, 20 & 27 Nov.
1885 recorded in the RNB 2.
3. CCJ Dec. 1885 Supplement.
4. Ibid., see questions 4, 5, 6, 10 & 11.
5. RMB 2, 12 Nov. 1885.
6. CCJ Dec. 1885 'Depression of Trade'.
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2. An extension and reform of the Board of Trade so as to
make it a true Ministry of Commerce.
3. To use every effort to bring a closer commercial union
between the Mother Country and her Colonies and Depen-
dencies.
4. By the systematic development of New Markets in com-
pensation for old.
5. By encouraging greater railway development in British
Colonies nd Possessions under Government guarantee if
required.
The publication of this reply was accompanied by an
editorial in the Journal which talked of the terrible
mistake of 'economic shortsightedness' Britain had
committed in 'divorcing the colonies from it'. Federation
in some shape or other was proposed as the only cure for
'this portion of the problem'.2
It was not only by voicing its opinions to the public
and Parliament that the London Chamber of Commerce
promoted imperial federation. Its reply to question
thirteen of the Royal Commission revealed that the City
lacked confidence in the efficacy of legislative changes.
The London Chamber of Commerce took the initiative in 1885
in a practical way by issuing invitations to the major
British chambers of commerce to send representatives who
would constitute an organising committee which would
arrange a Congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the
Empire .
The response from the other British chambers was
unenthusiastic. The Liverpool Chamber suggested that the
MP Sam Smith could represent them if he agreed to the
idea. He did not.4 Manchester declined to get involved
1. CCJ Dec. 1885 Supplement.
2. CCJ Dec. 1885 'Depression of Trade'.
3. RMB 2, executive meetings 2 & 23 June 1885.
4. Minute Book of the Council of the Chamber of Commerce,
(1883-1890) monthly meeting of 29 June 1885.
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at all. 1 Dublin presumably sent a representative as Irish
businessmen wished to remain part of the U.K., let alone
the Empire, and the Dublin Chamber subsequently
demonstrated great interest in the report given by its
deputation to the Congress. 2 Glasgow had a chamber of
commerce which was most closely in tune with the City at
this time. The president of the Glasgow Chamber, Sir
James Bain, already attended meetings of the Council of
the London Chamber by official arrangement between the two
chambers. 3 Despite this general lack of support, the
London Chamber went ahead with its plans and successfully
organised the Congress to coincide with the Colonial and
Indian Exhibition held in London in 1886. The Congress
was held, with the permission of the Prince of Wales, in
the conference room of the exhibition itself.4
Before the Congress could meet, the City businessmen
found it necessary to give a vigorous demonstration of
their belief in a united Empire. This was stimulated by
Gladstone's intention to introduce the Irish Home Rule
bill. A few days before the bill was introduced into the
Commons, a meeting of 'merchants, bankers and traders' of
the City was held in the Guildhall. 5 It was attended by
prominent businessmen of both political parties,
particularly Liberals. The meeting was encouraged to put
1. Proceedings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce,
1885-1890 ordinary meeting of the directors, 30 Sept.
1885.
2. Reports of the Council to the Members at the General
Annual Assemblies or Meetings (1880-9), 1887.
3. 103rd Report of the Directors of the Chamber of Com-
merce and Manufacture in the City of Glasgow (1886),
includes the letter from the London Chamber.
4. CCJ July 1886, 164. The City Corporation promised
£10,000 for the exhibition, The Times 2 Mar.1886, 10.
5. The Times 3 Apr. 1886, 12.
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party aside and remember only that they were Englishmen.
The question put by Sir John Lubbock was whether a united
Empire was to be maintained or not. The presence of so
many important Liberal City men' was a clear statement
that Gladstone could no longer rely on support from the
City business community which, although Conservative MP5
were elected, was still predominantly Liberal. 2 Although
the resolution passed at the meeting referred to 'the
interests of both Great Britain and Ireland' being injured
by the proposed home rule, the point was clearly
enunciated that the very shadow of the proposal had the
effect of driving capital out of Ireland and lowering
every Irish investment and security.
The City's aim behind its promotion of imperial
federation was to secure the continued economic dominance
of colonial business. The first four points on the agenda
for the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, as
compiled by the organising committee, were the diversion
of emigration to the colonies, the promotion of post and
telegraphic communication, federation itself, and the
codification and assimilation of commercial laws
throughout the Empire. 3 The improvement and reduction in
price of postal and telegraphic links would bring tighter
1. Lubbock, R.W. Crawford (former Liberal MP for the
City), R.B. Martin (late Liberal candidate for the
City), Prescott (Treasurer of the City Liberal
Association), Tritton (late Treasurer of the London &
Counties Liberal Union), Thomson Hankey, C.L. Norman
(late chairman of the West Kent Liberal Association),
'and many other leading Liberals'.
2. A list of the members of the City Liberal Club is in
the British Library, 10348, ccc. 13.
3. RMB 2, 25 Jan. 1886.
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control of information and extend the role of the City as
the centre of economic decision-making. The codification
and assimilation of laws meant the extension of British
laws to the Empire and their enforcement, again
facilitating the continued economic dominance of British
business over colonial.
By the end of June 1886 most of the U.K. chambers of
commerce had accepted invitations to the Congress. 1 The
Jersey Chamber of Commerce also agreed to send
representatives. By far the largest contingent
representing the Empire was the group for Australasia.
Thirteen chambers from Australia and New Zealand,
including one for Fiji, were to be represented. Canada
had four, as did South Africa and India. The West Indies
provided three, South America and Indo-China two each.
The Hong Kong Chamber and the British Chamber of Commerce
in Paris completed the list of acceptances.
The Journal announced the agenda of the Congress in
June. 2 To the first four topics were added the state
guarantee of war risks, the silver question and the reform
of bills of lading. The exaggerated claims of the Journal
for the popularity of imperial federation provided an
encouraging start for the Congress.
From the Royal Family and the young Princes to Her
Majesty's Government, parliamentary representatives
and the press, to the commercial and general public,
all classes in the old country are strongly in favour
of an alliance offensive, defensive and commercial,
if not political, with our relatives all over the
globe.3
1. RMB 2, 21 June 1886.
2. CCJ June 1886.
3. Ibid..
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The London Chamber had brought together representatives
from nearly 100 British and colonial business
organisations' to advance the type of imperial federation
which would be beneficial to City interests.
Tritton, as president of the City's chamber of
commerce, was chairman of the Congress and gave a rousing
introduction to the proceedings with the claim that 1886
marked the epoch of a great movement which tended to bind
closer together the Anglo-Saxon race.
The old Manchester School is dead. Peace to its
ashes! Long may they be undisturbed and may we never
hear of them again. (Hear, hear and laughter). In
place of them has arisen a young England - a young
English school of thought and sympathy, far-reaching
beyond anything which our fathers, with all their
wide sympathies, ever knew or dreamed of . . . The
question which we have to determine for ourselves is:
Are we to maintain our greatness, our commerce an
our maritime dependency. And, if so, by what means?
There was consensus at the Congress for the resolution
that the British Government encourage emigration to the
colonies in order to establish a closer union between the
colonies and the U.K. and to develop the resources and
commercial interests of the Empire. The question of
postal and telegraphic reform, although adjourned until
the second day, was also supported unanimously by the
1. CCJ July 1886, 165. Manchester and Glasgow were the
two main absences from the list of 47 English and 6
Scottish chambers. There were 3 Irish chambers
represented, Gibraltar sent one, Australasia managed
a total of 18 in the event, and Canada 5. There was
no change in the previous list of acceptances for
other territories.
2. CCJ Aug. 1886 Supplement. For a similar denunciation
of the Manchester School, see Imperial Federation
vol. 1, no. 1, 16. It claimed that the I.F.L. was
proof that New Liberalism had outgrown the decaying
condition of the Manchester School.
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Congress. It was the central topic of imperial federation
itself which provoked dissension.
The discussion got off to a bad start because the
Marquess of Lorne', who introduced the resolution, put
forward a motion different from that printed on the
agenda. The original resolution had proposed that the
Congress should send a deputation to ask the home
government to consult colonial governments at once as to
the best means of carrying out some efficient scheme of
imperial federation. Such a suggestion was popular with
the colonies, but the City had no wish for political
federation if it could secure continued economic dominance
of the colonial markets in a less official manner. Lorne
played down in his remarks any idea of a significant
change in the political relations between the U.K. and the
Empire. In its place he presented to the Congress an
insubstantial declaration expressing satisfaction at the
existing status of colonial representatives and desiring
that the colonies be consulted in reference to any
commercial treaty on the grounds that such consideration
would tend to develop trade within the Empire and its
defences in time of war. 2 Despite strong objections from
Sir Charles Tupper of Canada, Tritton said he was bound to
put the motion as worded by the Marquess, and it was
passed with nine dissentients. Tupper then managed to get
the original printed motion put to the meeting which
passed it unanimously.
1. Ex-governor General of Canada and son-in-law to the
Queen.
2. CCJ Aug. 1886 Supplement.
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The comments of the Journal on the Congress
emphasised the business view of imperial federation and
pointed out the economic basis of the renewed interest in
the Empire, attributing the decline in the popularity of
the Manchester School and the realisation by businessmen
of the importance of the Empire to the effect of foreign
competition.
The idea of a British Empire has, curiously enough,
sprung rather from commercial requirements, and from
the necessity of efficiently protecting our ocean
trade, than from the political situation, or from the
intelligent foresight of our statesmen. In
Government circles our Colonies have been considered
rather as elements of financial and political
weakness, than as a source of strength, of
production, and of increasing consumption. How is it
that, in less than ten years, the theories of the old
Manchester School, of which, in the past, Mr. John
Bright and Mr. Gladstone were leading exponents, have
come to be reversed?
We believe that the considerable development of
foreign competition, more especially that stimulated
by tariff exclusions and by the building up of
industries with State assistance, has done much to
open the eyes of British traders to the economic
value of our Colonies.'
The ideal form of imperial federation was envisaged as 'An
Anglo-Colonial Commercial Union' which was reducible to
two points, commercial development and mutual defence.
The Congress, which brought together business
representatives of the Empire, and launched a tremendous
attack upon the existing ideas of Gladstonian Liberalism,
was impressive. In conjunction with the I.F.L. conference
and deputation of the same summer, it may be considered as
responsible for Lord Salisbury's Government sending out
invitations to the self-governing colonies to attend a
1.	 CCJ Sept. 1886.
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Colonial Conference on imperial defence and imperial
communications to be held in April 1887.1
The London Chamber capitalised on the Colonial Con-
ference and maintained the momentum of the movement. It
convened a meeting of representatives of British chambers
of commerce to be held on the last day of the Colonial
Conference. Representatives from 17 British chambers
arrived and letters of support were sent from a further
12. An address was given in the presence of many promi-
nent figures by Sir George Baden-Powell on 'The Commercial
Relations of the British Empire'. Lord Carnarvon, for
example, added his voice to the discussion and repeated
the City definition of imperial federation - commercial
relations and defence.2
For all the excellent progress and publicity which
these efforts were achieving, the British public was not
stirred to any significant degree. Lord Rosebery had to
warn the I.F.L. in 1887 that unless a guarantee of £1,000
a year could be arranged for the following three years
there was little justification for the League to continue
in operation. 3 Labil1ire, one of the League's founders,
admitted that the funds of the society from the beginning
1. John Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences
1887-1911 (1967), 8. The circular was sent out by
Stanhope on 25 Nov. 1886. Kendle is one of the few
historians to mention the importance of the role of
the London Chamber of Commerce in this affair.
Labillière, op.cit., 31, includes the London Chamber
in his list of those groups which materially aided
the cause of 'Imperial unity and organisation'. For
the colonial conference see The Times, for example 18
Mar. 1887, 5; and the journal of the I.F.L., Imperi-
al Federation, Aug. 1886 for the I.F.L. Conference.
2. CCJ June 1887 Supplement; The Times 10 May 1887, 12.
3. Imperial Federation Dec. 1887, iii. The statement
had been made on 6 July 1887.
55
were provided by a few rich generous supporters, and that
sufficient importance had not been given to the enrolment
of a large number of annual subscribers of small funds.'
If such a broad church as the I.F.L., which contained
prominent politicians, protectionists, navalists and
businessmen, could not attract sufficient support, it
could be said that public interest in the Empire was
indeed lacking. 2 By March 1888 there were only 13
branches of the League in the U.K., of which two were in
Scotland. Canada had a further six branches.3
Efforts to gain support for the I.F.L. were made at
the ACCUK meeting in March l889, and a City branch of the
League was established by July. 5 Sir John Lubbock, the
president of the London Chamber, became president of the
branch. The event was launched at a public meeting in the
City in November. 6 Rosebery, Carnarvon, Brassey, Colomb,
Tupper and R.N. Fowler were all on the platform; even
Cardinal Manning was there. The Lord Mayor moved a
resolution which called upon the citizens of London to
support and subscribe to the branch. Rosebery sought to
inspire the meeting with racial flattery and was cheered
when he declared that the future of civilisation rested
with the Anglo-Saxon race. The Cardinal also flattered
those attending with references to the supremacy of
British business abroad. Fowler and Carnarvon put forward
1. Labillière, op.cit., 31.
2. But it is not true to say that it lacked support from
prominent businessmen, as suggested by Robinson &
Gallagher, op.cit., 15.
3. Imperial Federation, Mar. 1888, 58.
4. CCJ Apr. 1889 Supplement.
5. CMB 1, 11 July 1889, it met in the Chamber's
boardroom.
6. Imperial Federation 1 Dec. 1889, 274.
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a resolution which called upon the Government to convene a
second Colonial Conference.
In October 1890 a committee was appointed by the
London Chamber of Commerce to set in motion the process of
organising another Congress. 1 The forces battling for a
City version of imperial federation were regrouping for a
second assault upon the government and the public to try
to achieve in the 1890s that which they had failed to
achieve in the 1880s.
The City's 'National Commercial Policy' - Imperialism
It was a small step from promoting the maintenance of
the Empire to proposing that the Empire should be
expanded. In the context of the need for new markets and
the increasing foreign competition, the activity which
established the existing Empire could easily be invoked as
a model for future policy.
We are a colonizing nation . . . New efforts are
forced upon us, both by the growing necessity for new
markets, and by the activity which French, Russians,
Italians, and Germans are displaying in exploration
and annexation. It is time to renew in Asia and in
Africa, with modern improvements, the policy of the
East India Company from which our Indian possessions
originated.2
During the autumn of 1883 there was a demand that the
state should take a more active, leading role in the
expansion of British business abroad. The urgent need to
find consumers was presented as the 'Necessity for a
National Commercial Policy'. 3
 The absence of a rational
1. CCJ Nov. 1890, 262. CMB 1, 9 Oct. 1890.
2. CCJ Nov. 1882 Supplement. The comment was made on
the occasion of A.R. Colquhoun's paper on his
expedition from Burma to south-west China.
3. CCJ Oct. 1883.
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state policy, it was argued, had lead to the difficulties
in which business found itself.'
What the London Chamber of Commerce was advocating
was a 'British Colonial Policy', that is to say a
rejection of !aissez-a!!. and the instigation of a
national movement with two objectives; the one 'a
repetition in Africa of the action which had founded our
Indian Empire. The other, a movement of concentration and
consolidation of our present possessions.' 2 It was
thought at that time that the latter aspect, 'the union of
the naval, financial, mechanical and industrial experience
of the old country to the territory and raw materials of
the new' 3 could be put into operation first, as the most
immediately necessary, but events during the next month
changed the mind of the City, both objectives became
equally urgent. Under the heading 'Foreign Colonial
Activity', the June editorial of the Journal contended:
The events of the past month are of too important a
character to be passed over in silence, even though
allusion to them forces us once more to deal with the
colonial policy - or absence thereof - of the British
Empire.
we are now entering upon a period of competi-
tion . . . which unless noticed and met, is likely to
be most dangerous, and menaces to undermine our base.
We allude to the efforts which are being made by our
rivals in the direction f colonisation and the
development of new markets.
There was a note of desperation in the editorial which had
its origins in the details of the proposed Congo Treaty,
the German colonisation of Angra Pequena in south-west
1. CCJ Nov. 1883.
2. CCJ May 1884.
3. CCJ May 1884.
4. CCJ June 1884.
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Africa, and the success of the French campaign in Tonkin.
An indication of this concern was that trade sections for
West Africa and for South Africa were formed within the
London Chamber at this time.'
The middle of the 1880s was also a time when German
and French businessmen were promoting colonial policies
for their states. The Deutsche Kolonialverein had been
formed in 1882,2 and the Parti Colonial began to organise
parliamentary pressure at about this time. 3 The term
'colonisation' meant economic expansion to many European
businessmen. In France Jules Ferry employed the much
repeated definition: 'La politique coloniale est fille de
la politique industrielle'. 4 In Germany the word meant
the establishment of trading stations, or the acquisition
of spheres of commercial influence overseas, as well as a
state-directed policy of overseas or adjacent expansion.5
There was no doubt in the mind of the Journal of the
1. The West Africa trade section minute book, 1884-1903,
and the South Africa trade section minute book,
Guildhall MSS 16, 504.
2. Woodruff D. Smith, 'The Ideology of German
Colonisation, 1840-1918' (University of Chicago,
Ph.D., 1972); Hartmut Pogge von Strandman, 'The
Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion
under Bismarck', Past and Present xlii (1969), 140-
159; Fritz F. Muller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-Ostafrika
(Berlin, 1959), 50; Perard, op.cit., opposes the
idea that German high finance and heavy industry led
the colonial movement but gives evidence of many very
influential German businessmen being involved.
3. C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, 'The French
"Colonial Party", Historical Journal xiv (1971), 99-
128; L. Abrams and D. Miller, 'Who were the French
Colonialists?', Historical Journal xix (1976), 685-
725.
4. Pierre Guillen, 'Milieux d'affaires et imperialisme
colonial', Relations Internationales i (1974), 57-69.
5. Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of the German
Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (1930), 3-16.
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City's chamber of commerce as to the economic origins of
'The Scramble for Colonies' which began in the 1880s.
One of the most interesting economical features of
the year 1884, will, when its history is written,
prove to be the present scramble of European Powers
for new colonies. There can be little doubt that
this movement is the direct result of the industrial
development of the large States of Europe .
continental trade is at present growing more rapidly
than our own. It is consciousness of this fact,
doubtless, which has stimulated and produced the late
movement in favour of new colonies by France and
Germany.
Competition from foreign business interests abroad,
in many cases supported by European states, came to be
expressed in terms of a battle between nations for econo-
mic survival. The interdependent aspects of international
trade were ignored and the profits of merchants, ship-
owners, and financiers were projected as vital national
interests which were threatened by enemies. The state and
business interests were perceived as being so close that
not only did war become a metaphor for the economic strug-
gle between business interests from different countries,
but the competition for profits was seen as a replacement
of armed conflict. 'A commercial treaty is cheaper and
often as effectual than an invasion, and an adjustment of
tariffs may injure a rival as much as a campaign.'2
States were in a perpetual state of war, commercial nego-
tiations assumed the importance of military strategy.
This view of international relations between the great
1. CCJ Oct. 1884.
2. The Times 25 Jan. 1883. The CCJ expressed similar
views, even in the field of shipping competition, for
example CCJ Sept. 1883 'British Shipping' - 'The
modern phase of the economic war is for the
possession of new markets . . .'
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powers might best be described as economic nationalism.
The urgency of the situation caused by increasing
competition was such that the City could not wait for
British colonists to emigrate to new territories. Finance
itself was to spearhead the expansion of the Empire.
Let us make up our minds that the trade of the future
will have to be conducted on new principles. We can
no longer wait for markets to reach, unaided, the
condition of settled peaceful and financially
organised States. We shall have to interfere, more
actively than in the past, in anticipating these
results. Colonisation and future annexation can be
obtained by financial means as easily, perhaps more
easily, than by streams of immigrants. The
bondholder is a greater land grabber than the
colonist. Let us open our eyes to the truth of this
fact, and a great step wi111 be realised towards the
development of new markets.
By the end of the decade the demand was being made that
the state should annex territory wherever it was possible
and without hesitation, official British Residents should
be supplied wherever a request for them was made, and the
government should publicly declare a determined policy of
holding all lands opened up by British enterprise so that
security of investment, law and order, and trade could be
established. 2 The mutual dependence of the City and the
State was clearly expressed in the context of ever
increasing competition.
Capital, in fact, is entering into the competitive
period, as industry did some 25 or 30 years ago. The
profits of capital are being constantly reduced, both
on commercial investments and on securities, its
holders are becoming more enterprising than they
were, and are constrained to go further afield in
search of higher remuneration. . . . The power and
status of the British Empire depends fully as much on
its financial strength as on its industrial
resources. Any weakening of its financial position
1. CCJ May 1885.
2. CCJ June 1889
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would react immediately on the Government, and would
be felt as acutely in the diplomatic as in the
commercial world. . . . Credit is the basis of all
modern commercial operations, whilst national credit
is fully s valuable to the individual as to the
community.
The expansion of Empire was desirable in order to maintain
the expansion of business abroad, and the continued
expansion of business abroad was essential in order to
maintain the dominant, powerful position of the state
throughout the world. This was how the City saw the
economic and political future of Great Britain at the end
of the 1880s.
If the London Chamber of Commerce was to be at all
convincing in calling for a forceful policy of
imperialism, existing ideas and concepts had to be
replaced or reshaped. The old Manchester school had to be
superseded by a school of new imperialism, old Liberalism
by new Liberalism. The operation of grafting old ideas on
to new policies, whilst simultaneously introducing new
concepts, was a delicate one. The problem of docking
economic theory with political expediency called for great
agility of mind and a dogged adherence to the practical
demands of business. The whole issue revolved around the
role of the state in the economic life of the country.
Such a task was fraught with danger as interests other
than those represented by the City were also proposing new
ideas and demanding state action; in addition, not all
City interests were equally well served by the new stance
which the City was taking.
In the 1880s many interests in Britain were actively
1.	 CCJ July 1889.
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involved in promoting a change in the role of the state,
and most would have agreed that the days of laissez-faire
and laissez-aller were over. The socialists wanted the
state to take up ownership of the means of production and
distribution. The protectionists wished the state would
erect tariffs in their favour. A broad distinction could
be drawn between the City, which wished to see the state
active abroad but unchanged at home, and socialism and
protectionism which pressed for the state to be more
active at home. The City was in the difficult position of
arguing against state interference and in favour of
laissez-faire at home, but in favour of state aid abroad.'
Attempts to come to terms with this difficulty had resul-
ted in Lord Farrer's The State inRelation to Trade
(1881), George Baden-Powell's State Aid and State Interfe-
rence (1882) and had inspired an address by G.J. Goschen
to the members of the Philosophical Institute at Edin-
burgh, 2
 and the Bankers' Magazine reproduction, in 18
closely-typed pages, of an address by the French economist
Leon Say to the Cercle St Simon. 3
 It is not possible
therefore to talk simply of the City being for or against
free trade or laissez-faire. Its position was constantly
tailored to suit specific circumstances in order to pro-
tect particular interests.
1. CCJ Dec. 1885 'The Depression of Trade' - 'The old
theory of laissez-faire has been, with national
consent, apparently applied to our foreign, our
colonial, as well as our domestic policy'.
2. Laissez-faire and Government Interference (1883).
3. EM 1884, 349 'State Intervention in Business
Matters', the address concluded that the tendency
towards centralisation had increased under the
influence of the Manchester school. The address was
on 'State Socialism' which the BM 1884, 585, equated
with state interference.
6.3
Protectionism
The promotion of protectionism, which began in
earnest at the beginning of the 1880s with the formation
of the National Fair Trade League, 1 was concerned with the
approaching renewal of the commercial treaty with France,2
and the N.F.T.L. manifesto of 1881 emphasised the role of
the Empire in the future British trade prospects of Great
Britain. 3 Like the London Chamber of Commerce, the League
was concerned about the problem of foreign competition and
proposed imperial federation as part of the solution;
unlike the City, protectionists called upon the state to
protect their interests by raising tariffs against
competing imports.
The degree of support for tariff protection at this
time must not be exaggerated. It might well have been
true that a number of northern chambers of commerce were
1. Brown, op.cit., 17. The most prominent members of
the League were the worsted manufacturer W. Farrer
Eckroyd MP, the silk manufacturer S. Cunliffe Lister
(later Lord Masham), Samson S. Lloyd MP -
manufacturer and chairman of the Birmingham company
Lloyds Banking, David Mclver MP - shipowner and
chairman of the Liverpool Steamship Owners
Association, E.C. Healey - founder and proprietor of
the Engineer, T.W. Fenton of the Dewsbury Chamber of
Commerce, and James T. Edgecome - journalist and
editor of various fair trade publications.
2. Ibid., 23.
3. Ibid., 27.
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questioning the concept of free trade, 1 but not even the
Bradford Chamber of Commerce would countenance the
protectionist aims of the fair traders. 2 Other interests,
however, were increasingly willing to commit themselves to
a protectionist policy, the most important and influential
being the agricultural interest. As the effects of the
importation of cheap wheat and frozen meat from America
made themselves felt, 3 British farmers gave mounting
support to the National Fair Trade League which they
controlled completely by 1887.
Rents from farms had begun to fall from 1879 onwards
and the ability of land owners to borrow, using their
agricultural land as security, was dramatically
diminished. 5 The numbers of workers in agriculture,
fisheries and forestry were exactly the same in 1881 as
they had been in 1801 but as a proportion of the total
labour force they had dropped from 40 to just over 12.5
per cent. 6 The total value of the contribution which
agriculture made to the national income was the same in
1. Brown, op.cit., 10.
2. Ibid., 17.
3. J.D. Chambers & G.E. Mingay, The_2!!
Revo!ution (1966), 209. Between 1875 and 1900
imports of wheat and grain increased by 90%, meat by
300%, butter and cheese by 110%.
4. Brown, op.cit., 84 & 138.
5. Chambers and Mingay, op.cit., 167 & 177.	 On
borrowing, see the article by David Cannadine,
'Aristocratic Indebtedness in the Nineteenth
Century', Economic History Review, xxx (1977), 646.
6. Chambers & Mingay, op.cit., 208. By 1900 the figure
was just 10%.
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1901 as it had been in 1851, but its share of the total
had been reduced from 20 to under 6.5 per cent.' The
agricultural lobby was well-organised, however, perhaps
better organised than the business lobby. The Royal
Commission on Agriculture was at work five years or so
before that on trade. Chambers of agriculture were as
widely established as chambers of commerce, and the
Central Chamber of Agriculture, founded at about the same
time as the ACCUK, had a parliamentary committee to keep a
close watch on its interests. 2 In 1887 the agricultural
parliamentary committee was 176 MPs strong in contrast to
the 40 or 50 MPs who could be mustered in the
businessmen's cause. 3 During the l870s the ACCUK and the
Chambers of Agriculture had met as a joint committee in
order to study the possibility of the establishment of a
Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. 4 The bill to create
a Minister of Agriculture was given Royal Assent in August
1889, while the chambers of commerce were still pressing
for a minister of commerce.
It was perhaps the support of the landed interests
which enabled Howard Vincent to gain the endorsement of
the Conservative Party Conferences for the fair trade
movement in the late 1880s. 5 Such support could be con-
trasted with the vain attempt made in the ACCUK in 1888 to
1. Chambers & Mingay, op.cit., 210.
2. For details, see The Chamber of Agriculture Journal,
and Farmers' Chronicle founded in 1869, for example
the supplement 14 Feb. 1881.
3. CCJ Apr. 1887, 73 'A Parliamentary Commercial
Committee'.
4. A.H.H. Matthews, Fifty Years of Agricultural Politics
(1915), 246-8.
5. Brown, op.cit., 69.
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gain a vote in favour of a change in the fiscal
arrangements between Great Britain and the colonies: this
received only four votes.' As early as 1881 The Economist
had felt that the voting behaviour of the Conservative MPs
warranted the assumption that the party had adopted
protectionism. 2 For the 1885 general elections the
National Fair Trade League published 100,000 tracts and
pamphlets. 3
 The split in the Liberal Party over Ireland a
few months later resulted in the Conservative Party being
dependent upon the votes of the Liberal Unionists, a
political group supported by most City businessmen. This
dependence upon the free trade Unionists put the matter of
fair trade outside the sphere of practical politics so far
as the Conservatives were concerned.4
Fear of the protectionist lobby was sufficient to
cause the Bankers' Magazine and The Economist to oppose it
from the beginning. 5 When the Royal Commission on the
Depression of Trade was appointed in 1885, a number of
well-known protectionists were given places on it. The
Liberals feared that the commission was to be used to
promote protectionism and Gladstone told his colleagues to
1. CCJ Mar. 1888, Supplement.
2. Brown, op.cit., 59. See also Lord Salisbury in Econ.
19 Apr. 1884.
3. Brown, op.cit., 64.
4. Ibid., 62.
5. EM 1880, 268 'Protection, Reciprocity and Free
Trade'. The ACCUK was vigilant from the beginning as
well. When a resolution hinting protectionism was
put to it in 1881, the meeting expressed its opinion
that the principles of free trade formed the soundest
basis for the extension of British trade before
allowing the original motion to be passed, ACCUK
Reports 1877-1883.
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'Touch not, Taste not, Handle not'.' The commission's
main report was said by the Journal of the London Chamber
of Commerce to support the view that remedies for the
depression of trade depended for their application on
private enterprise and not on state aid. 2 There were two
minority reports, however, the larger of which was
protectionist in outlook.
Within the City
Obstacles to the already difficult task which faced
the City in its attempt to bring about a change in
political ideas and economic principles did not originate
solely from provincial manufacturers, landed interests and
the working class. Certain interests within the City
itself were experiencing conditions of business which they
felt could be altered by methods which the majority of the
City condemned, initially at least, as protectionist. The
major questions which presented difficulties from inside
the City were those of sugar and silver.
Foreign governments which subsidised their sugar
production threatened the expansion of the already
considerable wealth of the proprietors, merchants and
bankers connected with the British West Indies and British
Guiana which had long been well-represented by the West
1. Brown, op.cit., 63. Dunraven, Eckroyd, Nevile
Lubbock and Muntz had been appointed. Shaw Lefevre,
William Fowler and L.K. Cross had received
Gladstone's advice and refused to serve.
2. CCJ Feb. 1887, 26.
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India Committee. 1 Nevile Lubbock, 2 brother of Sir John
Lubbock, was chairman of this Committee and represented it
on the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce. George
Martineau sat on the Council as representative of the
London Sugar Refiners' Association, and Sir George H.
Chambers, 3 who was a prominent member of the West India
Committee, was an elected member of the Council during its
early years.
The European beet industry had taken possession of
more than half of the supply to the British market. The
West Indian and British refining interests proposed that
the manufacture and refining of sugar should take place in
bond and that duties could then be collected as the final
product went to the public. What they suggested was an
international agreement in order to prevent any of the
countries involved in sugar production from competing
unfairly with their rivals. 4 A select committee of the
House of Commons had recommended in 1880 that an
international sugar conference be convened to try to put
an end to the subsidies which foreign states paid to sugar
1. Douglas Hall, A Brief
Committee (Caribbean history pamphlets, St. Lawrence,
1971).
2. Nevile Lubbock was a director of the Colonial Bank
which dealt mainly with the West Indies, the Royal
Exchange Assurance, and the London & St. Katherine
Dock. In the 1890s he became a director of the
Demarara Railway Co., and the Colonial Co..
3. Chambers was a partner in Messrs. T. Daniel & Co.,
merchant & shipowners, as well as being the chairman
of the Barbados Railway Co., deputy-chairman of the
Demarara Railway Co., chairman of the London & St.
Katherine Dock Co., and a director of the Imperial
Fire and Imperial Life Insurance Cos.. He was
succeeded on the Council in 1887 by Edward Chambers
of the same firm.
4. CCJ Jan. 1888, 3.
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producers within their boundaries.' It was a vote on this
question in the summer of 1881 that had alarmed the free
trade sensibilities of Gladstone and disturbed
The Economist 2 . The National Anti-Bounty League was
formed at about the same time to speak for the combined
sugar interests, and it was not averse to colluding with
fair traders.3
An elaborate campaign was launched in the City by the
West India Committee in 1884 when the Lord Mayor attended
a small public meeting held at the Mansion House, 4 and
after which a deputation presented their views to the CO.5
The movement managed to survive the period when
parliamentary time was consumed by the Irish debates, and
in 1887 new impetus was added by the support which the
colonial conference gave to the issue. 6 In the same year
the British and Colonial Anti-Bounty Association was
formed with Nevile Lubbock as its chairman, and the sugar
lobby formed a parliamentary committee which pressed for
the recommendations of the 1880 Select committee to be
carried out. In July the government announced that a
conference was to be convened.7
The sugar lobby presented their cause as one of free
trade. The possibility of an international convention
resulting from the 1887 Sugar Bounties Conference was
1. Brown op.cit., 39.
2. Ibid., 59. The vote was lost by the sugar interest
153:80 but Gladstone was sufficiently worried to
suggest that the Cobden Club have 180,000 copies of
the speeches by Cross and Chamberlain published.
3. Ibid., 43 & 48.
4. The Times 23 June 1884; & 14 July 1884, 8.
5. CCJ Sept. 1884, 248.
6. Brown op.cit., 99-100.
7. Ibid., 43-4.
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eulogized by those with an interest in the sugar business
as the acme of free trade.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the proposed convention,
which is the present outcome of the Conference, pro-
poses to remove an artificial interference with the
natural course of an industry, it is deserving of the
hearty approval of all believers in Free Trade.
Should the Conference succeed in removing the protec-
tive barrier to the free exchange of sugar . . . it
will become historical as the first practical attempt
to bring about a general agreement to adopt Free
Trade in one commodity of almost universal consuxnp-
tion • 1
The fact that the sugar interest felt it necessary to
justify their actions in terms of free trade gives a good
indication of the opinions and fears of the more
influential groups within the City regarding interference
by the state in business matters. Had the way in which
the sugar bounties were to be ended and freedom of trade
enforced come to the fore, the presentation of the move as
a step towards free trade would have been more difficult.
The silver question was another issue which had
influential but by no means universal support in the City.
This question arose out of the appreciation in the value
of goldand the relative fall in the price of silver.
This meant a loss in exchange business to those who dealt
with countries whose currency was solely based upon
silver. Businessmen who supported the idea of fixing the
1.	 CCJ Jan. 1888, 3.
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valueof silvertothatof gold- usuallyataratioof 15
to 1 - took the name of bimetallists. Most City men and
nearly all the bankers were against an interference with
the value of precious metals, particularly that of gold.
It is important to bear in mind, however, when following
the arguments against state interference and in favour of
the free market in gold, that the Bank of England at this
time ensured a basic minimum price for gold. Indeed this
price was often raised during the l880s in order to bring
more gold into the country and to attempt to control the
market bank rate)- There was no more a completely free
trade or free market for gold than for any other
commodity.
As early as 1880 bimetallism was considered
enough of a threat by the banking fraternity to warrant
the publication of counter arguments. 2 A long paper which
purported to demonstrate how unsound was the economic
theory of bimetallism was printed in full in the Bankers'
Magazine 3 . The Economist argued for the freedom of supply
and demand.4
In February 1881 the Governments of France and the
U.S.A. had invited the U.K. to take part in a conference
on bimetallic currency. The representatives of 18
governments were sent to the conference, including
Britain. The representatives of some of them, including
Germany and the U.K., were instructed to declare at the
1. R.S. Sayers, The Bank of England Operations, 1890-
1914 (1936), 74.
2. EM 1880, 267-8.
3. EM 1880, 359. It had originally been read to the
Manchester Statistical Society.
4. Econ. 8 Apr. 1882.
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outset that their governments had definitely adopted the
single gold standard and were not to be understood to be
contemplating any fundamental change in their monetary
system. Clearly little could result from such a
beginning.1
Arguments against adopting bimetallism in England in
the early 1880s were not very sophisticated. Even in a
series of serious articles for the Journal of the London
Chamber of Commerce, written by John Henry Norman,
rhetoric surfaced.
It seems only natural that the greatest value in the
smallest bulk would be the most suitable to the
highly civilised and wealthy. Take India for
instance, where the bulk of people are only just
emerging from the use of shells as currency, but
where, at the same time, there is a system of State
note issue, confined to the State which has worked
well. Surely no one ,ould say that the people
require a gold currency.
Had bimetallism succeeded it would have been a useful
precedent for protectionists. The Royal Commission on the
Depression of Trade included the question of silver
depreciation in its questionnaire to chambers of
commerce. 3 The London Chamber of Commerce admitted that
the depreciation had resulted in the disorganisation of
much of the trade with silver-producing countries, but the
reason for the depreciation was ascribed to the increase
in supply of the metal and a decrease in demand. The
total effect of the changes in value of silver and gold
1. Pan. Papers (1881) LIII, 797 'Report of the Hon.
C.W. Freemantle CB, delegate appointed to represent
H.M.G. at the International Monetary Conference at
Paris 1881'. For the City's view, see BM 1882, 367.
2. CCJ Aug. 1883, 221; Sept. 1883, 258; & Oct. 1883,
293.
3. CCJ Dec. 1885 Supplement.
73
was considered to be the curtailment of profits of all
producers in gold-using countries. An article in the
Chamber's Journa! described the idea of fixing the price
of silver as 'protection of the most absolute kind'.
Silver was presented as 'naturally' the medium of the
poorer countries which had less security and smaller trade
operations, in contrast to the needs of the rich states
where the prevalence of law and order encouraged large
transactions. 1
The most important group of City businessmen who were
in favour of bimetallism were those who had interests in
India and the Far East. At its first official meeting in
January 1886 the East India and China trade section of the
London Chamber of Commerce convened a special meeting to
discuss the silver question 2 which in turn decided to
attempt to bring the subject before a general meeting of
the London Chamber of Commerce. Neither the Council nor
the executive of the Chamber readily agreed to this
demand, 3 and the East India and China section had to press
for it. 4 Gwyther gave the executive a clear choice,
1. CCJ Aug. 1885.
2. Guildhall Library MSS 16, 532, the minute book of the
East India and China Trade section, 19 Jan. 1886.
Two papers were written for the special meeting, one
by a bimetallist, P.F. Tidman of Messrs. Mactaggart,
Tidman & Co., and one by a monometallist, James
Whittall of Darley, Butler & Co. who was also a
director of the London, Paris & American Bank and an
ex-director of Jardine Matheson & Co..
3. RMB 2, 5 Mar., 18 Mar. & 18 Apr. 1886. The executive
tried unsuccessfully to get the Institute of Bankers
involved.
4. RMB 2, 6 May 1886. They asked that the executive
receive a deputation which consisted of J.H. Gwyther,
chief manager of the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China, subsequently its chairman, and
one of the Sassoons.
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either they called a meeting of the Chamber as the section
desired, or wrote to the Government proposing an inquiry
into the matter.' The executive chose the latter as being
the lesser of the two evils, and this was endorsed at a
subsequent Council meeting.2
Like some other difficult issues which isolated one
group of City business interests from the rest, the silver
question was put on the agenda of the Congress of Chambers
of Commerce of the Empire. The organising committee of
the Congress took great care to find speakers for and
against bimetallism. 3 At the Congress in 1886 a paper
written by H.H. Gibbs was read to the assembly and a
resolution moved by the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce.
This Congress recognises that the diminishing supply
of gold during recent years has been an important
factor in the existing depression of trade and
believes that the re-monetarisation of silver would
afford some relief to this state of things.4
This moderate motion, which avoided the crucial issue of
fixing the value of silver to that of gold, was carried on
a vote by chambers by 28 to 15.
The depreciation of silver was also discussed by the
metal section of the London Chamber. Their interest was
that the price of other metals was tied to that of silver.
Later in the same year this section held a special meeting
1. RMB 2, 12 May 1886.
2. RMB 2, 13 May 1886. The resolution was supported by
Tritton.
3. RMB 2, 19 May 1886.
4. CCJ Aug. 1886 Supplement. Two articles written by
Westgarth supporting bimetallism were published in
the Journal in the winter of 1886-7 and an attempt
was made to link the issue to unemployment, CCJ Dec.
1886, 291; Jan. 1887, 8.
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to discuss the matter which was attended by H.H. Gibbs.'
The chairman of the section was Henry Rivers Grenfell of
the firm of copper merchants Pascoe, Grenfell & Sons.2
The minority of City businessmen who had large
interests in silver-using countries did not rely on the
power of their arguments to protect their wealth.
Although Gwyther told the shareholders of the Chartered
Bank in 1887 that trade with silver-using countries could
be neither profitable nor peaceful unless bimetallism were
adopted, 3
 it has been suggested that the imperial or
exchange banks had converted their capital into sterling
which had been sent back to the U.K. before the serious
fall in Indian currency took place.4
The Royal Commission on Precious Metals chaired by
Lord Herschell delivered its final report in 1888.
Evidence had been taken from City men in the main, such as
the bullion broker H.L. Raphael, the discount broker H.
Schmidt, most importantly Bertram Currie of Glyn's Bank,
and directors of the Bank of England, Lord Addington and
H. Wollaston Blake. These men left the commissioners in
no doubt as to their views. It was difficult to get any
of the City men to agree that there was a scarcity of
gold. In the end the Commission was bound to conclude
1. Guildhall MSS 16,693, minute book of the metal trade
section, 22 Sept. 1886.
2. He had been Governor of the Bank of England in 1882,
held directorships on the board of Sun Life
Assurance, Universal Marine Insurance, the Sun Fire
Office and was chairman of the National Mortgage and
Agency Co. of New Zealand. In the next decade he was
chairman of the Peruvian Corporation.
3. Sir F.M. Compton Mackenzie, Realms of Silver (1954),
160.
4. A.S.J. Baster, Imperial Banks (1929), 174.
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that it was impossible to form any positive opinion as to
the relation between currency and prices, 1 and that to
adopt bimetallism would be a leap in the dark. 2 Although
the matter was not settled, the report of the Herschell
Commission had given a view which the majority of
businessmen would support. When the question of
bimetallism was put before the ACCUK in March 1889 by the
Birmingham Chamber, it was rejected by 45 votes to ii.
The question as to whether the adoption of particular
terms and the reinterpretation of existing concepts by the
City were the result of deliberate calculation or ardent
belief is a difficult one. A straightforward assumption
would be that the hierarchy of power and wealth within the
City determined the popularity of particular ideas, in the
sense that there were general leaders of opinion, such as
Sir John Lubbock, who often organised meetings to promote
a particular aspect of City opinion. Such men were
usually aware of the political significance of their
activity, but without detailed studies of them it is
impossible to say to what extent this awareness dominated
their beliefs. There were also leaders of sub-hierarchies
such as shipping, the various exchanges and merchant
groups. Such sub-hierarchies and groups would be
successful in proposing their own arguments and policy
proposals providing they were not raising questions which
1. Pan. Papers (1888), XLV, Final Report, Part II,
Conclusion 98. Herschell was chairman of the
Commission, Sir John Lubbock and Samuel Montagu were
amongst those appointed to sit upon it.
2. Ibid., Conclusion 120.
3. CCJ Apr. 1889 Supplement.
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threatened the interests of a majority of the general
hierarchy. Thus the West India Committee could succeed in
its presentation of anti-bounty legislation as free trade,
whereas those with business in the silver-using countries
had their proposal of bimetallism dismissed as
protectionism.
The ideas promoted publicly by the City, the opinion
of the City, was the result of a process which was
determined directly or indirectly by economic
considerations. That is not to say that such views
directly expressed an economic reality, however, as the
particular form which the opinion took was shaped by
consideration of publicly opposing alternative opinions
emanating from groups with other economic interests. This
dislocation between publicly expressed opinion and
privately recognised economic reality is explored in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: The City and the State: the official and the
hidden relationship
An attempt to make any sort of general statement
about the relationship between City business and the
British state appears, at times, to be an impossible task.
City interests were not always united, for example
shipowners and merchants were often at odds. British
interests abroad could also be ranged against each other
on the basis of geographical distribution. In South
Africa for example, the eastern province of the Cape
Colony competed at times with the western province, the
Cape Colony as a whole saw itself as having competing
interests with Natal, and it has been suggested on a
number of occasions that the interests of South Africa
conflicted with those of the City of London.' There are
also difficulties in talking of the British state as an
harmonious unity, as the same proliferation of subdivisions
present themselves; different political parties, the
imperatives of existing diplomacy, conflict between
departments (particluarly between the Treasury and the
rest), and disagreements within departments over the
advisability of a forward policy were all too evident. To
make matters more complicated there was a distinction made
1.	 For example the question of the Cape Colony's finance
could be seen as a contest between the City and the
colony, Andrew Porter, 'Britain, the Cape Colony and
Natal 1870-1914' Economic Hi s t o rI Review, xxiv
(1981), 554-577.-------
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by the FO between official and unofficial support of
British business interests abroad.'
Fortunately, the existence of the London Chamber of
Commerce helps clarify the situation to a large extent as
it brought together representatives of all the major City
business interests. The official communications between
this Chamber and the Government constituted the public
relationship between the City as a whole and the State.
This is not to say that individual firms and interest
groups did not formally communicate with the Government on
their own behalf, but here again the situation is
simplified by the existence of the Chamber of Commerce
because within this larger organisation trade sections
were formed which were composed of the most prominent
businessmen in their field. For the purposes of an
analysis of the relationship between the City and the
State which focuses on imperialism during the 1880s, it is
particularly helpful that the London Chamber had trade
sections based upon geographical areas, such as West
Africa, South Africa, East India and China.
The activities of these sections serve to demonstrate
the various ways in which the City sought to influence
public opinion and Government policy both directly, from
London, and indirectly, via British chambers of commerce
which had been established in distant foreign lands. The
minutes of these sections occasionally provide information
1. The idea of such a division was put forward by David
McLean 'Commerce, Finance, and British Diplomatic
Support in China, 1885-8', Economic History Review,
xxvi (1973), 464.
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on the private relationships between individual business-
men and politicians or civil servants, and from such
examples it is possible to obtain a better understanding
of the nature of the public, official relationship between
the City and the State.
The British Suez Canal
The first major success for the London Chamber of
Commerce in dealing with an issue involving the extension
of British economic and political power in the world was
the question of the control of the Suez Canal. The City
had a double interest in Egypt, as had been demonstrated
in the summer of 1882, that of business enterprise within
the country and the importance of the canal as a trade and
shipping route.
When Arabi Pasha, who had led a revolt of the
Egyptian army, started strengthening the fortifications of
Alexandria in 1882, British businessmen started leaving
the country. The Economist felt the need to remind the
Gladstone administration at home that business interests
in this matter should not be lost sight of as England had
greater interests in Egypt than any other European power.1
It was explained, in a later article, that the City saw
the question as one of the price of Egyptian securities,
the economic embarrassments connected with the hurried
closing of transactions in that country, and of alarms
about the unprotected condition of the canal.2
1. Econ. 17 June 1882, 735.
2. Econ. 24 June 1882, 775.
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Following the bombardment of Alexandria by the Bri-
tish fleet and the landing of British troops, who later
managed to defeat Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, the Bankers'
Magazine published a carefully argued justification for
the action. In much the same way as The Economist had
insisted 'that it is the traditional policy of the Foreign
Office not to use the material forces of the country to
enable individual Englishmen to obtain payment of debts
due from other countries' 1 , the Bankers' Magazine empha-
sised that it was not suggesting that the great British
commercial interests in Egypt entitled the U.K. to inter-
fere by force of arms. What it did maintain was that
Britain had a right of way over the canal as a trade
route, and that no interference with that right of passage
could be allowed.2
With British personnel in control of the Egyptian
military and administrative organisation, and the British
Government holding nearly half of the share capital of the
canal through which eighty per cent of the traffic which
passed was British, it was perhaps not surprising that
British shipowners felt that the time was ripe to try to
establish a stronger position over the French. The real
issue was the French control of the canal.
Two deputations had waited upon the Government in
April 1883, and the suggestion was made that a second canal
be built under British auspices in order to compete with
the first. A meeting of representatives of the major
1. Econ. 17 June 1882, 736.
2. BM 1882, 603.
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shipping interests took place in May to discuss the
building of such a British Suez Canal. 1 The particular
grievances listed by the shipowners were the incivility,
arbitrariness and partiality of the administration of the
canal; the high pilotage dues coupled with the exclusion
of British pilots; the absence of a Suez Canal Company
office in London; and the high maximum tariffs.2
Many members of the Council of the London Chamber of
Commerce were also members of the Shipowners' Committee
for the Construction of a Second Canal and the matter had
been informally before the Council for some time. 3 An
article in the CCJ prior to a debate in Parliament opened
with the blunt statement: 'British merchants have not
forgotten the late Anglo-French commercial treaty', and
continued to describe French state subventions to French
shipping lines as aiming a 'blow' at the British
commercial marine. The nub of the issue was that de
Lesseps declined to give the British a larger share in the
management of the canal, the shareholders adopted any
suggestions made by him, and the French Government would
ratify any vote of the shareholders.4
A debate in Parliament on 11 July 1883 infuriated the
City1 as it appeared that the British Government was
willing to provide the capital for a second canal which
1. BM 1883, 711, 'The Effect of the Suez Canal Incident
on the City'.
2. Ibid..
3. CCJ June 1883.
4. Ibid.. The editorial also pointed out that the
receipts of the existing canal for 1883 totalled
£2.5m of which £2m had been provided by British
ships.
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would also be under the control of the Suez Canal
Company. 1 The London Chamber of Commerce reacted swiftly
the following day at their Council meeting at which the
chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company was present by special invitation. 2 A resolution
was passed which accepted the need for a second canal but
regarded the terms on which the Government was to lend £8m
to the Suez Canal Company as inadequate and
unsatisfactory.
A meeting of the Council of the ACCUK was arranged
which resulted in a deputation being received by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board
of Trade. 3 The climax of the agitation was a special
general meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce convened
for the 18 July.4 Over 500 City businessmen attended the
meeting and passed two resolutions regarding the Suez
Canal. The first recognised the need for an improvement
of communication by water between the Mediterranean and
the Gulf of Suez. Its proposer, Alderman Cotton MP5,
referred to a smaller meeting which had been held at
Lloyd's in the previous week, and he went on to declare
that 'a second Suez Canal ought to be carried out in
1. CCJ Aug. 1883, 208-9; see also BM 1883, 711.
2. CCJ Aug. 1883, 236. W.C. Morgan and James Dixon were
on the Council as representatives of the Steamship
Owners' Association, and the General Shipowners'
Society.
3. Ibid., 235. The views of the Association were
expressed by its president, C.J. Monk MP, Norwood MP,
and Mr. C.M. Palmer MP.
4. Ibid., 236.
5. W.J.R. Cotton, of Messrs. Culverwell, Brooks & Cotton
the firm of wharfingers, merchants and brokers, was
MP for London from 1874-5, Lord Mayor of the City
1875-6, and chairman of the Australia Co..
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English interests, and in English interests alone'. 1 The
seconder, R.B. Martin, remarked that if they looked into
the banking accounts of those present a very substantial
means could be found of obtaining the LiOm required for a
British Suez Canal. The second resolution pressed for the
international management of the canal, declared the
proposed provisional agreement insufficient to safeguard
the interests of the U.K., and called for a Royal
Commission on the subject.2
The fact that major private City bankers of both
Liberal and Conservative persuasion had been active in
presenting the resolutions to the meeting, in addition to
the clear indication from Martin that the City could
finance its own second canal, was a clear enough
demonstration of the power and determination of the City
for M. de Lesseps who requested a meeting with the London
Chamber of Commerce.3
After careful preparation on the Chamber's part, the
meeting took place in November. 4 Count Ferdinand de
Lesseps and his son, M. Charles de Lesseps, had an
interview with the Council which was chaired by Charles
Magniac. From this meeting an agreement was reached just
1. The Times 19 July 1883, 10.
2. The resolution was proposed by Alderman R.N. Fowler
MP, partner in the banking firm of Dinisdale, Fowler,
Bernard & Dimsdale which he represented at the
Institute of Bankers. MP for Penryn and Falmouth
from 1868 to 1874 and for London from 1880 to 1891,
he was Lord Mayor 1883-4. Despite Quaker parentage
he energetically reorganised the City Conservative
Party. The resolution was seconded by Edward Power
of Messrs. Power Bros. & Co., a member and later
deputy chairman of the Baltic Committee.
3. The Second London Chamber of Commerce Annual Report
(1884), 27.
4. CCJ Dec. 1883, 354.
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a week later between the shipowners and de Lesseps. The
canal was to be enlarged, or a second built by a commis-
sion of engineers and shipowners half of which were to be
British. In addition to the three directors designated by
the British Government, seven new directors chosen from
among English shipowners and merchants were to be admitted
as members of the Board immediately. A consultative com-
mittee composed of the English directors was to be formed
in London, the Canal Co. was to open an office in London
and arrangements to be made for paying dues there. Future
appointments of officials in the Canal transit service
were to be largely English speaking. The surtax of 50
centimes was to disappear indefinitely from January 1884,
pilot dues extinguished from July in the same year, all
expenses resulting from groundings and accidents in the
Canal were to be borne by the Company in future and from
January 1885 the Company was to diminish transit dues by
50 centinies and by another 50 should the dividends for
1883 amount to more than 18 per cent. Finally the Company
agreed to divide with the shipowners on every succeeding
January 1st the extent of half of the profits in excess of
the amount of the profits last previously divided amongst
the shipowners, in terms of reduction in dues by tonnage.'
1. CCJ Dec. 1883, 354. The detailed description of the
agitation for a British Canal by D.A. Farnie,
East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History,
1854-1956 (Oxford, 1969), cli. 17, does not include
the important meeting between Lesseps and the Council
of the London Chamber of Commerce which took place on
23 Nov. 1883 just three days before Lesseps departed
from England leaving his son to negotiate a settle-
ment with the shipowners, ibid., 319. Farnie does,
however, mention the large meeting which the London
Chamber had convened in the summer, ibid., 315.
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These swingeing changes in the management and charges
of the Suez Canal Company, made in spite of weak
Government support, established the reputation of the
London Chamber of Commerce, and gave a good indication of
the new thrusting policy of the City in the battle for
business expansion in the world. The success of this
struggle for control of the canal demonstrated the ability
of the City to organise its influence and power through
its new Chamber of Commerce, and signalled the beginning
of the battle royal between the state-backed business
interests of the various industrialised countries which
was to take place in earnest in the following years
through to the First World War.
The West Africa Trade Section1
The immediate cause of the formation of the West
Africa section itself provides an example of the existing
relationship between business and the state, and the
willingness of the Government to consult business opinion
before involving itself in agreements which could affect
profit making. It also demonstrates the fact that such
consultation was often kept private. In the spring of
1884 the FO sent a confidential request to the London
Chamber of Commerce asking for its opinion regarding the
1. Guildhall Library MSS 16,504, The Minute Book of the
West Africa Trade Section of the London Chamber of
Commerce (henceforward WAMB).
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proposed Congo Treaty with Portugal. 1 In response to this
request the Chamber convened a meeting of businessmen with
interests in West Africa at which it was agreed that a
West Africa trade section should be formed. The West
Africa section decided that its opinions concerning the
treaty would best be relayed by means of an informal
interview with Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, the Parliamentary
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
It is not surprising that this suggestion was imme-
diately agreed to 2 , as the elected committee of the newly-
formed section represented most of the major British in-
terests in West Africa. 3 The chairman was Sir George
Taubman Goldie who had managed to amalgamate all the
British companies in the Niger area and, with a view to
obtaining a charter from the state, he had transformed
them into the National Africa Company in l88l. The
nominal capital of the company was £lm and City banking
support was indicated by the presence of Sir Charles W.
1. WAMB 31 Mar. 1884; see also CCJ Feb. 1885, 150
'Annual Report'. The section was not formed as Hynes
op.cit., 63, suggests, merely on the basis of their
vehement opposition to the treaty. The FO knew of
the London Chamber's interest in the matter as the
Council had sent a letter to the FO in the previous
year asking that the rights and privileges of British
subjects be safeguarded by the appointment of a
British Resident and periodic visits from British
warships to the Congo, FO 403/14, no. 118, 14 Mar.
1883.
2. WAMB 31 Mar. 1884. This request was made through the
Council of the Chamber.
3. WAMB 7 May 1884.
4. John E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of
Nigeria (1960), 46 et seq..
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Mills on the board.' Also on the committee of the section
was the other joint managing director of the National
Africa Company, Alexander Miller. 2 Francis Swanzy, head
of the largest British firm in the Gold Coast, 3 was
Goldie's deputy on the committee. The chairman of the
Africa Steamship Company, 4 Frederick William Bond, was
also on the committee, along with Thomas H. Hale of the
firm of Congo merchants. It was a powerful gathering of
British interests in West Africa.
The details of the private deputation to Fitzmaurice,
which took place on 7 April 5 , were kept secret. Not only
were they not written into the minutes of the section and
only a verbal account of them given to the Council of the
London Chamber 6 , but no mention of the deputation was
1. Mills was one of the four managing partners of the
private bank Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. which was much
respected by the Treasury. Sir Charles was also a
director of the Union Bank of Australia, the Anglo-
Austrian Bank, the North British and Mercantile
Insurance Co., and later became a director of the
Imperial Ottoman Bank.
2. W. Thompson, 'Glasgow and Africa: Connexions and
Attitudes, 1870-1900' (The University of Strathclyde,
PhD, 1970), 139, estimates that Miller Bros. was the
single most important commercial enterprise trading
in West Africa if their investment in Goldie's
company is taken into account.
3. F. & A. Swanzy. F. Swanzy was a director of the
Wassau (Gold Coast) Mining Co..
4. It was formed by royal charter in 1852. The other
major shipping company was the Glasgow and Liverpool
based British Africa Steam Navigation Co., formed in
1869 and managed at this time by Elder, Dempster &
Co.. A representative of this latter company was
elected to the section's committee in the following
year.
5. WAMB 7 Apr. 1884. Bond, Goldie and Banner were the
nominees of the section, J. Herbert Tritton and
William Dunn represented the Council at the
deputation.
6. CCJ May 1884, 139.
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made in the correspondence on the subject printed for the
F0 1 . This latter omission is more conspicuous as
correspondence with the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce was
printed 2 . Such caution and censorship, together with
evidence of other private communication with West Africa
interests, such as the letter from Lord Granville to Lord
Aberdare3, a director of Goldie's company, indicate that a
larger hidden relationship existed.
The resolution which the West Africa section of the
London Chamber passed on the question of the treaty with
Portugal, 4
 and which received the backing of the Council
of the Chamber, 5 must be regarded against the background
of the earlier private deputation. It was a public
communication sent in the context of private discussion
with the FO. As later events concerning other trade
sections suggest, 6 it is quite probable that the
resolution was compiled in secret agreement with the FO
for public consumption.
The other major British chambers of commerce also
opposed the treaty 7 . The Glasgow and Manchester Chambers
had direct contact with Goldie and the London West Africa
1. FO 403/38 'Further Correspondence respecting Portu-
guese Claims on the River Congo (April-June 1884)'.
2. CCJ May 1884, 141; FO 403/38, 23 April 1884, Glasgow
Chamber to FO.
3. Flint, op.cit., 57.
4. WAMB 7 May 1884. The resolution declared the treaty
to be detrimental to British trade, but suggested
that should it prove necessary to establish European
sovereignty in that part of Africa the question
should be referred to a conference of the different
powers involved.
5. CCJ June 1884.
6. See p.15O below.
7. Hynes, op.cit., 57-77.
90
section through James Hutton and George Miller. James F.
Hutton, the president of the Manchester Chamber, was a
director of Goldie's National Africa Company, and the
Glasgow Chamber took advice on West African affairs from
George Miller, Alexander's brother.' Thus the influence
of those interested in the National Africa Company and
their ability to attract public support extended far
beyond the City.
The opposition of the London and other chambers of
commerce was an important consideration in the decision of
the Liberal Government to postpone ratification of the
treaty with Portugal. 2 The matter was complicated by the
agreement between the French and King Leopold's
International Association, and by the German annexation of
the Cameroons in July. 3 On 15 November a conference of
powers, such as the West Africa section had proposed in
May, was convened in Berlin. British business interests
were unofficially represented at the conference by Bond
1. Thompson, op.cit., 174, suggests this, and it is
confirmed by my examination of the records of the
Glasgow Chamber. Hynes mentions the connection
between King Leopold and William McKinnon of Glasgow
but, important a man as McKinnon was, he did not
appear on the lists of directors of the Glasgow
Chamber at this time.
2. Hynes, op.cit., 65.
3. WAMB 7 Oct. 1884. Bond informed the section that the
two major shipping companies had already made
representations to the FO regarding the German
annexation, and the section passed a resolution
proposing that Lord Granville should urge the German
Government to accept the same privileges and
protection as the English merchants without placing
the area under the German flag. No action was taken
on the Congo treaty as the section did not at that
time know what were the proposals of Stanley and the
International Africa Association.
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and Jones (of Elder, Dempster) for shipping, Goldie for
the Niger, and Holt, Cookson and Rogerson for the
Liverpool Africa Association of merchants.1
The National Africa Company had managed to obtain
political status to a large extent before the conference
began. 2 The FO had made the company's chief agent, David
McIntosh, the British vice-consul of the area and, while
the Consul, Hewitt, was in England, McIntosh hurriedly
made treaties with the local tribes in the name of the
company with the authority of his new position. In order
to seal the company's control of the area Goldie lent it
his private fortune and managed to break the remaining
French firms there by trading at a loss. Just two weeks
before the Berlin Conference the last French firm had come
to terms with the National Africa Company. Working
through Lord Aberdare the company managed to convince the
FO, just three days before the conference began, to allow
the Union Jack to be hoisted at all places where the
company held 'independent title'.
As far as the official, public communications with
the state were concerned, Goldie suggested to the section
of the London Chamber that in preparation for the confe-
rence, the Government's hand could be strengthened if
certain resolutions were passed. 3 They stated that all
great rivers in West Africa should be freely open to
commerce and that any attempt to apply to the British
1. Flint, op.cit., 68.
2. This paragraph is based on Ibid., 60 et seq.
3. WAMB 27 Oct. 1884.
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protected River Niger a system not applied to the French
controlled rivers Senegal and Ogwe should be resisted.
The most practicable solution to the Congo question
suggested in the resolutions was for the European Powers
to delegate the policing of all its waters to the
International Association. These resolutions gave support
to the International Association in the Congo whilst
threatening the French that if they tried to use the
conference to officially regain some foothold on the Niger
they would be setting a precedent for interference with
their dominance in Senegal.' These proposals were
published in full in the November edition of the CCJ and,
as the Council of the Chamber had not yet met to endorse
them, they could be described as 'to be confirmed'. 2 The
Journal's editorial, 'African Conference at Berlin',
included the argument that the internationalisation of
waterways in West Africa would apply equally to existing
French possessions as to the Niger. Goldie's message was
thus well broadcast before the Conference began.
At the Conference the Niger Navigation Act drafted by
the British Delegation was accepted. 3. This document was
1. The wrong impression of the history of these
resolutions has been gained by Hynes, op.cit., 71, as
they were not approving international control of the
Niger but using it as a threat to the French, and
they were not formulated against Goldie but by him.
Goldie could not have opposed the resolutions at the
Council meeting, as Hynes suggests, as he was not
present. In any case the Conference had already
begun by the time the Council met on 13 November, CCJ
Dec. 1884, 350.
2. CCJ Nov. 1884, 317. They were returned to the
section by the Council with an explanation not
recorded in WAMB 2 Dec. 1884. The Economist had
supported the idea of an international commission for
the Congo and the Niger, Econ. 18 Oct. 1884, 1250.
3. Flint, op.cit., 69.
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typical of the free trade position taken by the British
throughout the world as it proclaimed that the navigation
of the Niger would be kept free for merchant ships of all
nations equally, but as there was not to be an
international commission to enforce it, this freedom of
trade would be, in practice, at the discretion of the
British state or whoever they appointed to apply it.
Before the Conference took place the senior clerk at
the FO, Sir Percy Anderson, argued that Goldie's company
should assume any new British responsibilities resulting
from the meeting in Berlin, and as soon as the terms of
the Niger Navigation act were known Villiers Lister (a
clerk at the FO) was for granting a charter to the company
without delay. 1 Over the next year and a half, until the
charter was granted in July 1886, a struggle took place
between the National Africa Co. and the FO during which
time the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Julian Pauncefote,
tried to redeem some of the political rights which the
company had obtained through the work of McIntosh. 2 In
the course of this wrangle a British protectorate was
declared over the Niger region in June 1885.
In the early days after the Berlin Conference, before
the negotiations became intense, the section put forward a
resolution to the Council of the London Chamber expressing
the City's satisfaction at the British Government's firm
stand at the Berlin Conference. 3 This was duly supported
by the Council. 4 At the same meeting the section also
1. Flint, op.cit., 70.
2. Ibid., 71-85.
3. WAMB 6 Jan. 1885.
4. CCJ Feb. 1885, 49.
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proposed that, in view of German activity on the coast1,
the whole of the coast from the Gold Coast to Lagos should
be brought under the protection of Britain. 2 The reasons
given were the better development of trade and in order to
avoid future difficulties.
At one point during the difficult negotiations
between the company and the FO, later in the year, Goldie
threatened to deliver the company's treaties to the
French. 3 Goldie went so far as to convene a special
meeting of the shareholders of the company in September,
at which he was given permission to approach the French if
necessary. In the same month Goldie instigated the West
Africa section of the London Chamber to pass a resolution
which threatened the Government further. 4 Goldie told the
trade section of the perilous position of British
interests in the neighbourhood of the Niger and emphasised
the need for an 'effective' British occupation of the
protectorate rather than the 'paper' occupation which
existed. These terms recalled the charges made by Germany
before the Berlin conference which had caused the FO so
much anxiety.5
1. For details of this activity around the Popos, an
area between the Gold Coast and Lagos, see John D.
Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa
(1963), 324-8.
2. WAMB 6 Jan. 1885, this resolution was reaffirmed a
few months later, WAMB 5 May 1885. Germany managed
to secure the area by the end of the year,
Hargreaves, op.cit., 328.
3. Flint, op.cit., 78.
4. WAMB 9 Sept. 1885. The Manchester Chamber sent a
similar resolution probably prompted by Hutton, FO
84/1742, 17 Sept. 1885.
5. Flint, op.cit., 68.
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The resolution, which the section supported, called
for the Government to police the protectorate in order to
establish law and order. The force of this resolution was
that the Government had no money to spend on the
protectorate, and this was precisely why they wanted to
rule the area through a chartered company. Goldie was
here playing upon the vulnerability of the state, a game
which, it has been suggested, he played systematically in
order to obtain a royal charter for the company.' There
was not the political will in Parliament to provide funds
for imperial expansion, yet the Government risked
embarrassment if they did not prevent national humiliation
at the hands of other powers. Public resolutions endorsed
by the City could thus be used to force the Government's
hand domestically, as well as endorse state action abroad.
Anderson's reaction at the FO to the letters from the
London and Manchester Chambers, which both arrived on the
same day, was 'The Niger Co. is evidently setting the
Chambers of Commerce in motion'. 2 Such a view of the
official resolutions of these chambers demonstrates that
the FO understood that the most prominent businessmen in a
particular part of the world could receive the support of
the City and other chambers of commerce. At the same time
such an understanding did not trivialize the political
reality that such action represented. Men such as the
president of the London Chamber, J. Herbert Tritton of the
1. Flint, op.cit., 55.
2. FO 84/1742, minute upon the letter from the London
Chamber datd 17 Sept. 1885.
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very prominent private City bank of Barclay, Bevan,
Bouverie, Tritton & Co., could not be easily set in motion
like a clock. Such fretful comments, indeed the whole
tussle between the FO and Goldie over the details of the
charter, were no more than the bickering between two
interdependent allies whose individual activities and
goals could not be achieved or maintained without mutual
support.
Apart from the close, but sometimes bitter,
relationship between Goldie and the FO, Francis Swanzy was
developing a closer relationship with A.W.L. Hemming at
the CO. The subcommittee which the West Africa section
formed in 18851, in order to organise its exhibition stand
at the Colonial and Indian Exhibition, had by February
1886 attracted Hemming to its meetings. 2 By April 1886
Swanzy was to be found promoting a draft resolution to the
section on the grounds that 'Mr. Hemming at the CO seemed
to concur' 3. When the letter arrived at the CO, Hemming's
minute was indeed sympathetic. Although not accepting
their demand for a resident commissioner in full, he did
propose that the Governor be asked to appoint an officer
with the special duty of paying visits to the relevant
1. WAMB 7 July 1885.
2. WAMB 5, 24 and 26 Feb. 1886. Lord Aberdare, Sir
James Marshall, J. Risely Griffith and H. Quayle
Jones all joined Swanzy and Banner on the
subcommittee at this time.
3. WAMB 21 Aug. 1886. The resolution requested that a
visiting or resident commissioner be appointed at
Kumasi.
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tribes. 1 The personal relationship with Hemming was main-
tained, and when the section was concerned about the
advance of the French to the rear of British possessions
in West Africa in the autumn of 1888 the committee autho-
rized Swanzy to see the CO informally, and Goldie to visit
the F0 2 . It was Hemming that gave Swanzy advice at the
co.3
The danger to the state of being seen to be dependent
upon a business concern such as the National Africa
Company (or the Royal Niger Company as it became on
receiving a Royal Charter) was that the support which was
given to the economic interests might arouse jealousy or
fear in rival British economic concerns. In the case of
the charter given to the Royal Niger Company, a reaction
was produced from the Liverpool and Glasgow firms which
constituted the Africa Association. 4 Their opposition to
1. CO 96/178 minute on the letter from the London
Chamber, 22 April 1886. Swanzy was not sufficiently
satisfied with the action being taken and feeling
justified by information published in a recent blue
book he pressed the section to write again WAMB 18
Nov. 1886. A further letter was sent in December
1887, CO 96/187, 22 Dec. 1887.
2. WAMB 20 Nov. 1888.
3. WAMB 2 Apr. 1889 - he advised that a deputation which
the section had in mind would bring undue publicity
to the aim in view. The communication was kept
private and verbal at this time.
4. Miller estimated the value of the constituent firms
as: T. Harrison & Co. (Stanley Rogerson, their
negotiator) £100,000; Miller Bros. £60,000; British
& Continental £50,000; John Holt & Co. £50,000;
agents of various firms £50,000; Stuart & Douglas
£45,000; T. Laughiand & Co. (Glasgow) £40,000;
Cooper, Johnston & Co. (Glasgow) £30,000; Cheetham &
Clarke £15,000; Hatton & Cookson £10,000; Cherry J.
Gertzel, 'John Holt, a British Merchant in West
Africa in the era of imperialism' (Oxford University,
D.Phil., 1959), 313. The Africa Association were
being encouraged by Holt and Miller to apply for a
charter for the Oil Rivers region, ibid., 307-13.
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the advantages of the monopoly, which had in practice been
conferred by the charter, mounted in 1887 taking the form
of a petition, and questions in Parliament.' This
opposition was placated by Goldie's suggestion that the
adjacent economic interests combine and govern the whole
of the Niger and Oil Rivers region. 2 The FO made the plan
more feasible by the way in which they announced the
extension of the British protectorate in the area. 3 The
role of the FO as a catalyst to the proposed amalgamation
was even more apparent when the negotiations were in
danger of breaking down in October 1887. By opening a
correspondence with the CO on the possibilities of a crown
colony in the area - which neither side wished to see -
the FO provided Goldie with a goad to steer the Africa
Association back towards a settlement. 4 By February 1888
an agreement was in sight.5
The prospect of an even larger monopoly, which would
include the Oil Rivers if Goldie and the Africa
Association combined, provoked the shipping companies into
action. They first approached the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of the FO, Sir James Fergusson 6 , who suggested
that they put their grievances down on paper. In the
letter which they consequently addressed to Fergusson the
African Steam Ship Co. and the British and Africa Steam
Navigation Co. pointed out that their combined fleets had
1. Flint, op.cit., 101.
2. Gertzel, op.cit., 344, George Miller was a middleman
between Goldie and Holt.
3. Flint, op.cit., 103.
4. Ibid., 104.
5. Ibid., 107.
6. FO 84/1916, 23 Feb. 1888, memorandum by Fergusson.
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cost Lim and were especially constructed to be able to
cross the bars of the shallow Oil Rivers in the Bights of
Biafra. Their counter-proposal to the amalgamation of the
Royal Niger Co. and the Africa Association was that the
steamers and importers pay small dues to finance the
government of Lagos if it were extended to include the Oil
Rivers.' The amount of capital involved in the shipping
concerns put them above any individual commercial company
and could not be ignored in any settlement, as Rogerson of
the Africa Association admitted to Fergusson.2
The nub of the shipowners' fear was that the profits
amassed from such a large monopoly as that envisaged by
the combination of the Niger Company and the Africa
Association would encourage the new group to consider
establishing its own steamers 'against which no-one could
compete'. 3 Bond had personally explained to Lister in no
uncertain terms that were he, Bond, chairman of the Niger
Co. he would never rest until he had a monopoly of all the
trade and the shipping. This aim, he maintained, every
businessman would share. 4 The FO officials suspected that
the shippers were more afraid of losing their own monopoly
than the establishment of a totally new shipping monopoly,
and that if this were the case the affair could be settled
by bringing the two sides together. 5 Salisbury
1. FO 84/1916, 27 Feb. 1888, letter from the ASS Co. and
the BASN Co. to Fergusson.
2. FO 84/1917, 9 Mar. 1888, memorandum by Fergusson.
3. FO 84/1917, 23 Mar. 1888, ASS Co. and BASN Co. to FO.
4. Minutes on ibid..
5. Anderson made the point and Lister concurred, ibid..
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concurred1 , and a private letter was sent from Lister to
Goldie a few days later..
This belief of the FO, in the settlement of economic
conflicts by amalgamation through negotiation, is an
example of the mentality of civil servants at this time.
Not being personally connected with the interests
involved, their duty ended with keeping their own house in
order. This could be done by constantly telling
competitors what their rivals were saying, or introducing
them to their rivals and leaving them to fight it out.
The problem for the FO was to make sure that they always
ended up on good terms with the winners. The winners were
likely to be the wealthiest interests involved, providing
that they also had adequate political backing and
connexions with the chief civil servants.
The size of the political support available to the
shipowners was intimated in a private letter from Thomas
Sutherland to Pauncefote, which arrived on the same day as
the letter from the shipping companies. 2 It also
demonstrated that they had contacts who were familiar with
the various government departments and their chief civil
servants. Sutherland3 had already relayed his message
verbally to Sir James Fergusson, but he also knew
Pauncefote well enough to send a private letter to him.
1. Salisbury's minute on the letter was dated 27 Mar.
1888.
2. FO 84/1917 23 Mar. 1888, Sutherland to Pauncefote.
3. Sutherland worked his way up to become chairman and
managing director of the Peninsular and Orient Steam
Navigation Company with interests in the east. He
became a director of the City Bank, and the Bank of
Australasia.
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The letter made the point that the shipping companies felt
the extension of the Niger Company's charter would be
destructive to private trade and would create a monopoly
which would be injurious to the commercial interests
connected with the district. It ended by warning
Pauncefote that there would be 'a very strong opposition
in the House of Commons and elsewhere' if the extension
were to be allowed to occur.' Official recognition of the
importance of the shipping interests was demonstrated when
Lord Salisbury agreed to receive their deputation in the
following month.2
Goldie had expanded his interests, with the help of
the state, to a point where he had attracted the attention
of the next level up in the hierarchy of wealth and power,
the shipping fraternity. This group, whose interests did
not always coincide with those of the merchants, were
sufficiently powerful to alert Salisbury to the need to
take a fresh look at the state's relationship with the
Royal Niger Company. 3 Goldie was to face a real struggle
with these ambitious rivals in the next decade.
1. FO 84/1917, 23 Mar. 1888, Sutherland to Pauncefote.
2. Flint, op.cit., 109-110.
3. Ibid..
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The South Africa Trade Section
In South Africa, British economic and political
interests were as tightly interlocked as they were in West
Africa. The situation was made more complicated in South
Africa by the presence of the Boers. An attempt had been
made to secure the control of the whole area for Britain
by the hasty annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 when
Disraeli was in power; but the subsequent war with the
Boers and the humiliation of Majuba Hill in 1881 (after
Gladstone had formed an administration) resulted in the
Pretoria Convention. This agreement gave the Transvaal
quasi-independence as the South African Republic, Britain
only retaining suzerainty over the foreign relations of
the territory. This was a set back to the expansion of
British business interests in the area, as The Economist
explained to its readers at the time. Federation of the
territories, it predicted, 'would have been followed by a
steady extension of British influence, British
immigration, and a rapid importation of British capital.'1
When the South Africa trade section of the London
Chamber of Commerce formed in May 18842, there were
already two other organisations in existence which
promoted British interests in the area to the British
public, the South Africa Association and the South Africa
Committee. It was during the fighting early in 1881 that
the South Africa Association formed with the intention of
1. Econ. 17 Sept. 1881, 1156.
2. Guildhall Library MSS 16,504, Minute Book of the
South Africa Trade Section, (henceforward SAMB).
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constituting a united voice of business opinion in case
the Government decided to give up the Transvaal)
The first meeting of the Association was dominated by
Blame, Macdonald and Co., a firm of Cape merchants which
in South Africa were Blame and Co. of Port Elizabeth, a
house which enjoyed 'unequalled prestige' in the Eastern
Cape. 2 A.J. Macdonald chaired the meeting and the
suggestion that a group of South Africa business interests
should be independent of the lobbying provided by the
Royal Colonial Institute was put to the meeting by D.P.
Blame. 3 The idea was endorsed by Donald Currie 4 and a
resolution formally proposing the formation of the
Association was introduced by W.G. Soper.5
1. The Empire 11 Feb. 1881.
2. R.V. Turrell, 'Capital, Class and Monopoly: the
Kimberley Diamond Field 1871-1889', 	 (London
University, Ph.D., 1982), 136.
3. Blame was the senior partner in both firms, chairman
of the Bank of Africa, a director of the London Joint
Stock Bank (the London banking agent for the Bank of
Africa), the Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.,
and the Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Co.. He
had been a resident fellow of the RCI since its
formation in 1868. For a list of the RCI resident
and non-resident fellows, see The Proceedings of the
RCI.
4. Sir Donald Currie MP (1825-1909) had been a Cunard
agent from 1849 to 1862, and he established the
Castle line in 1872. He joined the RCI in 1874.
5. W. Garland Soper was a member of the firm Davis and
Soper, Cape and Australian Commission merchants. He
attended relevant addresses at the RCI such as that
given by J.X. Merriman, 'Commercial Resources and the
Financial Position of South Africa' in November 1884,
Proceedings of the RCI xvi (1884-5). J. Bruce of the
same firm had joined the RCI in 1876. The
provisional committee formed by the South Africa
Association in Feb. 1881 was comprised of Currie,
Blame, Soper, Macdonald, Prince, Peacock, Barsdorff,
Durham, Harvey, Henwood, Dreyfus, Mosenthal and
W.T. Smith. Currie started off an endowment fund
with a donation of 100 guineas and by the end of this
first meeting it stood at £639.
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The South Africa Association had a successful
beginning 1 , and a deputation was received by Lord
Kimberley at the Co later in February from 'merchants,
colonists and others interested in the trade between the
United Kingdom and the South Africa colonies and members
of the South Africa Association'. 2 The deputation was
introduced by Sir John Lubbock and a memorial read out by
Macdonald. The main point of the memorial was that the
Transvaal trade was in the hands of Cape and Natal
merchants who had invested large amounts of capital in the
country on the understanding that it would remain in
British hands.
The other organisation formed in the early 1880s was
the South Africa Committee. The missionary lobby had long
been committed to the welfare of the native inhabitants of
Southern Africa 3 , and the business aspects of the
1. Within a month it had 48 individual members, 30 firms
as members and donations stood at over £1,348, The
Empire 11 March 1881, 5. At the second meeting a
committee was elected of the following firms and
businessmen: Messrs. Blame, Macdonald and Co.;
Messrs. Davis and Soper; Messrs. William Dunn and
Co.; Messrs. Donald Currie and Co.; Messrs. Findlay
Durham, Brodie and Co.; Messrs. Harvey and
Greenacre; Messrs. Mosenthal Sons and Co.; Messrs.
Peacock Bros. and Co.; Messrs. Savage & Hill;
Messrs. Sinclair, Hamilton and Co.; J.D. Thomson;
the Union Steamship Co.; and J. Seabright & Co..
2. The Empire 25 Mar. 1881, 2.
3. The most recent demonstration of this lobby was a
meeting in August 1882 convened by the London
Missionary Society at the Westminster Palace Hotel,
Anthony Sillery, John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland (Cape
Town, 1971), 73. Mackenzie was a missionary who was
appointed as the deputy commissioner for Bechuanaland
when it was declared a British protectorate in 1884.
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expansion of territory inhabited by the Boers had been
well publicised by them.' Missionary and businessmen from
the City combined to form the South Africa Committee which
organised a huge meeting at the Mansion House at a crucial
stage of the negotiations between the Gladstone Government
and the Boer Government in November 1883.2 The resolution
passed at the meeting called for freedom for British trade
and British missionary work, and it was used by Derby in
his negotiations.3
Both the Association and the Committee hoped to
publicly strengthen the imperialist policy of the British
Government in South Africa in general, and towards the
Boers in particular. The political relationship between
Britain and the South Africa colonies and independent
states was completely intertwined with the economic
interest involved. The Bankers' Magazine in October 1883
1. "But let the Transvaal annex Bechuanaland and the
only available road into the interior is left Out fl
the cold . . . If Bechuanaland becomes Transvaal
territory, then England voluntarily shuts herself out
of the fairest, richest, and most inviting part of
southern Africa." - Part of an article written by
Mackenzie quoted in Sillery, op.cit., 77.
2. Anthony J. Dachs, 'Missionary Imperialism - the case
of Bechuanaland' The Journal of African History, xiii
(1972), 655. Also Sillery, op.cit., 140, and Hynes,
op.cit., 104. Hynes emphasises the humanitarian side
of the South Africa Committee, 'the missionaries and
their allies'. Sillery refers to 'the Quaker City
men'. It should be remembered that Robert N. Fowler,
partner in the banking firm of Dimsdale, Fowler,
Barnard and Dimsdale, Lord Mayor of the City at the
time, had long since exchanged his Quaker faith for
high Toryism and the established church. Other
important businessmen on the Committee and present at
its meetings, such as Dunn, Harvey and the like, had
direct economic interests in the region. The
chairman, McArthur, and Westgarth, had an indirect
interest in South Africa being kept under strong
British control as their interest was in the
Australian trade.
3. Dachs, op.cit., 656.
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reiterated this point which had been made by The Economist
two years earlier: 'The Dutch have always been the great
difficulty in the way of a successful development of
British South Africa'. 1 To prove the effect that the
political situation was having on the business prospects
in the region, the BM compared the four and a half per
cent stock of the Cape and Natal with the New South Wales
four per cent. The Australian stock had a higher market
value than the South African despite the higher interest
paid on the latter.
The prominence of the political aspects of business
relations with South Africa created a particular
difficulty for City interests, as on the one hand, they
wished to influence the British state's South Africa
policy publicly and officially; but, on the other, they
wished to avoid such action being criticised as political.
This problem was evident at the formation of the South
Africa trade section of the London Chamber of Commerce,
the latter being a body particularly sensitive about
keeping its credibility as the voice of City business
rather than City politics. At the first meeting at the
London Chamber of those businessmen with interests in
South Africa, Captain Charles Mills (present in his
official capacity as the Agent-General for the Cape
Colony), who was particularly hopeful that a trade section
be formed, 2 expressed his great satisfaction at the way in
1. BM 1883, 965. For the views of The_Economist, see
p.1O2 above.
2. The Third Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1885), 26.
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which the Chamber was careful to avoid political
complications. The voice of pragmatism, provided by
Soper, replied that it was doubtful if it were possible
for the newly-formed section to avoid the political
changes which were associated with all commercial
questions. 1
The sensitivity of the London Chamber of Commerce
over the distinction between what were the political and
what were the commercial aspects of imperialism was well
brought out by the action taken when Natal attempted to
secure its economic hinterland in the autumn of 1886.
Natal offered to assume protection of Zululand and the
native reserve, a topic which the section had discussed
with Sir Henry Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, earlier in
the year. 2 The section had been informed that the British
Government needed driving on the issue 3, and it agreed to
ask McArthur to preside over a public meeting to which
representatives of the Aborigines' Protection Society had
been invited. 4
 The executive of the London Chamber did
not approve of the meeting on the grounds that it would be
political, but it did agree to finance the meeting if the
1. SAMB 2 May 1884. The third annual report complained
that the section did, in fact, take too much notice
of Mills' remark on the dangers connected with
political questions.
2. See p.118 below.
3. RMB 2, 25 Oct. 1886; SAMB 25 Oct. 1886. The section
was given this advice by Sir George Baden-Powell.
For details of this gentleman and his role in the
section, see p. 116 below.
4. An example of the business interests directly using
their contacts forged in the South Africa Committee.
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gathering were described as being convened by 'merchants
of South Africa and Natal'.' A second circular which
advertised the meeting under its new guise was rapidly
distributed by the section in order to correct the first
which was already circulating 2 but the fine distinction
was lost on the press when reporting the meeting. 3 Des-
pite the confusion, the meeting was well supported and
McArthur presided. Resolutions were passed calling for a
British protectorate over Zululand and the reserve and for
a deputation to be sent to the CO. Speakers at the
meeting, such as Soper and Baden-Powell, proposed annexa-
tion as a more desirable policy.4
Many of the businessmen who were elected to the
committee of the South Africa trade section when it formed
in the spring of 1884 were also members of the South
Africa Association, the South Africa Committee, or both.
Blame took the chair and T. Morgan Harvey 5 was elected
his deputy. Harvey, like two of his fellow committee
members, Blame and Barsdorff, was on the board of the
1. SAMB 25 Oct. 1886.
2. RNB 2, 25 Oct. 1886, special executive meeting.
3. The Times 27 Oct. 1886, 8, 'called by the South
Africa trade section of the London Chamber of Com-
merce'.
4. Ibid., the editorial supported the demands of the
meeting. The eastern three-quarters of Zululand was
annexed by Natal in 1887, Robinson & Gallagher,
op.cit., 215.
5. Harvey had established the merchant firm of Harvey
and Greenacre in 1860 and it had soon spread from
Durban to other parts of Southern Africa. Apart from
his position on the board of the Bank of Africa, he
was also on the board of the City Bank, along with
Sir William McArthur.
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Bank of Africa which at the time was one of the two great
Anglo-South Africa banks)- The important Mosenthal
company was represented on the committee by the head of
the family, Harry Mosenthal. 2 The other members of the
committee were John Paddon 3 , W.J. Anderson 4 , James
Blackwood5 , L.B. Twentyman 6 , Andrew Stein, and John Payne.
The shipping interests, such as Currie of the Castle Mail
Packet Co., and Giles of the Union Steamship Co. 7 , were
not represented directly8 on the committee but did appear
when their interests were involved.9
1. BM 1883, 965. A director of the other big bank, the
Standard, was elected to the committee in 1886. He
was Hugh Cameron Ross, SAMB 5 Feb., 1886.
2. Adolph Mosenthal & Co. traded in hides, mohair, wool,
and ostrich feathers, then diversified into diamonds
in the 1870s. Anton Dunkelsbühler was their repre-
sentative at Kimberley. Their capital has been esti-
mated at £0.5m, Turrell, op.cit., 97. Harry Mosenthal
(1850-1915) had floated the London & South Africa
Exploration Co. with M.J. Posno in order to buy the
farms on which the Dutoitspan and Bultfontein mines
were situated, ibid., 107. Mosenthal was a director
of this company, as well as being on the board of the
Adamant Diamond Mining Co., the Bultfontein Homestead
Mining Co., the Central Mining Co. of Dorstfontein,
and he was chairman of the Orion Diamond Mining Co.
which he had also floated in London.
3. A partner in Hill & Paddon, which he had founded in
1881 with James A. Hill. Paddon Bros., which
consisted of S.W. Paddon and W.W. Paddon, had been
the largest claim-owners in the Kimberley mines in
1876. They dissolved the partnership in 1887,
Turrell, op.cit., 138.
4. A partner in W. Anderson & Co., a firm of East and
West India brokers, he joined the RCI in 1875.
Another partner in the same firm, W.M. Farmer, held a
directorship in many gold mining and exploration
companies involved in South Africa.
5. A member of the firm of Blackwood, Garland & Co..
6. A member of the firm L. Twentyman & Son.
7. The Union Steamship Co., of which Giles was chairman,
was worth £O.5m in 1885 and paid a dividend of 5%
that year.
8. W.M. Farmer of W. Anderson & Co. was a director of
the Union Steamship Co., and his partner, W.J.
Anderson, was on the committee.
9. For example, Giles and Curry were present at the
deputation in May 1884.
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The first action of the new trade section, and one of
the strongest stimuli for its formation, concerned the
possibility of German colonisation in south-west Africa.'
A deputation was organised within two weeks of the section
being formed. It was received by Lord Derby on 16 May
1884. 2
 Sir Donald Currie MP introduced the deputation and
laid emphasis on the importance of southern Africa to the
shipping route to India and China. Derby's reply revealed
the confused and bungled state of affairs:
We had not claimed the place itself as British
territory; but we had claimed a sort of general
right to exclude fore[gn Powers from the coast up to
Portuguese territory.
It is possible that this was Derby's first public
statement on a matter4 that had been building up for a
year or more 5 . Certainly, this reply to the business
interests was not overlooked by the German press. 6 It was
only a week or so later that the Cape Government decided
1. SAMB 2 May 1884. J.X. Merriman had written to Mills
in January warning that German traders were acquiring
rights in the area of Angra Pequena and that Mills
should stimulate some political awareness of this in
London, such as arranging for a question to be asked
in Parliament, D.M. Schreuder, The Scramble for South
Africa, 1877-1895 (Cambridge, 1980), 121-2.
2. SAMB 16 May 1884; see also The Times 17 May 1884, 9.
3. The Times 17 May 1884, 9.
4. Schreuder, op.cit., 125, quotes a similar statement
by Lord Derby in the House of Lords 2 or 3 days later
and claims that it constituted Derby's first public
statement on the matter. It is probable that
Schreuder did not know of this deputation, as he does
refer to Currie's approaches to the Government later
in the year, ibid., 143-3.
5. Ibid., 117.
6. The Times 22 May 1884, 5, recorded that the anger of
the Kreuz Zeitung had apparently been deeply stirred
by Derby's reply to the deputation.
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seriously to consider taking control of that area of
coastline.' At about this time the R.C.I. set up a subcom-
mittee which included Capt. Mills and James Duncan Thom-
son, of the South Africa Association, to enquire into the
subject of the contemplated occupation of Angra Pequena by
the German Government. 2 All such action was too late, as
Germany made clear to the British a week later.3
This first public action of the South Africa trade
section, carried out with the backing of the London
Chamber of Commerce, demonstrates the way in which this
group of City businessmen could bring matters forcefully
to the attention of the home Government, and in doing so
provoke ministerial comment which informed the City of the
Government's opinion before Parliament. It also
demonstrated that such action could have immediate
international importance, such as the reaction of the
Kreuz Zeitung.
In the summer of 1884 a new threat to British
business interests in South Africa was posed when
freebooting Boers raided Mafeking. The fear which this
aroused in merchants for the safety of the road to the
north was not assuaged by Kruger's later annexation of
1. Schreuder, op.cit., 126. This news reached London by
telegram on the 29th May 1884.
2. The Minute Book of the RCI No. 3, 1882-5, 258. The
meeting took place on 27 May 1884, and the result was
a letter sent to Lord Derby on 10 June, ibid., 260.
Mills and Thomson were active members of the Council
of the RCI at the time. Thomson (J.R. Thomson & Co.)
was a director of the London & St. Katherine Dock;
the English, Scottish and Australian lThartered Bank;
the London and County Banking Co.; the Otago and
Southland Investment Co.; and the Scottish Universal
and National Insurance Co..
3. Schreuder, op.cit., 127. Mills tried in vain to
provoke further action from the London Chamber of
Commerce, SAMB 4 July 1884.
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Montishiwa's and Moswete's countries.' The South Africa
section of the London Chamber, having discussed the
question, concluded that it had 'not yet taken a form
involving commercial considerations but was mainly
political'. 2 This decision was based mainly on the advice
given in a letter from Blame in which he urged the
section to watch for further events before taking action.
Agitated members of the section, and the City in
general, gave expression to their feelings through a
public meeting organised by the South Africa Committee a
week later. T. Morgan Harvey was there, as were 'many
merchants connected with the Cape colony'. 3 The chair was
taken by Sir William McArthur, and the former premier of
the Cape, Sir Thomas Scanlen, and the late Minister of
Public Works, Merriman, were also present. McArthur
closed his introduction with references to the 'vast
financial interests' of Britain in the area and the impor-
tance of the Cape to the alternative route to India. The
main speech of the meeting was given by W.E. Forster who
raised the question of whether or not Mackenzie, as the
British representative in the area, had been given suffi-
cient police to support him in Bechuanaland. 4 Forster's
speech was considered as political dynamite by the CO to
judge from the long memorandum which Fairfield wrote in
preparation for answering expected questions in
1. Sillery, op.cit., 100-119.
2. SAMB 3 Oct. 1884.
3. The Times 10 Oct. 1884, 10. N.F. Robarts, Sir T.F.
Buxton, William Westgarth, J.M. Peacock, Sir James
Anderson and J.J. Irvine (Cape Colony) were also
there.
4. This was the issue over which Mackenzie had resigned,
Sillery, op.cit., 100.
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parliament. 1
City business interests were also busy working on the
same issue through the South Africa Association, and early
in November a deputation of merchants and others interes-
ted in South African affairs was received by Lord Derby
and E.V. Ashley at the CO. 2 The deputation was introduced
by Currie who explained that the uncertainty and unrest
regarding Bechuanaland and Zululand had lead to a reduc-
tion in South African imports and exports. Derby's reply
was that no British possessions would be given up, but
neither would Britain rapidly expand its possessions in
the region. As far as Derby was concerned Britain already
had more territory than 'sufficient for our strength'.3
The South Africa section, when it decided to withhold
action on this matter, had agreed that a meeting could be
called at short notice if necessary, and that meeting took
place on 1 November. Harvey had called the meeting to
discuss the desirability of giving a dinner to Sir Charles
Warren who was to lead a British expedition to deal with
the Boer incursions into Bechuanaland. 4 The speed and
success with which the dinner for Warren was organised
suggests that the South Africa section of the London
Chamber of Commerce was the most important centre for
contacts between economic and political interests concer-
ning South Africa. It also provides an example of the
rapid and effective organising ability of City businessmen.
1. CO 417/3, 30 Oct. 1884.
2. The Times 4 Nov. 1884, 10. Soper, William Ewing and
Daniel de Pass (De Pass, Spence and Co.) were present.
3. Ibid..
4. SAMB 1 Nov. 1884. The dinner was given on 5 Nov.
1884, and the toasts were proposed by Blame and
Giles, CCJ Dec. 1884, 350.
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When the suggestion for a dinner was put to the
section, the consent of Sir Charles Warren himself and
that of the executive of the Chamber had already been
obtained.' On 1 October Joseph Chamberlain had prepared
his memorandum for the Cabinet; around 18 October the
Cabinet had contacted the War Office; and on 29 October
Warren drew up a memorandum on the conduct of the expedi-
tion. 2 The meeting, at which it was revealed that
Warren's consent had already been given for the dinner to
be organised in his honour, occurred just three days
later. The quick action of Harvey, in contacting Warren
and securing the consent of the executive, demonstrates
the importance which the City attached to the expedition,
as well as the importance of private arrangements in the
staging of public events.
A search for some link, between the man who changed
his own, and then the Cabinet's, mind on the importance of
Britain's responsibilities in this matter 3 and the South
Africa section of the City's chamber of commerce, reveals
only one possible connection - the fact that Chamberlain
was probably the largest single shareholder in the Bank of
1. SAMB 1 Nov. 1884.
2. J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, The Road to the North (1937),
359.
3. Sillery, op.cit., 120, says that Chamberlain changed
his mind in October 1884 and then issued a forceful
minute to the Cabinet.
115
Africa at the time.' It is not improbable that he knew
the directors of the bank, a number of whom were also
members of the section's committee.
There is no hard evidence that the section had such
direct private contacts with ministers or civil servants
at this time. There is evidence that it turned for
political information to the Agent-General for the Cape
Colony, 2 who insisted that the wording for the section's
annual reports was politically judicious. 3 Sir George
Baden-Powell MP also supplied political information once
he had been elected to the section's committee.4
1. From the records of the shareholders in BT 31/36754
Co.No. 13272, it is not clear if Chamberlain had the
largest single group of shares at this time, but he
certainly did by the spring of 1889, and continued to
increase his holding. On the returns for 10 May 1889
he is accredited with 1,600 of the 40,000 shares of
the company. Each share had a nominal value of
£18.15s (on which there had been a call up of £6.5s).
Compare his holdings with those of a director like
Harvey who held 485 shares in 1889. In 1891
Chamberlain's shares had a nominal value of £375,000.
2. For example, when the section wanted to know the
details of a treaty between Germany and the Transvaal
they turned to Mills, SAMB 5 June 1885.
3. Mills was responsible for the businessmen's
expression of confidence in the ability of Warren 'to
re-establish that security in South Africa, which was
necessary for the conduct of commercial transactions'
to be changed to 'that security in the interior
districts of South Africa which was necessary for the
preservation of existing commerce, and the
maintenance of the trade route to Central Africa',
SAME 10 July 1885. This subtle political gloss,
which presented imperialism as an essentially
defensive strategy based on the status quo and the
freedom of trade, was something which the businessmen
in the section at this time had not yet mastered.
4. For example, he reminded the section of the necessity
for secrecy when discussing the purchase of Delagoa
Bay in order to forestall German entry into the area,
SAMB 27 Aug. 1886; also, when the section wished to
know the opinion of Sir Hercules Robinson on the
proposal for the appointment of a British Resident in
Swaziland they turned to Powell, SAMB 15 & 14 Apr.
1889.
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When Warren returned from South Africa in October
1885 1
 he was given another dinner, and this time it was
not merely from the section but from the London Chamber of
Commerce. 2 In the afternoon before the dinner six hundred
City businessmen attended a meeting organised by the
Chamber to hear an address on 'Africa South of the
Equator' 3 given by Sir George Baden-Powell 4 who had
accompanied the Warren expedition. In his paper Sir
George stressed the economic advantages of the region, and
a resolution urging the Government to ensure that British
business could exploit the potential markets to the north
of the Cape Colony was passed at the meeting. 5 The
dinner, which was presided over by McArthur and at which
toasts were proposed by the Lord Mayor and Soper, was the
climax to the day. Both the Secretary and the Under
Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs were present.
The willingness of Government ministers and their
deputies to endorse such demonstrations of support for
imperialism may be taken as an indication of the
1. A British protectorate had been declared over
Bechuana land while he was out there, and the south of
the area had become a crown colony.
2. CCJ Nov. 1885, 292. For details of the preparation
for the dinner, see SAMB 29 Sept., 16 & 19 Oct. 1885.
3. CCJ Nov. 1885 Supplement.
4. Sir George Baden-Powell (1847-98) had been private
secretary to the Governor of Victoria 1877-8, and a
joint Special Commissioner to the West Indies
Colonies 1882-4, before becoming the political
assistant in Bechuanaland and accompanying Warren on
his expedition. An MP for Kirkdale, Liverpool from
1885 onwards, Baden-Powell represented the shipping
interests in Parliament. He wrote widely on colonial
affairs, being an active promoter of imperialism and
imperial federation. He mixed socially with people
such as Herbert of the CO, see CO 417/12, London
Chamber of Commerce to CO, 23 Oct. 1885 and minutes.
5. This was endorsed by the Council and sent on to the
CO, CO 417/9, 23 Oct. 1885.
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importance which the state attached to the City chamber of
commerce and its activities. This was particularly so in
the case of the dinner for Warren, as a meeting had been
held in the City in the previous month which had passed a
resolution describing the Government's early recall of Sir
Charles Warren as prejudicial to the political and
commercial interests of Britain in South Africa.1
The City businessmen focused public, Government and
international attention on specific issues in a number of
ways. They passed resolutions at section meetings which,
after being endorsed by the Council of the Chamber and
sent on to the Government, would stimulate a reply which
was then published in the CCJ. Formal deputations were
received by Government ministers and given ministerial
comment. Public meetings were held to publicize
particular information or specific points. Addresses were
given by informed sources to public meetings. Dinners
were prepared to draw attention to, and celebrate the
departure and return of, men who played significant
executive roles in imperialist policy.
The section also had direct contact with Cape and
Natal politicians and officials, as demonstrated by the
action which it took in response to the threat posed by
the discovery of gold in the Transvaal. The fear of the
dominant firms which were represented in the trade section
1. The Times 17 Sept. 1885, 8. The Lord Mayor,
McArthur, Soper, Giles and Hugh Seabright were
amongst 'the merchants and others' present. The
meeting heard two despatches from Warren which were
read out by Soper. The editorial in Th_Times
supported the views of this meeting and talked of ti
chaotic arrangements of the CO.
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was that the attraction of the gold might encourage the
formation of a major trade route from Delagoa Bay due
westwards to the Transvaal, across territory not under
British control. Such a route would not only result in
the loss of potential new business associated with the
goldfields, but also the loss of the old business of the
area which at that time was drawn southwards from the
Transvaal to the major commercial centres of Durban, Port
Elizabeth and Cape Town. These were the centres in which
the major British firms were established. Having made
such an effort to keep the road north up through
Bechuanaland in British hands, the businessmen did not
wish to see the business of the area drained out to the
east through Boer and Portuguese territories.
The section's first move was to deal with the
economic problems of Natal, as Sir Henry Buiwer was in
London. Buiwer, the Governor of Natal, was invited to a
meeting with the section at the London Chamber of
Commerce'. The cost and feasibility of annexing Zululand,
Natal's hinterland, were discussed with him, along with
the possibility of a reduction in the customs charges of
Natal in order to encourage trade down to Durban. Buiwer
explained that a lowering of duties would do no good as
the situation was a political one; the trade route to
Delagoa Bay was being developed by people with an interest
in building a railway there, the conditions of which had
been established by agreements between the Transvaal and
1.	 SAMB 11 Jan. 1886.
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Portuguese Governments.' The section decided, under
pressure from Paddon in particular, to make their feelings
known to the British Government at once, and a
subcommittee was formed to prepare a letter setting out
the importance of preserving British trade in South Africa
in view of the existing competition and fiscal
arrangements in the Portuguese possessions. 2 Bulwer
supported their opinion by agreeing to deliver the letter
to the Co himself.3
In March 1886 William Dunn 4 became chairman of the
South Africa trade section of the London Chamber of
Commerce, and the size of the committee was increased by
five to fifteen. 5
 Two of the new members were directors
of the Alliance Bank. 6 Dunn was involved with the South
Africa Committee 7, had been elected to the Council of the
1. For the history of this railway agreement, see Jean
van der Poel, Railways and Customs Policies in South
Africa, 1885-1910 (1933), 3-7; see also J.J. van
Helten, 'German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Co.,
and the Political Economy of the Transvaal, 1886-
1900', The Journa! of African History, xix (1978),
369.
2. SAMB 22 Jan. 1886. The letter was adopted by the
section on 5 Feb. 1886.
3. SAMB 11 Jan. 1886.
4. Sir William Dunn (1833-1912) has established the
merchant firm of Mackie, Dunn & Co. in South Africa,
and later the London firm of bankers and shippers,
William Dunn & Co.. At this time he was a director
of the Alliance Bank, the United Discount Co., and
the Home and Colonial Marine Insurance Co.. He later
became an MP, and in 1916 Lord Mayor of the City of
London. He remained chairman of the section until
1891.
5. The new members were James Macalister (Dunn & Co.),
H.C. Ross (a director of the Standard Bank, and of
the Merchant Banking Corporation, and later of the
Alliance & Parr's Bank), P. Henwood (1828-1907) who
had established himself in Durban as a hardware
merchant in 1856 and soon became the most important
in the country with branches in the diamond fields
and later in the goldfields, and Baden-Powell.
6. Dunn and Macalister, later Ross.
7. For a direct reference to this, see SAMB 4 Apr. 1889.
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London Chamber (like McArthur), and had somewhat fewer
inhibitions about expressing opinions on what had been
called the political side of South Africa questions. For
example, at the first meeting of the section over which he
presided it was agreed that they should advocate the
unification and federation of South Africa, and that such
a policy should be introduced within the following ten
years. 1
In the summer, the section took advantage of the
presence of Sir Gordon Sprigg in London to press its
opinions regarding the Delagoa Bay route more firmly upon
the Imperial and the Colonial Governments. Sir Gordon was
Prime Minister and Colonial Treasurer of the Cape Colony2.
The section, perhaps under the influence of Dunn's
experience of political activity, recognised the important
difference between the official and the private modes of
communication. The meeting with Sprigg was divided into
two, a private discussion and an official deputation, 3 and
even the official discussion was treated secretly for fear
of it coming to the ears of the Germans.4
1. SAMB 12 Mar. 1886.
2. Sprigg had promoted the interests of the east Cape
merchants in the legislative assembly, or tried to,
see A.J. Purkis, 'The Politics, Capital, and Labour
of Railway-Building in the Cape Colony 1870-1885'
(Oxford University, D.Phil., 1978).
3. SAMB 27 Aug. 1886 only recorded the deputation.
Fortunately the Chamber's Rough Minute Book No. 2 has
survived in which the private meeting was also
recorded, Guildhall Library MSS 16, 466, RMB 2, 27
Aug. 1886. It is unfortunate for the historian that
the London Chamber of Commerce was becoming sensitive
about what it officially minuted.
4. SAMB 27 Aug. 1886.
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At the private meeting it was agreed that neither
Sprigg nor the businessmen were to be committed in any way
by the discussion. The point under discussion was the
duties of the Cape Colony in relation to the Delagoa Bay
route, the businessmen wishing to see a fixed tariff for
the colony) At the deputation the direct problem of
Delagoa Bay was discussed. Baden-Powell suggested that
the Portuguese colony should be bought, as the goldfields
in the Transvaal were opening up. Sprigg replied that he
was afraid that Germany might make terms with Portugal for
acquiring it. The key to South Africa was Delagoa Bay, in
Sprigg's opinion, and the question was entirely one of
purchase. In confidence Sprigg told the section that he
had been in communication with the Colonial Secretary and
that the Cape Government were willing to give every
assistance in the purchase provided they received a quid
pro quo.
The attempts of the businessmen in the section to
influence policy regarding the preservation of southward
trade routes was not confined to meeting colonial
politicians and governors in the City. The business
represented in the trade section had establishments in all
the principal trading centres in South Africa 2 , and had
'constituents' in the diamond fields when they opened3,
1. For the context of this plea see pp. 122-124 below.
2. Parl. Papers (1904) LXI, 'Report received from Mr.
Henry Birchenough the special Commissioner appointed
by the Board of Trade to report upon the present
position and future prospects of British trade in
South Africa', 8.
3. Turrell, op.cit., 97.
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and would probably have the same in the goldfields as they
developed. They therefore had much influence in the
chambers of commerce in South Africa. Pressure was put on
the Cape Assembly through the local chambers of commerce
to bring the Cape Colony tariff to exactly that of Natal
in order that no major changes occurred to existing trade
structures, and so that the Cape and Natal did not indulge
in an economically suicidal war of tariff reductions.' In
this way it was hoped to bring as much of the new business
associated with the goidmines into the hands of the
existing prominent firms.
The Durban Chamber of Commerce was the first of the
coastal chambers 2 to take action on the matter. The
immediate stimulus was provided by a letter from the
Colonial Secretary informing the chairman that the High
Commissioner was contemplating the organisation of an
enquiry into the question of Border Customs and duties.3
The Chamber immediately formed a committee to prepare a
report on the customs tariff, and invited the Maritzburg
Chamber of Commerce to meet them to discuss the question.4
The resulting report, which proposed a 6 per cent ad
1. For a history of the Natal and Cape tariffs, see van
der Poel, op.cit., 10-18.
2. Kimberley Chamber of Commerce was the first to act,
The Port Elizabeth Telegraph 9 Oct. 1886, according
to the account of the meeting of the Capetown Chamber
of Commerce. The paper has only two pages.
3. Natal Advertiser 23 July 1886. This two page paper,
'the largest circulation in Durban', had badgered the
Chamber of Commerce to establish transport links with
the goldfields, as Kimberley was already doing, ibid.,
12, 16 & 22 July 1886. The question of tariffs was
urgent as the Transvaal Government Law No. 4, 1882
was due to come into operation on 1st September 1886
and it was possible that it would be used to discri-
minate against goods entering the Transvaal via the
Cape and Natal, Natal Advertiser 7 Aug. 1886.
4. Ibid., 26 July 1886.
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valorem tariff, was presented to the Chamber a week or so
later, 1 and the chairman of the Chamber called a meeting
to consider the question of establishing rapid and regular
communication between Ladysmith (the end of the existing
railway) and the goldfields.2
Sir Benjamin Wesley Greenacre, 3 who had been visiting
the goldfields, returned to Durban ten days later and made
public his views 4 that the goldfields would prove
exceedingly rich and bring business to Natal, provided the
necessary steps were taken. The measures he had in mind
were the extension of the railways and an adjustment of
the Natal tariff thus securing Natal's share in the trade
of the Transvaal. 5 It was at this time that the Durban
Chamber and the London Chamber of Commerce agreed
officially to co-operate.6
The Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce was a little
slower off the mark and it was not until the end of
September that it met to consider what steps should be
taken by the Cape Government to secure a portion of the
1. Natal Advertiser 6 Aug. 1886.
2. Ibid., 7 Aug. 1886.
3. Greenacre (1832-1911) was in partnership with T.
Morgan Harvey, the deputy chairman of the London
South Africa trade section. Harvey and Greenacre had
formed in 1860, four years after Greenacre had
arrived in Durban from the U.K., Greenacre was later
Mayor of Durban.
4. In an interview given to the Natal Advertiser 17 Aug.
1886.
5. Greenacre had been elected to the Legislative Council
in his absence and an advertisement, which he had
placed in the Natal Advertiser 20 Aug. 1886, presen-
ted his intentions as an elected representative to
push the railway on to the goldfields, and also to
take the necessary fiscal steps.
6. SAMB 20 Aug. 1886. The agreement was made a week
before Sprigg met the businessmen in London.
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increasing trade with the Transvaal for the colony.1
C.F. Blame was chairman of the Chamber, but it took a
timely intervention by William Macfarlane at a crucial
meeting to provide this Chamber with detailed information
about the activity of the Durban Chamber. He amended the
resolution which the meeting had intended to pass for one
which would harmonize the Cape tariff with the Natal
tariff. Macfar lane, a member of the firm Mackie, Dunn &
Co., explained that in this way a beggar-my-neighbour
policy between the Cape and Natal could be avoided, and
that it was only this, and no more, that the Cape
Government was empowered to do under existing law in any
case. The Port Elizabeth Chamber voted unanimously for
the amended resolution.
This co-operative common tariff level was the policy
which all the Cape Colony's chambers of commerce and
mercantile bodies agreeed upon. 2 At the meeting of the
Cape Town Chamber of Commerce on the subject, the names of
those present - Ross, Twentyman, and Anderson - recall the
committee of the London South Africa section. The views
of the Kimberley Chamber, that the Cape's dues should
equal those of Natal, were put to the meeting. The
meeting was held at such a late date that the chairman was
able to tell the Cape Colony Chamber that the Government
had decided on that same day to carry out the proposed
changes in dues.3
1. The Port Elizabeth Telegraph 30 Sept. 1886.
2. Ibid., 7 Oct. 1886.
3. Ibid., 9 Oct. 1886.
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This activity is an example of the dominant British
business interests in southern Africa combining to present
a united front in order to exercise political influence in
the Cape and Natal in the face of a change in circumstan-
ces which threatened their control of business in the
region. The offer of a common customs rate to the
Transvaal was an attempt by the oligarchy of established
mercantile interests, who all had firms in the City of
London, to retain their profit levels at a difficult time.
This is not to say that all interests were involved, or
that local competition, for example between the west and
the east Cape, disappeared 1 ; but in the face of this
general threat most of the wealthy British business of
South Africa managed to achieve a united opinion expressed
through the chambers of commerce of the region, regardless
of political boundaries and local rivalries.
In London, the South Africa trade section decided
that the most it could officially ask for from the British
Government was the appointment of British Consuls at the
two ends of the proposed railway route, Delagoa Bay and
Pretoria 2 , which would compete with the existing southward
routes. This the FO proceeded to do, 3 and by the
following spring the section was pleased to know that its
demands had been met. 4 During 1887-8 the Cape and Natal
1. It did not, see the report of the Chamber of Commerce
meeting, Port Elizabeth Telegraph 30 Oct. 1886.
2. SAMB 28 Sept. 1886; RMB 2, 21 Oct. 1886, gives the
letter from the Chamber to the FO. The letter also
asked for a Consul at St. Lucia Bay.
3. RMB 2, 4 Dec. 1886, Herbert immediately agreed to the
Consul in Pretoria on behalf of the Secretary of
State, but said that they would hear later from the
FO on the Consul for Delagoa Bay.
4. SAMB 4 Mar. 1887.
126
Governments attempted to buy this railway line which
McMurdo's Anglo-American syndicate were building from
Delagoa Bay towards the goldfields of the Transvaal)
Long discussions took place in the London Chamber of
Commerce, and Dunn assured the section that the railway
would not go on to Pretoria whilst it was in McMurdo's
hands. 2 Dunn was proved correct, and the Portuguese
Government took over the concession in June 1889 as
McMurdo had only completed 82 kilometres of the line.3
There was another early reaction to the discovery of
gold in the Transvaal which led City businessmen to make
further demands on the British state, and further cement
the close relations between British political and economic
interests in the area. This was the expectation that
similar riches to the gold discoveries might be found in
nearby territories, and City money was ready to finance
the necessary exploration. The Bechuanaland Exploration
Company was floated in 1888 on the basis of a 400 square
mile mineral concession in Khama's Country, north of the
Transvaal. 4 The main capital of this enterprise, those
holders of more than 1,000 shares, came from City private
1. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 219.
2. SAMB 20 Apr. 1888.
3. Philip R. Warhurst, jlo-PortugueseRelations in
South-Central Africa, 1890-1900 (1962), 112.
4. The Company's file is kept at Companies House,
Company No. 26499, as the company is still in
existence.
127
and merchant banks,' and wealthy merchants. 2 The South
Africa Loan Mortgage and Mercantile Agency initially held
a massive 50,000 shares, or more than a third of the total
allotted, most of which it offloaded before the
Bechuanaland Exploration Company was a year old.3
Early in 1888 Cecil Rhodes, who had made his money in
the diamond mines at Kimberley and founded the Gold Fields
(later Consolidated Gold Fields) of South Africa in 1887,
1. Co. no. 26499. Charles A. Prescott (Prescott, Cave,
Buxton, Loder and Co.) - 1,000 shares; Leo
Rothschild (the London Rothschilds of New Court) -
4,200 shares; Edward Huth (Frederick Huth & Co.) -
1,200 shares; and Burt, Brochelon & Burt - 1,040
shares. This information was given in a return dated
6 Sept. 1888. The company was constituted in May
1888 of 150,000 shares of £1 each, of which 125,000
were allotted. 79,000 of these shares were to be
considered as paid up, probably as payment for the
possession of the Northern Gold Fields Exploration
Syndicate Concession through the Caisse des Mines,
and for the services of the civil engineer Edward
Jones. A call up of 14/- was made on the other
46,000 allotted shares. J.S. Galbraith, 'Origins of
the British South Africa Company', J.E. Flint & G.
Williams (eds.), Perspectives of Empire (1975), 152,
mentions Mosenthal & Sons, Henry Oppenheim, and the
Baron Henry de Rothschild of Paris as being amongst
the first subscribers. Oppenheim took 60 shares
according to the September 1888 returns, but there
seems to be no holding by the Paris Rothschilds at
this time, although a few thousand shares were in the
hands of Parisians.
2. Mosenthal - 3,500 shares; C.N. Lawrence (Price &
Pierce, commission merchants) - 1,200 shares; Robert
Mcllwraith - 1,200 shares; J.S. Coilman - 1,200
shares; E. Schloessen - 1,000 shares; W.G. Anderson
- 300 shares, & T.J. Anderson - 500; Edmund Davis -
4,000 shares.
3. It is difficult to know the circumstances under which
the shares were attributed to James Thorburn and John
Robertson of the South Africa Loan Mortgage and
Mercantile Agency. A clue may be that H.B.T.
Farquhar, one of the directors of the British South
Africa Company when it formed, was at this time
chairman of the South Africa Loan Mortgage and
Mercantile Agency.
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talked to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, about
the hopes which he, Rhodes, had for opening up
Matabeleland and Mashonaland through the De Beers Co.. 1 A
lot of City banking, merchant, and shipping capital was
already involved in the diamond mines at Kimberley. 2 Most
of the very wealthy British businesses with interests in
South Africa had their fingers in the diamond mine pie.
Rhodes' venture, the Gold Fields of South Africa, was
also floated largely with City money, including the
wealthy merchants of the South Africa trade. 3 A number of
East India Merchants put their money in the mines led by
the founder subscriber, C.G. Arbuthnot of Arbuthnot,
Latham and Co., who had 1,000 shares. 4 The extent to
which merchants and merchant-bankers were to be found with
substantial investments in both the Bechuanaland
Exploration Co. and the Gold Fields of South Africa is
1. Paul Maylam, Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British
(Connecticut, 1980), 50; also Galbraith, op.cit.,
154.
2. The London Rothschilds, the Mosenthals,
J.H. Schroeder & Co., Sir Donald Currie, Paddon &
Hill, Blame, W.G. Anderson and De Pass all put money
into the diamond mines, and the Standard Bank was
involved in financing J.B. Robinson, Turrell,
op.cit., Appendices.
3. The original seven subscribers were Thomas and
Charles D. Rudd, J.J. Hamilton, W.M. Farmer (partner
of W.G. Anderson), Francis Rhodes, Major General
F.R. Pollock, and Charles G. Arbuthnot. Harry
Mosenthal took 1,500 shares when it was floated.
Frederick Huth and Co., merchant bankers, also took a
large number of shares, Edward Huth 1,000, and Daniel
Meinertzhagen 1,000.
4. H.L. Arbuthnot of the same firm took 3,000 and the
firm itself took another 200. Robert Ryrie of
Arbuthnot, Ewart and Co. took another 1,000.
Alexander Lawrie took 250 and John Mackintosh 100.
Harvey Brand and Co. had 700, of which W.T. Brand had
200 and James Brand 500.
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significant. 1 It was an indication of the willingness of
merchants to invest some of their capital in gold mines
when they had the opportunity, in the same way as they had
in the diamond mines in the 1870s. The large presence of
East India merchant capital demonstrates that the
inclination was not limited to merchants with interests in
South Africa. When so much of the capital for the Gold
Fields and the Bechuanaland Exploration Co. came from the
City it is difficult to see one or the other as anything
but metropolitan in character, and any competition between
them as secondary to the main fact, which was that the
expansion of British business in the area was City
financed.
At the same time as very wealthy City interests were
becoming involved, directly and indirectly, with the idea
of profit-making to the west and north of the Transvaal,
the London Chamber of Commerce organised a public meeting
to provide a platform for Revd. John Mackenzie. He had
been running a campaign throughout the previous year in
order to gain support for the direct imperial
administration of this same area which he named 'Austral
Africa'. 2 The address was given a week or so before the
1. For example, Frederick Huth and Company had 1,200
shares in the former and 2,000 in the latter.
Mosenthal had 3,500 and 1,500 shares, J.W. Anderson
and Co. had 600 shares in the Gold Fields through its
partner W.M. Farmer and 800 in the Bechuanaland
Exploration Co. via the Andersons.
2. Mackenzie's book Austral Africa, Losing it or Ruling
it (1887), set out his ideas in detail. He wished
for a federation of the different colonies and states
of South Africa under British rule which would
stretch up to the River Zambesi. This, to Mackenzie,
was the ideal way of bringing civilisation and
Christianity to the area.
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floating of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, and one
of the proposals which Mackenzie made at the meeting was
for a railway north through Bechuanaland,' a suggestion
which the Bechuanaland Exploration Company made to the
CO.2
Seventeen Members of Parliament were at the meeting,
including Sir Donald Currie and Sir R.N. Fowler, as well
as the president of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce,
Walter Searle, and the Cape's Agent-General, Mills. It
was a powerful meeting at which the resolution, declaring
the general desire for an extension of British influence
up to the Zambesi, was proposed by Sir Charles Warren of
expeditionary fame, and seconded by Baden-Powell. Added
importance was given to an already influential assembly by
the presence of Joseph Chamberlain in the chair. 3 It is
little wonder that the meeting caused widespread comment
throughout the South African press, all of which was
carefully collected at the CO.4
In July 1888, Sir Hercules Robinson was instructed to
inform Kruger that the whole of the area south of the
1. CCJ June 1888 Supplement; The Times 15 May 1888, 10.
2. Maylam, op.cit., 78.
3. Here is a second example of the coincidence between
Chamberlain's economic and political interests. The
Times 15 May 1888, emphasised the importance of the
meeting for the way in which it marked a change in
Chamberlain's political views on the Empire.
4. CO 417/26, 18 July 1888, London Chamber of Commerce
to Knutsford enclosing a copy of the CCJ Supplement,
appended are the cuttings from the Natal Witness, the
Natal Mercury, the Cape Argus, the Capetown Mercury
and De Volkstem. This meeting was described by
Sillery, op.cit., 146, as the single most important
event of Mackenzie's 1887-8 campaign.
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Zambesi was a British 'sphere of influence' 1. This novel
method 2 of proclaiming domination of a territory was
forced upon Lord Salisbury by the lack of parliamentary
will to agree to a protectorate for the area. 3 As the CCJ
had complained at the beginning of the year in an
editorial on the 'Future of South Africa': 'The average
voter, the condition of whose pocket limits the action of
Her Majesty's Government, has no knowledge of and no
interest in Colonial questions'.4
If public money was not available to push forward the
frontiers of empire, City money was willing to extend the
areas in which profits were expected, and in September
1888 the Exploring Company carried Out a survey of the
proposed railway to the north. 5 In the following month
the company submitted its conditions to the CO. The
demands included the acquisition of land, mineral rights,
the power to levy taxes, to carry out irrigation and to
1. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 221-2, suggest that
earlier pressure for the extension of Bechuanaland
northwards had been offset by opposition from the
Cape but the situation changed with the discovery of
gold in the Transvaal and the expectation of a new
rand for colonial enterprise in adjacent territories.
2. According to Meade at the CO. Sillery, op.cit., 151.
3. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 222.
4. CCJ Jan. 1888.
5. Maylam, op.cit., 81. The Exploring Company, BT 31-
4176/26995, had been formed by the same group as
those composing the Bechuanaland Exploration Co.,
Lord Gifford, R.W. Murray, F.I.R. Seaver, George
Cawston, and Edward Jones. All had one, two or three
hundred of the founder shares. The Bechuanaland
Exploration Co. itself held the other half of the
founder shares, 1,000 shares. 10,000 ordinary £1
shares were also issued. Lord Gifford had served in
Wolseley's Ashanti campaign, participated in the Zulu
War, held a position in the colonial service in
Western Australia, and Gibraltar. He had a director-
ship in a number of gold mining companies in Africa
and Australia, the Kaiser Gold Mines, the Goldfields
of North Queensland, and was the chairman of Notre
Dame des Victoires (Transvaal) Gold Mining Co..
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lay out townships.'
It was in November that the South Africa section of
the London Chamber was informed by its chairman, Dunn,
that it was desirable that the Government should be
strengthened with an expression of opinion on the
Bechuanaland issue, as questions had been asked in
Parliament. 2 A resolution was subsequently passed which
approved of the 'extension of the British protectorate',
stressed the need to keep Bechuana land out of Boer hands
and under the direct rule of Britain, and asked that the
CO should receive a deputation on the subject.3
Dunn and the trade section were apparently confused
by the new fine distinction between the concept of a
protectorate and that of a sphere of influence. This
became evident at the deputation which took place in
January when Knutsford pointed out the different grades of
imperialism represented by the colony of British
Bechuanaland, the protectorate of Bechuanaland, and the
1. Maylam, op.cit., 81.
2. SAMB 14 Nov. 1888. Mackenzie, Searle and J.J. Ingram
were present as guests. The only question which had
been asked in the House had merely queried the
placing of the eastern boundary of the British
protectorate at 300 and that of the sphere of
influence at 200 longitude. The importance of this
question arose from rumours of the Rudd concession,
and it was intended to establish whether the British
sphere of influence included the territory the
mineral rights of which Lobenguela was reported to
have sold to a 'Cape syndicate' for £1,200 and some
rifles. For the details of the relation between the
parliamentary question and the concession granted to
the Cape syndicate, see the pamphlet of the South
Africa Committee, CO 417/37, 358-363.
3. The section also decided to contact the other major
British chambers of commerce in order to enlist their
support.
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sphere of influence around Bechuanaland) When compared
with the statement Lord Derby had given to businessmen a
few years previously, when he equated British annexation
with a British protectorate, 2 it is understandable that
such confusion existed. The speed with which diplomatic
arrangements had had to adapt to the demands for
imperialism by businessmen, while operating within the
confines of a parliamentary political system, was the
source of the fine distinctions and misunderstandings.
Judging by the letter that was sent to the Co in
December from the London Chamber of Commerce, the
advancement of the railway north was their main concern.3
This was an objective which was shared with Mackenzie who
had close contact with the CO. 4 The suggestion that the
Government needed supporting with a resolution from the
section might even have been suggested by the Government.5
1. Dunn retorted that he thought it was very difficult
for the natives to define the difference, Cape Argus
11 Jan. 1889. The report of the deputation in this
newspaper was preferred, by Herbert at the CO, to
that in The Times, CO 417/26, letter from the London
Chamber of Commerce to the CO, 19 Dec. 1888, annexed
cuttings and minute.
2. The Times 4 Nov. 1884, 10, 'you know that a protecto-
rate means annexation. It is the same thing . . •'
3. Co 417/26, 6 Dec. 1888, the London Chamber of
Commerce to CO. The reason given for placing
Bechuanaland under direct rule was that the railway
north was dependent upon this, and that trade in turn
was dependent upon the railway.
4. Sillery, op.cit., 146.
5. Lord Salisbury had prompted such action on other
occasions, for example when he wanted the Portuguese
to think that he had a strong public opinion behind
him, Oliver, op.cit., 151; or when he stimulated
Johnston to write an article for The Times in August
1888 on British policy in Africa, ibid., 139.
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Certainly, the Government was encouraging the railway
enterprise at this time.'
Between the time that the South Africa section asked
for a deputation on the topic of Bechuanaland in November
and the time that the deputation occurred in the new year
circumstances had changed. The prospectors for the
Bechuanaland Exploration Company had reported that Khama's
country was abundant with gold reefs; 2 news of the Rudd
concession which Rhodes and Beit were to finance was
confirmed; 3 and Lord Knutsford, who had no objections to
a strong company having a charter provided that that was
the limit to Government involvement in the area, had told
Gif ford that in his efforts to obtain a royal charter for
the Imperial British Central South Africa Company he
should try to work with Rhodes. 4 The Gifford group made
one last independent attempt to obtain state backing for
their capital investment early in January 1889, when the
CO was asked whether they would grant a charter for a
scheme which merged the Bechuanaland Exploration Co. and
1. According to a letter from Mills to Merriman, which
is quoted in Schreuder, op.cit., 213, Mills claimed
that £3m of City money was ready for investment in
the railway northwards. Many private interviews were
taking place at this time between the representatives
of enterprises financed by the City and Government
departments, Maylam, op.cit., 78; Galbraith,
op.cit., 154.
2. Maylam, op.cit., 22.
3. Lobenguela apparently signed the concession 30 Oct.
1888, sillery, op.cit., 153.
4. Galbraith, op.cit., 163. Rhodes had already proposed
a degree of amalgamation after meeting R.W. Murray
and Sir Charles Metcalfe during their survey work for
the Exploring Co. in South Africa, Maylam, op.cit.,
53.
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the Exploring Co. into one undertaking. 1 It was as a
result of this application that Sir Hercules Robinson, the
High Commissioner of South Africa who was also a director
of De Beers, warned Rhodes that, unless he travelled to
England to see Lord Salisbury and Nathan Rothschild
personally, the Rhodes group was in danger of being out-
manoeuvred by the Gif ford group.2
Thus, when the deputation from the London Chamber of
Commerce took place on 9 January 1889, the stage was being
set for an amalgamation of the two groups who sought a
royal charter. Under these new conditions Gifford, who
had promised to attend the deputation, found himself
detained elsewhere when it took place. 4 Chamberlain also
sent his regrets that he was not able to attend. Neverthe-
less, it was a well-attended deputation which Henry Kimber
MP introduced. 5 The main points put by those who attended
were that the Government should develop its administration
in the area, and that the projected railway from Kimberley
1. Co 417/38, 3 Jan. 1889. Herbert was under the mis-
guided impression that this application had the back-
ing of Rhodes and the wealthy Colonel North who had
made his fortune out of Chilean nitrate. North was
at that time forming the Bank of Tarapaco and London.
2. Maylam, op.cit., 54.
3. CO 417/38, 3 Jan. 1889. It is not clear why it was
postponed until this date as the information was sent
in a private letter on 12 Dec. 1889 which is noted in
the register, but not in the files, at the PRO.
4. Cape Argus 11 Jan. 1889, Gifford was described as the
chairman of the Bechuanaland Railway Co.. He had
submitted his plans for the railway to the Government
on 20 Dec. 1888, CO 417/26.
5. Present were Dunn, Mackenzie, Bell, Twentyman,
Macalister, Hamilton, Dyer, Thomson, Searle, Arnold-
Forster, N. Thomas, Maynard (Union Steamship Co.),
Stein and James Ansell.
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through Bechuanaland should be speedily constructed.'
As in the case of West Africa, the state had been
confronted with competing interests and its response was
to encourage the competitors to amalgamate. In March
Rhodes and Beit left South Africa for England, and at the
end of April Gifford, with Rhodes' support, submitted a
plan to the CO. 2 The two economic groups were amalgamated
into the Central Search Association in May. 3
 At the same
time the Exploring Company liquidated itself and reformed
as The (new) Exploring Company, its shares being
distributed between the two groups.4
The draft charter for the British South Africa
Company was submitted by Gifford in June 1889, and the
charter was quickly granted. 5 The final amalgamation of
all assets and investments took place in June 1890 with
the formation of the United Concession Company whch took
over the Central Search Association as a going concern.6
There were no real losers from the City's point of view,
1. The South Africa Question (1889) - a pamphlet
produced by the South Africa Committee, (a copy may
be found in CO 417/24, 24 Feb. 1889) records that
nearly a month later this committee was also granted
an interview which was confidential.
2. Maylam, op.cit., 53.
3. Galbraith, op.cit., 166. A quarter of the shares
went to Gold Fields of South Africa (25,500), 22,500
went to the Exploring Company, and Rhodes, Rudd and
Beit held about 36,000 shares between them.
4. BT 31-4468/29152. Only 10,000 of its 35,000 shares
were offered to the market, the rest were distributed
amongst the Bechuanaland Exploration Co. (4,725),
Rhodes (4,800), Beit (4,793), Gifford (600), Cawston
(1,000), Maund (6,000), Jones (1,350), and R.W.
Murray (1,050).
5. Maylam, op.cit., 54. It was granted within four
months.
6. BT 31-4815/31926. 4m £1 shares were offered, of
which only l.3m were immediately taken up. The
Exploring Co. had a quarter of these shares.
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as many merchants and some bankers, like the Rothschilds',
had money on both horses involved.
City interests were clearly involved in the promotion
of the diamond and gold mining companies, the exploration
companies, and the mercantile firms. All of these were
interested in who controlled the trade routes. All
interests were also in favour of the expansion of the
power of the British state in the area accompanying the
extension of economic interests there, although they did
not always all agree on the form which the power of the
state should take. The state in turn was dependent upon
the business interests for the extension of its power in
the region, as the business capital could facilitate, in
the short term, a policy which the City proposed but which
Parliament was not prepared to finance at that time.
The East India and China Trade Section
The first major event involving the London Chamber of
Commerce in the relations between the state and City
businesses with interests in the East was the annexation
of Upper Burma. After the withdrawal of the British
Resident from Mandalay and Bhamo in 1879 and the abolition
of the Mixed Court, British trade with Upper Burma
declined2 . Burma proceeded to open diplomatic relations
with the French early in 1883.
1. They had 3,000 shares in the Central Search
Association when it was formed, BT 31-4451/28988;
also mentioned in Galbraith, op.cit., 166.
2. The situation was presented in this way in a memorial
to the Government, CCJ Apr. 1886, 96. For further
details, see A.T.Q. Stewart, The Pagoda War (1972).
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The Council of the London Chamber of Commerce were
officially made aware of the situation by a memorial from
a large number of City merchants, and quickly sent a
memorial to the India Office. 1 Fears about the general
activities of the French in the Far East were raised in
the following year, particularly over the French
expedition to Tonquin and the construction of a railway
from Saigon to Phnom-Pen 2 . In October 1884 British
business interests 3 in Rangoon organised an enormous
meeting of the whole of the British mercantile community
and 2,000 Burmese at which a resolution was passed urging
that the British Government should be sent a memorial
about the state of affairs in Upper Burma.4
A few months later City merchants with interests in
Burma met in the London Chamber of Commerce and the result
was a memorial, endorsed by the Council of the Chamber,
which they hoped to present to the Secretary of State for
1. CCJ Feb. 1883, 44.
2. CCJ June 1883, 144.
3. These were essentially the Irrawaddy Flotilla
Company, the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation
(floated in 1863 to take over the business of William
Wallace, see A.C. Pointon, The Bombay Burmah Trading
Corporation Ltd. 1863-1963 (1964)), Messrs. Gillan-
ders, Arbuthnot and Co., and Messrs. R. & J.Q.
Rowett. These were the companies represented at a
deputation from the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce to
the Chief Commissioner, Parl.PaRers (1886) L,
(c.4614), 269, 'Correspondence relating to Burmah
since the accession of King Theebaw in October 1878',
(henceforward Burma Corresp.), enclosure 4 in No.
125, 24 Sept. 1885. Wallace Bros. of London had the
largest interest through their direction of the
Bombay Burmah Trading Company, see A.C. Pointon,
Wallace Brothers (Oxford, 1974).
4. This information is given in a memorial presented to
Kimberley in March 1885, CCJ Apr. 1885, 96; see also
Burma Corresp. No. 96, 6 July 1885, from Messrs.
Mime and Co. to Lord Randolph Churchill.
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India.' The Earl of Kimberley received the deputation at
the India Office on 25 March 2 and prominent members of
the deputation, such as S.S. Gladstone (a partner in
Ogilvy, Gillanders and Company) 3
 and W. Paterson (of
Paterson and Simons) 4, made it clear that they wished the
Government to annex Upper Burma. The memorial which they
presented appeared more modest, asking for a British
Resident in Mandalay with an assistant in Bhamo, both with
sufficient force to support them, and for the re-
establishment of the Mixed Court. Kimberley assured the
deputation that Lord Dufferin was aware of 'the
unsatisfactory position of affairs' and that relations
with Burma would be restored without resort to annexation.
As in South Africa, the City business interests
worked through the local chambers of commerce when
appealing to the. local government bodies. The Rangoon
Chamber of Commerce, having asked the Viceroy of India to
establish order in Upper Burma to no avail, then wrote
directly to the Secretary of State. This letter, which
1. CCJ Apr. 1885, 108. The Council meeting was held on
13 Mar..
2. Ibid., 96. Those present included Sir W. McArthur,
Samuel Morley, R.N. Fowler, S.S. Glasdtone, E. Garnet
Man, S. Oppenheim, R. Gladstone (Liverpool), Ernest
Haines, Holt S. Hallett, W.M. Porter, Alexander
Fraser, John Watson, W. Gillam, John Haddon,
W. Paterson, G.W. Anderson, W. Nursley Witt, and the
secretary of the London Chamber.
3. This firm was the London end of Gillanders, Arbuthnot
& Co., Gladstone was later a director of the
Peninsular & Orient Steam Navigation Co., and in 1899
Governor of the Bank of England of which he was a
director at this time. H.N. Gladstone, third son of
W.E. Gladstone, became a partner in both the
Gillanders firms, as well as a director of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China in 1897.
4. Paterson was a director of the Chartered Bank, and
the chairman of the London, Paris & American Bank at
this time.
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the Chamber had sent previously to the London Chamber of
Commerce, 1 outlined the arguments of the British
businessmen, and two points they made were particularly
strong. The first removed the usual constraint
conspicuous in considerations of British imperialism, by
pointing out that British Burma produced a revenue surplus
every year (which went into the coffers of the Indian
Government) and that consequently the annexation of Upper
Burma would pay as a commercial undertaking. The second
was a blunt warning, that if there was no change in the
policy of the Indian Government all the rich markets of
Upper Burmah would be lost by British businessmen,
probably to the French.
These fears appeared to be realised when a French
Vice-Consul, M. Haas, arrived at Mandalay in May 1885, the
news of which was telegraphed to the London Chamber of
Commerce. The executive of the London Chamber immediately
wrote to the India Office with the information and also
reported the rumour that a proclamation was soon to be
issued reducing the import duty on French goods into Upper
Burma to half that which was applied to British goods.2
In July the London Chamber again wrote to the India
Office, this time enclosing the letter from the Rangoon
Chamber of Commerce. 3 Matters worsened in August when
King Theebaw alleged that the Bombay Burma Trading Co. had
fraudulently exported timber from Upper Burma and demanded
1. Burma Corresp., No. 94, 1 June 1885. The date of the
original letter to the London Chamber was 18 May. A
copy of this letter was also sent to the India Office
by Milne and Co. of Glasgow, ibid., No. 96.
2. Ibid., No. 95, 4 June 1885.
3. Ibid., No. 97, 16 July 1886.
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royalties of around £200,000 from the firm.' The company
took the case to an English court and in early September
Lord Randolph Churchill, the newly-appointed Secretary of
State for India, issued a virtual ultimatum to Mandalay.2
A month later King Theebaw refused to accept the
company's version of the dispute and Dufferin responded
with an ultimatum which demanded trade concessions and the
acceptance of a British agent. Before the demand had
reached Mandalay, British troops were already embarked for
Rangoon and Churchill had announced the probability of a
war which would have results beneficial for British
trade. 3 Before the war began in early November, the
London Chamber of Commerce had held a special meeting,
again in response to leading London firms, at which it
expressed its satisfaction at the prompt action taken by
the Government and urged that annexation or at least 'an
efficient protectorate' be established when the fighting
ended.4
Parallel with the London Chamber's activities over
Burma ran its efforts to promote the construction of a
railway line from India to China. The Colquhoun-Wahab
expedition of 1882 had revived the idea of such a railway,
and the CCJ had given much publicity to it. 5 In 1883
Coiquhoun addressed the leading British chambers of
1. Stewart, op.cit., 72.
2. R.F. Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill (Oxford, 1981),
208.
3. Ibid., 209.
4. Burma Corresp., No. 133, 23 Oct. 1886. The meeting
had been held on the previous day.
5. CCJ Nov. & Dec. 1882 Supplements.
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commerce and received some financial backing from them for
a survey expedition. 1 Funds were not sufficient for a
complete survey, as the Government of India refused to
contribute or to pay Colquhoun a salary whilst the survey
was undertaken. Holt S. Hallett carried Out the project
as far as the contributions would allow 2 , and The Times
financed Coiquhoun as its correspondent to undertake a
special mission to the area.3
The London Chamber provided a platform for Hallett's
paper on his survey expedition and published it. 4
 The
meeting which heard his address endorsed the mercantile
importance of the railway communication from Burma to
China by passing a resolution, and when the Council met it
was agreed that a circular letter be prepared to be sent
to the British and Indian Chambers of Commerce urging them
to support the India-China railway scheme.5
A month or two later, in September 1885, Coiquhoun
addressed the London Chamber of Commerce on the subject,6
and at the monthly Council meeting in October he was
cross-examined on the feasibility of the scheme.7
1. CCJ Nov. 1887 Supplement; see also the Proceedings
of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1879-85, 28
Nov. 1883. London gave £500, as did the Glasgow and
Rangoon Chambers of Commerce, Manchester eventually
gave around £400, the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce
£300, and the Singapore Chamber £100.
2. CCJ Nov. 1887 Supplement.
3. Nathan H. Pelcovits, Old China Hands (New York,
1948), 139.
	 -_______________
4. CCJ May 1885 Supplement, 'Railway Extension to South
West China and Siam'.
5. CCJ June 1884, 160-1.
6. CCJ Oct. 1885 Supplement, 'A National Policy in the
East'.
7. CCJ Nov. 1885, 292. The president of the Glasgow
Chamber, Sir James Bain, was also present.
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Coiquhoun managed to convince the Council, and the rough
minutes of the meeting reveal that the calculations
involved were based upon the assumption that Upper Burma
would be annexed and the trade from the Shan States would
be then directed via Moulmein) Thus the question of the
annexation of Upper Burma and the scheme for a British
Indo-China railway were firmly connected, so far as the
City was concerned.
The Council requested that the executive of the
Chamber take the necessary steps to impress upon the
Government the importance of the railway scheme, and a
meeting of representatives from the Manchester, Glasgow,
Liverpool, Calcutta and Rangoon Chambers of Commerce was
to be organised by the City in order to examine the
project more fully. H.M. Matheson pressed the Council at
the November meeting2 to do what it could to gain access
to China as he considered it to be the largest market that
Britain could have. The CCJ in the same month devoted an
editorial to Burma and the need to develop new markets.3
The Indo-China railway project was also cited in the
London Chamber's reply to the Royal Commission on the
Depression of Trade (which the CCJ published in
December), 4 as an example of what could be done to pull
British business out of the trade depression.
1. RMB 2, 8 Oct. 1885.
2. RMB 2, 12 Nov. 1885. For details of Matheson and his
firm, seepp.147-l48 below.
3. CCJ Nov. 1885.
4. CCJ Dec. 1885 Supplement.
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Burma was again discussed at the Council meeting in
December 1885, as a result of further representations from
important East India merchants in the City, and a letter
was sent to the India Office detailing economic reasons
for annexing Upper Burma, including the Shan States.1
Almost alone, 2 the London Chamber of Commerce pressed for
the annexation of Upper Burma, and had allied the question
with that of the railway to China. As far as the London
and Rangoon Chambers of Commerce were concerned, it
appears that the pressure on the Government was exerted
officially and publicly3, much of the information on the
changing position of the French in the area coming from
business sources. 4 There were, however, other covert City
interests which were in operation at the time.
The most recent study which includes the annexation
of Burma, in contrast to previous histories, brings out
the growing intimacy between Lord Randolph Churchill,
1. Burma Corresp. No. 170, 11 Dec. 1885.
2. The exception was the Liverpool General Brokers'
Association which wrote to the India Office advoca-
ting annexation rather than the creation of a
protectorate, ibid., No. 162, 2 Dec. 1885. Some City
newspapers also pressed for annexation, The Statist
17 Oct. 1885, 430.
3. This is to ignore the private family connection
between James Bryce and his brother J. Annan Bryce
who had been one of the three Bombay partners of
Wallace & Co. between 1876 and 1884, and particularly
active in Burma during this period before being made
a partner in the London firm of Wallace Bros.,
Pointon, op.cit., 22-3. It is also to ignore the
possible private contacts which Matheson no doubt had
with politicians and civil servants, see p.157 below.
4. Burma Corresp., No. 95, 4 June 1885. The London
Chamber of Commerce letter which passed on the
information that Haas had arrived; ibid., No. 134,
29 Oct. 1885, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce
enclosed a translation of a contract between the
Burmese Government and the Comte de la Bourdonnais;
also ibid., No. 125, 12 Oct. 1885, see the numerous
telegrams from Jones of the Bombay Burma Trading Co..
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Secretary of State for India, and Nathan Rothschild.1
Further, the account records the persistent use by
Churchill of the importance of trading interests 2 and how
he emphasised every rumour about French banking and
railway initiatives in Upper Burma to the Cabinet. 3 The
work includes the fact that within a week of the
announcement of the annexation of Upper Burma a Rothschild
company had applied to take over all Burmese railways and
to construct lines to the frontier 4, as well as an account
of the later attempts of the Rothschilds to gain
possession of the ruby mines, 5
 and their arrangement of a
loan to smooth over the difficulties caused by the
continued presence of Burmese envoys in Paris once the
British troops had entered Burma.6
As an example of the relationship between the City
and the State, the annexation of Burma provides the
historian with evidence of various economic interests.
Some were expressed officially and publicly through
chambers of commerce, and others via intimate relations
1. Foster, op.cit., 206 & 395.
2. Ibid., 208.
3. Ibid., 207.
4. Ibid., 195.
5. Ibid., 211. For more details of the struggle for
possession of the ruby mines in the mid-l880s, see
Stewart, op.cit., cl-i. 12; and Parl. Papers (1887)
LXIII (c.5l40), 'Correspondence regarding the Ruby
Mines of Upper Burma', 535.
6. Foster, op.cit., 211. The envoys had already
arranged a railway concession with the French. The
diaries of Edward Hamilton, BL Add. MSS 48649, 21
Aug. 1888, record that Churchill turned to Rothschild
for everything. They also note, ibid. 48650, 4 Jan.
1889, that he was later given up as a hopeless
politician, and ibid. 48675, 23 July 1899, that
before the end of the century Nathan Rothschild had
struck up a close friendship with A.J. Balfour in
place of Churchill.
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hidden from the public at the time. Certainly the City as
a whole applauded the annexation of Burma, even
The Economist congratulated the decision to annex rather
than form a protectorate in Upper Burma, on the grounds
that it would encourage the swifter development of
business in the area.1
It is not possible to say that this example of
British imperialism was based purely on economic
considerations. Opponents of such an economic approach to
the matter 2 agree, however, that economic motives and
imperial strategy were interdependent, 3 and interacted.4
The official requests from the Rangoon and London Chambers
of Commerce for imperialism of some description in Upper
Burma, in order to relieve the suffering of trade and
answer the threat posed by French, provided justification
for the British Government's action. The equation of
British business activity abroad with the power of the
British state in particular areas of the world had become
a firmly held belief, if not a reality, and any attempt to
extricate the one from the other in order to distribute
responsibility for imperialism would appear almost
impossible. Both economic and political factors were
indispensable to each other. For this reason Churchill
was to be found disseminating the business advantages to
the Cabinet, and the London Chamber of Commerce to be
1. Econ. 2 Jan. 1886, 9.
2. Stewart, op.cit. 66, argues against the thesis of
Woodhouse on the grounds that the economic interests
were 'not completely coincident'. Foster sets out to
show how electoral matters were Churchill's
overriding consideration.
3. Stewart, op.cit., 66.
4. Foster, op.cit., 207
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editing its resolutions to exclude any direct references
to British business interests.'
City businessmen with an interest in India and the
Far East formed a trade section within the London Chamber
of Commerce not long after the war with Burma had begun.2
As chairman, it elected H.M. Matheson3 of Matheson and
Co., who remained at the head of the section until his
death twelve years later. He had chaired the group of
London merchants formed in the previous decade to oppose
the treaty with China. There was no doubt as to his place
as the most influential City businessman on matters
concerning the East. Indeed, the first president of the
London Chamber of Commerce had been a partner in his firm.
Matheson & Co. was the City firm of Jardine, Matheson &
Co., and the manager of the Hong Kong headquarters of the
firm, William Keswick, was also the chairman of the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation which dominated the
foreign financial activity in China and Japan.4
When considering the role of Matheson in relations
between the City and the State, it should be remembered
that not only were the interests of Jardine, Matheson &
Co. and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank firmly intertwined
1. RMB 2 - the adjourned Council meeting of 22 Oct.
1885.
2. Guildhall Library MS 16, 532. The Minute Book of the
East India and China trade section (henceforward
EICMB), 16 Dec. 1885.
3. His wife wrote his biography, Memorials of H.M.
Matheson (1899). He had put the capital of the firm
into the founding of the Rio Tinto Company of which
he was the chairman. H.M. Matheson had six times
refused to be an MP on grounds of business and
health. (Alexander Matheson was a director of the
Bank of England).
4. Maurice Collier, Wayfoong: The Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (1965).
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(the bank lending the firm silver with which to influence
the officials of the Chinese Imperial Household and
others), but that they were also both tied in with the
British presence in China. The silver which the bank
supplied as short term loans on Jardine, Matheson's
account came originally from the British Government's
Treasury Chest and the account of the Inspector General of
the Chinese Customs, Sir Robert Hart of the British
Consular Services.' The cash which promoted the Matheson
business in China and the Far East was indirectly provided
by the British state, and by an arrangement which the
British state had imposed upon China, controlled by one of
Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Representatives
Abroad. When Matheson spoke upon eastern matters in the
City, the strength of his influence was ensured by the
confluence of the economic and the political.
James Macandrew, another member of the Matheson firm
and a director of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company,
was also elected to the committee of the East India and
China section. The committee's two vice-chairmen were
W. Paterson and 0. von Ernsthausen. Paterson, apart from
his partnership in Paterson & Simons, in Ker and Co., and
his position on the boards of the Chartered Bank and the
London Paris and American, was also a director of the
Neptune Steamship Co., the Thames and Mersey Marine
1. Collier, op.cit., 34,49 & 60. The Chest meant that
£75,000 a month in silver passed through the bank.
The customs account contained the fines, fees and
confiscations of the customs.
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Insurance Company and the Spanish Copper Company.
Ernsthausen's company had its main interests in Calcutta
and he was a member of the London Jute Association.
There were three other businessmen elected to the
Committee of the section who, besides Paterson, were
associated with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
China - Dent, Whittall and Gwyther. Sir Alfred Dent of
Dent Brothers was considered largely responsible for
obtaining in 1881 the Royal Charter for the British North
Borneo Company of which he was a director. He was also a
director of the Royal Exchange Co., the North China
Insurance Co., the Shanghai Waterworks and later the
Chartered Bank, of which he became chairman in 1890.
James Whittall had been manager of the Hong Kong
headquarters of Jardine, Matheson, and in 1885-6 was a
general merchant with interests in Ceylon. He was a
director of the Chartered Bank and, like Paterson, of the
London, Paris and American Bank as well. J.H. Gwyther
represented the Chartered Bank on the Committee. He was
the manager of the bank at that time, becoming a director
in 1887 and its chairman in 1896. A few years later
Gwyther took a place on the board of the London, Paris and
American Bank, and of the City Bank.
Also on the Committee were Sir H.S. King MP and W.W.
Cargill. King's company, originally East India and
Colonial agents, was described as bankers and East India
agents in 1886. Cargill was joint managing-director of
the New Oriental Bank Corporation with A.J. Macdonald.
The Committee was completed with P.F. Tidman of
Mactaggart, Tidman and Co. with interests in Batavia;
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Cardross L. Grant of the China firm of Adamson, Bell &
Co.; H. Abrens of Volkart Brothers with interests in
Karachi; Alexander Patrick Cameron of Maclame, Watson
and Co. destined to take a place on the board of the
Chartered Bank a few years later; J. Annan Bryce of
Wallace Brothers, whose agents in the Far East were
Matheson and Co.; and representatives of Alex Lawrie and
Co., Blyth, Greene and Jourdain, and Ireland Fraser.
At the section's second meeting a resolution was
passed approving of the annexation of Burma.' It was at
this same meeting that the secret context of such
resolutions was indicated by Matheson. His main concern
at this time was for more active assistance from the
Government 'in the promotion of commercial enterprise in
foreign countries', as such activity was being provided by
the United States and Germany for their businessmen. What
was revealing was that the letter which he presented to
the section for approval, before sending it to the FO, had
been compiled with the assistance of Sir Julian
Pauncefote, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the FO.2
The subject of the letter was the fear that a German
syndicate was about to arrive in China and negotiate a
loan which was thought to involve conditions favouring
1. EICMB 19 Jan. 1886.
2. Ibid..
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German business interests.' A letter had appeared in The
Times which argued that the London Chamber of Commerce
should send a memorial to Lord Salisbury requesting that
the Government should rescind its old traditions and
instruct the British Minister in Peking to support bona
fide English business as the question was of national
importance. 2 The result of the businessmen's requests was
the despatch of the Salisbury telegram to Peking, an event
which has been described as a crucial decision in the
relationship between business and the state. 3 The British
Minister was instructed that: 'In cases where foreign
representatives interfere to the detriment of British
commercial interests you are at liberty to give the latter
your support.'4
Sir Julian Pauncefote, who helped compose the
important letter which the London Chamber officially sent
to Lord Salisbury, has been shown to be a master at
distinguishing between the official and the unofficial
capabilities of the FO. 5 He was a man to whom the
Rothschilds wrote directly in private letters giving
1. FO 405/41 'Correspondence regarding British Trade and
Commerce in China and other countries', No. 9,
suggests that the syndicate was formed by the Berlin
Discount Co., the German Bank, Krupp, and Rothschilds
with a view to sending agents to China who would
tender for loans at low rates on condition that the
loan was used for German arms, rails and the like.
Ibid., No. 10, refers to articles in The Globe 1 Jan.
1886, and The Times 2 Jan. 1886.
2. It was written by Panmure Gordon, a prominent City
stockbroker, FO 405/41, No. 14; also cited by David
McLean op.cit., 467.
3. D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics in British
Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford, 1968), 304-5;
this is mentioned by McLean, op.cit., 468, who
concurs with Platt.
4. FO 405/41, No. 19, Salisbury to O'Connor, 26 Jan.
1886.
5. McLean, op.cit., 470.
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confidential information and who in turn called upon the
Rothschilds at their business address.' The fact that
Matheson and Pauncefote came together to concoct the let-
ter which the London Chamber of commerce was to send back
to the FO demonstrates the degree to which official commu-
nications could be stage-managed by City businessmen and
Government departments. The masquerade of the official
performance continued out in China where O'Connor offi-
cially held himself aloof from the intrigues of economic
competition, yet used the information he gained officially
to instruct Jardine, Matheson privately which Chinese
officials to approach, and perhaps bribe. 2 Official com-
munications between businessmen and Government departments
may be regarded, therefore, as performances played out
according to scripts secretly prepared in the private
reality of the close relationship between City and State.
Apart from the direct communication with Whitehall,
business interests also employed the indirect route, via
Westminster, to ensure that it came quickly to the notice
of the relevant minister. A few days after the section had
approved the Matheson/Pauncefote letter at the London
Chamber of Commerce, Robert Bourke 3 wrote to Philip
Currie4 recounting the views of 'our Commercial friends'
1. FO 17/1038, Lord Rothschild to Sir Julian Pauncefote, 4
Aug. 1886, 9-10; also cited by McLean. Pauncefote had
been sympathetic to business interests in the East on
earlier occasions, see Pelcovits, op. cit., 131 & 137-
8. The Rothschilds were also in correspondence with Sir
Philip Currie on the matter later, incidentally prai-
sing Jardine, Matheson, FO 17/1038, Lord Rothschild to
Currie, 27 Aug. 1886, 149-150; also cited by McLean.
2. McLean, op.cit., 471.
3. Baron Connemara (1827-1902), MP for King's Lynn 1868-
1886, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4. First Baron Currie of Hawley (1834-1906), assistant
Under Secretary at this time.
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on the China question. Bourke instructed him to bring the
matter before Lord Salisbury, suggesting 'some practical
step'. 1 The practical suggestion proposed by Currie was
the telegram to which Salisbury agreed.2
The CCJ celebrated the Salisbury telegram as an exam-
pie of the Government's willingness to declare its support
for British business abroad, and as 'a new departure in
the relations between the British Government and trade'.
The Journa! also assumed responsibility for having ini-
tiated this development. 3 With a change of Government
intervening, it was on behalf of Lord Rosebery that the
London Chamber received replies to the Matheson/Pauncefote
letter. The Chamber's request for support to be given to
businessmen was acknowledged and the action taken by the
Goverenment in respect of China announced. 4 A second
letter from the FO sought to extend the action by taking
up the general question of support for British businessmen
abroad, whilst simultaneously attempting to play down the
importance of the Salisbury telegram by declaring that
such action had always been the responsibility' of Govern-
ment representatives abroad. In support of this position,
the letter quoted from general instructions:
It is the duty of Consular officers to protect and to
promote the lawful trade of Great Britain by every
fair and proper means, and to uhold the rights and
privileges of British merchants.
1. FO 17/1021, Bourke to Currie, 23 Jan. 1886, 8.
2. FO 17/1021, Currie to Salisbury, 26 June 1886, 6.
3. CCJ Mar. 1886, 'Government and trade'. McLean, op.
cit., 467, described the Matheson-Pauncefote letter
as 'the most influential source of commercial
opinion'.
4. CCJ Mar. 1886, from P.W. Currie, on behalf of
Rosebery.
5. CCJ Mar. 1886, from J. Bryce, on behalf of Rosebery.
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This attitude was repeated later in Parliament, when it
was clearly announced that diplomatic officers were
instructed 'to make the commercial interests of Great
Britain an object of their constant attention'.1
The willingness of the new Government to extend the
action taken by Salisbury was made clear in its letter to
the London Chamber of Commerce. It requested that the
Chamber make practical suggestions as to possible greater
measures of support that could be afforded by British
representatives abroad to British business. At the
suggestion of C.M. Kennedy2 this invitation was extended
to the ACCUK, the other major chambers of commerce not
included in that Association, and other representative
organisations such as the Chamber of Shipping.3
One of the suggestions which emanated from this
initiative was from Sir E. Malet in Berlin, who proposed
that the British chambers of commerce cojointly appoint
1. Pan. Deb. 3rd Series, ccciii, 97-8, 8 Mar. 1886.
When the Manchester Chamber of Commerce attempted to
obtain a copy of these instructions to verify the
statement for themselves, they were refused, FO
83/902, Manchester Chamber to FO, 15 Mar. 1886.
2. He had a position in the Commercial Department and
was in the habit of attending the annual meetings of
the ACCUK (see for example, FO 83/773, ACCUK to FO,
12 Sept. 1883, and FO 83/806, same to same, 16 Aug.
1884). He would privately arrange for the
opportunity to put the FO point of view at these
meetings, FO 83/807, 4 Oct. 1884, his handwritten
report of the 1884 meeting; he even gave private
support to shelving motions and 'got the meeting
tired by other and long speeches' in order to
manipulate the ACCUK, FO 83/954, letter from Kennedy
to Currie, 28 Sept. 1887.
3. CO 83/902, 4 Mar. 1886.
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agents abroad themselves. 1 The idea was sent to the
chambers of commerce confidentially, as the Germans were
following the public discussions over the Royal Commission
on the Depression of Trade, and any proposals made
regarding more effective economic competition, very
closely in order to compete better with British business.
Needless to say, the British chambers did not relish
assuming what they saw as the Government's respon-
sibilities. In fact, the suggestion, that chambers of
commerce should appoint their own agents, was as welcome
to the business community as the suggestion made by the
London Chamber in February, that the British Consuls
should foster the formation of British chambers of
commerce abroad, was to the Government.
The degree of continuity which the Salisbury telegram
of 1886 and Rosebery's subsequent action represented in
the history of State support for British business abroad
is difficult to assess. There is much evidence that the
state was not openly supporting British business abroad at
this time. It is hardly likely that The Economist would
have opposed the implications of the Salisbury telegram so
strongly if state support for business abroad had been the
norm. 2 The Bankers' Magazine had described the Gladstone
Government of the early 1880s as 'ostentatious in
proclaiming that they will not consider the claims of our
1. This paragraph is taken from a confidential report
printed for the Cabinet by the FO, FO 83/951 Jan.
1887, 'Correspondence respecting Commercial Reports
by Her Majesty's Representatives Abroad, and the
Appointment of Agents to represent Chambers of
Commerce'.
2. Econ. Jan. 1886, 34-5.
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investors abroad'.' The Chamber of Shipping 2 and, as we
have already seen, the London Chamber of Commerce did not
consider the Government to be actively giving assistance
to business. It is a fact that Granville had instructed
O'Connor in May 1885 that he was in no way to assist the
representatives of British finance.3
Certainly, the fear that bribery might be suspected
if the state became too closely associated with a
particular firm was a factor in the FO's calculations4.
The danger only existed, however, if such a relationship
became public, there seems to be little question that in
private the state was closely associated with particular
firms, particularly in the East. There is no doubt that
such fears were realised as the royal charters were
granted during the 1880s, particularly in the case of Sir
Hercules Robinson and the British South Africa Company.
What is significant about state support for business at
this time, is the large-scale imperialism which
accompanied it, and it is perhaps mainly for this reason,
with an eye to international relations, that Rosebery
tried to make little of the Salisbury telegram.
Other aspects of the relations between the City and
the State, as illustrated by the East India and China
trade section of the London Chamber of Commerce, were not
1. EM 1884, 1086.
2. FO 83/902, 18 Mar. 1886.
3. McLean, op.cit., 466.
4. A fear expressed by T.V. Lister, head of the consular
service, ibid., 475. The letter to the London Chamber
of Commerce explained that the state could not choose
'between British subjects of equal respectability or
financial position, who may be competitors', CCJ Mar.
1886, 54.
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dissimilar from the other sections previously described.
The section was a bridge between local chambers of
commerce and the City's chamber on numerous occasions and
for a variety of subjects'. Indeed, the section decided
that for import issues the local chambers should take them
up first and then receive the support of the London
Chamber. In this way the fact that one or two major firms
dominated the business of a region, and also decided which
opinions were expressed by the London Chamber after
consultation with the Government, was less evident.
One such important issue was the question of access
to the interior of China. The idea of a railway from
India into south-west China was still current in the late
lS8os, 2 but the alternative route, by steamer up the
Chinese rivers, was gaining attention. The Upper Yangtse
Navigation Company asked for the section's support in
1887, but it was decided that it would be better if the
British chambers of commerce in China took the matter up
first.3
At the end of 1888 facilities were conceded by the
Chinese to British steamers using the Yangtse River.
1. EICMB 8 Nov. 1887, the Singapore Chamber over the
Cochin China Tariff; at the same meeting, and ibid.,
10 Jan. 1888, the Karachi Chamber over the extension
of railways; also 10 Jan. 1888 the Bengal Chamber
received support for its proposal that there should
be provision for discussion of the Indian budget; at
this same January meeting the section agreed to co-
operate with the Foochow Chamber over the decline in
quality of China tea; ibid., 18 Oct. 1889, the
Calcutta Chamber over the development of Indian
railways; and many more.
2. Ibid., 8 Nov. 1887, the resolution passed at the
public meeting which took place on the previous day
at which Colquhoun gave an address was also approved
by the section.
3. Ibid..
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Macandrew suggested that the railway had less chance of
construction than previously, and that the waterways
offered the best means of meeting French competition in
Western China. The section considered that access by the
West River would provide entry into this area of China,'
and continued to be unenthusiastic about the railway in
later years, despite approaches from other British
chambers of commerce. 2 It is probable that the question
of the India-China railway involved similar considerations
as the Delagoa Bay railway had had for City businessmen
with interests in South Africa; a new route into the
hinterland of existing British firms would tend to drain
trade away from established commercial centres where these
firms were well established.
The general relationship between the City and the
State represented the coming together of two different
worlds. Civil servants concerned solely with political
considerations would discuss between themselves their
skill in manufacturing propaganda with which to justify
policy decisions. They could boast of their ability to
present opponents of British imperialism abroad emotively
1. EICMB 11 Dec. 1888. The FO negotiated with the
section regarding the Cheefoo Convention, asking that
it accept the opening of C'hung K'ing in return for
agreeing to postpone access to the navigation of the
Upper Yangtse for the time being, EICMB 17 Dec. 1889.
2. EICMB 27 Oct. 1891, the blank Prospectus of the
Burma-Shah-China Railway was left on the table.
Ibid. 23 Nov. 1891, five British chambers, including
Liverpool and Glasgow, had already passed resolutions
in support of the scheme for the railway, but the
London Chamber's section let the matter drop without
taking action.
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and in such a bad light as to make 'every old woman in
London weep'.' Businessmen had to justify their decisions
to their colleagues in terms of profit and business
advantage. An amusing example is provided by Goldie's
defence when he was accused of philanthropy over his
restrictions on the liquor trade on the Niger. In a
letter to the West Africa trade section he admitted that
'No doubt civilisation would incidentally benefit', but
emphasised that his actions were based 'solely on the
development of trade'
When the two worlds communicated with each other,
there was sometimes animosity, 3 antagonism, 4 or a lack of
understanding. 5 Each side tended to see the decision-
1. Stewart, op.cit., 72. The topic was a description of
King Theebaw, in preparation for justifying the
annexation of Burma, Lord Churchill's secretary was
writing to his opposite number at the FO.
2. WAMB 19 July 1887.
3. Fairfield's comments were characterised by their
acerbity, he rarely missed an opportunity of making
disparaging remarks about business interests and was
not afraid of hyperbole. See his remarks about
Gifford's proposals for a charter, CO 417/38, 215, 3
Jan. 1889; and for Gifford and Rhodes combined, CO
417/28, 124-5, 6 Feb. 1889. The London Chamber of
Commerce did not escape his disapprobation, C0427/1,
minute on London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 19 Aug.
1887.
4. For example, the struggle between Goldie and
Pauncefote over the exact nature of the charter for
the Royal Niger Co..
5. For example, the incredulity of the civil servants
over the shipping companies' fear that Goldie and the
Africa Association would take full advantage of their
monopoly.
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making from its own point of view.' Nevertheless, the
wealthiest, most influential businessmen, the highest-
ranking civil servants and Government ministers usually
had a general, if not always good, understanding of the
degree to which they were dependent upon each other and
the limitations by which each side was constrained. 2 This
understanding was developed from unofficial encounters
between the two sides. In private, Lord Gifford, Lord
Aberdare or Lord Castleton might discuss frankly with
ministers, often men who were also their friends, the
exact nature of political limitations which determined the
amount of support they could expect from the state for
economic ventures. Businessmen, such as Matheson, Rhodes,
Bond, Currie, Jones, North and Rothschild, might
informally acknowledge the realities of the
interdependence of economic and political interests in
their negotiations with civil servants and politicians.
From such conversations would evolve agreements and
enterprises which were then publicly justified, not in the
same realpolitik terms of their creators, but in general
1. From the Whitehall side, the expectation that the
mere passing on of information to competing business
interests, such as the shipping companies' fears to
Goldie,. would result in good-mannered negotiation
rather than increased competition; from the City's
side, it took those with one foot in the political
camp, such as Mills, to prevent the South Africa
section from being too explicit in its resolutions.
2. The politicians tended, perhaps, to overestimate the
power of directors on a company's board to control
headstrong managing-directors, such as Goldie and
Rhodes, and to underestimate the deviousness of such
men - such as that demonstrated by Rhodes' company's
retention of the Rudd concession. Such businessmen,
however, were aware of the financial constraints upon
the state, and exploited them.
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expressions suitable to the audiences involved. The
official communications between the City and the State
were designed to deny the real nature of the
interdependent relationship, as we have seen. With the
revival of the tradition of granting royal charters, 1 such
denials became less convincing as the relationship was
increasingly evident to the public. Herbert felt that he
had to write to Rhodes privately before officially putting
a suggestion to the Exploring Company. 2 Pauncefote even
wrote to Goldie returning a letter which contained
information that the FO preferred not to know, or to be
known to know, and Goldie was asked for a suitably edited
substitute letter.3
The necessity of glossing over the complex
articulation of economic and political activity was
dictated as much by domestic politics as by consideration
of the related field of diplomacy. Such behaviour gives
some idea of the importance which Whitehall attached to
the public relationship between the City and the State.
It also explains the behaviour and importance of the
London Chamber of Commerce and its committees. 4 As
relations between business and the state became closer in
1. The initiative in reviving the system of chartered
companies has been attributed to Pauncefote, K.
Tregonning, History_of_2ern_Saba (Singapore,
1965), 21.
2. CO 417/37, 445.
3. FO 84/1917, 6 Mar. 1888.
4. Particularly the passing of resolutions approving of
state policies, or to strengthen the hand of
Government, such as the West Africa trade section
before the Berlin conference, the South Africa
section after the declaration of the sphere of
influence, and the East India & China section when
upper Burma was invaded and annexed.
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all major countries in the late seventies and eighties,1
the diplomatic judgement of which aspects of the
City/State relationship could be made official became a
more complex affair, 2 while the role of City opinion as an
instrument in diplomatic negotiations increased in value.
1. Rosenberg, op.cit., 65.
2. For example, whether or not to keep deputations
secret, or even whether to allow them to take place,
such as the West Africa section's request regarding
foreign entry into the hinterland of the Gold Coast,
see p.97 above footnote 3. The FO sometimes had
to chase letters from other departments sent to the
London Chamber to avoid embarrassing the Government,
Co 96/196, 23 Mar. 1892 Anderson to CO.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POLICING OF PROFITS AND POSSESSIONS
ABROAD
The City's insistence in the late nineteenth century
that the navy should protect city business interests
abroad was not a new demand. An Act of Parliament had
been passed in 1707 for the better securing of the trade
of the kingdom by cruisers and convoys. In 1742, during
the war with Spain, meetings were held by the merchants of
the City which resulted in the Lord Mayor presenting a
petition to the House of Commons.' A six day
Parliamentary hearing was given to the City's grievance:
That the Navigation and Commerce of these Kingdoms
have been continually exposed to the growing
Insolence of the Spanish Privateers, from the
Commencement of this just and necessary War; that
during its whole Progress and Continuance, not
withstanding the repeated application of the
suffering Merchants for Protection and Redress, their
Losses and Misfortunes have considerably increased of
late, to the Impoverishing of many of his Majesty's
Subjects, the Great Detriment of Trade in general,
the Diminution of his ajesty's Revenue, and the
Dishonour of the Nation.
The City's basic concern was for trade expansion, and
it was with such an end in view that the war with Spain
was felt to be just and necessary. This is not to say
that the City has been consistently war-like in its
outlook. In the mid-nineteenth century when The Times was
in a bellicose mood and attacks were being uttered against
Napoleon III, the City merchants and bankers convened a
meeting to protest against the creation of distrust, ill-
will and hostility between the U.K. and France. War was
1. A short Account of the late Application to Parliament
by the Merchants of London upon the neglect of the
Trade . . .	 (1742).
2. Ibid., 4.
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not in the business interests of the City at this time,
and to make sure that there was no confusion over their
feelings a deputation of leading City men was sent to
France to convey a friendly address to the French
Emperor .
A disquiet about the state of the British navy began
to surface in the late nineteenth century at the same time
as the international race for colonies began to
accelerate, and it is difficult to separate the issue of
empire from that of imperial defence. Most people who
supported one supported both, and City businessmen were
prominent in the promotion of the British naval expansion
which took place in the 1880s and 1890s, a fact which has
not often been made clear in previous studies of imperial
federation or naval expansion.2
The defence of commerce and empire had been of great
concern to members of the R.C.I.. The most notable
proponent of imperial defence, and one of the earliest,
was Sir John Charles Ready Colomb. 3 He first set out his
1. Francis Hirst, The Six Panics and Other Essa1s
(1913), 17. This book was inspired by Cobden's The
Three Panics (1862). This was the second panic,
1851-2.
2. On imperial federation: Burgess, op.cit., and
Shields op.cit.; on naval expansion: Donald M.
Schurman, 'Imperial Defence, 1868-1887' (Cambridge
University, Ph.D., 1955), and B. McL. Ranft, 'The
Naval Defence of British Sea-Borne Trade, 1860-1905'
(Oxford University, D.Phil., 1967). Arthur J.
Marder, British Naval Policy, 1880-1905 (1940), 26 et
seq., restricts himself to the interests of workers,
industrialists and shareholders who were involved in
the construction of warships and armaments.
3. 1838-1909. A copy of Sir John's papers is in the
National Maritime Museum (henceforward NMM), PST/55.
For his biography, see Howard D'Egville, Imperial
Defence and Closer Union (1913).
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views anonymously in a pamphlet in 1867, The Protection of
Commerce in War'. The R.C.I. provided him with an arena
in which to express and discuss his opinion. 2 Apart from
Colomb, the only other persistent critics of the state of
the British navy during the 187 Os were Sir John Hay MP and
Lord Henry Lennox.3
On the Liberal side of Parliament, Sir Thomas Brassey
had begun compiling his enormous, but uncritical, study of
the British Navy during the 187Os. 4
 In his first volume
Brassey set out the details of public spending upon the
navy from 1806 onwards. The conclusion which he drew from
his statistics was that the annual cost was close to a
steady £1O.5m 5 . An examination of this stable state of
affairs was prompted by the Russia scare of 1878 when it
was feared that British trade in the Far East would be
attacked by specially equipped auxiliary cruisers out of
Vladivostock.6
1. He retired from the Royal Marines in 1869, with the
rank of captain, in order to drop anonymity and give
all his energies to this issue.
2. He gave a number of papers there in the 1870s, and
his ideas were repeated in the papers of other mem-
bers, such as Sir Donald Currie and Francis P. de
Labillière. Colomb's articles and addresses were
brought together and published in The Defence of
Great and Greater Britain (1880) which was timed to
influence the Carnarvon Commission.
3. Admiral P.H. Colomb, Memoirs of Admiral Sir Cooper
(1898), 440. P.H. Colomb was Sir John's brother,
and the book traces the degree of interest, or rather
the lack of it, shown by The Times in naval matters
during the 1870s and the early 1880s. Sir John Hay
had been pressing for a better navy since 1862,
Admiral Sir John D. Hay, Lines from My Log Books,
1834-84 (1898).
4. The first volume of The British Na y1
 (henceforward
The British Na) appeared in 1882. For Brassey's
other writings and addresses on the topic see his
Papers and Addresses, ii (1894).
5. The British Navy, ii, 401.
6. Ranft, op.cit. 149.
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It was at this time that the City was first involved
in a demonstration which could be described as jingoism.1
In January 1878 a meeting of the City Neutrality Committee
had been convened. In the morning before the meeting was
due to be held, City Conservatives broadcast an invitation
to anyone who wished to support the Government's foreign
policy to meet at the same building. 2
 A petition in
favour of the Government was produced in the Stock
Exchange and there was cheering and singing in Lloyd's. A
deputation to Parliament was hurriedly arranged and on the
following day Lord Beaconsfield was able to thank the Lord
Mayor for 'such a decided and spontaneous expression of
opinion'. The prominence of R.N. Fowler at the heart of
the demonstration confirms the fact that it was organised
by the City Conservative group. The lack of reaction to
the demonstration from City Liberals, who dominated the
City business community, marked, perhaps, the beginning of
a movement away from Gladstone by City businessmen as
their need for a strong foreign policy became more urgent.
The result of the war scare in 1878 was the formation
of the Colonial Defence Committee which developed into a
Royal Commission on the defence of British possessions and
commerce abroad. 3 The Earl of Carnarvon was appointed as
1. The source for this paragraph is Hugh Cunningham,
'Jingoism in 1877-8', Victorian Studies, xiv (1971),
429-450.
2. According to H.R. Grenfell, '. . . every gambler on
the Stock Exchange, every toady of Baron Rothsc4ld,
every Jew Pedler had received instructions to seize
the room', ibid., 436.
3. The Colonial Defence committee existed from March
1878 to April 1879, N.H. Gibbs' inaugural lecture as
the Chichele Professor of the History of War at
Oxford, The Origins of Imperial Defence (1955). For
the work of the commission, see CAB 7/2.
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its chairman, and he considered that the commission should
essentially cover the protection of British trade and
trade routes,
to make the public generally aware (which I do not
think they are at present) that our interests are so
large afd so exposed to hostile interruption in time
of war.
Those who hoped for some significant change to result from
the deliberations of the Carnarvon commission were
disappointed when the general elections resulted in a
change of government, and a new Gladstone administration
was formed.
Gladstone was well known for his support for a policy
of direct taxation. His strategy with the Carnarvon
commission was to give it 'its tether, let it take its
time and perhaps make itself useless'. 2 When the
commission finally reported in 1882 despite Gladstone's
delaying tactics, the promise of secrecy which Carnarvon
had given to some of those providing evidence was used as
an excuse for concealing the whole report from public
gaze. Only twelve copies were printed. Some considered
that further political jobbery was afoot when the
responsibility for considering the report was assigned to
the Inspector General for Fortifications, and the
retirement age of Sir Andrew Clarke was extended in order
that he might do the work.3
1. PRO 30/6, 52, Carnarvon to Hicks-Beach whose idea the
commission had been, 13 Sept. 1879.
2. Gladstone to Kimberley, June 1880, quoted in
Schurman, op.cit., 153.
3. Ibid., 217.
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It was Carnarvon himself who, in 1883, managed to
elicit a statement from the Government about action which
was to be taken as a result of the commission's report.
His enquiry in the House of Lords produced a memorandum
from the War Office.' The commission's recommendations had
been drastically reduced in monetary terms, and they were
further reduced at the hands of an inter-departmental
committee appointed in the following spring. When the War
Office eventually informed the Colonial Office of the
recommendations of the Inspector General of Fortifications
the total had been reduced from £2m to under £900,000.2
One copy of the Carnarvon Commission's report had
been smuggled to the Queen and in May 1884 she wrote to
Gladstone asking him to consider the defence needs of the
Empire. Gladstone returned an evasive agreement to do
so. 3 In the following month Lord Salisbury expressed
doubts about the condition of the navy in a speech given,
appropriately, at Portsmouth. 4 . The First Lord of the
Admiralty, Lord Northbrook, was eventually provoked into
making the notorious remark that if he had another £3m to
spend on the navy he would not know what to do with it.5
The only persistent discussion of the state of the
navy up to this time had been from papers given at the
R.C.I. and at the Royal United Services Institution.6
1. Schurman, op.cit., 219.
2. CAB 37/17, 13.
3. Schurman, op.cit., 222, referring to RA:022 No. 2.
4. Which elicited a reply from Lord Northl?rQok in
Parliament, Parl. Deb. 3rd Series, cclxxxviiJ, 1731,
9 June 1884.
5. P.H. Colomb, op.cit., 446.
6. The R.U.S.I. Journal, for example Wilmot's paper of
1878.
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Admiral Colomb records that there were 'not even to the
end of 1883 any really strong feelings as to the naval
position in the mind of the country'. 1 When the
imperialists gathered together at the I.F.L. conference in
the summer of 1884, however, imperial defence was amongst
those topics at the top of the agenda.2
One of the joint honorary secretaries of the I.F.L.,
H.O. Arnold-Forster, has been credited with starting the
naval scare which took place in the autumn of 1884. He
had already fired the first shot of the campaign in the
previous year with an article in Nineteenth Century. His
text had been a sentence from a speech given by Gladstone
in 1878:
The strength of England is not to be found in
alliances with great military Powers, but it is to be
found henceforward in the efficiency and the
supremacy of the navy - a navy as powerful now as the
navies of all Europe.3
In 1883, Arnold-Forster had warned Lord Northbrook that an
increase in naval expenditure would be achieved in the
near future, but he was not taken seriously and told to do
his worst.4
The size of expenditure on imperial defence was a
thorny question. It had been hoped that the colonies
1. P.H. Colomb, op.cit., 444.
2. Sir John Colomb, it will be remembered, was one of
the founders of the I.F.L..
3. Mrs. Mary Arnold-Forster, The Right Hon. Hugh Oakley
Arnold-Forster: a memoir (1910), 54 (henceforward,
Arnold-Forster).
4. Arnold-Forster to Phipps Hornby, 5 Nov. 1884, in the
Phipps-Hornby papers at the National Maritime Museum,
PHI /123.
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would contribute substantially to the costs of the British
navy, but the Intercolonial Defence Conference held in
Sydney in January 1881 had not been encouraging.' The
Carnarvon commission had imagined that the growing wealth
of the colonies would signal a willingness to bear a
larger proportion of the defence burden. The commission's
first report had concluded:
The growth of the Colonies in wealth and population
will, in all probability, be relatively more rapid
than that of Great Britain's; and their power to
take a fair share of the defe9ce of the Empire will
be constantly on the increase.
The total which the Imperial Parliament was willing to
vote determined the proportion which was to be asked of
British posessions such as India.3
In the summer and early autumn of 1884 the City and
the Government were informed about the condition of the
British navy from three public sources, and Arnold-Forster
was involved in all three. The Statist, of which Arnold-
Forster was the political editor, published a letter from
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Syxnmonds in July. 4 Later
in the summer Arnold-Forster went to visit W.T. Stead of
the Pall Mall Gazette. Having stimulated Stead's interest
in the navy, Arnold-Forster left him some papers with the
details of his arguments on the condition of the navy.5
The third source of public concern about the navy was the
1. Parl. Papers (1887) LVI (c.5091-I) 'Proceedings of
the Colonial Conference of 1887', 213.
2. Ibid., 284.
3. Schurman, op.cit., 216, a quotation of the views of
Sir R. Herbert.
4. The Statist 18 July 1884.
5. W.T. Stead, 'How the Great Imperial Work was Begun',
Review of Reviews, July 1897, 77.
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Imperial Federation League, of which Arnold-Forster was an
honorary secretary and his father was the president.
Accounts of the naval scare of the autumn of 1884
usually concentrate on the articles which appeared in the
Pall_MallGazette in mid-September. 1 Arnold-Forster's
visit had prompted Stead to go to Portsmouth and consult
Admiral Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby. Stead was then provided
with information by a number of naval officers 2 , but his
greatest mentor was Lord Charles Beresford. 3 When Stead
approached the First Sea Lord, Sir Cooper Key, and
presented him with this freshly-gathered opinion, Key
declared that an increase in the naval estimates was not
politically possible however desirable it might be.4
Undaunted, Stead began to publish articles criticising the
condition of the navy. Contemporary accounts of the scare
suggest that these articles ignited the tinder of public
concern, with the result that the Government had to bow to
public opinion and agree to increase the level of public
spending on the navy.5
Looking more closely at the affair it would appear
that party politics played a greater role than public
opinion, although there is no doubt that the R.C.I. and
I.F.L., with their membership of City businessmen and
1. Gazette 15 & 22 Sept. 1884, t The Truth
about the Navy'.
2. Including Fisher, probably on the orders of Phipps-
Hornby, Frederick White, fl_Lie_o!_W.T.
(1925), i, 145. See also Marder, op.cit., 121 where
reference is made to Taprell Dorling, Men of War
(1929), 22.
3. Rear Admiral Sir Sydney M. Eardley Wilmot, An
Admiral's Memoirs (1927), 84-5.
4. Review of Reviews, loc.cit..
5. Ibid., 78 'The work was done from first to last by
the press'.
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other imperialists, constituted a vocal section of public
opinion in favour of better imperial defences. The cen-
tral figure in transforming the articles in the Pall_Mall
Gazette from a Stead crusade into a political issue was
W.H. Smith. The reaction of Gladstone's secretary, Edward
Hamilton, to the Stead articles is interesting:
When Parliament is not sitting there are always raked
up some 'burning questions'; and at the moment the
two questions which are being chiefly ventilated in
the press are 'overpressure in schools' and the
'State of the Navy'. There is quite a panic about
the latter; but it is a very old story. 1-
Such an old story, in fact, that when Smith wrote a letter
to The Times immediately following Stead's articles,
neither the editor of The Times 2, nor even Arnold-Forster
in felt that public opinion would be
interested in it. Nevertheless, Smith had called for a
commission of inquiry on the subject in his letter.
Smith was not merely blowing hot air on the strength
of Stead's articles. He had been First Lord of the
Admiralty under the previous Disraeli administration, and
had taken care to keep up a correspondence with admirals,
officers and naval dockyard officials after he had left
office.4 He was well aware of the exact condition of the
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48637, 19 Sept. 1884.
2. The Times, 23 Sept. 1884. The Times was only won
over to the navalist camp two or three weeks later by
the contents of some inter-departmental correspon-
dence on the naval question, Schurman, op.cit., 224;
The Times 18 Oct. 1884.
3. The Statist 27 Sept. 1884, supported Smith's call for
an enquiry but justified the inactivity of the
Admiralty and Government on the grounds that public
opinion was lacking.
4. Sir Herbert Maxwell The Life of W.H. Smith (1894),
235. Also see the Hainbiedon MSS for examples of such
correspondence.
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navy and, at the beginning of 1884, had been sounding out
the opinion of that section of City business interests
which would be most concerned at any failings in the state
of the navy, Lloyd's. He had asked the opinion of the
secretary of Lloyd's on the ability of the navy to protect
shipping and trade, and whether the interests concerned
would do anything to bring the matter before the Govern-
ment.' H.M. Hozier replied that, although the navy was
totally inadequate to protect business and that even a
failure to keep communication on the high seas open would
mean enormous losses, it would be difficult for
businessmen to bring the situation to the attention of the
Government without an inquiry being made or a commission
appointed on the subject. Smith's demand for an inquiry
later in the year could be seen as a means of providing
the avenue by which the City might make its voice heard on
the naval issue.
Politically, the 'Radicals' in the Liberal camp were
expected to be attracted to the arguments for the need to
make the navy efficient. 2 While it was realised that the
'hysterical excitement' of the Pall Mall Gazette did not
extend far beyond London, there was fear that a number of
Liberal MPs, particularly the radicals, would vote with
1. Hambleden MSS PS8/103, H.M. Hozier to W.H.Smith, 10
Jan. 1884.
2. See Hamilton's comments in his Diaries, Hamilton
Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48637, 23 & 25 Sept. 1884. The
latter comments were stimulated by Stead' visit to
Gladstone, at which Stead argued that the Board of
the Admiralty admitted the weakness of the navy.
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the opposition.' The Times began a series of articles on
'The Navy and imperial defence' during October 2 and the
Cabinet decided that there would be no inquiry, but a plan
of the future shipbuilding for the navy would be produced
when Lord Northbrook returned from Egypt.3
Unfortunately for Gladstone, the pressure for some
change in the naval expenditure coincided with Gordon's
ill-fated attempts to carry out the withdrawal of Egyptian
forces from the Sudan. In the issue of The Times which
commented upon Lord Northbrook's reassuring speech to the
City at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in November, there were
rumours that Khartoum had fallen. 4 In the same week
Brassey had also been in the City, at the Fishmonger's
Hall, declaring that 'if public opinion called for further
protection for the commerce of the country and was fully
prepared to bear the charge which must be imposed for
those burdens' 5 they would be carried out. Already The
Times was suggesting any serious doubt about Britain's
supremacy at sea would have a paralyzing effect on British
business activity. 6 The Statist linked the naval question
1. J.A. Spender, the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry
CabBanrierman r1923), 53, a letter from
Bannerman to Childers, 2 Oct. 1884, enclosing the
views of H.H. Fowler; also Bannerman's report to
Childers on the State of the Navy in Cabinet, ibid.,
6 Oct. 1884. Schurman, op.cit., 224, suggested that
the Queen badgered Gladstone at this time, but there
appears to be no evidence in the letters from the
Queen to Gladstone in BL Add. MSS Loan 75.
2. The Times 13 & 22 Oct., 7 & 13 Nov. 1884.
3. BL Add. MSS 44645, Cabinet Minutes, ff 186,187; for
Gladstone's letter to Smith informing him of the
decision, see ibid. 44,300, 23 Oct. 1884.
4. The Times 11 Nov. 1884. Northbrook's speech was
given, ibid., 6.
5. Ibid., the editorial quoted these words. For the
report of the speech see ibid., 10.
6. Ibid., 9.
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to the Government's lack of a colonial policy.1
Gladstone, however, was not a man to lose his head,
and when the naval estimates, adding an extra £lO.75m over
five years 2 , were introduced to the Cabinet in early
December he managed to reduce them by about half 3 , and
continued to delay the settlement of the estimates as long
as possible. 4 Despite this great performance by the
grand, but ever older, man, his political dexterity was
overshadowed by the City's reaction to the Russian scare
and the Sudan expedition in the spring of 1885.
If the naval debate in Parliament at the beginning of
December 1884 had been 'languid and the house of Commons
thin, notwithstanding all the boasted interest taken in
the state of the Navy and all the lashing of the country
into excitement by the Pall Mall Gazette', 5 the tensions
of the spring of 1885 were to produce a rapid, further and
larger increase in public expenditure on armaments and the
navy, this time with the City's involvement. As Admiral
Coloxnb described it:
1. The Statist, 1 Nov. 1884, 486, 'The Burden of
Empire'; 15 Nov. 1884, 543, 'The Cost of Government
by Pressure'. Reference has been made, Arnold-
Forster, 60, to a City meeting in November 1884 which
resulted from Arnold-Forster having approached some
of the leading men in the City. It is possible that
this is, in fact, a reference to the first meeting of
the I.F.L. (18 Nov. 1884) which was concerned with
imperial defence. The dates given to letters in the
biography are not always correct, and it could even
have been confused with a later year.
2. BL Add. MSS 44645, Cabinet Minutes, f 234.
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48,638, 3 Dec. 1884.
This was an account of the meeting given by
Gladstone, only Lord Hartington is reported to have
grumbled at the reduction in the end.
4. BL Add. MSS 44547, Gladstone's letters to Childers,
21 and 22 Dec. 1884.
5. Hamilton Diaries, EL Add. MSS 48,638, 3 Dec. 1884.
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The excitement in England reached its height on 9th
April when there was a panic on the Stock Exchange,
Russian stock fell ten points, Egyptian six and our
own Consols two points. A great meeting to consider
the state of the navy was held at the Cannon Street
Hotel on the 15th, and a resolution urging the
Government to take immediate steps in regard to it
was moved by Mr. Henry Hucks Gibbs and seconded by
W.H. Smith, First Lord under the former Government.
On the 21st April Mr. Gladstone moved for a credit of
eleven millions . . . On 2nd May a conciliatory
reply was received from St. Petersberg . . . the
Stock Exchange recovered itself.1
It is tempting to infer from this record of events that
there was a simple economic cause linked by the City
meeting to a political effect , but the reality was more
complicated.
It is possible to argue that the effect of the
meeting itself had an effect on City prices, as there was
'a sudden and rapid advance in prices' on the Stock
Exchange on the Friday following the meeting. 2 This rise
took place, however, before the Cabinet met. 3 A detailed
and extended study of the movements of the Stock Exchange
would be needed before it would be possible to make
definite statements about the timing of particular rises
and falls. What can be said is that fears in the City did
have a general effect on the prices of stocks and shares,
and the loss of confidence in the defence capability of
the navy could knock thousands of pounds off the value of
City investments abroad.
1. P.H. Colomb, op.cit., 473-4.
2. The Times, 15 Apr. 1885, 11. See also B.M. 1885,
471.
3. The Cabinet met on the following Tuesday, CAB 41/18,
20 Apr. 1885.
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The_Times' claim that the meeting was convened
without reference to party politics 1 does not preclude it
from being a party political affair. The Lord Mayor who
presided at the meeting was R.N. Fowler, a man who had
been personally involved in reorganising the City
Conservative Association. Henry Hucks Gibbs, who moved
the resolution, was a major link between Lord Salisbury
and City opinion 2 and a future Conservative MP for the
City, as was Lord Salisbury's nephew, A.G.H. Gibbs. 3 The
Conservative bias is confirmed when we find W.H. Smith
seconding the motion and Sir John Hay supporting it. The
resolution:
That this meeting views with deep concern and anxiety
the present state of the Navy, and urgently presses
upon the Government the necessity that immediate
steps be taken to provide such additional ships, guns
and men as shall afford e security which our Empire
and our commerce require.
may well have been cheered by the meeting, but where were
the Lubbocks, the Martins, the Rothschilds, the Barings,
the Glyns, the Grenfells and the Trittons, all of whom
appeared as vice-presidents, trustees or general committee
members of the City Liberal Club? 5
 None were listed as
present at the meeting. W.E. Forster did speak to the
1. The Times 15 Apr. 1885, 10.
2. See his letters to Lord Salisbury in the latter's
papers, Hatfield House MSS 3M/Class E. H.H. Gibbs
became the first Baron Aldenham.
3. Later the second Baron Aldenham.
4. The Times, 17 Apr. 1885, 10.
5. City Liberal Club (1891) provides a list of members.
It must be remembered, that within months of this
meeting the Liberal Unionists split off from the
Liberal Party taking most of the prominent City
businessmen with them. An organising committee for
the London Liberal Unionists did not take shape until
March 1888, and included Sir John Lubbock and H.M.
Hozier, The Liberal Unionist 1 Aug. 1888, 12.
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meeting and gave a very good speech, but he had long
drifted away from Gladstoniari Liberalism towards imperia-
ii sm.
The City Liberals, although conspicuously absent,
were eloquent in their silence. No-one contradicted the
impression, which was embodied in the second resolution
passed at the meeting, 1 that the City was declaring its
willingness to pay the necessary price for a larger navy.
If Gladstone had been slow to forget the failure of City
Liberal opinion to react to the jingo meeting held in the
City in 1878,2 he must have been mortified by the events
of 1885.
To describe the meeting as party political is not to
deny the sincerity of the feelings of the City businessmen
involved. The seriousness of their concern about the
state of the navy was demonstrated by the deputation which
they sent to the First Lord of the Admiralty of the newly-
formed Conservative administration three months later.3
It was further confirmed by the events of 1888.
1. The Times 17 Apr. 1885, 10, 'That this meeting is
further convinced that in any financial scheme
necessary in the public interests (sic), the
Government may be assured of the hearty cooperation
of all classes'.
2. Cunningham, op.cit., 438.
3. The Times 18 July 1885, 5. On this occasion Sir
George Hanson, another member of the City
Conservative Club, was present; see also The Statist
25 July 1885, 90. For a list of members of the City
Conservative Club committee, see enclosure in R.N.
Fowler to Lord Salisbury, 12 Dec. 1883, Hatfield
House MSS, 3M/Class E.
4. See below pp. 192-193.
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The City business group which had most to fear from a
war were the shipowners. War insurance premiums raised
their costs immediately a war was expected. 1 There was no
confidence amongst this group of businessmen in the
ability of the navy to protect the trade routes. 2 It is
not surprising, therefore, that they were the businessmen
who first brought the question of protecting British trade
to the attention of the London Chamber of Commerce. Their
fear was that, in the event of war, trade would no longer
be entrusted to British shipping but to ships sailing
under neutral flags. This point was put to the executive
of the London Chamber of Commerce about two weeks after
the City meeting on the navy by John Glover. 3 Glover was
one of the City's most important shipowners and insurance
brokers, 4 a founder and past president of the Chamber of
Shipping, and an elected member of the Council of the
London Chamber of Commerce.
The fear was an old one, 5 but was felt to be a real
threat to British commerce in the 1880s. When Glover
brought the matter before a special meeting of the
Council, 6 he proposed that a committee be nominated to
1. FO 83/902, letter from the Chamber of Shipping, 31
Mar. 1886, which referred to the previous spring.
2. CAB 7/2 Colonial Defence Commission, evidence taken
on 3 May 1881, Question 4695, Currie's reply to the
question, asking him what amount and character of
protection he would look to from the navy in time of
war, was that he expected none.
3. RMB 2, 29 Apr. 1885.
4. A partner in Glover Bros., and member of Lloyd's as
an underwriter who became chairman of the Lloyd's
committee in 1901.
5. Ranft, op.cit., 92, describes the same fear for the
scare of 1860.
6. Having first given notice of the resolution, RMB 2, 1
May 1885.
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consult with other chambers of commerce to consider the
desirability of urging the Government to guarantee war
risks at sea as a security for national trade and to
prevent the diversion of that trade to neutral channels.'
At this meeting Tritton emphasised the fact that war was
inseparable from the apprehensions of war so far as its
effects on the shipping business was concerned. The
effect on share prices also was unlikely to have been far
distant from his banking mind. The Council of the London
Chamber supported the idea of a state guarantee of war
risks and it was decided that an informal conference be
arranged to 'prepare the ground quietly'.2
The matter was discussed at a meeting of the London
Chamber's executive in the following month and it was
reported that the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester,
Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull and Bristol agreed to be
involved, providing Glover would go and speak to them.3
The ground was prepared so quietly that very little
evidence of the conference exists. The annual reports of
the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce record an invitation in
July to a conference in London at the Mansion House at
which the Lord Mayor was to preside.4
If there was little evidence of the conference, the
question of a state guarantee of war risks was broadcast
1. R'1B 2, 7 May 1885.
2. Ibid., 12 May 1885.
3. Ibid., 23 June 1885.
4. 103rd Report of the Directors of the Chamber of Com-
merce and Manufacturers in the City of Glasgow (1886),
the invitation was received on 13 July 1885. The
meeting was officially convened under the auspices of
a body calling itself the Empire Defence League.
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in a most detailed and unusually lengthy fashion by the
CCJ. 1 In a three-and-a-half page editorial the topic was
debated and three major points were put forward in favour
of the idea. The first was largely defensive and argued
that such action could not be described as 'state
socialism' or 'class legislation' but rather served the
interests of the nation as a whole, being a question of
'national cooperation'. The second point was that such a
state activity would have an impressive 'moral effect' on
foreign Governments, and the urgent need for such a
measure was considered to be found in the 'colonial
action' of the European powers. The final point in
support of a state guarantee is perhaps the most
important. It argued that such a 'system', if instituted,
would ensure that the Government of the day kept the armed
forces in a state of 'adequate efficiency to protect our
ocean going trade', as the alternative would be severe
financial loss leading to the ousting of the Government
from office.
The long exposition of the need for the state to
assume such direct support for British business interests
on the high seas contained within it the main concerns of
the City at this crucial point in its history. Its
concern with the threat without - of foreign economic
competition and foreign imperialism - and the threat
within - of competition from other economic groups at
home. The denial that such state support wou1 onstitute
1.	 CCJ June 1885 'State Guarantee of War Risks'.
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state socialism or class legislation reflected the rise in
political and economic importance of the working class in
Britain and the challenge, harboured within the
protectionist movement at home, to the independence and
dominance of the City. Just at the time when the greatly
increased City interests abroad demanded support from the
state, domestic order was in danger of changing.
Business, whether industrial or agricultural, neces-
sitates, as it does, the employment of capital,
demands, as its first condition of investment, the
existence of social order and security.1
It was on the maintenance of that order at home, and
abroad, in which City business interests could flourish
that the City concentrated its attention. The similarity
between the enforcement of property rights at home and the
protection of British commerce abroad was brought out in
the CCJ editorial.
Surely if the community admits the principle of
national taxation for the protection by police of law
and order at home, it will also admit of the now
necessary principle of similar imposition for similar
protection of our trade on the waterways of the world
on which we 1ave attained such proud and unrivalled
pre-eminence.
Income tax, however, was already unprecedentedly high for
peace time as a result of the costs of imperial and naval
expansion which had already taken place. It was the
income-tax payers who needed to be convinced of the need
for a growing Empire and an expanding navy, as much as did
that section of the working class which had been newly-
enfranchised. The City feared for its position both at
home and abroad, the two being interdependent, and one way
1. CCJ May 1886, 'State Socialism'.
2. CCJ June 1885.
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in which both could be preserved was by convincing a
substantial section of the voting public that this inter-
dependence, so crucial for the City, was also crucial for
the nation as a whole. Such an idea would justify the
costs of the new imperialism and the new navalism. Having
ex-City bankers as prominent politicians considerably
advanced this cause, and Goschen had clearly stated the
position in February 1885 to the ACCUK:
He was here to contend that it was a false
distinction to attempt to separate by any broad line
of demarcation home from colonial and foreign
interests. (Cheers) There were few foreign
questions which did not vitally affect the home and
domestic j nterests of the commercial class of the
community.
The fiercer the competition and the more rapid the
imperial expansion, the closer the threat of armed
conflict between the great powers was to become. That
country whose business community had the most widely
spread interests around the world was the most vulnerable
and needed a large increase in its navy if the economic
and political dominance which it had attained was to be
preserved. How sensible it was to expect to preserve such
a dominance without eventually being involved in the
enormous bloodshed of a war of unknown proportions, was a
question which was not posed by the imperialists and
navalists of the 1880s, but was in effect answered by
their adoption of Darwinian terminology and the assumption
that permanent economic warfare between nations was the
natural state of affairs.
1.	 CCJ Mar. 1885 Supplement.
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The connection between warfare and the protection of
business abroad was, of course, not new. it is not sur-
prising to find that under 'Steps to be taken on the
outbreak of war' - a document presented to the British
Cabinet in March 1885 - step one, section one was the
concentration of British vessels in order to protect the
smaller of them, and step one, section two was the protec-
tion of British trade afloat and the destruction of the
enemies' trade.' Trade was considered, in secret, to be a
legitimate war target by the British armed forces. When
the Chamber of Shipping, anxious about the possible result
of war upon the interests of its members, wrote to the
Foreign Office in March 1886 forwarding a resolution which
had been passed at their annual meeting 2 , the realities of
the situation were laid bare. The Chamber of Shipping
wanted to have an international arrangement whereby, in
the event of the likelihood of war, a certain number of
days notice might be given in order that British shipping
might find a safe, neutral port, or at least manage to
leave a dangerous one. The FO contacted Colonel Hozier of
Lloyd's, and privately informed him that it would not be
advantageous to enter into international guarantees of
this sort as they might act as an inducement to such
rights being asserted by other countries. 3
 Considering
the British war plans of the time, it was clear that no
quarter would be given to foreign trade if hostilities
broke out.
1. CAB 37/14, 15, 16 Mar. 1885.
2. FO 83/902, letter from the Chamber of Shipping, 31
Mar. 1886, and minute by Sir E. Hertslet.
3. Ibid., memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet, 31 Mar. 1886.
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The issue of the role of the state in time of war was
placed on the agenda of the Congress of Chambers of
Commerce of the Empire which took place in the summer of
1886. The resolution was introduced by George Baden-
Powell and offered three alternatives:
That in the opinion of this Congress it is urgently
necessary that steps should forthwith be taken by Her
Majesty's Government for the better protection of
private property at sea in war time, to include
vessels and cargoes whether by:-
1. some scheme of state compensation for losses
incurred;
2. international agreement as to the treatment of
such property in time of war;
3. more efficient and complete measures for the
defence of British commerce in time of war, more
especially by the provision of sufficiently
fortified stations for coaling and refuge.1
The discussion at the Congress was somewhat confused,
owing mainly to the presence of prominent protectionist
MPs, Howard Vincent, Seaton Karr and Gibson Bowles. The
printed resolution was dispensed with and, after a verbal
struggle, a vote of thanks to Baden-Powell was passed
unanimously. If the first two suggestions of the
resolution had not been already ruled out by British war
strategy, they were, in any case, censured by
The Economist on the grounds of state interference. It
warned that the consequence of a state guarantee would be
that the Government would decide which voyages might or
might not be undertaken by commerce. 2 The expansipn of
the navy remained the only viable avenue of protection for
the expanding Empire and the associated growth of British
economic interests abroad.
Criticism of the condition of the British navy
1. CCJ Aug. 1886, Supplement.
2. Econ. July 1886, 859, 'State Guarantee against loss
by War Risks'.
186
continued to come in 1886 from the same sources, the naval
officers, imperialists, businessmen and politicians of the
Imperial Federation League. The journal of the League,
Imperial Federation, sprang to life in January 1886,
containing many articles on the navy, 1 most importantly a
paper given by J.C.R. Colomb at an I.F.L. conference in
July. 2 The first edition of Brassey's NavalAnnual was
published in the same year and quoted a most unsettling
speech delivered by Sir Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby:
We have ships without speed, guns without range, and
boilers with only a few months of life in them. This
is called economy, but it is really only not spending
money, closing purse strings, and keeping our fleet
in such a state of inefficiency and preparedness as
to render it comparatively useless should we at an
time become involved in a war with a Maritime Power.
Admiral Hood's declaration at the Lord Mayor's Banquet of
the previous year that Lord George Hamilton had already
ordered fifteen vessels to be constructed4 had clearly not
reassured naval officers, even if it had managed to calm
some of the fears of the City.
The idea that the colonies would pay for a larger
navy was still current. The London Chamber's Congress and
the I.F.L. conference 5 , both of which had called for a
colonial conference, resulted in invitations being sent
out by the Salisbury Government to the self-governing
colonies asking them to attend a conference to be held in
1. Imperial Federation, No. 1, 7, 'Imperial Defence';
No. 2, a similar article; No. 4 a third, etc.
2. Ibid. No. 8, Aug. 1886. The paper was a sequel to
one which Colomb had given at the R.U.S.I. in May
before an audience which had included the Duke of
Cambridge and the Prince of Wales.
3. Lord Brassey, The Naval Annual, 1886 (1886), 56.
4. The Times, 10 Nov. 1885, 6.
5. The latter had been followed by a deputation,Imperial
Federation, Sept. 1886.
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1887. 1
 The questions of imperial defence and imperial
communications were to be on the agenda. 2 Before this
conference was held, agitation for a closer examination of
the British armed forces recommenced in the City.
In January 1887, William Whyte, chief constructor at
the Admiralty, read a paper at the Mansion House on the
design of battleships. 3 A speech by Sir Edward Hamley in
the House of Commons in March stirred the City's interest
further. Hamley proposed a complete system of protection
for Britain, talked alarmingly of foreign ironclads in the
port of Liverpool, and gave an encouraging reminder that
commerce would receive fresh impetus from such security.4
Hamley was immediately invited to address a meeting at the
Mansion House under the auspices of the London Chamber of
Commerce. This was the first of a series of addresses
which the Chamber organised over the following years.
Hamley's address was to be on the defence of London
and the commercial ports of Great Britain, and the CCJ
when it announced the forthcoming meeting provided a
comment on 'Home Defences'. 5 National defence was
presented by the Journal as a question of 'ordinary
insurance', a form of ransom:
1. See pp. S3 -S*above.
2. Kendle, op.cit., 8.
3. The Times 22 Jan. 1887, 6.
4. Parl. Deb. 3rd Series, cccxii, 238-249, 14. Mar. 1887.
5. CCJ Apr. 1887, 'Home Defences'.
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If Paris was mulcted in a ransom of one hundred and
twenty millions sterling, what would the probable
ransom of London amount to? . . . As the income tax
is the sheet anchor of British finance, and as the
business man is the special victim of that tax, the
question of national defence resQ1lves itself
essentially into a commercial question.
The rise in income tax was to be seen as a form of
insurance, not directly a guarantee of war risks, but
indirectly so, as far as the commercial ports of the
country were concerned. This was the starting point for
the London Chamber's campaign to educate tax-payers into
accepting the costs of a larger navy by playing upon their
fear of invasion and ransom.
The Colonial Conference itself gave fresh impetus to
the question of defence. Labillière, in his book on
imperial federation, described the conference as being
'quickly followed by a naval scare, well-grounded and
actively promoted by the great commercial bodies of the
U.K. and by the home press'. 2 Essentially, the conference
had ended in Australia agreeing to pay £126,000 a year
towards the costs of a naval squadron. 3 The London
Chamber of Commerce had arranged for a meeting to mark the
end of the conference. Representatives of all the
chambers of commerce of the U.K. were invited and an
address was given by Baden-Powell on 'The Commercial
relations of the British Empire' in which he stressed the
defence and commercial aspects of closer relations between
1. CCJ Apr. 1887.
2. Labilliêre, op.cit., 138.
3. Kendle op.cit., 8. For the reception of the blue
books on the conference see CCJ Aug. 1887, 178.
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the colonies and the U.K. 1 Nevertheless, the London
Chamber received little support from other chambers in its
subsequent efforts to promote naval expansion, even the
Chamber of Shipping did not become involved. 2 The naval
movement of 1888-9 was essentially the work of the London
Chamber of Commerce and a strong-willed naval officer and
his associates.
The naval officer was Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby. Sir Geoffrey's active spirit had
been demonstrated in the late 1870s when he attempted to
form a 'ring' or cartel amongst those who were possible
candidates for the post of First Sea Lord with the
intention of forcing the Government to adopt measures of
naval reform. 3 His later help in 1884 to Stead's search
for damaging information has already been mentioned. In
the autumn and winter of 1887 Phipps-Hornby was busy
maturing his plans to awaken the public to the need for a
bigger navy which could defend not only the channel but
commerce and the colonies as well. 4
 He had refused an
offer of a peerage and a seat in Parliament from W.H.
Smith in 1887. The fact that Smith was making such offers
shows how much the independent voice of Phipps-Hornby was
to be feared, and is a measure of his influence in naval
1. The Times, 10 May 1887, 12; see also CCJ June 1887
Supplement.
2. See the Annual Reports of the Chamber of Shipping.
3. P.H. Colomb, op.cit., 412.
4. Mrs. Fred Egerton, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey
Phipps-Hornby (1896), 371.
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circles
Lord Charles Beresford is often credited with much
influence in the naval movement of the late nineteenth
century 2 , but in these early years of the movement
Beresford was only one of a circle of independently-minded
officers who gravitated around the strong-willed and
experienced Phipps-Hornby. Others in the group were
Captain James Bruce, Charles C. Penrose Fitzgerald, 3 and
probably Eardley-Wilmot. 4 P.H. Colomb was a close
acquaintance of Phipps-Hornby and inclined to give, as
well as take, advice.5
The alliance of City and navy was demonstrated by the
number of admirals and generals who were packed on to the
platform when the London Chamber convened a meeting in
January 1888 to hear an address by Brassey on 'The
1. Egerton, op.cit., 369. Also for peerage, see his
private papers at the National Maritime Museum,
PHI/120 D, letter from Fitzroy, 9 Jan. 1892. Smith's
narrow party approach to the state of the navy was
revealed in his letter to Lord Salisbury, 12 June
1884, Hatfield House MSS 3M/Class E, when he
suggested that the House of Lords committee proposed
by Sir John Hay should not be favoured as its
recommendations could be embarrassing in the event of
a sudden change of Government.
2. For example, H.R. Moon, 'The Invasion of the U.K.,
1888-1918' (London University, Ph.D., 1977), 32. It
is true to say, as does W.M. Hamilton, 'The Nation
and the Navy: methods and organisation of British
navalist propoganda, 1889-1914'. (London University,
Ph.D., 1982), 48, that Beresford became a public
figure and one of the era's foremost big navy
spokesmen.
3. C.C.P. Fitzgerald, Lif!_Try (1897), 256,
acknowledged that Phipps-Hornby was the leader; see
also idem., From Sail to Steam (1916), 156.
4. Eardley-Wilmot, op.cit., 80.
5. This is clear from his letters in the Phipps-Hornby
Papers.
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Defences of Empire and the Protection of Trade'.' Two
months later the Lord Mayor was present at another London
Chamber of Commerce meeting to hear a paper on 'The Corn
Supply in Case of War' given by Captain Warren R.N., with
Major-General Sir Charles Warren in the chair. The
dangers which could arise to social order should the
nation's food supply be interrupted were clearly spelt
out. The grave national peril, of which Sir Charles
Warren warned from the chair, was answered by a call from
Sir John Glover for an omnipotent navy. 2
 The CCJ in
reporting the meeting described it as a fitting sequel to
the Hamley speech of 1887 and Brassey's speech of January
1888, and talked of the support given by 'distinguished
naval, military and commercial authorities'.3
The Times supported the work which the Chamber was
doing4 , and the climax of the London Chamber's campaign
was the meeting in May with Beresford in the chair. The
1. CCJ Feb. 1888 Supplement. The resolution, passed at
the end of the meeting recording its emphatic opinion
that the Government 'should in no way relax but
rather increase its efforts', was seconded by the
Duke of Cambridge. Also present was Beresford, who
had recently resigned his position over the reduction
in the salary of those in the Intelligence Committee
of the Admiralty, letter from Bruce to Phipps-Hornby,
20 Apr. 1888, PHI/120 C; the Naval Intelligence
Department were against the Admiralty to a man.
General Brackenbury of the War Office Intelligence
Branch was also on the platform. For his ideas on
the need for a complete defensive scheme, see his
secret memorandum to the Cabinet, CAB 37/19, 7, 4
Feb. 1887.
2. CCJApr. 1888, 76.
3. Ibid..
4. The Times, 26 Jan. 1888, 'though not a very ancient
body the London Chamber of Commerce has done some
good work, but it never took up a more important
subject than that of the defences of the Empire and
the protection of trade'.
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address on 'The Defence of Merchant Ships in case of War'
was to be delivered by Sir Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby him-
self. 1 During the preparations for this great event, the
acolytes of Phipps-Hornby had made their own contact with
the City via the cousin of C.C. Penrose Fitzgerald, Henry
Hucks Gibbs. 2 In the relative seclusion of the City
Conservative Club, Fitzgerald, Bruce and Beresford met
John J. Jackson (of the colonial broking firm Jackson &
Till), Arnold-Forster, and probably Alex Wood. 3 This
small Conservative group appear not to have been aware,
initially at least, of the great meeting which had been
arranged by the London Chamber of Commerce for May, and
only learnt about it when the Chamber asked Beresford to
chair the meeting. 4 The aim of the group was to erect 'a
City scarecrow' to frighten the Government, 5 not realising
that the City had been arranging an intimidating
1. CCJ June 1888, 125.
2. Fitzgerald to Phipps-Hornby, 10 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C.
3. Bruce to Phipps-Hornby, 20 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C,
mentioned that Jackson was in the chair. The Times
10 May 1888, 12, gave three names as the organising
secretaries - Jackson, Arnoid-Forster and Wood.
William Paterson, R.F. Tufnell (deputy chairman of
the Royal Mail Steam Packet) and H.S. King MP
attended this group's preliminary meeting later,
The Times 15 May 1888, 10. Captn. J.A. Fisher became
involved at some stage, Fisher to Phipps-Hornby, 6
June 1888, PHI/120C.
4. Beresford to Phipps-Hornby, 24 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C.
In the letter Beresford said he had heard that
Phipps-Hornby was to address the London Chamber of
Commerce, and he asked Phipps-Hornby if it were
possible to add his name to a circular which the
Conservative group were distributing to advertise a
preliminary meeting of theirs. Phipps-Hornby did
more, he attended the meeting, The Times 15 May 1888,
10.
5. Bruce to Phipps-Hornby, 20 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C.
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demonstration of its own at which the navy's 'big man"
had already agreed to speak. The fear of the Government
at the prospect of even a small meeting in the City was
indicated by W.H. Smith's repeated efforts to stop the
Conservative group from organising a public meeting.2
As the date of the London Chamber's big meeting on
the navy approached, the Adjutant-General, Lord Wolseley,
began to add his voice to those which warned that the
imperial defences were seriously inadequate. 3
 His views
were the excuse for a deputation of MPs to wait upon the
Secretary of State for War. 4 Despite a scolding from Lord
Salisbury, Wolseley went on to make a very strong
statement in the House of Lords on 14th May:
When I make this statement I am fully aware of the
responsibility which I incur in making it. My
statement is as follows: As long as the navy is as
weak as it is at this moment, Her Majesty's Army
dispersed as it is cannot hold its own over the
world. Our defences at home and abroad, at the
present moment are in an unsatisfactory condition,
and our military forces are not organised or equipped
1. This was Beresford's description of Phipps-Hornby,
Beresford to Phipps-Hornby, 24 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C.
This group was later assimilated by the London
Chamber of Commerce, Arnold-Forster being elected to
its Council in 1888, and Jackson in 1892. Beresford
went on to give a number of addresses to the London
Chamber, see ch.E below.
2. Bruce to Phipps-Hornby, 20 Apr. 1888, PHI/120C. This
was another example of W.H. Smith placing party
before naval interests, in spite of his close
relations with the navy. This state of affairs was
hinted at by Admiral Sir George Elliot in public,
The Times 15 May 1888, 10.
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48648, 11 May 1888.
Wolseley had been reprimanded by Salisbury for his
speech in Parliament but continued to give his
opinion at social functions such as a dinner at the
house of Sir John Pender, the great business name in
telegraphic companies, ibid., 15 May 1888; see also
The Times 15 May 1888, 5-6.
4. The Times 10 May 1888.
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as they should be to guarantee even the safety1of the
capital in which we are at the present moment.
It was at this time that Punch changed its mood on the
naval question from one of frivolity to seriousness.2
Phipps-Hornby's paper on 'The Defence of Merchant
Ships in case of War' was given on 28th May. The platform
was full of military and naval personnel - including
Fitzgerald, Bruce and sixteen admirals - called 'as
experts'. 3 The shipping interests were well represented,
including Thomas Sutherland MP, chairman of the P & 0. It
was the Earl of Carnarvon, chairman of the earlier Royal
Commission on the navy, who, following Phipps-Hornby's
address, put the resolution that the navy and merchant
shipowners should meet to organise a reliable scheme of
defence which would inspire commercial confidence and
ensure the maintenance of the food supply to Britain
during a war. Brassey seconded the motion, thus
demonstrating Liberal support for the idea. Sutherland
summed up the City's concern in a question which The Times
quoted in its editorial, 'Was England, in the event of war
1. The Times, 15 May 1888, 5-6. This was sufficiently
important to bring before the Cabinet, CAB 37/21, 14,
6 June 1888.
2. Compare the treatment given to Beresford's activity
in January and February with the mixed presentation
of early May, and the full page cartoon which
depicted Britannia as 'The Unprotected Female' just
two days before the great City meeting, Punch 28
Jan., 40; 11 Feb., 61; 5 May, 208; and 26 May
1888, 230.
3. CCJ June 1888, 125; see also The Seventh Annual
Report of the London Chamber of Commerce (1888), 74.
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breaking out tomorrow, able to keep the sea and protect
her commerce?''
The Government reacted so quickly, following this
meeting, in announcing its intention to increase the size
of the navy that about a week later Phipps-Hornby was able
to put in his speech for the City meeting organised by the
Conservative group:
I am glad that a speech by the First Lord of the
Admiralty made yesterday week has relieved me from
giving, and you from the tedium of hearing, my
reasons for agreeing with Sir Edward Hamley when he
said that the weakness of the Navy obliged him to
propose certain military precautions.2
The supply vote was postponed in June, on the grounds that
there was insufficient parliamentary time available, and
the country had to wait until the following February to
hear the details of the Government's plans for the navy.3
1. CCJ June 1888, 125; The Times 29 May 1888, 11-12.
The Times felt that it would be difficult to
exaggerate the importance of this meeting; Marder,
op.cit., 131, described the naval scare of 1888 as
being under full sail following the 'influential
public meeting convened bythe London Chamber of
Commerce in May'; Ranft, op.cit., 118-120, stressed
the pressure from the House of Commons attributing
much to Beresford who was supported by the brother of
Penrose Fitzgerald, the MP for Cambridge.
2. Phipps-Hornby papers, PHI/12l B 'Address on the
subject of the naval requirements delivered to the
City of London, 5 June 1888'; in fact, Phipps-Hornby
was not present at the meeting to deliver the speech,
although the conclusions it contained were brought
before the meeting by its chairman, Tritton, The
Times 6 June 1888, 6. Other prominent City
businessmen who were present included R.N. Fowler,
Sir George Chambers, J.S. Gilliat, R.B. Martin,
Rokeby Price, H.S. King, and Edward Dent.
3. The decision on the estimates was finally taken on 11
Dec. 1888, George E. Buckle (ed.) The Letters of
Queen Victoria 1886-1901 (1930), 1, 456.
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The London Chamber of Commerce did not rest on its
laurels. It introduced a resolution on imperial defence
to the autumn meeting of the ACCUK. The motion, put for
London by Sir Vincent K. Barrington, was seconded by
Tonks, for the Birmingham Chamber, who recalled the words
of Sydney Smith's prediction that nations would have to
ask their bankers if they might go to war.' The London
Chamber also discussed the idea of nominating a committee
to inquire into the defences of the Port of London. 2 In
the new year the Chamber managed to secure the Mansion
House and the offices of the Lord Mayor for a meeting on
the naval question at which Lord Brassey gave a paper on
'The Actual Strength of the Navy and the Expenditure
Required to Secure its Supremacy'. 3 Sir Geoffrey Phipps-
Hornby, who had been ill during the autumn months, made a
special effort to attend and speak to the paper. 4 In his
speech, Brassey charged that the Treasury was not
competent in matters naval, a major challenge to the
Treasury's role in general.5
Gladstone, even in opposition, pronounced himself
against so early a recurrence of a naval scare and any
further additions to the naval estimates. 6 At the
Treasury, Goschen had to give way to his colleagues. 7 The
1. CCJ Sept. 1888, 207-9.
2. Guildhall Library MSS, 16,459, Council Minute Book,
No. 1, 13 Dec. 1888 (henceforward CMB1).
3. CCJ Feb. 1889 Supplement.
4. Egerton, op.cit.,, 374.
5. Henry Roseveare, The Treasury (1969), 183 et seq..
6. Hamilton Diaries, EL Add. MSS 48650, 14 Dec. 1888.
7. Ibid.; Edward Hamilton at the Treasury felt sure, as
late as the end of the year, that £20m over five
years was not liable to be presented to Parliament.
This figure he was given by Beresford whom he met
whilst hunting and shooting at Wilton, ibid., 30 Dec.
1888.
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Naval Defence Bill proposed a spending of £21.5m over five
years, £l1.5m of which was to come from the ordinary
shipbuilding vote and the additional LiOm from a special
Naval Defence Fund.
The Bill was based upon a confidential memorandum
drawn up in July 1888 by the Sea Lords.' The Admiralty
had been asked to give information firstly upon the amount
of naval force necessary in the event of a naval war
between the U.K., without allies, and the French, in a
similar position, with a view to protecting the coast of
the U.K., Gibraltar and Malta. Secondly, there was a list
of the force required to afford reasonable relief to
coaling stations if attacked, and thirdly, the amount of
naval force necessary in a naval war between the U.K.,
without allies, and a combination of France and Russia in
the case where Constantinople was to be defended. The
cost of providing for such a situation totalled over
£18.5m for the ten battleships, thirty-seven cruisers and
eighteen sharpshooters, and a further £4m for the
armaments of such vessels.
The Naval Defence Bill was significant, not only for
the unprecedented size of such expenditure in time of
peace, but also for the fact that it was based on a total
and complete plan of supremacy over the most dangerous
combination of rivals. The supremacy was doubly ensured,
as it covered the threat of this combination, but did not
take into account the fact that Britain could build iron
1.	 CAB 37/22, 24, August 9th, 'The Requirements of the
British Navy'.
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dads in three-and-a-half years (75 per cent faster than
three years previously) 1 in contrast to the ten years
which it was then taking France. The building programme
was, therefore, one which could not be bettered by its
rivals as their building was slower and more expensive2,
leaving aside the fact that money could be raised more
cheaply and more easily in Britain than in France and,
more especially, Russia.
The money involved in the new naval bill raises
another aspect of relations between the City and the navy.
There was a rumour in the City, in February 1889, that the
Government was going to incur a defence loan of £lOOm.3
At the Treasury Edward Hamilton was arguing against a
resort to government borrowing to pay for increased naval
expenditure, on the grounds that it was unprecedented and
liable to be seen as an attempt to remove naval expendi-
ture from parliamentary control. 4 Although The Economist
was sceptical of Goschen's claim in March that the Govern-
ment did not intend to raise the additional expenditure by
a loan, it was surprisingly encouraging about the vast
expenditure which it described as 'not too ambitious'.5
The dependency of the Government on the City for the
success of its financial arrangements, that is the
cheapness and facility of its borrowing, is a point which
should not be ignored.	 Examples were particularly
1. CAB 37/22, 40, 1 Dec. 1888, 'Naval Estimates, 1889-
90', 3.
2. CAB 37/22, 36, 14 Nov. 1888, 'Naval Estimates, 1889-90'
3. The Statist, 23 Feb. 1889.
4. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48650, 24 Feb. 1889;
he also felt it would be the ruin of Mr. Gosen's
career.
5. Econ. 9 Mar. 1889, 299.
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numerous at this time. The Chancellor's task of
successfully attracting tenders for the Local Loans Stock
in early 1888 would have been hopeless had he not taken
Lord Revelstoke, Nathaniel Rothschild and Bertram Currie
into his confidence.' The rise of the broking interest
constituted another section of the City which had to be
rewarded if the financial proposals of the Government were
to be carried out satisfactorily. Aspects of the County
Government Bill of 1888, for example, required a good
bribe to broking interests. 2
 The formation of joint-stock
companies and the money to be made from such transactions
had whetted the brokers' appetites. 3 As Edward Hamilton
of the Treasury confided to his diary,
It is no use nowadays to attempt to take any
financial step without giving Brokers, which are such
a powerful body an interest and witout taking the
financial 'big-wigs' into confidence.
The best example of the period was the conversion scheme
which Goschen carried out, having taken Reveistoke,
Rothschild and one or two representatives of the joint-
stock banks into his confidence, and having eventually
accepted the necessity of offering the brokers sufficient
pecuniary encouragement. 5 Such a conversion meant a per-
manent reduction in the public costs of managing the
national debt, and so more money for the Chancellor, or at
least some slight relief given the unpalatable, high rate
of income tax.
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 49637, 18 Jan. 1888.
2. Ibid., 48638, 13 Feb. 1888.
3. Ibid., 48637, 25 Jan. 1888, the newly formed Guiness,
and Bass companies are cited as examples.
4. Ibid., 7 Jan. 1888. See also p.246 below.
5. Ibid., 48638, 4 Mar. 1888, et seq..
200
The conversion scheme was not enough to pay for the
huge naval increases and it is worth noting where the
Chancellor turned for his money, as it is arguable that
the burden of taxation is distributed according to the
political power of the different sections of the country
upon which it falls.' The idea of taxing the activity of
the Stock Exchange had brought howls of protest in 18882
and it was to the landed interest that Goschen turned in
the spring of 1889. Goschen's argument, that City finan-
ciers paid income tax on their investments and so the
returns which men like the Duke of Westminster received in
ground rents ought to be liable to tax, was not enthusias-
tically received by the Cabinet 3 , but his percentage
estate duty on all estates over £10,000 went down very
well in the budget. 4
 Early notions of a registration tax
on imports and exports, 5
 or a tax on shipping tonnage 6
 did
not receive serious attention. The increased death
duties, feared by some to be the thin end of the wedge of
a graduated system of taxation 7 , together with an
adjustment of the duty on beer, provided most of the
money. As Edward Hamilton concluded 'it is better to
tread on the toes of our rich class than to run amuck
1. For example, the relative increase in income tax and
decrease in indirect taxation as the working class
achieved more power.
2. Hamilton Diaries, EL Add. MSS 48648, 20 June 1888;
also CCJ Aug. 1888, 186 - unsurprisingly Roger Eykyn
and Samuel Montagu were the main opponents of the
duty.
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48650, 11 Apr. 1889.
4. Ibid., 16 Apr. 1889.
5. Ibid., 26 Mar. 1889.
6. Ibid., 26 Feb. 1889.
7. Ibid., 16 Apr. 1889.
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against the commercial masses'.' It could be considered,
therefore, that the choice of source for the money which
paid for the larger navy in 1889 marked a rise in the
political influence of business in general, and a relative
decline in the influence of the landed. After all, two or
three days after the budget when the Exchequer needed
immediate borrowing of £6m2 , he had to be able to approach
a City which would give him good advice and deal with his
needs with equanimity. The Chancellor could not afford to
be on anything but good terms with the City.
The importance of the navy to the City cannot be
overestimated. As the CCJ had argued in 1885, the pro-
tection of British trade and transport abroad was as
essential to British business interests as policemen were
to the protection of property at home. This was particu-
larly the case during a period when the power of the state
was officially supporting business abroad. Such was the
expectation that had been aroused by the end of the 1880s
that, when British warships were sent to Delagoa Bay fol-
lowing an appeal for help from the chairman of the Delagoa
Bay & East African Railway Co. 4, the CCJ presented the
incident as a recognition by the British Government of the
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48650, , 2 Apr. 1889.
The brewers, of course, complained and a deputation
was received, see ibid., 30 Apr. 1889.
2. Ibid., 18 Apr. 1889, Hamilton records that he
immediately went to ask the advice of the Rothschilds
over lunch at New Court.
3. See p.182 above.
4. FO 403/110 'Correspondence regarding the Delagoa Bay
Railway Company, 1888-9; see also Pan. Papers
(1890) LI (c.5903), 297 'Correspondence respecting
the Action of Portugal in regard to the Delagoa Bay
Railway'.
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right to protect British capital wherever it might be
invested. 1
Such an interpretation of events offended the
sensibilities of The Economist, which pointed out that if
the state were to use force to support the claims of
British business against foreign governments Britain would
never be at peace. The nub of The Economist's anxiety was
the approaching possibility of exactly such a reality, as
is clear from its appeal for an end to the 'blowing of the
war trumpet' 2 . These fears were not unwarranted to judge
from the speech which Lord Salisbury had made at the
annual dinner of the London Chamber of Commerce earlier in
the year. He stated that business and the state were
locked together and the greatest duty of the state was to
defend British business interests abroad.
I dare not hope in this non-political assembly, that
any portion of that kind indulgence is due to any
sympathy with our political views, but I recognise
rather in it that acknowledgement of the deep
connection between the conduct of commerce and the
conduct of the Government of this country, and an
admission that we on our part and indeed you on your
part, have ever been anxious to conduct those
relations in the utmost spirit of co-operation and
harmony. It is of great satisfaction to us to have
the pleasure of meeting the Chamber of Commerce of
the greatest commercial city in the world . . . For
in a great commercial country like this the main
object, and one of the chief objects, of the
Government must be to so conduct the affairs of the
country that industry and commerce shall have a
course to do their work and display their
energy . . . You are the masters. . . . Our greatest
duty is to provide the material for defending th
splendid commerce which your enterprise has created.
1. CCJ July 1889 'The Moral of Delagoa Bay'; see p.61
above.
2. Econ. 6 July 1889, 860.
3. CCJ Mar. 1889, 57, 'The Conduct of Commerce and
Government'.
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This moment did not mark the apex of the City's influence
and achievement, but was rather the definite starting
point of a much greater political role. Naval defence was
only beginning its expansion, a growth which reflected the
rapidly increasing magnitude of the City's wealth and
power.
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SECTION II: 1890-1900
Deeper than defence or amusement or government itself
beats the pulse of the collective life which
energises the Empire in its remotest bounds and
determines the place of English people in the world.
Nowhere is this mighty pulse so easily felt as in the
City of London, where the sum of substantial national
interests determines the course of national policy by
operations as noiseless, as unnoticed, but as
irresistible as those of gravity. The secret of
national vitality, like the secret of individual
life, eludes the individual observer; but he who
knows the determining value of facts as compared with
conscious motives will always find his most fruitful
and fascinating field of study in that great group of
forces compendiously described as 'the City'.
The Times, 11 July 1891
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CHAPTER FOUR: FREE TRADE - THE MALLEABLE WEAPON OF
DOMINANCE
If by free trade is meant the free exchange of
untaxed commodities - to which alone the theories of
the political economists can apply - no such trade
exists, or ever existed, not so long as revenue has
to be raised ever can exist.'
'Free trade' did not refer to an economic reality in
the 1890s, any more than it had in the 1880s, but
continued to be part of the public arguments with which
the City promoted its own brand of nationalism. The
problems involved in simultaneously supporting an aggres-
sive form of economic nationalism and maintaining a
credible concept of free trade were as great for the City
in the 1890s as they had been in the previous decade. In
many respects the battles for ideas and the circumstances
under which they were fought were the same as before. The
depression during the early years of the decade, perhaps
the worst which occurred during the period known as 'the
great depression', lent credence to the ideas of groups
opposed to existing policy, and protectionism was as
popular as ever in the Conservative Party. Gladstone was
elected to power yet again, in spite of the divided state
of the Liberal Party. In the City itself, the debate over
sugar bounties and bimetallism persisted. If the
increasing business interests of the City were to be
protected and supported by the state in the 1890s as they
had been in the 1880s, the City needed to be just as
energetic and agile in its use of concepts and ideas, just
1. A. Williamson, British Industry and Foreign Competi-
tion (1894), 2-3.
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as forceful in its promotion of empire and imperialism.
The greatest threat to the City's policy during this
decade, judging by the strength of its reaction, was
Gladstone and his Irish policy. In May 1893 a remarkable
demonstration was mounted in the City which involved the
Lord Mayor in an avowedly political meeting. The Times
preferred to call the event 'superficially political' but
'in reality national'.' Certainly it was one of the best
demonstrations of City nationalism of the late nineteenth
century. Members of the Stock Exchange set out in a three
part procession from Capel Court, Gresham Street and
Basinghall Street to meet at the Guildhall. All wore a
Union Jack favour and marched singing 'Rule Britannia'.
The Irish flag, carried by Harry Bourke, was flanked on
either side by a Union Jack. In the square in front of
the Guildhall they burnt a copy of the Home Rule Bill to
the singing of the national anthem. A large crowd
gathered in the square and stayed all afternoon while a
meeting was held inside the Guildhall.2
Sir Reginald Hanson reminded the meeting of the
reception which Gladstone had given to a deputation of
merchants and bankers not long before, when they had been
rated for disturbing the closing years of the Grand Old
1. The Times 4 May 1893.
2. Ibid., 6. The meeting was convened at the request of
the 'merchants, bankers and liverymen of the City'.
Sir Reginald Hanson described those assembled as
representing 'the commercial and corporate interests
of the capital'. All the City MPs were present, as
were representatives of the shipping community
Dixon-Hartland and Sutherland - and the banking
interests - a bevy of Lubbocks, one Rothschild, a
number of directors from the Bank of England, as well
as a small band from the Committee of Lloyd's.
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Man and for deserting the Liberal cause. To counter the
latter charge, Hanson pointed out that the four MP5 whom
the City had elected as Liberals in 1868 were present on
the platform to protest against the Home Rule Bill. The
meeting then enthusiastically resolved, with encouragement
from Sir John Lubbock, that the effect of the Irish Bill
would be injurious to the 'mercantile and social
interests' of the U.K. and 'dangerous to the stability and
integrity of the Empire'.
It is an indication of the complexity of the City's
position at this time that the man to whom they could most
confidently turn for a preservation of the idea of free
trade, Gladstone, was the very man who was endangering
their notions of empire and imperialism. Those who, like
the City, supported imperial federation, did not
necessarily believe in free trade, however, and it was
within the imperial federation movement that the City had
to fight against protectionism.
Imperial Federation
The aim of the City's concept of imperial federation
was continued, if not greater, dominance of the British
Empire as a market for its business activities. 1 The free-
trade imperial federation which the City promoted was in
fact a freedom to dominate the Empire; in the same way as
the free trade policy pursued by the City domestically was
in fact freedom from the interference of the state with
1. This has been called 'non-tariff protection' by
Marcello de Cecco, Money and Empire (Oxford, 1974),
29.
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the power and activities of the City within the U.K..
This underlying reality only surfaced occasionally, one
such example being the almost malicious delight with which
the CCJ greeted the failure of Australian banks in 1893.
The Australians thought they had reached the time,
when they could do without us. They will find the
mistake of this belief, and also that they are
controlled by the London money market whether they
like it or not.'
The blame for the failure of the banks was attributed to
the protectionist policies employed in those colonies, on
the grounds that an undue expenditure on public works had
resulted from the lack of the financial responsibility
that would have existed had the money been raised by
income tax. 2 Another example of the way in which the City
might be prepared to use its financial power to bring the
colonies to heel was publicly proposed by Sir John Lubbock
in his address to the annual meeting of the London Chamber
of Commerce. Loans to the colonies, he declared, would be
made on condition that the colonial tariffs were reduced.3
This policy may well have been put into effect
unofficially by the City. 4 As the economic depression
1. CCJ May 1893. Compare this triumphant tone with a
similar one used by Rokeby Price when giving evidence
to the 1877-8 Royal Commission on the Stock Exchange,
Powell, op.cit., 615.
2. CCJ May 1893.
3. The 12th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1894), 21. Sir Charles Dilke, Problems of
Greater Britain (1890), 630, had pointed out that the
surest way of popularising the connection between the
colonies and Britain in the colonies themselves, was
to offer cheap capital loans. An indirect way of
offering better terms to colonial borrowing was to
admit colonial loans into the category of trust
stocks, a ploy which Lord Rosebery considered 'one of
the best trumps in the game', in a letter to Loring
13 Sept. 1891, Royal Colonial Society Library MSS 11,
Imperial Federation League Correspondence, 1885-93.
4. See p.22O below.
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made itself felt, the City reiterated its solution which
had not changed, except for the insistence on colonial
free trade, since it had first proposed a 'national
commercial policy' ten years previously.
By means of an active policy of annexation, colonial
development, emigration, construction of roads,
railways, telegraphs and harbours, by careful and
wise investment, subject to colonial free trade, we
may build up a commercial development in the future
which will be more free from fluctuation, and less
under the economic influence of other States, than
has been the case in the past.1
The battle which took place at the Second Congress of
Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, between the supporters
of a free trade form of imperial federation and those who
wished to see an imperial customs union, has been
described as disastrous for the protectionist movement.2
The success of the City's strategy at the Congress was not
straightforward. The battle plans had been laid out at
the top of the agenda by the London Chamber of Commerce in
the form of three resolutions. The first proposed that
arrangements should be devised to secure a closer
commercial union, and was clearly intended to lead the
enemy on to common ground. The second claimed that a
commercial union within the British Empire on the basis of
free trade would tend to promote its permanence and
prosperity, and aimed at dividing the enemy's ranks. The
third warned that any fiscal union between the U.K. and
its colonies based upon protection would be politically
dangerous and economically disastrous, and that the
1. CCJ Jan. 1893, 'Trade Depression and its Remedy'.
2. Brown, op.cit., 115.
210
arrangement most conducive to an intimate commercial union
would be a reduction of colonial tariffs as near as
possible to the 'non-protective policy' of the U.K.; this
was intended to be the final crushing defeat of the
enemy.
The first move was successfully carried out by Lord
Brassey, who lured the colonial interests in the
protectionist camp forward with talk of lending capital
cheaply to the colonies, which is what he meant by
commercial union. The second stage went badly wrong as
the colonial representatives, particularly Tupper, saw the
trap - if a resolution including free trade were passed, a
discussion of differential duties would be pre-empted.
After a series of skirmishes which were reminiscent of the
first Congress, this resolution was postponed. The final
move fared no better, and the debate continued into the
second day of the Congress. All through the second day
the battle continued. The situation became so serious for
the free traders that Sir John Lubbock was forced to hand
over the chair to Tritton in order to address the Congress
himself; the fear of defeat for the protectionists was so
strong that Tupper demanded that a vote on his amendment
be taken again. On the third day Tupper's amendment was
successfully defeated, and the third motion passed by 47
votes to 33. Despite this hard-won victory for the City's
interpretation of imperial federation, the retreating
protectionists managed to inflict minor damage on the free
traders by winning the unanimous support of the Congress
1.	 CCJ July 1892 Supplement.
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for a slightly altered second resolution. This resolution
read 'freer' trade, not free trade, when it was finally
passed.
The timing of this victory was important. In 1891
Lord Salisbury required, as a precondition for a second
colonial conference1 that the I.F.L. draft detailed
proposals for imperial federation. This was a challenge
to the unity of the League, which could be roughly divided
up into three groups according to the priority which each
assigned to different aspects of imperial federation, the
free-traders, the defence group, and the protectionists.
Such a difficult task came in the wake of another threat
to the free trade view of imperial federation, the
formation of the United Empire Trade League. This
organisation, established in the spring of 1891, took over
the leadership of the protectionist cause in Britain from
the National Fair Trade League. Its declared aim was to
unite
on a broad, popular and patriotic foundation all
societies and persons, in the United Kingdom and
throughout the Empire, interested in the extension of
British trade, the security of Bfitish capital, and
the prosperity of British labour.
Lord Salisbury had in mind, no doubt, the strong
feeling for protectionism within the Conservative Party
when he set his precondition. At the Conservative Party
Conference in Birmingham in 1891 there were only six
dissentients to Howard Vincent's motion which proposed
'the extension of commerce upon a preferential basis
throughout all parts of the British Empire'. 2 In the
1. Brown, op.cit., 109.
2. Ibid., 78.
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following May, shortly before he advised the Queen to
dissolve Parliament, Lord Salisbury declared that it was
necessary to have the threat of retaliation in order to
gain access to foreign markets.' This lukewarm support
for a policy of retaliatory tariffs did not lead to a
Conservative victory at the polis, and some Cobdenites
unfairly suggested that the Liberal majority of 40 seats
represented Britain's rejection of a policy of
retaliation. 2 The election results did not deter the
Conservative Party Conference from again voting for
tariffs in December l892.
The report on imperial federation, which Salisbury
had requested, was finally passed by the executive of the
Imperial Federation League in November 1892. It was
essentially a free trade affair, 5 the question of some
form of customs union had been relegated to a section
headed 'conducive to the maintenance of national unity but
not essential to it'. 6 It is possible that the report had
taken so long to be prepared and endorsed because the free
traders, who clearly dominated the League, had wanted to
see what the outcome of the Congress would be before
committing themselves. Certainly, the tensions caused by
the compilation of the report led to the break-up of the
1. Ibid., 79.
2. Ibid., 81.
3. Ibid..
4. Labillire, op.cit., 224; Kendie, op.cit., 15;
Brassey, Papers & Addresses, iv, 216.
5. Bryce described it as 'harmless' from a Liberal point
of view when suggesting to Gladstone that he should
not call a second colonial conference in response to
the I.F.L. deputation, Bryce to Gladstone 12 Apr.
1893, Bryce Papers.
6. National Review Feb. 1894, 814.
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the Imperial Federation League in November 1893.1
It has been suggested that the free-trade group of
the League were responsible for its break-up 2 , but this is
unlikely as the report had been free trade and Sir John
Lubbock, who represented the City branch of the League,
had been surprised to receive the circular recommending
that the body be dissolved. 3 It is more probable that it
was the group which wished to promote defence interests
above all else that brought about the League's demise.4
This would seem to be borne out by the fact that the
defence group immediately set up the Imperial Federation
(Defence) Committee, taking the old League's emblem and
secretary.
The City was certainly not happy that the I.F.L. was
dissolved, and at the final meeting of the League Sir John
Lubbock had spoken out against the idea which was carried
by a single vote and later endorsed by postal voting.
Lubbock's reaction to this set-back for the cause of free-
trade imperial federation was swift. He contacted bran-
ches of the I.F.L. throughout the British Empire and in
July 1894 a meeting was held at his house to discuss the
establishment of an organisation to succeed the I.F.L..5
1. The report had been presented to Gladstone in March
1893 by a 100 strong deputation which included many
City men. Gladstone stressed two points in reply,
the importance of free trade as the basis of trade,
and the need for definite figures for the colonial
contributions to imperial defence which were envi-
saged in the report, United Empire vi (1915), 272.
2. Tyler, op.cit., 207.
3. Hutchinson, op.cit., ii, 39.
4. This was the impression of someone who was present at
the final meeting, G.W. Rusden, The History of Aus-
tralia (1897), iii, 494.
5. United Empire, vi (1915), 431.
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The fact that Sir Charles Tupper was present at the
meeting demonstrates the thoroughness of Lubbock's
preparation for the event and his determination to create
a representative body. The meeting decided to form a new
association with the Duke of Devonshire at its head.
It is clear from Sir John's letter to the Duke just
what the banker had in mind when he went to such energetic
lengths to save the I.F.L..
It is thought desirable to keep up the flag of Unity
and to show our desire to maintain the integrity of
the Empire . . . It seems important that the Colonies
should not imagine that there is on our part any
lukewarmness as to the maintenance of the Union.'
Enclosed in this letter to the Duke was a memorial signed
by the most prominent men in the City of all parties. The
Duke was also given to understand that the Lord Mayor had
promised the Mansion House as a venue for the inaugural
meeting which he would be willing to chair. The City was
clearly taking over control of the imperial federation
movement and intent on constituting a much more robust
organisation than the I.F.L. had been.
To ensure wide acceptance of the new body, proofs of
the proposals for its construction were sent out to a
number of prominent political individuals for their
comments. The title of the new organisation was a particu-
lar problem. It was Sir R. Herbert who baulked at the
continued use of the term 'imperial federation' and
suggested something like British Empire Union.2 Herbert
1. Hutchinson, op.cit., ii, 39-40, Lubbock to Devonshire
19 Dec. 1894.
2. Ibid., 46-7.
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had agreed to be chairman of the association if Devonshire
accepted the position of president.1
In April 1895 a formal deputation officially met the
Duke of Devonshire at the House of Lords and presented him
with a scroll, bearing a list of signatures which Sir John
Lubbock described as 'the most important that had ever
emanated from the City of London'. 2 The Duke agreed to
head the organisation, and in the following month the
British Empire League was founded, the permanent unity of
the British Empire its primary objective. 3 The inaugural
meeting of the B.E.L. took place early in 1896 at the
Mansion House. The Queen became the patron of the League
and many prominent statesmen associated themselves with
it. Its journal, the began
publication in 1899.
The Times applauded the formation of the B.E.L.,
seeing as its task the transformation of vague imperial
feeling into a systematic effort to draw closer the ties
which bound the mother country to her colonies and
dependencies. 4 The Economist on the other hand, whilst
agreeing that the unity of the Empire was a worthwhile
1. Ibid. , 47, Lubbock to Devonshire 18 May 1895.
2. United Empire vi (1915), 431.
3. It appears that there was a group of MPs in the
Commons at this time which called itself the Colonial
Party, CCJ (Commerce) 1894, 540. It included Duke,
Gorst, Northcote, Macfarlane, Baden-Powell,
Wedderburn, Heaton, Vincent, Dunn, Arnold-Forster
Barton, Curran, Allan, Dalziel, and Captn. Norton.
Its secretary was J.H. Hogan.
4. The Times 30 Jan. 1896.
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objective, questioned the wisdom of producing the sort of
propaganda which was expected from the B.E.L.. 1 The
complacent view of The Economist, that relations with the
Empire should not be imperilled by restlessness or
impatience, contrasted with the anxiety of City
businessmen who were under the strain of increasing
foreign competition.
While City interests were reconstituting the I.F.L.,
they did not abandon work for free-trade imperial federa-
tion through the London Chamber of Commerce. On the
contrary, in 1893 at the instigation of the London Chamber
of Commerce the ACCUK sent a memorial to the Government
urging that a colonial conference be called. 2 The London
Chamber regretted being unable to receive or entertain the
delegates to the Ottowa Conference in l894, but a few
months later the Chamber was again involved in organising
another, the third, Congress of the Chambers of Commerce
of the Empire. 4 At the top of the agenda was the commer-
cial relations between the U.K. and the colonies. 5 Joseph
Chamberlain, Colonial secretary in the new Government,
agreed to be honorary president of the Congress.6
The appointment of Chamberlain to the Colonial
Secretaryship, and his commitment to colonial development,
1. The Economist 1896, 131-2.
2. CCJ (Commerce) 1893, 175.
3. CMB 1, 11 Oct. 1894. According to Kendle op.cit.,
18, the conference had arisen as a result of a
discussion between the Australian and Canadian
colonies over the Pacific cable and a steamship line
from Vancouver to Australia.
4. CMB 2, 9 May 1895.
5. CCJ June 1895, 112.
6. Asked in November, CMB 2, 14 Nov. 1895, he offered
any assistance in his power, CCJ Nov. 1895, 199.
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was hailed in the City as the promise of a new forward
policy. 1 The fact that his aspirations were interpreted
in these terms, reflected the reservations which
businessmen felt about Chamberlain's view that the
colonies were a vast estate, a national domain. Whilst
the City welcomed a strong commitment to empire and
imperialism, it no more desired the interference of the
Government in the economic aspects of imperial federation,
than it wished for a protectionist form of federation. As
the CCJ explained succinctly:
The danger lies in the fear that, while thus anxious
to realise the aspirations of those who know, the
Gover1iment may ignore the knowledge of those who
know.
Government aid in this context was criticised for lacking
'individual responsibility' and more importantly 'private
endeavour'. The Chamber's Journal ended by stressing the
importance of the navy, without which 'the profitable
development' of the Empire was impossible.
An area in which the business aspects of the British
Empire could, in the opinion of the London Chamber, be
acceptably promoted by the state was the appointment of
commercial attacs. 3 A better system of intelligence was
required in order to maintain the predominance of British
business in the Empire. The London Chamber had
successfully promoted this view at the ACCUK annual
1. CCJ Sept. 1895 'The New Forward Policy'.
2. Ibid..
3. CCJ Aug. 1895 'Government and Trade'.
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meeting in 1894.1 Chamberlain's decision to ask all
colonial governors to ascertain to what extent foreign
nations were competing with British business was welcomed
and described as marking the official abandonment of the
principle of laissez-faire.2
Sir Henry Bergne of the Commercial Department of the
FO invited the London Chamber to discuss informally what
improvements might be introduced by the FO in order to
assist British trade along the lines which had been
suggested in the CCJ. 3 The City had asked for a better
consular service and a better service from the consuls
since the 1880s. At last the matter was acknowledged as
one in which the Government could benefit from business
experience. The long list of new consuls and commercial
attaches, printed in the annual report of the London
Chamber for 1896, attested to its success in attracting
increased support from the state for British business
abroad both inside and outside the Empire.4
1. The 13th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1895).
2. CCJ Dec. 1895 'The Development of Colonial Trade'.
3. CMB 2, 9 Jan. 1896.
4. The 15th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1897), 52. The London Chamber expressed its
gratitude to Chamberlain formally in a resolution
which it put before the ACCUK in 1896, CCJ Jan. 1896,
10. The debate over the role of state
representatives abroad in promoting British business
continued. The Chamber put another resolution to the
autumn meeting of the ACCUK, CMB 2, 16 July 1896.
There was a debate in the House of Commons in the
summer, CCJ Aug. 1896, 141-3. In November the
Council of the London Chamber supported the
suggestion of its executive that British
representatives in the colonies should send regular
reports to the U.K., CMB 2, 12 Nov. 1896. Rosebery's
suggestion that the Chamber itself should obtain the
information was not accepted, CMB 2, 12 Nov. & 10
Dec. 1896.
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The third Congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the
Empire of 1896 was attended by four hundred delegates from
one hundred and seventy-two organisations)- It played a
major role in promoting the City's view of imperial
federation both generally, as representing continuity
during the interval between the I.F.L.'s demise and the
formation of the B.E.L., and particularly, as it did not
endorse Chamberlain's idea for an imperial customs union,
for which it was complimented by The Economist 2 . The
Congress agreed that the British Government should call an
imperial conference and that a consultative imperial
council be formed. The details of imperial federation
were aimed, as they had been in 1892, at extending the
dominance of City finance over the Empire - the
codification of the commercial law of the Empire, the
establishment of further British postal routes and
telegraph cables, an imperial postage, and a uniform bill
of lading.3
As had happened previously, the Congress of the
Chambers of Commerce of the Empire was followed by the
convening of a colonial conference a year or so later.
The London Chamber of Commerce gave a banquet to the
Colonial Premiers while they were in London. 4 One of the
1. CCJ June 1896 'Imperial Commerce'.
2. Econ. 1896, 755-6, The Economist still insisted that
the discussion of subjects upon which there was
strong disagreement tended to produce discord rather
than unity.
3. The 15th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1897), 83.
4. CCJ Aug. 1897, 140. The conference, which the London
Chamber had hoped to hold with them to discuss such
subjects as closer commercial relations, CMB 2, 6 May
1897, did not take place for lack of time, The 16th
Annual Report of the London Chamber of Commerce
(1898).
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outcomes of the meeting between the Colonial Premiers and
the Colonial Secretary in 1897 was the realisation that
only the Belgian and German trade treaties stood in the
way of the colonies reducing their tariffs in favour of
the U.K..' The London Chamber of Commerce had decided,
before the conference took place, to try to facilitate a
rapid renunciation of these treaties, 2 and following the
conference Lord Salisbury proceeded to remove them.3
In the same year, a new Canadian tariff was announced
whereby goods of British origin would receive a 12.5 per
cent rebate. The willingness of a colony to lower its
tariff was regarded in the City as a movement towards that
free-trade imperial federation which it had long been
promoting. The president of the Institute of Bankers
described it as 'a first step in the direction of free
trade; a beginning towards throwing off those shackles of
Protection with which unfortunately almost all of our
Colonies hampered themselves' 4 . He went on to point out
that a £2m loan which had been successfully floated for
Canada in the autumn had, at 2.5 per cent, been the lowest
interest rate at which any colony had previously secured a
loan. A considerable factor in the success of this loan,
he intimated, had been Canada's unilateral movement
1. Kendle, op.cit., 30.
2. CMB 2, 6 May 1897.
3. Kendle, op.cit., 30.
4. Journal of the Institute of Bankers (1898) 'The
Inaugural Address by Robert Williams MP, given 1 Dec.
1897.
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towards free trade.' It is clear that the City, and
particularly the banking community, were concerned to
maintain the integrity of the British Empire in such a way
as to preserve the economic dominance of the centre over
the periphery.
The Colonial Stock Act of 1900 might be taken as a
final example of the City's free-trade imperial
federation. It has been pointed Out that colonial
government stocks fared no better, or worse, after being
admitted to the category of trustee investments. 2
 Simply
put, there was apparently no economic advantage to the
colonies from the change. There was, however, an
advantage from the City's point of view, as the colonies
had to adopt the previous Colonial Stock Acts. They had to
agree to pay from their domestic revenues any sum which an
English court judged owing to the stock holders, and to
invalidate any colonial law which altered trustee
regulations. This Canada did in June 1900. The City had
been hoping to achieve just this sort of security for
finance through its free-trade imperial federation policy.
1. David Jessop, 'The Colonial Stock Act of 1900; a
Symptom of the New Imperialism', Journal of Imperial
& Commonwealth History iv (1975), 154-163, suggests
that Canada was exploiting an imperialist mood and
gives the impression that the loan was successfully
placed because of public popularity for the Empire in
Britain. He does not emphasise why Canada in
particular was so popular in the City.
2. Ibid., 161.
3. Ibid., 160.
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Crown colonies borrowed money by means of the
Colonial Stock Act of 1900 in preference to using the
Colonial Loans Act of 1899.1 The effect of this change
was to provide business for the City rather than keep it
in the hands of the state. Chamberlain's unimplemented
schemes, such as his ideas for the creation of Colonial
Consols and a reserve fund for the colonies from Suez
Canal receipts, 2
 like the Colonial Loans Act of 1899,
would have meant that the state took away business which
might have gone to the City, an element in the over-
enthusiastic colonial policy of Chamberlain upon which the
City had already expressed concern. 3 It was to avoid
precisely such possibilities that the City had
successfully promoted its particular free trade version of
imperial federation, that is its freedom to act as the
business centre for the British Empire.
Silver
But there is one business that we must maintain for
ourselves in England, that at present we have
entirely the monopoly of, that is our free trade in
gold. That means to English banking its power and, I
may say, its world wide opportunities. In no other
country in the world - not in Paris nor in Berlin -
is gold absolutely free. . . . That centres te
trade in London, and keeps it from Paris or Berlin.
The term 'free trade' was applied to describe
Britain's maintenance of a gold standard, a position which
the majority of the City would support. A minority of
1. Richard M. Kesner, 'Builders of Empire: The Role of
the Crown Agents in Imperial Development, 1880-1914',
Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History, v (1976-
7), 316-7.
2. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS. 48665, 22 Nov. 1895.
3. See p.217 above.
4. Journal of the Institute of Bankers Mar. 1898, 140,
R.B. Martin.
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City businessmen, whose main interests were in silver-
using countries, held a very different view of the
currency question. They wished Britain to adopt a silver
and a gold standard, such that the two metals would have a
fixed ratio of value. It was believed by some that this
would halt the relative rise in the price of gold and the
relative fall in price of silver. Many prominent City
businessmen who felt this way were members of the London
Chamber's East India and China trade section, which made a
number of unsuccessful attempts in the early 1890s to
obtain the support of the Council of the Chamber for
bimetallism) The Council, however, was quick to
contradict any suggestion that it favoured the
introduction of a silver standard.2
The trend was going against silver. During the l870s
most European and Scandinavian countries had adopted the
gold standard, or reduced their coinage of silver. In
1892 Austro-Hungary adopted the gold standard, in the
following year Russia decided to coin lOOm gold roubles
and the Sherman Act was repealed in the USA. During the
next two years even South American countries began to
choose the gold standard. 3 The Mints of India had been
1. For example, EICMB 6 Oct. 1892; CMB 1, 12 Oct. 1892.
In 1894 the section supported the idea of a silver
dollar for the Straits Settlements, EICMB 24 Jan., 8
Feb. 1894. It also tried to obtain the support of
the Council for the resumption of the Monetary
Conference, EICMB 6 Mar. 1894; CMB 1, 8 Mar. 1894.
2. Following a bimetallist deputation to the Prime
Minister in May 1892, a letter was printed in The
Times claiming that all British chambers of commerce
were in favour of introducing a silver standard. The
Council immediately issued a letter denying this, CMB
1, 12 May 1892.
3. BM 1896, 743, provides a list of these changes. For
details of some of the changes, see de Cecco, op.
cit., Cli. 3 'The Spread of the Gold Standard in the
World - a short review'.
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closed to the free coinage of silver in 1893.
The president of the London Chamber of Commerce, Sir
A.K. Rollit, felt so confident of the general opposition
to disturbing the gold standard in the City that in his
presidential speech in 1894 he accused the Bimetallist
movement of attempting to replace the British gold stan-
dard with 'a currency of cowries and brass farthings')
It was not possible, however, to dismiss the support that
did exist for bimetallism with a tactless remark. The
economic depression continued into 1895, expectations for
an improvement in business were not realised and none of
the 'leading markets in the world' appeared in a better
position than they had a year before. 2 Lord Brassey
returned from India criticising the decision to close the
Indian Mints. 3 The time had come when those in favour of
the gold standard felt that the activities of the
Bimetallist League and their supporters had to be checked.
Bertram Currie, who had attended the Monetary Conference
in Brussels, convened a meeting which resulted in the
1. A struggle took place in the East India & China
section over whether or not Rollit should be called
to account for his remark. In the end he attended a
meeting of the section to explain that he had been
speaking in a personal capacity, EICMB 14 June, 5
July 1894.
2. CCJ Jan. 1895.
3. CCJ Feb. 1895, 23. He gave an address to the City on
'Indian Currency', in which he listed those who were
opposed to the closure - the Statist and the
signatories of a letter to the Government of India,
representatives of the Bank of China, the Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, and such firms as
Kilburn, Yule, Steel, Gillanders, Arbuthnot and
Graham.
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formation of the Gold Standard Defence Association.' It
was not long before Sir John Lubbock took a spell as head
of this Association, Tritton was chairman of its council,
and Pascoe C. Glyn its Treasurer. 2 Currie, like Lubbock,
was no stranger to the Cobden Club which also produced
literature to counter the work of protectionists and
bimetallists.3
Arguments between the gold and silver factions conti-
nued in the pages of the CCJ also. 4 The East India and
China trade section maintained its attempts to influence
events, 5 prompted on occasion by the chambers of commerce
of Bombay, Bengal, Calcutta and Singapore 6 , but even with
unofficial information at their command7, the efforts of
the section were thwarted. 8 No doubt the China Associa-
tion also tried to promote silver as a currency. It may
be taken as evidence of the importance which City
businessmen with interests in the Far East attached to the
London Chamber of Commerce that at no time was there talk
of leaving the London Chamber over the silver issue,
1. Roger Fulford, Glyn's, 1753-1953 (1953), 203. Currie
was its first president.
2. The Gold Standard 1898, a selection of the papers of
the Association for the years 1895-8 is to be found
in the Goldsmiths' Library, Senate House Library of
the University of London.
3. For example, Lord Farrer, The Neo-Protectionist
Schemes of the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain (1896),
leaflet 105 cv of the Cobden 1ub.
4. CCJ July 1895, 67.
5. EICMB 4 Oct., 15 Nov. 1897.
6. Ibid. 29 Mar. 1898.
7. Ibid. 19 Apr. 1898, Keswick had heard that a
commission was to be established.
8. EICMB 24 May & 25 Oct. 1898.
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despite the great importance this question had for them.
The debate over bimetallism, like that over
protectionism, brought out the distinction between the
public use of the term 'free trade' and the political and
economic reality which it was being used to promote.
Precious metals were not left to find their own value as
the term 'free trade' suggests. There was a fixed minimum
rate for gold which was maintained by the Bank of England.
In the context of the bimetallist debate the City used
'free trade' as it had been used in other contexts, to
limit state action to its existing commitment. Free trade
meant state support for some interests but not for others.
It was an important catch-phrase with which to sustain the
dominance of particular businesses within British economic
activity, and to maintain the supreme position of those
same interests in the context of foreign economic
competition abroad.
Sugar
The degree to which the concept 'free trade' could be
reshaped to protect economic interests was best
demonstrated in the 1890s, as in the previous decade, by
those with interests in the West Indies. Although the
British Government had made special tax-concessions and
arrangements for the West Indies in 1894-5, which
eventually included a government loan 1 , the help which
1. H.A. Will, 'Colonial Policy and Economic Development
in the West Indies, 1895-1903' Economic History
Review xxiii (1970), 129.
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other powers gave to their sugar production was denounced
as 'a violation of the true principles of free trade', and
the abolition of such practices demanded, at a meeting of
the London Chamber of Commerce in 1898.1
Such an extreme test of the malleability of the term
'free trade' was not easily contrived, and it was largely
due to the vigorous efforts of Nevile Lubbock with the
support of the West India Committee. 2 The City as a whole
was not enthusiastic about the needs of the West Indies
interest, and Nevile Lubbock's main task in 1897, when the
Royal Commission to inquire into the state of affairs of
the West Indies was meeting, was to prevent the London
Chamber of Commerce from presenting evidence to the
commission
Joseph Chamberlain had shown a strong personal
interest in the West Indies within weeks of taking
of f ice, 4 and a speech he gave to the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce in the winter of 1897-8 established the
1. CCJ Feb. 1898, 29. The resolution was put by N.
Lubbock and seconded by E. Tate.
2. The West India Committee increased its membership
rapidly between 1886 and 1898, its yearly income from
subscriptions rose from £722 to £2,265, Hall, op.
cit., 30. This was perhaps a reflection of the acute
difficulties which the West India sugar industry
experienced during the 1890s.
3. N. Lubbock wrote to the Council of the London Chamber
threatening to resign if evidence was offered, CMB 2,
14 Jan. 1897, The Bakery, Biscuit-Making and
Confectionary trade section, however, convened a
meeting in May on the subject of the Royal
Commission, GMB 3, 12 May 1897. The West India
Committee was well-represented at the meeting with
the result that it was decided to adjourn until the
Royal Commission had reported.
4. Will, op.cit., 133.
5. Hall, op.cit., 29. The speech was given on 18 Jan.
1898, and he received a resolution of thanks from the
West India Committee for it.
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political context for an attempt to obtain the active
support of the London Chamber of Commerce for a policy of
countervailing duties. This action was instigated by a
letter from the Greenock Chamber of Commerce,' and it was
Sir Thomas Sutherland, chairman of the Greenock Chamber
and MP for Greenock, who spoke to the general meeting of
the London Chamber of Commerce 2 as 'a convinced Free
Trader' in support of the resolution to abolish foreign
sugar bounties.3
When the issue was raised in the City's chamber of
commerce in the following year, it was again introduced by
means of a letter from another chamber of commerce, 4 and
not from within the City. 5 Nevile Lubbock had to resort
to article 28 of the rules of association of the London
Chamber6 in order to get the Council to convene a meeting
1. Exec.MB 27 Jan. 1898. Henry Coke pressed the subject
at the executive meeting.
2. This was the general meeting referred to on p.227
above. It had been well-planned at the Council
meeting the day before when it was made clear that no
amendments to the resolution were expected and no-one
was to speak for the Chamber as a whole, CMB 2, 3
Feb. 1898. The resolution was later sent to Lord
Salisbury and Chamberlain, CMB 2, 3 Mar. 1898.
3. The Bakery section was still against countervailing
duties, as the executive of the Chamber was informed,
Exec.MB 27 Jan. 1898. When the Bakery section had a
joint meeting with the General Produce section to
discuss the resolution from the Greenock Chamber,
however, the result was support for the Greenock
resolution which urged the Government to re-open
negotiations immediately with the bounty-giving
countries with a view to abolishing the duties.
4. CCJ June 1899, 169.
5. Indeed, the Bakery section had issued a circular in
March calling for an end to state interference in the
sugar question, which appeared to have the authority
of the Council. Within 24 hours the Anti-Bounty
League had officially raised the issue with the
London Chamber and N. Lubbock attended the Council
meeting to press the point, CMB 2, 24 Mar. 1899.
6. A general meeting could be called at the official
request of nine members of the Council.
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which marked the climax of his efforts to gain City
support for the abolition of sugar bounties.' By the time
the meeting was held in June 1899 Nevile's brother, Sir
John Lubbock, had been persuaded to support a demand for
an international convention on the question of sugar
subsidies: Sutherland had convinced the London shipping
interests, as represented by John Glover, to support it
also 2
At the meeting a very fine distinction was drawn
between countervailing duties, which the City was not
being asked to support, and the demand for an
international convention containing a penal clause
prohibiting the import of subsidised sugar, which was
proposed at the meeting. Such arguments stretched the
credibility of the free trade argument to its limits and
despite all Lubbock's planning at least one City
businessman present described the proposal as
protectionism. 3 Although a majority of the meeting did
eventually support the proposal, the City as a whole was
clearly unsure about the soundness of such behaviour.4 If
the City was uncertain, the ACCUK was strongly against
1. General Purposes Committee meeting, Exec.MB 2, 30 May
1899; CMB 2, 8 June 1899. N. Lubbock had to use
this means of convening a general meeting as the
Council had voted against such a meeting, in March by
12 votes to 6, CMB 2, 11 Mar. 1899; also CCJ June
1899, 169.
2. CCJ July 1899, 121; The Times 13 June 1899, 12.
3. Robert Wales of the Coffee & Cocoa Section.
4. This was demonstrated again in the following year
when N. Lubbock again had to use article 28 in order
to convene a meeting, CMB 2, 19 Apr. 1900.
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such protectionist proposals. 1 Nevertheless, Nevile
Lubbock continued tirelessly to cajole the London Chamber
into supporting West India interests 2 until the Brussels
Convention ended the bounty system in 1902. His efforts
demonstrated what a small, determined and influential
group of businessmen could achieve providing their demands
did not clash with any major City interest. The only
casualty in this case was the further deformation of the
concept of 'free trade' which the City seemed prepared to
accept. The fact that help to the West Indies could be
described as encouraging the growth of 'Imperial
sentiment' made the activity more palatable to the City.4
Free Trade and City Nationalism
What we may term trade expansion from the business
point of view, is the same thing as imperialim
looked at politically or in a statesmanlike manner.
The City continued to promote imperialism as the only
economic way forward for the U.K. in the 1890s, as it had
1. CCJ Apr. 1900 Supplement. Lubbock insisted on a vote
by chambers, rather than individuals, but still lost
by 42 to 25. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce had
recently joined the ACCUK and resisted vigorously
this tampering with the old principle of free trade.
2. In 1901 Sir Nevile Lubbock threatened to call yet
another special meeting if the delegates from the
City to the ACCUK meeting were not instructed to vote
in favour of the sugar bounties resolution, CMB 2, 28
Jan. 1901. In the event, the resolution was
withdrawn, CCJ Apr. 1901 Supplement. N. Lubbock was
knighted in 1898 for his services to the West Indian
colonies, whether this was intended to arrest his
activities or encourage them is not clear, but the
latter was the effect achieved.
3. Hall, op.cit., 29.
4. CCJ Aug. 1898 'Commercial Legislation'.
5. Bankers' Journal 1899, 515.
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done in the previous decade. The proposed sale of British
goods to new areas of the world was merged with the idea
of the spread of civilisation. Vaunted as the liberation
from a state of primitive stagnation, or even regression,
for the cultures and economies of the non-industrialized
world, imperialism was essentially the education of the
newly-civilised into a newly-dependent position.
In Asia and Africa countless populations are, so to
say, waiting for us. The great thing to do is to
teach people to want, to teach the naked savage to
want clothes, to reach the dweller in a hut to want a
house, and so on.
The realisation that Britain had become isolated
during its period of financial and imperial expansion
became acute at the beginning of 1896. An article in the
Bankers'_Mazine asked Germany and other would-be
colonizing nations to bear in mind that the lands which
Britain colonized were 'thrown open to trade without
restriction or limit', that 'blood and treasure' were
expended in the spread of civilization by Britain who then
stood aside and let British merchants and traders 'be
elbowed out of the field' by German competition. 2 Free
trade could be used as a justification for imperialism at
an international as well as a domestic level.
As industrialization in Europe and the USA
accelerated, the economic competition abroad intensified,
and relations with the other major powers continued to be
presented by the City as a fine mixture of free trade and
1. CCJ (Commerce) 3 Jan. 1894.
2. BM 1896, 194. It is interesting that this article by
Hartley Withers suggested an alliance between Japan
and the U.K..
232
economic nationalism. The idea that economic competition
between nations was a substitute for real warfare was
reiterated in the 1890s.
The time seems to be approaching when political
economy, right or wrong in its application to
commercial affairs, will displace the master of
military or naval manoeuvres. Nations will fight,
not with the sword or the rifle, but through the
medium of the Customs' office.'
The fact of economic interdependence and co-operation
between countries was ignored by the City publicly. Free
trade now represented competition not co-operation, and
the term 'free trade' was allied to the armed rivalries of
nations not to peaceful coexistence. In this way war
became a continuous and natural aspect of economic
survival. Economic nationalism was the only future
presented by the City. Even The Economist admitted the
limitations of 'the old Manchester doctrine' and laissez-
faire, and suggested that democracy made the advantages of
association and state leadership acceptable. 2 The country
was publicly prepared to go to war over 'the open door' of
free trade in China. 3 The conflation of Britain's
'prestige' in the world and British business interests
abroad was established. 4 The Economist which had
admonished the ccJ for blowing the war trumpet in the
1. CCJ June 1900.
2. 7 Apr. 1894, 416 'The Advance Towards State
Socialism'.
3. CCJ Jan. 1898; see the next chapter for details,
p.269 below.
4. BM 1896, 196, referred to 'the prestige with which our
commercial prosperity is so closely connected'; CCJ
Feb. 1900, '"British prestige" is not an empty
phrase, but must be maintained at all costs, as any
loss in this respect must re-act on those material
interests which lie at the base of our commercial
supremacy.'
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1880s was, in 1896, anxious to assure Germany that, des-
pite the lack of panic on the Exchange, British resistance
to the Kaiser's telegram would lead to war if necessary.1
The reaction of the City to the outbreak of war in
South Africa a few years later provided the best example
of City nationalism since the 1893 demonstration against
Gladstone's Irish policy. At the suggestion of Sir John
Lubbock 2 , the Lord Mayor convened a meeting at the
Guildhall 'in support of the South Africa policy of Her
Majesty's Government'. 3 Inside the Guildhall the Band of
the City of London Police provided patriotic music to a
packed house, and an overflow meeting was conducted
outside to a very carefully selected crowd. Such
manifestations of nationalism were well-planned public
exhibitions. There was no blind patriotism in the mind of
those who organised them, as demonstrated by the way an
attempt to tax brokers' contracts during the war was
quickly and successfully opposed by the London Chamber of
Commerce. 4 Indeed, the money needed to finance the war
itself involved the City directly. Edward Hamilton
discussed the possible ways of raising money with Harvey
at Glyn's Bank, 5 with Alfred Rothschild 6 , and with
E. Cassel. 7 Both Cassel and Nathan Rothschild said they
1. Econ. 11 Jan. 1896, 34.
2. Hutchinson, op.cit., ii, 116, 11 Oct. 1899.
3. The Times 17 Oct. 1899, 12 'The City and the War';
see also ibid. 12 Oct. 1899, 10, & the editorial
comments.
4. CMB 2, 8 Mar. 1900; CCJ May 1900, 90-1.
5. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS. 48676, 19 Jan. 1900.
6. Ibid., 4 Feb. 1900, in order that he might discuss it
with his brother, Nathaniel.
7. Ibid., 12 Feb. 1900. This took place over dinner.
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would assist the Government in guaranteeing the success of
the loan.' The City's love for its country in the hour of
need was questioned, however, by the Governor of the Bank
of England: "Their patriotism is a mere matter of price -
make that attractive enough and there will be no danger of
the loan not being subscribed."2
The role of the City in the expansion of the navy is
described below and, as in the case of the navy, the City
projected itself as nationalistic only when it suited its
pocket either directly or indirectly. The nationalism
associated with imperialism could be an important and
direct factor in profit-making, as The Economist noted in
1893.
Messrs. Rhodes, Rudd, and Beit, Baron Nathan de
Rothschild, and the select few to whom shares (of the
Central Search Association) were allotted, should
have a very extensive opportunity of making money at
the expense of investos in general and patriotic
investors in particular.
Another aspect of free trade that was changed by the
City's nationalism was its resonance with other freedoms,
particularly democracy. When City journals, such as the
Bankers' Magazine, referred to liberty they meant the
City's freedom to carry on the specific economic activity
which was making it so wealthy and powerful. Thus it was
argued that liberty was in danger from democracy,
"politics may be summed up as a struggle between two sets
of maggots as to which is to eat the cheese. 4 The City
1. Ibid. 6 Feb. 1900.
2. R.S. Sayers, The Bank of England, 1891-1944 (1976) i,
16.
3. Econ. 1893, 1371.
4. BM 1895, 139-140.
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was complaining about the country-wide indifference to
City affairs, and the preoccupation of other sections of
the population with their own economic interests. The
difficulty was exacerbated, from the City's point of view,
by the fact that its economic activity was not as
conspicuous or easy to understand as wage-earning or
industrial manufacture.
• • • the growing disproportion between our imports
and exports, pleasantly as the excess may be
explained away when the "unseen" factors which cause
it are laid bare by economists and statisticians.
Democracies, however, show a lofty disdain for the
"unseen"; and in that disdain reposes a danger to
our economic regime - not only in matters of trade -
in the near future.1
The fear was that protectionism would soon be within the
range of practical politics, and, if that was the case,
the City did not know where such a movement would stop.
As Bryce retorted in the debate on the shrinkage of
markets initiated by Howard Vincent in 1895, protectionism
might be carried so far as 'to prevent British capitalists
from investing money abroad or lending money to industrial
enterprises in foreign countries'.2
The behaviour of the City business community was
challenged even by the ACCUK in 1897, particularly
'gambling in "futures". 3 The CCJ defended City business
practices as 'the acme of perfection in administering
1. CCJ Feb. 1899.
2. Pan. Deb. 4th Series, xxxi, 1240, 15 Mar. 1895.
3. CMB 2, 4 Mar. 1897, at the Council meeting H. Rokeby
Price and Faithfull Begg strongly criticised the
ACCUK resolution which the London Chamber had been
asked to second, and no further action was taken by
the Council following its condemnation of the
proposal.
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human affairs'.' Democracy was not seen in such a
favourable light, and the delay of important commercial
bills in Parliament, possibly reflecting the criticism
which City business was receiving, suggested to the London
Chamber of Commerce that the idea of a commercial party in
the House of Commons should be resurrected. 2 Although the
London Chamber was successful in obtaining the support of
the ACCUK for the idea 3 and at one point it was expected
that the commercial party would become an accomplished
fact, 4 the realities of such a move eventually eroded any
optimism.
Some people have advocated the organisation of a
commercial party, but what guarantee is there that it
would survive the existence of the Parliament in
which it was formed, and how many candidates for
Parliament woUld dare to appeal to a constituency for
election mainly on the ground that they were members
of the commercial party? Would they be likely to be
more numerous than the so-called labour party? Such
as it is, that party and its members are by no means
free from political conideration and they sit on the
same side of the House1
It was decided to form a commercial committee of MPs
rather than a party, and this was formally put to the
Council of the London Chamber in 1899.6
The advantage of the term 'free trade' to the City's
promotion of its form of nationalism was that, in the same
way as the term could be used to present foreign
1. CCJ Aug. 1897.
2. CCJ Feb. 1898 'Commerce in Parliament'.
3. CCJ Mar. 1898 Supplement. The motion was carried
despite the intervention of the President of the
ACCUK against it.
4. CCJ Apr. 1898, 74. The subject was also discussed at
one of the London Chamber's monthly dinners, CCJ Dec.
1899, 245.
5. CCJ Dec. 1899.
6. Y Jan. 1900, 270.
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competition as selfish and protective, it could be used
domestically to denounce protectionism and socialism as
selfish class interests. This is not to say that the City
opposed all forms of 'state socialism'. Chamberlain's
plan to help develop the crown colonies was not expected
to encounter any serious opposition, "These are
revolutionary days, and, as Sir William Harcourt has told
us, we are all Socialists now . . . . The City was not
against increased organisation and control which it was
developing itself through its economic activity and near
monopolistic practices. This behaviour was presented, not
as the protection of class interests, but as a quality
which was more in keeping with free trade, that business-
like attribute 'efficiency'. The merits of regularity and
reliability were promoted as the justification for those
aspects of City behaviour which were clearly not free
trade. It was on this basis that monopolies such as the
shipping rings, 2 or the state's refusal to put the
business of colonial development out to tender were
defended. 3 The only businesses which could be counted on
to be reliable and regular were existing big businesses
which had large amounts of capital at their disposal.
'Efficiency' meant submission to the existing laws of free
trade and the market, the City's laws. In this way any
business not aiming at making a profit, such as state-run
1. BM 1895, 497 'State-Aided Expansion of Trade'; The
Economist had already admitted the advantages of
association and state leadership, Econ. 7 Apr. 1894,
416 'The Advance Towards State Socialism'.
2. Pan. Papers (1909) XLVII (cd. 4668) 'The Report of
The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings and Deferred
Rebates', 382, Q 10588.
3. Kesner, op.cit., 321.
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businesses, were 'bound to be inefficient, or to prejudice
the interests of individual or joint-stock traders'.'
Just as efficiency was reduced to the way in which
big business made profits, so the study of economics, if
it was to be a science 'in the true sense of the word',
was to be confined to the existing everyday activity of
business. 2 The formation of the British Economic Associa-
tion had not provided the orthodoxy which had been hoped
for. 3 Although the economists themselves were not blamed,
it was pointed out that "the wildest theories and most
hare-brained schemes of social and economic reconstruction
can be, and are continually, based on the writings of
economists". 4 An example given in this context by the
Bankers' Magazine was that the most influential socialist
writer, Karl Marx, had based his writings on those of Adam
Smith.
The view which the City presented of itself and its
activities was not necessarily accepted by contemporaries.
National interests were not City interests beyond 'the
square mile'. Free trade and nationalism were not obvious
allies in the minds of all.
Free trade arranged in the interests of capital that
is polyglot, mobile, and cosmopolitan, is not
necessarily to the advantage of labourers chaied to
the spot by language, family and circumstances.
The money-lending abroad of the early part of the century
was compared with that of the late nineteenth century, the
former period being a time when England lent to her
1. BM 1895, 144.
2. EM 1897, 35 'Facts versus Economic Theories'.
3. The Times 21 Nov. 1890.
4. EM 1897, 35.
5. Arnold White, jiish Democracy: its promises and
perils (1894), v-vi.
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political friends, the latter being when capital was lent
to political and industrial rivals 'helping them to
supplant us in the struggles whether of peace or war'.1
The account which the City gave of the expansion of
British business interests abroad, an objective, free-
trade process in the national interest, has been taken up
by historians since the late nineteenth century without
detailed scrutiny. 2 The term 'free trade' in isolation
suggests, like the term 'free market', economic activity
carried on by discrete interests without the involvement
of the state. During the 1890s, it was used by the City
as a justification for a state-subsidised, state-
supported, oligarchic economic development at home and
abroad. At the same time it was an ideational position
from which similar behaviour by other economic interests,
either domestic or foreign, were criticised and, when
necessary, from which the proposals of minority interests
within the City were discredited. The way in which the
major City business interests promoted their dominant
economic position over time was based upon a successful
connection between the economic reality and the ideas
employed to justify City activity politically.
1. The Increased Armaments Protest Committee, Empire,
Trade and Armaments: An Exposure (1896). A pamphlet
costing 2d.
2. A modern, positivist, economic viewpoint is particular-
ly close to the City's own public image of itself, the
political and moral assumptions being masked by a
pseudo-objective gloss. Such assumptions sometimes
intrude unnoticed into the work of historians, for
example, Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 210 & 251,
refer to 'the energy of the British expansive economy'
and 'the intrinsically neutral movement of commercial
development and colonization'. P.J. Cain and A.G.
Hopkins, 'The Political Economy of British Expansion
Overseas, 1750-1914', Economic History Review xxxiii
(1980), 481-3, use the term 'free trade' as if it had
an ahistorical, unproblematical, economic meaning.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 'POLITICS AND FINANCE": MONOPOLIES, MINES,
LOANS AND RAILWAYS
• . • we may perhaps contend, without fear of
contradiction, that the problems of politics tend
every year to become more c1osel connected with
practical questions of finance .
In the last decade of the nineteenth century the
Bankers' Magazine used the term 'revolutionary' in the
context of 'politics and finance' to argue that British
democracy resulted in the encroachment of politics into
the arena of British economic activity. 3 By contrast,
supporters of political democracy in Britain described the
'revolutionary' aspect of the period as the intrusion of
British finance upon politics.
the growing stake of our wealthy classes in countries
over which they have no political control • . . it
means a constantly growing tendency to use their
political power as citizens of this State to
interfere with the political conditions of those
States where they have an industrial stake.4
The City admitted the interlocked relationship
between state and finance in other countries, 5 as it
fitted in with the argument that British economic
nationalism was a necesssary response to the economic
nationalism of other nations, but when referring to the
British domestic scene the City emphasised the dangers of
1. The title of an article, BM 1895, 139.
2. Ibid..
3. Ibid., 142.
4. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (1938), 357-8.
5. BM 1895, 141, did mention, for example, the Russian
state's successful struggle to provide a loan to
China.
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state interference which might result from giving the vote
to an ignorant electorate.'
More recently it has been proposed that the term
'financial revolution' describes the process of change
which the City underwent in the second half of the
nineteenth century. 2 Essentially the change resulted from
the rise of joint-stock companies, particularly the joint-
stock banks, in association with the revolution in
international communications and the creation of a huge
foreign bill market with its associated brokers and
discount houses. 3 As a writer on the City in the 1870s
remarked, a banker could not afford to ignore the bill
market:
The wide significance thus given to bills of exchange
as a necessity of trade, makes the discounting of
such paper the first duty of a well-conducted bank,
which must keep in view the principles of shortening
credit, anticipating the payment of money, meeting
the demands of commerce, and facilitating financial
transactions.
Most of the paper discounted was created by the
activities of British merchants and the expansion of
British trade during this period. It is not surprising
1. EM, 1895, 141, particularly the discussion of
bimetallism by agricultural electors 'who know as
much about legal tender as about lunar geology'.
2. de Cecco, op.cit., 76.
3. W.M. Scammell, The London Discount Market (1968),
160-1. Scammell includes the role of the Bank of
England in his list of major changes, but this is
because he is concerned with the period up to 1914.
4. William Purdy, The City Life (1876), 67. Purdy gave
a figure of £16.88m as the total acceptances of the
metropolitan joint-stock banks in the early 1870s,
ibid., 68.
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that wealthy merchants became specialists in the bill
market as acceptance houses.' These merchant banks, as
they became known, did not in fact claim to be bankers as
they did not conduct deposit business and they continued
to be involved in import and export. 2
 They also
specialised in the floating of foreign loans. It is
almost impossible to distinguish between a very wealthy
merchant and a merchant banker at this time. Wealthy
merchants were in evidence on the boards of the large
joint-stock banks 3 and more in evidence than any other
group, including bankers, on the boards of colonial, or
exchange banks.4
These colonial, exchange or imperial banks were an
important factor in the expansion of British commerce
abroad. 5 Most were originally formed under royal charter
in the third, fourth and fifth decades of the nineteenth
century, and quite a number failed in the 1866 crisis.6
1. Leaf, op.cit., Ch. 7.
2. Ibid., 186.
3. For examples, see below, p.244-. Cassis, op.cit., 51-
2, table 1.8, gives examples for those houses which
gained a place on the Accepting House committee as
merchant bankers in the new century.
4. Ibid., 75, table 1.14. The colonial banks included
were limited to fifteen of which three were South
American, 3 Australian and two Egyptian.
5. A.S.J. Baster, The Imperial Banks (1929).
6. E.W. Hamilton, Memorandum on Chartered Banks (1877).
Those which dealt with foreign trade and survived the
1866 crash are: (with the year in which they
received a charter) - Bank of Australia (1835),
Colonial Bank (1836), Bank of British North America
(1840), lonian Bank (1844), Bank of South Australia
(1847), Oriental Bank Corporation (1851, failed in
1884), London Chartered Bank of Australia (1852),
English, Scottish & Australian Bank (1852), Chartered
Bank of India, Australia & China (1853), Bank of
Egypt (1856), Chartered Mercantile Bank of India,
London & China (1857), London & South Africa Bank
(1860, later amalgamated with the Standard Bank), and
the Bank of British Columbia (1862).
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Later banks were formed under the Companies Acts.' Banks
with interests in Argentina and the River Plate trade such
as the large and very profitable London and River Plate
Bank, and the English Bank of the River Plate, were
distinguished from other banks with South American
interests (the English Bank of Rio de Janeiro, the London
Bank of Mexico & South America, and the New London &
Brazilian Bank) and other exchange banks in general by
their carrying on business as London bankers. 2 None of
these South American banking companies had received royal
charters, and all of them had been established after
l86O.
The close interrelation of merchants and banking
interests was reflected in the directorships which
merchants held on the boards of the large joint-stock
banks, the colonial or exchange banks, the large insurance
companies, and the large discount houses. 4 When referring
to City finance of the late nineteenth century the role of
1. The Standard Bank of British South Africa (1862), the
Bank of Africa (1879). Many were also formed under
colonial charter or under local laws, such as the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, most of
the other Australian, Canadian and New Zealand banks.
The Union Bank of Australia was a partnership.
2. A distinction made by F.G. Hilton-Price, A Handbook
of London Banks (1882).
3. The 1880s was a time of massive influx of British
capital into South America, by 1890 there was more
British capital in the River Plate area than had been
in the whole of South America ten years previously,
David Joslin, A Century of Banking in South America
(1963), 96.
4. See overleaf.
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merchants must be considered as well as bankers and
others. 1 As Sandeman declared when he was Governor of the
Bank of England, the bankers and the merchants were asso-
ciated in one great brotherhood and they all joined with
the Bank of England in maintaining the resources which
were necessary for carrying on the affairs of the Empire.2
The word 'finance' has been defined as the disciplined
organisation of capital, 3 and the role of the exchange or
colonial banks had the same effect abroad as the amalga-
mation of the City and provincial banks had in England4,
namely the lowering of discount rates to the City level5,
or, to look at it another way, to connect distant business
with the activities of the City. With the advent of
regular fast steamship mail deliveries, and even more so
with the telegraph, businessmen in the City could manage
their affairs abroad directly and continuously.6
1. The Rothschilds referred to themselves as merchants
at this time. The largest mining companies, such as
Consolidated Gold Fields, also became as much
involved in finance as production, R.V. Kubicek 'The
Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment', The Journal of
British Studies (1972) xi, 89.
2. Quoted in Ellis T. Powell, The Evolution of the Money
Market, 1385-1915 (1915), 649.
3. Powell, op.cit., 258.
4. W.T.C. King, History of the London Discount Market
(1936), 272.
5. The colonial banks were criticised abroad for this,
Baster, op.cit., 138.
6. A good example of this in relation to Argentina has
been provided by Charles Jones, 'Mercantile Diaspora,
Technological Change and The Evolution of Argentine
Dependence', a paper given to the Conference on the
Diaspora of the British, organised by the Institute
of Commonwealth Studies in July 1981. Scammel, op.
cit., 164, suggests that the telegraph was super-
seding the foreign bill; and G.A. Fletcher, The
Discount Houses in London (1976), 29, points out tt
the advent of the telegraph meant that a large pro-
portion of foreign bills were finance bills drawn to
take advantage of the international interest rate
differentials.
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This trend towards a greater control of world business by
the City often coincided with the formation and
maintenance of monopolies as we shall see, particularly
when the state was involved in business affairs on the
grounds of national interests.
The relationship between the state and finance had a
number of aspects. The most evident was the domestic.
The state was dependent upon the City for the successful
management of its finance and sought advice beyond that of
the merchant directors of the Bank of England before
taking any action:
It is no use nowadays to attempt to take any
financial step without giving the Brokers, which are
such a powerful body an interest and without taking
the financial 'big-wigs' into confidence.'
The big-wigs were B. Currie of Glyn Mills (who had a place
on the Treasury committee of the Bank of England), the
Rothschilds, the Barings, and, for very important or very
large operations, the large joint-stock banks.2
It has recently been suggested that this aspect of
the relationship between finance and politics was purely
technical in nature, 3 but such a view ignores the fact
that the action being contemplated by the state was to do
business with the merchants, brokers and bankers who
1. Hamilton Diaries BL Add. MSS 48647, 7 Jan. 1888.
2. For examples of the Rothschilds and Barings being
consulted see the following paragraph. For the
joint-stock banks see ibid., 48648, 4 Mar. 1888.
Currie was considered by Hamilton to have the best
financial judgernent in the City and was often turned
to, for example see ibid., 48647, 18 Jan. 1888, and
48650, 4 Jan. 1889; see also p.199 above.
3. Yussef Cassis 'The British Imperial Economy 1890-
1914', a paper given at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, 14 June 1984.
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constituted City finance. It would be perhaps
oversimplifying the case to make an analogy with a
customer asking the advice of a car salesman before buying
a car from him, but the essential relationship was the
same. Take for example the twin problems which faced the
Treasury in January 1889, how to borrow the money for the
expenses of converting the old Three Per Cent stock and
how to place the Local Loans stock on the market.' The
raising of money for the former would have been the
responsibility of a syndicate formed by the Barings and
the Rothschilds, 2 the arrangement for which had been made
informally by Edward Hamilton 3 , but the Chancellor of the
Exchequer was over-anxious about the possible reaction of
Gladstone as leader of the opposition in the House of
Commons4 and the two merchant financiers involved were a
little too greedy 5 . However the Government could only
turn to the City, and eventually it was to ask for tenders
for £5m in Treasury Bills.6
The antagonism of the City could wreck government
finances and reduce the range of possibilities open to
them. This was demonstrated by the City's acceptance of
Goschen's conversion scheme in 1888 even though the terms
were less advantageous than those which the City had
refused four years previously when proposed by a Liberal
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 7 Indeed, the lack of
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS. 48650, 16 Jan. 1889.
2. Ibid., 16 Jan. 1889.
3. Ibid., 31 Jan. 1889.
4. Ibid., 7 Feb. 1889.
5. Ibid., 13 Feb. 1889.
6. Ibid., 4 May 1889.
7. Ibid., 48648, 14 Mar. 1888.
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sympathy for Gladstone in the City was most pronounced and
extended to the Directors' Parlour at the Bank of England,
where, if Hamilton is to be believed, one director had
told the wife of Gladstone's doctor that her husband
should find some means of putting an end to the old
gentleman, and another had declared his intention of
sending the grand old man an undertaker's advertisement
which asked why people went on living a life of trouble to
themselves and others when they could be comfortably
interred for three pounds.1
The political importance of government expenditure
meant that the relations between governments and the Bank
of England, let alone the City at large, were not always
harmonious. For three years under the second Salisbury
government an attempt was made to reach an agreement with
the Bank of England on a reduction of charges. 2 According
to Hamilton, the Governor of the Bank stayed in office for
an extra year in order to negotiate the agreement 3 which
was reached in the spring of 1892, when the Government's
banking costs were reduced by about £50,000 a year.4
During the following summer, the Gladstone administration
found that its borrowing requirements were higher than
they had ever been before. 5 In order to relieve some of
the strain of the demand on the City some money was
borrowed from the National Debt Commission. 6 The
government was still faced with a large amount however,
1. Hamilton Diaries, EL Add. MSS 48648, 31 Jan. 1888.
2. Ibid., 48657, 27 Feb. 1892.
3. Ibid., 27 Dec. 1891.
4. Ibid., 29 Mar. 1892.
5. Ibid., 48661, 11 Aug. 1893.
6. Ibid..
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and not one director of the Bank was politically friendly
towards the government.' Faced with a bank charge of 3.5
per cent on a proposed advance to cover the borrowing
requirements the Chancellor of the Exchequer threatened,
in order to knock off half a per cent, to take the
government's account with its average balance of £5m to
'other people' in the City. 2 Such extreme behaviour
serves to emphasise the lengths to which the state could
be driven merely to obtain business terms approaching
those which other customers, of far less means, enjoyed in
the City.3
From a domestic point of view the State-City
relationship was one in which the State was dependent upon
City finance. The Bank of England was a private bank and
had to keep an eye on its profits; it was even accused of
hesitating in its role as a reserve bank on this account,4
and it became more commercially-minded from 1890 onwards.5
Early in 1890 it appeared to have secured control of all
the balances of public and semi-public bodies which were
large lenders, including the important India Council
balances which had previously been used in daily and
weekly market loans. 6 It began to offer interest on these
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48661, 11 Aug. 1893.
2. Ibid., 20 Sept. 1893.
3. According to Hamilton, Welby of the Treasury wished
to convict the Bank of extravagant charges in January
1892, and in September 1893 the Chancellor of
Exchequer complained that the official rate was 4 per
cent1 the market rate was near 2.5 per cent.
4. R.S. Sayers, Bank of England Operations 1890-1914
(1936), 93.
5. de Cecco, op.cit., 99, citing Sir Henry Clapham, The
Bank of England (1966).
6. King, op.cit., 303.
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deposits, and in July of the same year it re-admitted the
discount houses to rediscount facilities. 1 In 1899 it was
said to have the monopoly of discount business in the
city. 2 The big finance houses were now strong enough to
force down interest rates to facilitate their flotation of
foreign loans, or were at least accused of doing so3 , and
the attempts of the Bank of England to raise the interest
rate in order to attract gold into the City so securing
its reserve levels could be in exact opposition to the
interests of the Government.4
It has been suggested that the advent of a state
interest in foreign capital investments was symbolised by
the purchase of the Suez Canal shares in l875. The fact
that the Rothschilds supplied the Disraeli Government with
over £4m with which to buy the shares, well before
Parliament voted the expenditure of such an amount6,
certainly indicates the potential power involved in the
close relations between City finance and the British
state. It also indicates a long-standing interest in
1. King, op.cit., 303; de Cecco, op.cit., 99.
2. King, op.cit., 311, for the second half of the year
only.
3. Sayers, op.cit., 5. The criticism arose in the
winter of 1889-90. The Bank of England, particularly
in the early 1890s, was in a weak position in
relation to the City as regards control of the
interest or discount rate. Bertram Currie expressed
this view to the Treasury early in 1891, Hamilton
Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48655, 30 Jan. 1891, and the
same conclusion was reached by Sayers, op.cit., 5-6.
4. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48652, 1 Jan. 1890.
The Chancellor was also afraid of being cornered by
bill brokers when he wished to borrow, although this
did not protect him from paying dearly, ibid., 48654,
6 Nov. 1890. Harcourt complained of the jobbing and
rigging of the market a couple of weeks later, ibid.,
23 Nov. 1890.
5. Leland H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to
1875 (1937), 325.
6. Powell, op.cit., 522.
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Egypt by the Rothschilds who helped the state out of a
number of difficult diplomatic constraints by the ready
supply of finance, in exchange for which the state put
business their way.1
Finance also played an important role in
international relations for European powers, both within
Europe and in relation to imperialism. In 1887 France
banned all new issues of Italian securities, following the
renewal of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 2 A tariff war
ensued between France and Italy, and French banks ceased
to honour Italian commercial bills, which in turn resulted
in the German state encouraging German banks to form a
syndicate to buy Italian securities and honour Italian
bills. The part played by Hambros and Barings of London
in this arrangement gained for them the privilege of first
refusal on Italian state financial activity in the future,
a position which had been held by the Paris Rothschilds
earlier in the 1880s. The founding of banks crowned this
mixture of finance and politics.3
1. Powell, op.cit., 521-2, refers to the monthly
advances of cash given in 1885 on the strength of a
private note from the Chancellor and the later
business of floating the £9m loan. See also Hamilton
Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48660, 15 March 1893 and, ibid.,
48671 1 June 1897 on the conversion and dam contract.
2. Herbert Feis, Europe the World's Banker 1870-1914
(Yale University Press, 1930), 236. Since the first
signing of the Treaty in 1882, the German state had
been arranging loans for Italy despite unfavourable
market conditions, ibid., 235. This paragraph is
based upon ibid., 233, 237-9.
3. In August 1890 the Instituto di Credito Fondario was
formed by a German syndicate headed by Bleichrôder
and the Deutsche Bank, and in 1894 the Banco
Commerciale Italiano was founded at the urging of the
German state. The German banks did not always
respond unquestioningly to the dictates of the German
state, they refused some of the demands made upon
them, such as the taking over of two bankrupt Italian
banks in 1893.
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Financial relations between Russia and Germany
provide further examples of the important role which
finance played in international relations. In 1887
Germany, which had been a major subscriber to Russian
loans, refused to accept Russian bonds as collateral, or
rather Bismarck instructed the Reichsbank not to accept
them. 1 What the Paris Rothschilds had lost in Italy they
were to have the opportunity of recouping by financing
loans to Russia, and within ten years the French came to
possess Russian government and industrial securities worth
in excess of 300m roubles. It was made clear to the
Russians in 1887 that the assurance of continued political
friendship was necessary if the financial facilities were
to be expanded.2
In Britain, the Government could not instruct the
Bank of England as to its policy because it was a private
bank; still less could it give orders to the London Stock
Exchange which was a completely independent association of
individuals. This does not mean, however, that the
British state was not concerned with finance in its
international policy making. Many examples have already
been discussed for the l880s in the context of
imperialism3 , and examples of such a relationship were not
limited to the Empire. The Peruvian default of the l870s
involved the British state first unofficially and then
officially. 4 The suspension of payments by Argentina in
1. Feis, op.cit., 213.
2. Ibid., 215.
3. Ch. 2 above.
4. Feis, op.cit., 106-7.
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1891 were settled under the auspices of the Bank of
England.1
Regarding international relations in Europe, the
British state could not ignore the relations between
finance and politics. Apart from the situation in
Turkey 2 , Egypt 3 and Persia 4 , the British state was to be
found offering financial assistance to the Portuguese
state in 1897 in order to avoid control of Mozambique
passing to the Transvaal or a foreign power. 5 In
relations with Germany, Lord Salisbury attributed his
position of strength to the success of the Russian loan
floated in Paris in 1891.6 In Britain, therefore, finance
and politics were as interrelated as in other European
states, and although the state had no official structure
through which it could order City finance to support its
foreign policy, it did have close unofficial relations
with City finance. 7 The Treasury could indirectly
negotiate with such finance houses by offering or
withholding business opportunities with which it could
reward support for its policies. In 1890, for example,
1. Feis, op.cit., 108. Partly because it related to the
Baring crisis.
2. Ibid., et seq..
3. Ibid., 382 et seq..
4. Ibid., 361 et seq..
5. Ibid., 250. This followed the default of the
Portuguese government on payments of its railway
bonds in 1892 after which the British Stock Exchange
banned all dealings in the new securities, the
British having nearly brought the Portuguese state to
bankruptcy three years earlier over the issue of
compensation to the Delagoa Bay railway company.
6. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 290-1.
7. See p.25O above.
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when the Rothschilds undertook the conversion of an
Egyptian loan they wanted it to be inscribed at the Bank
of England but the Bank would not agree without a hint
from the state, which in this case was not forthcoming.'
It is not surprising that this relationship was seen
from outside the United Kingdom as one of close dependen-
cy. This occasionally produced results of a most undesi-
rable kind. For example, in May 1891 the Russian Govern-
inent, having unsuccessfully negotiated with the Paris
Rothschilds for a conversion, threatened to take revenge
by withdrawing £3-4m of gold from its deposits in London,
a threat which sent the bank rate up to five per cent.2
Around the end of the 1880s there had been some
attempt to reduce the more direct relations between the
state and British finance abroad. The role of the Crown
Agents was confined to British Crown Colonies and
Protectorates only, and their offices were moved from the
Treasury to the Colonial Office Buildings. 3 There was an
attempt to modify the responsibilities incurred in
charters which had been granted earlier in the century to
colonial or imperial banking companies4, and the Treasury
had declined to advise that royal charters be issued for
banking companies for quite a number of years. 5 During
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add.MSS 48653, 24 May 1890.
2. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add.MSS 48655, 24 May 1891.
3. Kesner, op.cit., 312.
4. Following the 1879 Companies Act, the Disraeli
administration sought to legislate such a change in
the form of the Chartered Banks (Colonial) Bill 1880.
The bill was not passed before the dissolution of the
government, but a Model Charter scheme was formulated
by the incoming Liberal government, Baster, op.cit.,
131-6.
5. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add.MSS 48651, 30 July 1889.
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the 1880s, however, the Queen granted charters to five
companies, one of which called itself a banking company.'
It is not surprising that foreign governments tended to
equate the activity of the British state with the
interests of City finance
Perhaps the most prominent example which highlights
the close relationship between the British state and City
finance, including both the domestic and foreign aspects
of the structure, was the Baring crisis in 1890. Faced
with the possible crash of a major financial house (as a
result of a revolution in the Argentine Republic) which in
turn would probably have caused a general run on the banks
in the City, the Governor of the Bank of England and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer had a long discussion 2 and
agreed upon the necessity for gold to be supplied to the
Bank from abroad. According to Hamilton, the Rothschilds
were involved in arranging for the gold to be sent from
Russia and from the Bank of France.3
The roundabout way in which the Treasury provided for
the issuing of Treasury Bills to the Bank, the only form
of security the Bank of France would accept for its £2m of
gold, is a lesson in the dexterity of state finance and
its close relations with City finance. The Treasury
issued the Bills to the Bank by nominally raising £2m from
the Bank by Treasury Bills and used the proceeds of the
sale to pay off an equivalent amount of the temporary loan
1. The British North Borneo Co. in 1882, the Royal Niger
Co. in 1886, the Imperial East Africa Co. in 1888,
the British South Africa Company in 1889, and the
Imperial Bank of Persia in the same year.
2. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add.MSS 48654, 10 Nov. 1890.
3. Ibid..
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which the Treasury had from the National Debt Commission
or Redemption account. The Commission then used this
money to buy Consols from the Bank at the certified price
of the day. Thus. the Bank got Bills in lieu of Consols
and the Commission obtained Consols at a very favourable
price in lieu of the temporary loan to the Treasury.1
The Government was not prepared to guarantee the
Barings directly2 , but was willing to suspend the Bank
Charter Act if necessary. 3 It was left to the Governor of
the Bank of England to arrange a guarantee fund by calling
together all the very wealthy men of the City and setting
up a joint guarantee for the £4m necessary to make the
liquidation of the Baring estate, rather than bankruptcy,
viable.4 It is not clear just how legal the whole opera-
tion was 5 , but within less than a week the guarantee had
amounted to nearly £lOm.6
The government did not necessarily relish the close
relations it had with the City, as it was constantly faced
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add.MSS 48654, 12 Nov. 1890.
2. Ibid., 11 Nov. 1890. The Governor of the Bank,
Lidderdale, wanted the Government to put up Lim, the
same amount as the Bank was contributing to the
guarantee.
3. Ibid., 12 Nov. 1890. This expedient which allowed
the Bank to suspend cash payments was used on a
number of occasions in the nineteenth century, de
Cecco, op.cit., 82.
4. For a detailed account of the crisis see de Cecco,
op.cit., 88-97. The way in which de Cecco emphasises
the distinction between an 'inner Sanctum' and the
joint-stock banks is to ignore the fact that most of
the inner group were directors of the joint-stock
banks.
5. Hamilton in his diaries thought that the Bank of
England might have difficulties in justifying its
action to its shareholders, BL Add. MSS 48654, 12
Nov. 1890. The question for the joint-stock banks
was whether their involvement was legal.
6. Ibid., 17 Nov. 1890.
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with the possibility of criticism in Parliament if it
became too obviously allied with the City, while also
being in danger of equally important criticism if it did
not maintain its established obligations to the City. In
1877 Hamilton had prepared a long memorandum on the need
for the state to retreat from its obligation to the
chartered banks. He had argued that it was 'a generally
accepted theory' that it was desirable for the government
to avoid interfering with private enterprise and
mercantile speculations, and that it was 'equally
acknowledged' that the government should do nothing which
could have the appearance of giving 'a select few of a
class' an advantage over their fellows.' A decade or so
later he was engaged in hiding just such widely
deprecated behaviour from the public.
The proposed grant of a charter to the Imperial Bank
of Persia had a provision in its Deed of Settlement
whereby £200,000 out of the capital would go to Baron G.
de Reuter in payment for the concession which he had
obtained from the Shah in order to cover his expenses,
probably bribes. The Cabinet felt that the Treasury could
not ratify such a large sum. As Hamilton complained,
'People like Solicitors and Stockbrokers wholly fail to
appreciate the Parliamentary difficulties which such a
proposal might involve.' 2 By a fortunate coincidence the
prospectus for the Bank of Persia, which had been fully
underwritten by first class City houses according to
1. Memorandum on Chartered Banks (1877), 22.
2. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48651, 13 Aug. 1889.
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Hamilton,' was not to be issued until Parliament had been
prorogued. 2 Reliance upon such coincidences demonstrates
the distance between the realities of the City backed
enterprise, which the state was supporting, and the arena
of debate in which the activities of the government were
justified. The following sections of this chapter provide
further examples of the tension-filled, but close,
relationship between finance and politics.
East India and China Trade Section
The best example of the relationship between state
and finance in the sense of loans is provided, as it was
in the previous decade, by events relating to British
interests in the Far East. As in other trade sections of
the London Chamber of Commerce, all the major banks with
interests in the area were represented by members of the
East India and China trade section who attended meetings
regularly. Matheson, Keswick, Macandrew (all three of
Matheson & Co.), 3 Paterson, Gilfillan, Scott, and
Richardson were the most regular members. Macandrew's
membership of the community of City finance in the l890s
was indicated by his chairmanship of the National Bank of
New Zealand, and his place on the board of the National
Mortgage Agency of New Zealand. 4 William Keswick had
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48651, 13 Aug. 1889.
2. Ibid., 21 Aug. 1889.
3. Apart from their connections with Jardine Matheson,
and the Hong Kong & Shanghai bank, Macandrew and
Keswick were both directors of the Indo-China Steam
Navigation Co..
4. Magniac had been involved in both of these companies,
it is likely that there was a permanent connection
between them and the Matheson firm. Macandrew was
also a director and later chairman of the Berne Land
Co..
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directorships in a number of mining companies at the end
of the decade. In terms of banks, apart from being
chairman of the Hong Kong & Shanghai bank London
committee, Keswick was also chairman of the Imperial Bank
of Persia.' Thomas Scott, the East India merchant with
particular interests in Singapore, was a director of the
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London & China and was
on the board of the Bundi Tin Mining Syndicate. William
Paterson, also a member of a firm which had predominantly
Singapore interests (Paterson & Simons), was a director of
the other big eastern bank, the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia & China. He was also still chairman of the
London, Paris and American Bank 2 . S. Gilfillan of
Adamson, Gilfillan & Co. was no stranger to finance,
having founded the prosperity of the Borneo Co. branch in
Siam through his activity as an accredited agent of
Lloyd's 3 and the banking business of the company.4
1. The link between the Hong Kong & Shanghai bank and
the Imperial Bank of Persia continued until the
merger of the two concerns in 1960, for their
relations see the introduction by David McLean to
Frank H.H. King, Eastern Banking (1984). Keswick was
also a director of the Trust & Loan Co. of China,
Japan, & the Straits around 1890, and of the British
& China Corporation from its formation in 1898.
Regarding the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is worth
noting that Baron de Reuter was elected to the
Council of the London Chamber of Commerce in 1893.
2. He also became chairman of the Thames & Mersey Marine
Insurance Co., he was a director of Pahang-Kahang,
and in the mid-decade a director of the Eastern
Mortgage & Agency Co..
3. Henry Longhurst, The Borneo Story (1956), 44.
4. The Hong Kong & Shanghai bank did not open a branch
in Siam until 1888 when it took over the account of
the Borneo Co.. It also had the account of the Burma
Bombay Trading Co., Collis, op.cit., 91. In the last
decade of the century, Gilfillan was a director of
the Sungei Ujong (Malay Peninsular) Railway Co..
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J.W. Richardson was a partner in the firm of Richardson,
Bradley & Co. which had its main interests in Swatow.
At the end of the 1880s an organisation, which had
committees in both Shanghai and Hong Kong, was formed to
represent British interests in China, 	 the China
Association.' The general committee was formed of
businessmen who occasionally attended the East India &
China section of the London Chamber, and from the early
1890s onwards it was chaired by William Keswick. 2 The
section of the London Chamber played a senior role to the
China Association. The latter officially approached the
section for support on a number of occasions 3 , and
sometimes officially informed the section of events which
demanded action. 4 Unofficially, the members of the
association being also members of the trade section, there
was constant communication between the two groups. It
would seem that the London Chamber of Commerce was
officially brought into play when the China Association
found difficulty in influencing the government on its
•
1. Nathan M. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign
Office (New York, 1948), ix.
2. Ibid., 160. The Association pulled together many of
the former leaders of the Shanghai and Hong Kong
Chambers of Commerce, as well as all the directors of
the Hong Kong & Shanghai bank. Its first chairman
was Sir Alfred Dent.
3. For example, EICMB 9 June 1891, 21 Nov. 1892, 21 Dec.
1893, and 30 Aug. 1894.
4. For example, the fact that Russia had taken Port
Arthur, EICMB 29 March 1898.
5. Pelcovits accepts the close association between the
Association and the FO, though the thesis of his book
is that "there existed a fundamental clash between
mercantile and official attitudes on British policy
towards China", Pelcovits, op.cit., vii.
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An example of the close contact between the two
groups was given when Sir John Pender 1 attempted to gain
an advantageous position in China for his telegraph
company, which the bankers, merchants and shippers feared
would result in persistently high charges for them. 2 Sir
Philip Currie at the FO would not supply the City
businessmen with a copy of the Chinese Telegraphic Conven-
tion without Pender's permission, which was not given.
The trade section wrote to Sir Philip Currie again asking
what could be done. 3 By the spring of 1890, no copy had
been obtained so Sir John Lubbock was then prompted to put
a question on the matter in the House of Commons. 4 The
eventual suspension of the ratification of the Convention
has been described as a victory which gave such prestige
to the China Association that no Anglo-Chinese affairs
were solved without its intervention from that time
onwards .
The fact that membership of the Association and the
trade section overlapped to a great extent makes it
difficult to distinguish, where unofficial communications
were concerned, between action taken for individual firms,
the trade section or the Association. 6 For example, when
the trade section met to consider a telegram from the
1. Sir John Pender MP was involved in at least ten
telegraph companies.
2. EICMB 22 Nov. 1889.
3. EICMB 17 Dec. 1889.
4. EICMB 17 Apr. 1890.
5. Pelcovits, op.cit., 162.
6. Pelcovits knew little of the workings of the London
Chamber of Commerce, he thought Keswick was chairman
of the Council of the Chamber, ibid., 161. Keswick
was elected to the Council in 1892 for a number of
years, and was chairman of the trade section after
Matheson died in 1897.
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Shanghai Chamber of Commerce warning that the cable
companies were again trying to ratify the Chefoo Telegraph
Convention, Sir Alfred Dent attended to confirm that the
FO had instructed the British minister in Peking to leave
the matter in abeyance. 1 The main point is that, as with
British interests in other parts of the world, the state
departments and ministers were in official and unofficial
communication with the major businessmen involved, and
that these businessmen rapidly acquired information which
was used by one or other of the organisations to which
they belonged.
Since the formation of the trade section Matheson had
been advocating the entry of British business into the
interior of China on the grounds that it would provide the
largest possible market for British enterprise. 2 What was
envisaged was control of the trade of the country. The
section had already dropped the idea of a railway from
Burma as it was desirable to keep the trade flowing to the
coast where British interests were well-established, and
attempts to gain access to the existing interior trade
routes, the rivers, had been partially successful.3
In 1895 other countries appeared to be achieving
success where British business had not. The Japanese,
having beaten the Chinese militarily, negotiated a treaty
1. EICMB 23 Nov. 1891. He had received the information
in a letter from the FO.
2. RMB 2, Council meeting 12 Nov. 1885.
3. Access to the Yangtse had already been conceded,
EICMB 11 Dec. 1888, and pressure for entry into the
West River was maintained, ibid., 21 Dec. 1893, the
section giving support to the requests of the Hong
Kong Chamber of Commerce and the China Association.
See also ibid., 30 Jan., 8 July & 25 Nov. 1895.
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which gave them access to the upper Yangste 1 , and the
Franco-Chinese treaty of the same year appeared to put the
French in a strong position regarding the building of
railways. 2 The French were already feared because of
their increasing influence in Siam. 3 Indeed, Paterson
accused them of breaking every promise they made4 , and
later warned that Siam was rapidly becoming French.5
The section formed a subcommittee to consider the
Franco-Chinese railway treaty 6, demonstrating the ability
of the section to bring important businessmen together on
an important issue at short notice. In fact, it was under
the official auspices of the China Association that
1. When the section knew of this they pressed the
British government for equal rights, EICMB, 22 July
1897.
2. Ibid., 8 July 1895.
3. Ibid., 30 Oct. 1893, the section asked that British
consuls be appointed where French consuls had been
placed. The Franco-Siamese treaty was considered
again in the following month, ibid., 21 Dec. 1893,
and a memorial worded by a subcommittee composed of
Annan Bryce, P.D. Thomson, Sir Andrew Clarke, J.M.
Ryrie and A. Currie was approved and sent to Lord
Rosebery in the new year, ibid., 8 Feb. 1894. In the
summer the British government was again urged to keep
its attention on events in Siani, ibid., 11 July 1894.
All chambers of commerce in the U.K. were circulated
that it was time to approach the FO again, ibid., 30
Aug. 1894. The reason for opening a branch of the
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank in Siam in 1888 had been
because the British Legation had wanted to forestall
a French bank, Collis, op.cit., 89.
4. EICMB 8 July 1895, again a subcommittee was formed of
the same people with the addition of S. Gilfillan.
5. Ibid., 25 Nov. 1895. In 1897 two of the four men
proposed as consular representatives by the section
were appointed in Siam, CMB 2, 9 Jan. 1897. In 1899
the French negotiated a loan for Siam and French
officials were appointed in the country, a letter to
FO, EICMB 13 June 1899.
6. EICMB 8 July 1895. The subcommittee consisted of
Matheson, Gwyther, E. Dent, Keswick, Macandrew, Annan
Bryce, E. Iveson, E. Pandorff, J.W. Maitland and P.D.
Thomson.
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Keswick had an interview with Lord Salisbury later in the
year. 1 Keswick had suggested at an informal meeting of
the Association that the time had come to go to the FO in
order to ask for clarification of the government's far
eastern policy. 2 T.H. Whitehead, the branch manager of
the Chartered Bank at Hong Kong, had telegraphed The Times
in October 1895 that Russia had achieved a secret
agreement with China for the occupation of Port Arthur;3
news which, when The Times published it, was described as
false by Lord Salisbury in his Guildhall speech. At his
interview with Lord Salisbury, Keswick told him that the
waterways were preferable to a railway from India, as they
were cheaper and would draw a greater proportion of
commerce towards Shanghai. Salisbury reassured him that
the opening of the West River was already receiving
attention from the government. The main point put by
Keswick was that the Yangtse was the most important area
for British business with China, as it was the richest and
most vulnerable portion of the country. Keswick stressed
the fact that it also gave access to the extensive western
provinces, notably Szechuan.
The main advantage of the Sino-Japanese war, for the
City, was the placing of loans to China to help repay the
1. EICMB, 25 Nov. 1895. The section's subcommittee
decided not to act once Lord Salisbury had accepted
the request from the China Association.
2. This and all information on the interview with Lord
Salisbury which was recorded in the minute book of
the China Association is taken from Pelcovits,
op.cit., 183-9, unless otherwise noted.
3. Sir Edward Compton Mackenzie, Realms of Silver
(1954), 181. The Times, 25 Oct. 1895, 5.
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war indemnity to Japan. At the outbreak of war in 1894,
Sir Robert Hart approached the Bank of England on behalf
of the Chinese Government for a loan of £6m, but was
refused on the grounds that the transaction was
speculative and therefore a request from the FO was
necessary. 1 The Hong Kong & Shanghai bank was the only
institution which would advance money to China during the
Sino-Japanese war of 1894_5,2 but it was not successful in
its bid to float the whole of the Japanese indemnity.3
Russia, with French assistance, secured the first
indemnity loan of about £16m at four per cent.4
Within weeks of this loan being organised, the Hong
Kong & Shanghai bank had reached an agreement with the
Deutsche-Asiatische Bank for financial co-operation in
China. 5 The Hong Kong bank had opened a branch in Hamburg
in 1889 as the German merchants, the principal of which
1. Mackenzie,op.cit., 203.
2. King, Eastern Banking, 3.
3. Collis op.cit., 68. Just how anxious the Hong Kong
bank was to succeed in its bid to take a major share
in the first loan might be questioned in view of the
fact that two-thirds of the issue of its £3m silver
1895 loan were left in the underwriters' hands,
Mackenzie, op.cit., 203.
4. FO 233/120 No. 96, the syndicate was composed of:
M.M. Hottinguere & Cie., La Banque de Paris et des
Pays Bas, Le Credit Lyonnais, La Société Générale
pour favoriser le dèveloppement du commerce et de
l'industrie en France, Le Comptoir National
d'Escompte de Paris, La Sociètê Gènêrale de Credit
Industriel et Commercial, La Banque Internationale de
Commerce St Petersbourg, La Banque d'Escompte de St
Petersbourg, La Banque Russe pour le Commerce Etran-
ger, La Banque de Commerce de Volga-Kama. According
to Hamilton's Diaries, EL Add. MSS 48664, 13 June
1895, the French as well as the English Rothschilds
stood aloof from the loan "ostensibly on the ground
that this (U.K.) country has been left out in the
cold."
5. In July 1895, David McLean 'British Banking and Gov-
ernment in China: the FO and the Hong Kong & Shang-
hai Bank 1895-1914' (Cambridge University, Ph.D.,
1973), 30 (henceforward, 'British Banking in China').
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was the Siemsson firm, wanted to send their remittances to
Hamburg direct, and it was feared that the newly-founded
Deutsche-Asiatische bank might get the business.' The
German government had been active in the establishment of
the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank and all the large German
banks, including the Prussian State Bank - the
Seehandlung, held shares.2
Preliminary discussion for the second indemnity loan
began in November l895. The Chinese looked around for
better terms. 4 When another British backed company, the
Ottoman Bank, considered tendering for the loan, it was
told by Bertie of the FO that the Chinese were engaged in
trying to beat down the costs of the Hong Kong bank's
offer, and so the Ottoman Bank lost interest. 5 The
preliminary agreement for the second indemnity, which was
to go to the Hong Kong bank and the Deutsche Asiatische,
was settled in the spring of 1896.6 The London manager of
the Hong Kong bank, Ewen Cameron, managed to get the whole
of the loan, including the £Bm which constituted the
German bank's share, inscribed at the Bank of England
despite intitial opposition from Hicks-Beach, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 7 Lord Salisbury, no doubt
recalling the interview he had had with Keswick three
1. Collis, op.cit., 107.
2. Feis, op.cit., 437.
3. For details of the joint-proposal put forward by the
two banks, see FO 233/120 no. 97, 23 Nov. 1895.
4. For the arguments of China against the offer, see FO
233/120, no. 101.
5. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 31.
6. 7 March 1896, ibid., 34.
7. Ibid., 34-5. It is not clear how he managed this.
Hicks-Beach had refused to communicate with the Bank
of England unless Lord Salisbury pressed him on
political grounds.
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months earlier, gave instructions that the Chinese should
be pressed on the question of opening up the West River to
foreign trade as part of the deal.'
On the Russian side, offers of money were connected
to the construction of railways from the Siberian line
into Manchuria and from Peking to Hankow. Fears of such
concessions were heightened in Britain during the competi-
tion for a third indemnity loan during 1897.2 Events
moved quickly at the end of the year when Germany occupied
Kiaochow and the rumour that Russia had offered a guaran-
teed loan of £l6m was confirmed. Cameron informed Bertie
that only a loan guaranteed by one of the European powers
would have any possibility of success in the existing
state of uncertainty. 3 In case there was any lack of
understanding in political circles that the City consi-
dered the situation uncertain, the secretary of the China
Association had written to Bertie the day before Cameron
wrote and Grundy had explained that he was calling a
meeting of the Association's committee 'in order to obtain
an official pronouncement of the increasing anxiety which
is felt regarding Eastern affairs' 4 . In arguing for the
support of the British state for the loan, Cameron
stressed the relationship between the political and
business advantages to be derived from such action:
The move would be popular in this ountry, and our
prestige and authority in China would be beyond ds-
pute and our commerce safeguarded proportionately.
1. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 35
2. The whole of this paragraph is based on McLean,
'British Banking in China', 35-7.
3. FO 17/1330, 359, Cameron to Bertie, 23 Dec. 1897.
4. FO 17/1330, 352, China Association to Bertie, 22 Dec.
1897.
5. Cameron to Bertie, 23 Dec. 1897, op.cit.; 	 also
quoted in McLean 'British Banking in China' 37.
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The president of the China Association, Lord Loch, dis-
pelled any doubts that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
at the FO, George Curzon, might have had about the extent
of support which existed amongst the businessmen with
interests in China for such a loan, a week or so later.'
Edward Hamilton was given the job of devising a
scheme which was to be presented to the Cabinet.2
Hamilton was working on the idea of a direct state to
state loan which Hicks-Beach had proposed. 3 Such a
project would have been an unprecedented example of the
intermeshing of finance and politics in Britain, and not
without some domestic opposition as Hamilton noted, 'It is
a new departure to lend money to foreign, tottering
states, and there will be plenty of reminders that charity
begins at home.' 4 Hicks-Beach even wanted to make a
profit for the state out of the effect which the announce-
ment of the loan would have had on the Stock Exchange. He
suggested that the state buy up Chinese stock before news
of the loan pushed up their price, and then sell them at a
profit afterwards. 5 Attached to the loan itself was a
list of conditions, at the head of which was the opening
up of the inland communications of China to foreign
1. Pelcovits, op.cit., 212. There was to have been a
deputation later but events moved too quickly.
2. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48670, 31 Dec. 1897.
3. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 40.
4. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48672, 2 Jan. 1898.
5. Ibid., 6 Jan. 1898. Hamilton felt that he would have
to resign if this suggestion were taken up, regard-
less of whether it was legal or not.
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trade) By this time, however, Cameron had been told that
a guaranteed loan was quite out of the question as Lord
Salisbury felt that the House of Commons would not
contemplate such a move.2
Hicks-Beach was imagining that the inter-state loan
would be seen as a coup on the lines of the purchase of
the Suez Canal shares, and that Britain should obtain
secretly, independent of the Hong Kong bank, a position of
equal predominance to that acquired when the Suez deal was
brought off. 3 Cameron had pointed out that the Chinese
wanted to buy ships and guns in order to strengthen their
position in the world, 4 and, the Chinese minister in
London having been instructed to apply for a British
Government guarantee for the loan 5 , the Chinese were
offered a £16m loan provided that a proportion of it were
spent either in liquidating an old loan of high interest
or in paying British contractors for ships and guns. 6 In
either case British business would profit doubly. Hicks-
Beach was vigorous in his public declarations of the
significance of the situation in China and the importance
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS. 48672, 6 Jan. 1898.
Lord Salisbury had consulted O'Connor about possible
conditions and three definite demands had been listed
- the opening of inland communications, the admission
of foreign salt, and the retention of Sir Robert Hart
at the customs. The possibility of some territorial
concessions as collective security was also mooted,
as it had been at Loch's interview with Curzon,
Pelcovits, op.cit., 212.
2. FO 17/1330, 360, Bertie to Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1897.
It is interesting to note that the communication was
to be made verbally, a point which Bertie underlined
when asking for Lord Salisbury's opinion.
3. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 41.
4. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48672, 22 January 1898.
5. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 41.
6. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48672, 25 Jan. 1898.
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of British business interests there. As he informed the
Swansea Chamber of Commerce:
We did not regard China as a place for conquest or
acquisition by any European or other power. We
looked upon it as a most hopeful place of the future
for the commerce of our country and the commerce of
the world, and the Government are absolutely
determined, at whatever cost, even - and he wished to
speak plainly - if necessary at the cost of war, that
the door should not be shut.
This was a sentiment which the London Chamber of Commerce
applauded wholeheartedly.2
War had been the origin of the loan, war was partly
the aim of raising the loan, and war was threatened if the
loan was refused. As Hamilton noted in his diary, China
was between the Russian 'devil' and the British 'deep blue
sea'. 3 The Russians had threatened to invade China if the
British loan was accepted. At the end of January the
Chinese refused both the Russian and British loans. 4 Lord
Salisbury insisted that British banks were to have a share
of any loan secured by European financiers. 5 The Hong
Kong bank negotiated an agreement with the Chinese
Government in mid-February for a £16m loan, split equally
with the German bank. Cameron was confident that he could
find underwriters for the £8m in the City; this was not
surprising in the wake of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer's declaration that the government was willing to
go to war for British business interests in the country.
This same Chancellor of Exchequer baulked at instructing
1. This was reported in the CCJ Jan. 1898.
2. Ibid..
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48672, 25 Jan. 1898.
4. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 44, the source
for the rest of the paragraph.
5. 5 Feb. 1898, Pelcovits, op.cit., 214.
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the Bank of England to inscribe this new loan, preferring
the suggestion to originate in the FO which was better
able to justify the action on political grounds.1
The trade section of the London Chamber was engaged
in providing arguments for George Curzon to use. 2 At the
end of March, Curzon was informed that ninety per cent of
trade with China was in the hands of British merchants who
were alarmed by the possibility of Russia and France
instituting protectionist policies in north and south
China respectively. 3 In the same month a resolution was
passed by the ACCUK on the topic, and a couple of months
later the London Chamber provided representatives to take
part in a deputation organised by the ACCUK. 4 Whether
such action was organised after specific discussion with
the Government ministers on its necessity, as had happened
in the previous decade, or merely as an accepted habit in
order to facilitate state support, is of no real impor-
tance for the relationship between financial and political
interests was so close at this time.
1. The Rothschilds also wanted the loan issued by the Bank
of England, Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48672, 11
Mar. 1898. The Chancellor of the Exchequer refused,
according to Hamilton, because the Bank was seen as a
'semi-state bank' and if the loan was issued by the
Bank it would seem as if the Government were 'standing
behind the financiers'.
2. A letter from the China Association had stimulated the
section into preparing its views and requesting a
meeting with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, EICMB 29 Mar. 1898. To achieve this a commit-
tee was formed, composed of Rollit, Keswick, Gilfillan,
D. Cruickshank (Begg, Dunlop & Co.), J.N. Stuart
(Alexander Lawrie & Co.), W.G. Gullard (Paterson Simons
& Co.), Coke, Macandrew, Gwyther, Annan Bryce, W.
Adamson (Adamson & Gilfillan) and Auchenloss (Eastern
Mortgage & Agency Co.).
3. In fact the deputation went to the House of Commons
whilst Curzon was waiting for them at the FO, but
Rollit presented him with the statement later, EICMB 29
Mar. 1898.
4. EICMB 14 June 1898.
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In 1896 Lord Salisbury had not been slow to remind
the Chinese Government that having the loan inscribed at
the Bank of England was an unusual favour which could only
be granted at the express request of the British Govern-
ment and that the effect of the action would be to raise
the value of the loan in the market, materially improving
the credit of China. What he required from the Chinese in
return was the rapid opening of the West River and other
conditions.' Although Salisbury insisted that the in-
scription of the loan at the Bank would not have been done
except to oblige China, 2 it is easy to see the whole
affair from the point of view of yet another successful
piece of business completed by the Hong Kong bank with
state backing. After all, the British Government was
asking for attached conditions which were primarily of a
business nature.
It has been suggested that the relationship between
British politics and City finance in China, in the last
decade of the century (and beyond), was primarily a case
of the FO using financial enterprise to achieve political
ends, 3 or a mutual dependency which nobody wanted. 4 Such
a view would seem to ignore the City's point of view, that
state support meant successful business, and while the re-
lationship was not always harmonious, it was a much sought
after, common element in late nineteenth century finance.
1. FO 17/1279, 53 telegram from Salisbury to Beauclerc,
26 Mar. 1896.
2. Ibid., 61 telegram from Salisbury to Macdonald, 28
April 1896.
3. David McLean 'Finance and "Informal Empire" before
the First World War', Economic History Review xxix
(1976), 301.
4. King, Eastern Banking, 3.
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In the City's eagerness to obtain control of, or
profit from, the internal trade of China, the construction
of railways was to play an important part. The proposals
for a Yunnan Railway System put forward in 1895 provides a
good example of the arguments used to encourage such a
take over. At the forefront of the reasons presented was
the suggestion that, as the Chinese Government was to
receive a proportion of the profits, the financial credit
of the government would increase; an advantage which the
City was not slow to appreciate. The railway would also
offer strategic advantages, troops being able to move
quickly around the country and at a twenty-five per cent
discount. The rice tribute, it was argued, would arrive
in good condition if carried by rail, and could be rapidly
distributed in time of famine. To the objection that the
construction of the railway would increase foreign
influence, the proposers boldly answered that this was
wholly erroneous, and cited South American countries as
examples of railways built with British capital where
'they have never attempted to exercise political influence
thereby' .
The construction of a convincing argument with which
to persuade the Chinese to accept British railways had
been undertaken by the British government in 1886. The
India Office had been asked to provide a report of the
benefits of the railways in India in the past, in order to
facilitate the introduction of steam locomotives into
China. 2
 The Chinese were slow to adopt the invention, and
1. FO 233/120 no. 106, 14 Dec. 1895.
2. FOCP 405/41 no. 80, P. Currie to Godley.
274
so pressure of a somewhat stronger nature than arguments
had to be brought to bear. When Li Hung Chang visited
London in 1896 in order to request an increase of 5 per
cent ad valorem on the import and export duty of China,
the chamber of commerce in the City had no doubt about
what the FO should demand in exchange for such an
agreement, the opening up of China 'to the influence of
European progress and to the introduction of those
appliances of Western civilisation of which China is so
destitute' •1
The Anglo-German syndicate, which had been formed in
1898 to float the third indemnity loan for China,
transformed itself during the year to include the possible
construction of railways north of the Yangtse. 2 Jardine
Matheson and the Hong Kong & Shanghai bank together formed
the British & Chinese Corporation which, with the help of
the Rothschilds (for which Alfred received an Order of the
Crown First Class from the Kaiser), reached an agreement
with Germany; the spheres of interest for the railways
being defined by the financial groups, not by diplomats.3
The contract for the Northern Railways Extension loan was
signed in October 1898, the British government having
allowed the businessmen to put in the prospectus that it
had noted the assurance of the Chinese Government's
guarantee
1. CCJ July 1896. The China Association and the East
India & China trade section had arranged a reception
and dinner for Li Hung Chang, EICMB 22 June, 27 July
and 7 Aug. 1896.
2. McLean, 'British Banking in China', 46.
3. Ibid., 56.
4. Ibid., 63-4.
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In the same year that William Keswick became chairman
of the East India and China trade section in the City, he
also became one of the principal directors of the British
and Chinese Corporation which was to lend £6m in the first
four years of its existence.' At the end of 18982, the
trade section could only express satisfaction at the
performance of the government regarding events in China.
The ratification of the railway administration had already
taken place, and the section was assured by Keswick that
other negotiations were proceeding favourably. 3 Keswick
repeated his satisfaction at the government's behaviour in
protecting British interests in China at the spring
meeting of the ACCUK in l899.
The West Africa Trade Section
In the Niger region the Royal Niger Company continued
to carry out its dominant economic and political role.
For example, it was Goldie who set up the Anglo-German
negotiations in 1893 with Ernst Vohsen, who represented
the commercial and financial interests of the Hamburg
region. 5 In West Africa as a whole, however, the large
capital of the British shipping interests was beginning to
1. Collis, op.cit., 72.
2. The section had been involved in two deputations
earlier in 1898, EICMB 29 Mar., and 14 June 1898.
3. EICMB 20 Dec. 1898. The section had by this time
established a number of subsections, this was a
meeting of the China, Japan, and Straits Subsection.
4. CMB 2, 12 Jan. 1899, a letter was also sent to the FO
from the London Chamber expressing their
satisfaction. To what extent these eulogies on the
government's actions were a result of Lord
Salisbury's request to the China Association in the
summer of 1898 for a 'definitive expression of City
opinion' Pelcovits, op.cit., 236, is open to
speculation.
5. Flint, op.cit., 181.
276
consolidate its importance literally through amalgamation.
The successful demand for a House of Commons inquiry into
the administration of the Royal Niger Company in 1888 left
Alfred Jones of Elder, Dempster & Co. boasting of his
influence at the
Elder Dempster obtained management of the Africa
Steamship Co. of London in 1890, which gave Jones a
monopoly of the main British shipping lines to West
Africa. 2 The three-cornered struggle between the shipping
companies, the R.N.Co., and the Africa Association
underwent a series of changing alliances and agreements
which finally resulted, in 1893, in an agreement between
Goldie and Jones for a long term shipping contract 3 , and a
subsequent agreement between Goldie and the Africa
Association whereby the latter sold out their Niger
interests and withdrew from the interior. 4 Goldie had
already secured a monopoly of the Niger and Benue, but the
shipping interests were just beginning to exercise the
advantages of their monopoly.
Monopolies, unless backed with very strong state
support, were vulnerable to competition from businessmen
with larger financial resources at their disposal, who
could afford to buy out the monopoly-holder or undercut
prices for a longer period than the monopoly-holder. John
Holt of the Africa Association wanted to challenge the
shipowners control in West Africa. Shipowning had become
1. Gertzel, op.cit., 362.
2. Davies, op.cit., 86.
3. Ibid., 92.
4. Gertzel, op.cit., 489.
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a very expensive business by the last decades of the
century, and although Holt had managed to persuade the
wealthy firm of Miller Brothers to consider financing
ships to compete with existing companies, Holt himself had
to abandon the plan for lack of capital.1
The shipowners consolidated their position in the
early 1890s by forming the Bank of British West Africa.2
George William Neville who had joined the Africa Steamship
Co. in 1874, and subsequently handled Elder Dempster
business in Lagos, approached the Africa Banking Corpora-
tion3 while it was establishing a branch in Lagos, be-
coming its agent. 4 The bank had obtained the right from
the Crown Agents early in 1892 to import new silver coins
into West Africa and to charge a commission of one per
cent on their distribution. Later in the same year the
bank asked Jones if Elder Dempster would take over their
Lagos branch. The Crown Agents were very unhappy about
the firm assuming the rights which had been granted to the
bank (despite a deposit of £10,000 in securities), and
even withdrew the Government funds from the bank in the
following year. Jones was forced to agree to form a
company, the Bank of British West Africa, which was regis-
tered at the end of March 1894.
1. Gertzel, op.cit., 317.
2. Richard Fry, Bankers in West Africa: The Story of
the Bank of British West Africa (1976).
3. The Africa Banking Corporation was formed in 1891,
its directors in 1896 were W.J. Thompson (senior),
Edward Webb, J.D. Alexander, H.E.M. Davies, A.Durant,
Sir Francis Knollys, W.E. Pilcher and Thomas Rudd.
It became one of the three major banks in South
Africa as may be guessed from the list of directors.
4. Fry, op.cit., 19. The following information on the
formation of the bank is taken from Fry unless
otherwise noted.
5. Co.No.40,828, now the Standard Bank of West Africa.
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The nominal capital of the bank was £100,000 divided
into ten pound shares.' Jones was by far the largest
shareholder, holding 1,733 shares. The only other share-
holders with more than 100 shares were Alexander Sinclair
and John Davey, Jones' other partners at Elder Dempster
both held 433 each. It is probable that the name of Henry
Coke2 , who described himself at this time as of the London
office of David Sassoon & Co. 3 , gave financial status to
the company in the City and consequently to the Crown
Agents. The directors of the bank during the 1890s were
Jones, Bond, Coke, Lawrence, and Neville who had become
the bank's manager.4
The successful formation of the bank put more power
into the hands of Jones and the shipowners through its
control of currency in West Africa. Currency for the
middle-men in the Niger area, for example, had largely
been in the form of bottles of spirits during the previous
decade. The Royal Niger Co. had imposed heavy duties on
the import of spirits after the granting of its charter,
and in 1887 had prohibited imports into the northern
territories. 5 Jones had used the spirits controversy
1. The information for this paragraph is taken from the
early hard-copy of the company's files.
2. Coke had been president of the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce in 1890, and no doubt because of his connec-
tion with the firm of Sassoons, a founder director of
the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. He was elected
to the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce in
1896.
3. The Sassoons were merchant bankers and traders known
as the Rothschilds of the East.
4. The other original subscribers besides Jones and Coke
were F.W. Bond and Edwin Bicker-Caarten of the Africa
Steamship Co., Sir Edward Lawrence, a Liverpool
merchant; 0.H. Williams, a Liverpool cotton broker;
V.B. Hammond, a Liverpool underwriter, and William
Moss, a banker's clerk.
5. Gertzel, op.cit., 442.
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which arose in the later 1880s in order to cultivate a
closer relationship with the F0 and Co by supplying them
with statistics of the amount of spirits shipped into the
area, particularly the fact that the R.N.Co. imported more
than was publicly admitted.' Control of the quantity of
liquor imported could be used to devalue it as currency,
an important instrument in the context of a competitive
price war, as Holt was quick to realise.2
The amount of British sterling silver issued from
West Africa rose from a yearly average of £24,426 in the
period 1886-1890, to £116,323 during 1891-5, and more than
doubled to £257,090 for 1896-19O0. 	 It was the currency
which the Africans preferred if they accepted metal. 4 The
shipowners had a new hold over the merchants, as the bank
could make advances conditional on goods being shipped
with their lines, and could withhold distribution of the
new silver coins.5
Holt continued to try to induce other shipping lines
to enter the West Africa trade. In 1891 he encouraged
James Knott of the Prince Line to compete with Jones, but
there was little support from the merchants, particularly
as Jones was buying up even the boating companies whose
craft were used to land the cargoes. 6 In 1894 the London
1. Gertzel, op.cit., 445. It is worth noting in passing
that this provides another example of an issue where
humanitarian and economic interests connected. The
Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee was
formed in 1887 under the Chairmanship of the Duke of
westminster.
2. Ibid., 447.
3. Davies, op.cit., 133.
4. Ibid., 136.
5. Ibid..
6. Ibid., 87-91.
280
General Steam Navigation Company began a service to West
Africa, again encouraged by Holt, but the company gave no
dividend for the half year to February 1895 and ceased its
service to West Africa in June 1895.1
Apart from any pressure that Jones might have exerted
on merchants through the bank, he also concentrated during
these bouts of competition on keeping all the Crown
Agents' business, and cut prices to the bare minimum.2
Lack of unity amongst merchants, particularly between Holt
and the Millers, 3 also played into the hands of the ship-
owners. When the London General withdrew in 1895, a ship-
ping conference, ring or monopoly was formed for West
Africa, comprising the companies which Jones managed and
the Woermann Line of Hamburg. Under the rules of this
organisation, merchants who shipped with the conference
would receive a ten per cent rebate on their costs,
deferred for a twelve month period, provided they shipped
exclusively with the companies comprising the conference.4
In practice this meant that, in the case of Holt for
example, the shippers held £10,000 of his money
continuously.5
The financial strength of the shipowners/bankers was
immediately and permanently increased as a result of the
ring. Not only were the larger merchants obliged to
provide what amounted to an interest-free loan to the
shipowners (the smaller merchants and commission houses
1. Davies, op.cit., 97.
2. Ibid., 95.
3. Ibid., 101.
4. Ibid., 110.
5. Ibid., 112.
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did not refund the rebate to their customers and so
profited from the rebate), but the large business done by
the Crown Agents also contributed its share.' It must be
remembered that all the business of the Crown Colonies and
Protectorates was handled by the Crown Agents. All goods
and materials which were ordered by them were shipped by
the conference 2 , and thus thousands of pounds of their
money was also held by the conference. The financial
business of the Crown Agents, such as the banking business
of the Governor of the Gold Coast, was also carried on by
the same group of businessmen, the British shipowners.3
The success of the shipowners' bank, which after ten
months had attracted £87,665 in deposits, encouraged the
major British firm in West Africa, Miller Bros., to open
up small banks connected to their stores. These opened at
various stations in the Gold Coast before the Bank of
British West Africa could organise the opening of branches
to the west.4 The Bank was given the silver monopoly for
the Gold Coast in June 1896 by the Crown Agents, and that
for Sierra Leone in April l898, but by the end of the
century the Bank only had three branches in the whole of
West Africa, at Lagos, Accra and Sierra Leone. 6 At the
small Miller banks, bills of exhange were drawn and accep-
ted, cash deposited, and cable and mail transfers negotia-
ted with British banks or between various stations along
1. The Shipping Commission 1909, op.cit., Vol. III,
Question 10578.
2. Ibid., Question 10617.
3. Dummett, op.cit., 340.
4. Ibid., 332.
5. Fry, op.cit., 28.
6. Company files, two more branches in the Gold Coast
opened in 1901, and two more by 1906.
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the Gold Coast. Eventually the Miller Bros., the R.N.Co.
and the Africa Association established their own banking
company, the Anglo-Africa Bank,' which began with a branch
in Old Calabar where the owners dominated trade. 2 So
began a decade of competition between the two banks which
did not end until l9l2.
West Africa had its mining and railway development in
the last decade of the century, as did many other areas of
the globe. The state was to be responsible for the
construction of the railways, and the agreements between
the mines and the state was to help finance them. An
obstacle to the mines, railways and the general expansion
of business at this time was the disturbed state of
Ashanti. The London Chamber of commerce had drawn the
attention of the government to the hindrances of trade
caused by the unsettled state of affairs in this area in
the previous decade. 4 The government refused to appoint a
British Resident in the area in 1886 on grounds of 'policy
and prudence' and in the following year because of the
cost of protecting such an official. 5 A report in the
semi-official French newspaper, Temps, in 1890, that
France claimed the territories lying behind Ashanti,
stirred the West Africa trade section to new efforts.6
1. Davies, op.cit., 144.
2. Fry, op.cit., 34.
3. Ibid., 51. The Bank of Nigeria, which the Anglo-
Africa Bank had become in 1905, sold out to the Bank
of British West Africa in 1912, although Jones did
not long survive this victory. The trade section of
the London Chamber recognised the dominant position
occupied by Jones at the turn of the century, by
inviting him to attend their meetings, which he did,
WAMB 31 Jan. 1900.
4. Co 96/178, London Chamber to Co 1 22 Apr. 1886.
5. CO 96/187, London Chamber to CO 1 22 Dec. 1887.
6. WAMB 1 Apr. 1890.
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A resolution was sent to the CO calling attention to
the report and urging the importance of protecting British
interests by negotiating treaties with the natives, so as
to prevent undue advantage being taken by the French of
recent agreements. 1 In the following year the West Africa
section of the London Chamber agreed to support a
deputation organised by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce
regarding the boundaries of Sierra Leone, but the support
of the City businessmen was conditional on the question of
'our position on the Gold Coast' being added to the
deputation's agenda. 2 The deputation was to have been
received by Lord Salisbury, but in the event it was left
to Lord Knuts ford at the CO to explain the extent to which
the British state had made large concessions to France in
the Sierra Leone area under the Anglo-French agreements of
1889.
There was a slight difference of opinion amongst the
businessmen who constituted the West Africa section in
London at this time, regarding the importance of the
hinterland of the Gold Coast. The Millers had stores at
Axim, Half Assini, Elmina, Saltpond, Dixcove and Sekondi.
1. The Anglo-French Convention of 1889 defined the
western boundary of the British protectorate for only
20 miles inland. Dumett, op.cit., 167, points out
that Meade used nearly exactly the same words as
those of the resolution sent from the London Chamber
when making the same proposals to the FO.
2. WAMB 24 Nov. 1891. Hynes, op.cit., 121, wrongly
implies that the London Chamber only began to focus
its attention on the Gold Coast after the disclosures
made at this deputation. The fact that the London
Chamber was mainly interested in the Gold Coast
rather than Sierra Leone, might help to explain why
Salisbury felt able to grant such large concessions
to the French in Sierra Leone.
3. Hynes, op.cit., 118.
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They were interested in opening up the interior at Tarkwa
and at Tamsoo in connection with the mining and rubber
developments. 1 At a meeting of the section in September
1890, following a discussion over the relative advantages
of the coast and the hinterland of West Africa
territories, a vote was taken which won support for the
coast, a position which Miller had opposed.2
Nevertheless, early in 1892, Miller appeared to have
strengthened his position. He managed to get a discussion
of the proposed railway and harbour for the Gold Coast
adjourned, and swayed the meeting in favour of a scheme
for improving routes to the interior with a detailed
account of an interview he had had on this subject with
F.M. Hodgson, the acting Governor of the Gold Coast. 3 The
trade section agreed to support Miller's suggestions, and
sent a letter to Knutsford pointing out the restrictions
to trade caused by the bad condition of the roads to the
interior. The importance of securing the hinterland of
the Gold Coast by a declaration that it was a British
sphere of influence was also agreed upon at this meeting.4
1. Dumett, op.cit., 331-2.
2. WAMB 18 Sept. 1890.
3. WAMB 24 Feb. 1892. Hodgson had already sent a draft
scheme for improving communications with the interior
to the CO.
4. CO 96/228, London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 5 Mar.
1892. A second replacement letter was necessary as
the first was liable to misinterpretation according
to Goldie (perhaps with the prompting of the CO or
FO). The second explained this, Co 96/228, 8 Mar.
1892. The laundering of official communications on
this issue did not end there. Knutsford's reply to
the Chamber appeared to admit that Britain had been
pre-empted in the area by other powers, and Anderson
had to write to the CO to get them to telegraph the
Chamber to prevent the original reply being printed,
CO 96/196, FO to CO, 23 Mar. 1892.
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The attitude of the London Chamber and its West
Africa section can be distinguished clearly from those of
the Liverpool Chamber and the Manchester Chamber. The
London section had close connections with the Co and the
FO. It has been suggested that the discussions which led
to the Fergusson treaty-making expedition in the Gold
Coast in 1892, stemmed directly from the resolution sent
from the section in March.' Certainly, when Lord
Salisbury made up his mind in March 1892 to conclude
treaties in order to anticipate the French, the decision
was communicated confidentially to the section 2, and the
FO had suggested that the CO ask Goldie for information on
the issue. 3 The London section had no desire to fracture
this close relationship by publicly criticising the
Government over the concessions it had made to the French
over Sierra Leone. It did consider, however, that the CO
should be asked to follow the precedent set by other
departments and in future send the Chamber the details of
any proposed treaties or action which might affect
commercial interests.4 Given their close relations with
the state, this was as far as the City businessmen with
interests in West Africa were prepared to go.
At the second Congress of the Chambers of Commerce of
the Empire, however, a resolution which criticised the
Government as a whole was successfully proposed by the
1. Dumett, op.cit., 170-1.
2. Hynes, op.cit., 121.
3. CO 96/227, FO to CO, 24 Mar. 1892.
4. WAMB 24 Feb. 1892.
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Lagos Chamber of Commerce and seconded by the Liverpool
Chamber.' By the time that the resolution had been
forwarded to the CO, the ACCUK had had a chance to vote on
a similar resolution, and Goldie had been instrumental at
that meeting in engineering its defeat, describing it as
'a decided and, I believe, wholly unmerited reproach on
our Colonial and Foreign Offices'.2
With the election of the Liberal government in 1892,
the section wrote to Lord Rosebery, the new Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, urging upon him the fact that
the delimitation question had not been settled, but the
resolution which was included declared that the section
relies confidently on Her Majesty's Government taking
all steps, whether by treaty-making or otherwise, to
prevent the encroachments by foreign countries on the
hinterland of the Gold Coast Colony, the natral
resources of which are undoubtedly very valuable.
Such an opinion constrasted sharply with the resolution
from the Congress of the Chambers of commerce of the
Empire, or that which was put unsuccessfully to the ACCUK
1. CCJ July 1892 Supplement, 69, 'That in the opinion of
this Congress the interests of British Trade are
certain to suffer so long as the Government of this
country does not, before recognising treaties .
put itself in communication with British merchants
trading in or with the place in question or with
Chambers of Commerce possessed with information as to
the interests involved.' The CO refused to accept
the resolution in that form, CO 96/228, London
Chamber of Commerce to CO, 25 Oct. 1892, minute by
Hemming.
2. CO 96/228, London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 25 Oct.
1892. Lord Rosebery's reply was characteristically
ambiguous, much to the concern of CO officials, and
stated that in future 'every effort will be made by
Her Majesty's Government to ascertain from the most
competent sources the nature and extent of British
interests which might be affected . . .', CO 96/227,
FO to CO, 5 Nov. 1892, minutes on this by Meade
et al..
3. WAMB 9 Sept. 1892.
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in the same month. With such close connections with the
state, any strong disagreements between the London section
and the FO or Co which were communicated in official
communications, were limited to gracious requests and
polite recommendations. It is not surprising that, given
this established relationship, the London West Africa
trade section should reject the proposal put forward by
the Manchester Chamber in the following year for a West
Africa Consultative Committee to advise the state.' Top
of the list of the reasons given by the London section for
rejecting such an idea, was that they were already
represented by the West Africa trade section of chambers
of commerce and, it might have added, very well
represented in the London case.
The closeness of relations between the City
businessmen and the state departments allowed the City to
keep a close watch on the progress of official
communications. For example, in 1893 Swanzy heard
unofficially that a memorial from the merchants and
traders of the Gold Coast 2 had been held up by the
colonial governor and had not reached the CO. The section
was then able to ask Ripon officially if the memorial had
been received, and could arrange for questions to be asked
in the House of Commons if it had not. 3 Such an example
also demonstrates how the London Chamber could put
1. WAMB 12 May 1893.
2. WAMB 4 Jan. 1893. The section decided to support
this memorial.
3. WAMB 12 May 1893.
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pressure on colonial governors from the metropolis.1
It is interesting to note that the source of requests
could be considered significant in deciding upon the
source of funds for implementing decisions. For example,
concerning the treaty-making mission in the Gold Coast in
1892, Meade thought that part of the cost of the mission
might be defrayed from Imperial Funds, because the
treaties were to be made in the interests of British trade
and the idea had been urged on the Government by British
merchants outside the Colony. 2 Perhaps this was another
reason why the various sections of the London Chamber
sometimes encouraged the first move on an issue to be made
by a local chamber of commerce during the last twenty
years of the century. Their decision could have been
based upon which was the most likely source of money
available for a particular project, colonial or imperial.
At all events, the issues raised by the West Africa
section of the London Chamber of Commerce regarding the
Gold Coast in the 1890s seemed to have been
sympathetically received at the CO. This could partly
have been due to the fact that the section was well-
informed and closely in touch with the officials of the
CO, as a result of which the section did not request
action which was not within the bounds of probability.
For instance, in 1893 a large constabulary force under the
command of Colonel Sir F. Scott was despatched by Governor
1. The Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce could act as an
official source of business opinion in West Africa,
see for example the letter from George Mordaunt,
ibid.. The Accra Chamber was not formed until 1895,
WAMB 1 Aug. 1895.
2. CO 96/277, minute on FO to CO, 24 Mar. 1892.
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Hodgson to fend off a threatened Ashanti attack on Kumasi.
Before Hemming at the CO had had time to comment on
suggestions sent from Hodgson 1 , the West Africa section
had passed a resolution in more general terms advancing
the same proposals. 2 Scott believed that the Ashanti
could be brought under British protection without a shot
being fired. The resolution passed by the section pro-
posed that the time was opportune for the Governor of the
Gold Coast Colony to establish a system of administration
in order to better secure the life, liberty and property
of natives desirous of carrying on trade with Europeans.
Hemming did not trust the Ashantis to be calm under
British protection, although he recognised that the scares
of attack on the colony paralysed trade and caused costly
expeditions such as Scott's. Bramston thought the time
was ripe for a bold strike, particularly as the colony
could afford the costs involved. 3 Following a further
report from Hodgson, Bramston was still inclined to the
forward movement4 although, following a meeting with
Meade, the use of British troops was ruled out, but a
Resident was to be installed at Kumasi with a strong guard
of Hausas if a protectorate was accepted without trouble.
Ripon was not prepared to annex the Ashanti 'in name or in
fact' .
One of the main reasons why City businessmen with
1. CO 96/238, 330, Hodgson Confidential, 18 Nov. 1893.
Hemming's minute, the first, was made on 19 Dec.
1893.
2. WAMB 12 Dec. 1893. It was not confirmed by the
Council until a month later, CMB 1, 11 Jan. 1894.
3. CO 96/238, 330.
4. CO 96/238, 278.
5. Ibid..
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interests in the Gold Coast wanted the interior brought
under British control, and transport connections to the
coast improved, was the mines. As in other parts of the
world, British merchants appreciated that money was to be
made where mineral resources were extracted and they often
put their own money into the mines. The Swanzy firm, for
example, was involved in three gold mining companies in
the Gold Coast, the Wassau (Gold Coast) Mining Co., the
Gold Coast Amalgamated Mines, and the Tainsoo (Wassau) Gold
Mining Co..' Two other mining groups established them-
selves in the mid-90s, the Cote d'Or Co. (later Ashanti
Goldfields), and the Castle Gold Exploration Syndicate
(connected with the Goldfields of Eastern Akim and the
Birrim Valley Gold Mining and Dredging Co.). The Cote
d'Or group was backed by the London merchant firm of Smith
and Cade 2 , and the Castle Gold group had amongst their
original unofficial subscribers Sir Thomas Sutherland.3
1. The Wassau, BT31-2926/16317 was founded in 1882 and
three partners of F.&A. Swanzy - Swanzy, Cleaver, and
F.J. Crocker - held the most substantial portion of
the shares. The Gold Coast Amalgamated, BT31-
15905/55728, registered in 1898 had three-quarters of
its 100,000 £1 shares divided between Swanzy,
Cleaver, E.H. Bayldon and P.T. Struben. The Tamsoo
Co., BT31-7806/55831, also registered in 1898, had a
nominal capital of £60,000. Swanzy, Cleaver, Bayldon
and Struben had around two to two and a half thousand
shares each originally.
2. Co 96/285, 427 & 460, Cade to CO, 17 Feb. & 4 Mar.
1896. The Cote dsOr, BT31-6215/44040, was registered
in 1895 with a nominal capital of £4,000 in 400 £10
shares. Ashanti Goldfields, Co.No. 52,676 was
registered in 1897, £250,000 in £1 shares.
3. CO 96/280, 468, an enclosure in Maxwell to CO, the
Castle Gold Exploration Syndicate to Maxwell, 13 Nov.
1896. The Castle Gold, BT31-6778/47690 registered in
April 1896, £5,000 in £1 shares. Eastern Akim, BT31-
8247/59839, registered in 1898, £100,000 nominal
capital, 26,000 of the £1 shares being 6% preference
shares. Birrim Valley, BT31-8892/65459, formed March
1900 with £150,000 in £1 shares.
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Having Joseph Chamberlain at the head of the CO from
the mid-decade onwards brought business and government
even closer together. Chamberlain was ready to invite
businessmen to conferences at the CO in order to discuss
policies for West Africa. 1 Following his unsuccessful
attempt to pass a new land ordinance in 18972, which had
been opposed by City businessmen, he called a conference
of businessmen to discuss ways of raising the necessary
revenue for the construction of the railways. 3 Although
Chamberlain rejected the idea of a royal charter for the
Castle Gold Explorations Syndicate (Maxwell had suggested
the Borneo Co. as a model) 4 , he later gave them
concessions which almost amounted to the same thing 5. He
also had a ready ear for information on the Cote d'Or
group, 6 who secured a monopoly by late 1896.
H.W.B. Russell of Liverpool obtained a rubber monopoly
similar to Cade's mining rights.8
1. For example, on harbours and railways, WAMB 25 Oct.
1898.
2. Whereby all the land of the Gold Coast colony was to
be taken over by the Government, WAMB 5 May 1897.
3. WAMB 22 Mar. 1899. The outcome of the conference was
that the state would in no way interfere with the
rights of natives to make what terms they could for
concessions. The final draft of the Concessions
Ordinances of 1900 exempted the Ashanti Goldfields
and the Castle Gold Syndicate's territory, Dumett,
op.cit., 222. The section of the London Chamber
spent much time on this issue going through the bill
clause by clause in its reply to Chambei,ain, WAMB 19
Sept. 1899.
4. CO 96/280, 460, Maxwell to CO, 28 Dec. 1896, minute
by Chamberlain 31 January.
5. Dumett, op.cit., 223.
6. CO 96/285, 459, minute on Cade to CO, 4 Marw 1896,
"Chamberlain told me that McArthur had spoken to him
about Mr. Cade".
7. Dumett, op.cit., 198.
8. Ibid., 199.
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Chamberlain was more forceful than his predecessors
at the CO. For example, he empowered the Crown Agents to
finance and construct railways for Sierra Leone and
Lagos. 1 He did not wait for the agreement of the governor
of the Gold Coast before instructing the Crown Agents to
proceed with the western railway in 1897.2 Ordinances
from the Gold Coast Governor which inscribed stock were
used in place of approaching Parliament or the Gold Coast
government. The money was then raised on the credit of
the Crown Agents as the market did not favour colonial
government securities at the time. 3 In contrast to his
immediate predecessor, Chamberlain did not consult the
Cabinet when preparing for an expedition against the
Ashanti, but merely notified the Prime Minister of the
pending preparations for war.4
Business pressure for the construction of the
railways in West Africa had been evident since 1892.
Captain Lang and other royal engineers began surveys in
1893 6 , and the West Africa section of the London Chamber
of Commerce, which was anxious to learn when the engineers
would have completed their labours, 7 was told by Swanzy,
1. Dumett, op.cit., 244.
2. Ibid., 249.
3. Ibid., 249-253.
4. Ibid., 139.
5. CO 96/228, 502, letter from the London Chamber of
Commerce to the CO, 25 Oct. 1892. The Congress of
the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire had passed a
resolution in favour of light railways being
established in British Crown colonies on the West
Coast of Africa.
6. WAMB, 12 May 1893.
7. WAMB, 12 Dec. 1893.
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after one of his visits to the Co in January 1895, that
the survey had been completed.' A copy of the appraisal
by the government's civil engineer, W. Shelford, of the
report prepared by Lang was forwarded to the trade section
later in the year.2
The section of the London Chamber took part in two
large deputations, composed of representatives from the
major British chambers, to Colonial Secretaries during the
summer of 1895. The first was to Ripon near the end of
June, but the government resigned between the deputation
being organised and the date on which it was received.
This perhaps explains the boldness of Ripon's reply,
considering he was a member of a Liberal administration
under Gladstone. He declared that during his time as
Colonial Secretary he had maintained two aims. The first
was to do what was best for the colonies, and the second,
which he emphasised was not second in point of importance,
had been to promote to the utmost of his power the trade
and commerce of Britain.3
The second deputation took place on 23 August and was
received by Joseph Chamberlain accompanied by Bramston and
Hemming, the two close supporters of the London West
Africa section at the CO. The Liverpool Chamber was
present in force, its representatives including Jones,
Coke, McArthur, Holt, Elder, Maclver, Alexander Sinclair
(Elder Dernpster) and T.E. Tomlinson (The Lagos Stores).
1. WAMB, 25 Jan. 1895.
2. WAMB, 21 June 1895.
3. WAMB, a printed booklet describing these deputations
affixed in the minute book following the entry for 1
Aug. 1895.
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The City had sent Swanzy, Cleaver and J.E. Wilson, the
deputation being introduced by Baden-Powell. The
businessmen were told that work on the Lagos railway had
almost begun and that the Gold Coast railway would be
immediately proceeded with.
Chamberlain's arrival at the CO heralded a speedy
solution to the Ashanti question. A meeting of the London
West Africa section was called specifically on this
question at the beginning of August 1895 to ask yet again
for a system of British administration to be established
in Ashanti, or failing that for the appointment of a
Resident.' In January 1896, 'a large expedition
undertaken in the interest of trade development' 2 took
Kumasi without a shot being fired and sent a flying column
up to West Ashanti to establish a British Resident and
protect British interests. 3 The initial instructions from
Chamberlain to the new Resident at Kumasi stressed his
responsibility for encouraging trade in the area.4
By the end of the century Goldie's star had faded and
he resigned his chairmanship of the West Africa trade
section, although he had been re-elected. 5 Swanzy took
the chair with Miller as his deputy. The shipping
1. WAMB 1 Aug. 1895.
2. Meade's description of of Scott's force, Dumett, op.
cit., 194.
3. Ibid..
4. Ibid., 195.
5. The decisive meeting took place at the end of 1897
when the section sent a letter to the FO, CO and the
Treasury which urged that the Niger Company
territories, the Colony of Lagos, and the Niger Coast
Protectorate be united under government rule, WAMB 1
Dec. 1897.
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interests could field a substantial team of support.'
Although the major mercantile and shipping interests were
striving to maintain their respective monopolies, they
united through the official activity of the London Chamber
of Commerce to influence a government with which they had
a very close relationship.
South Africa Trade Section
In southern Africa the economic changes resulting
from the gold discoveries were rapid and the trade section
of the London Chamber of Commerce took a few years to
adjust itself and reflect the new situation. At its
simplest, it could be represented by the change in chair-
manship of the committee from Dunn 2 to Mosenthal 3 , from
merchant-based finance to mining-based finance. The situ-
ation was not as clear as that however. As we have seen
during the 1880s much merchant capital was invested in
mining and exploration enterprises, which were set up in
association with the rapid expansion of British influence
in southern Africa.4 The centre of the complexity lies in
any attempt to make general distinctions between merchant,
1. See, for example, the disagreement within the trade
section over Miller's proposal for a new railway from
Accra to Kpong. Miller had J.H. Batty - his managing
agent, and H.J. Hutchinson on his side, but the
shipping interests had Capt. F. Voules (Elder,
Dempster), E. Bicker-Caarten (secretary of the Africa
Steamship Co.), Bond and Jones, WAMB 31 Jan. 1900.
Swanzy and Cleaver were on the shipping side,
probably because of Swanzy's quarter interest in the
Volta River Transport Co. which monopolised the steam
launch on this waterway, Dumett, op.cit., 331.
2. Chairman from 1886 to 1891.
3. Chairman from 1895 on into the new century.
4. See Ch. 2 above.
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banking, shipping or mining interests, as businessmen
could be involved in a number of interests even though
they had originally made their fortune in one of them.
Taking the committee of the South Africa trade
section as a representative sample, it is clear that by
the end of the 1880s merchants were involved in gold and
land companies, and the finance companies or banks which
expanded with the gold boom)- In 1888 the movement of
merchant and banking capital into the Transvaal gold mines
was apparent:
Things have changed very much and people like the
Barnatos and Hill & Paddon are putting a lot of money
into the Rand. Lippert is encouraged from home to
act by Schroeder & Erlager (heads of two of Europe's
biggest banking firms).
John Paddon, one of the earliest members of the trade
section's committee, set up the Oriental and Sheba Valley
United Gold Mining Co. in l889, of which T. Morgan
1. Econ. 19 June 1897, 876, in the second half of the
1880s the imperial banks in southern Africa, and the
Natal Bank, had been growing - in terms of deposits
and current accounts liability - by at least 20 per
cent per annum. Despite the closure of the Cape of
Good Hope Bank, and the Union Bank, Capetown, in the
early 1890s, the Africa Banking Corporation and the
National Bank of the South Africa Republic were
successfully established. The latter bank had been
established by H. Eckstein (the Johannesburg firm
acting for Wernher, Beit & Co.) with the Treasury of
the S.A.R., A.P. Cartwright, The Corner House (1965),
112.
2. Ibid., 62, written by Eckstein.
3. 8T31-4324/28100, £400,000 in £1 shares. Major
shareholders in the first allotment were the Nil
Desperandum Co., C.K. White & J. Silbury, B.& I.
Lewis, and T.J. & W.G. Anderson. In the second
allotment in April 1889 E. Lippert took 5,000 and
W.W. Daniell 3,000. Joseph and Isaac Lewis took much
larger shares and Paddon kept over 76,000. A.J.
Newton and A.T. Layton were also directors. Paddon
was also involved along with Soper and H.C. Ross in
the Sheba Gold Mining Co., to which the Oriental &
Sheba was sold in 1893.
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Harvey, another long-standing committee member, was a
director. Harvey was also on the board of the Transvaal
Mortgage Loan and Finance Co., and the Kenya Exploration
Co.. L.B. Twentyman was a director of the Central Mon-
trose Estate and Gold Mining Co. which was established in
l889, and also sat on the boards of the Vaal River
Diamond Co., the West Rand Estates & Land Co., and the
Nooitgedacht Estate & Gold Mining Co.. J.J. Hamilton was
a director of the South African Gold Trust & Agency which
was established in 18882, in which W.J. Anderson's
partner, W.M. Farmer, also had an interest. Archibald
Parker was chairman of the South Africa Prospecting &
Mortgage Co., as well as holding a substantial block of
shares in the Goldfields of South Africa. Harry Mosenthal
had become more involved in mining companies than any
other merchant. 3 James Macalister, perhaps the most regu-
lar attender of the trade section during the 1890s, was a
1. BT31-4568/29912, £160,000 in £1 shares was floated to
buy out the Montrose Gold Mining & Exploration Co.
machinery for £30,000 cash and its farm and lands for
£95,000, of which £80,000 was in fully paid up shares
of the new company. Thomas Bell and W.M. Farmer were
also directors. The company was wound up in 1909.
2. BT31-4293/27857, £110,000 in £1 shares, bought up the
goodwill of the South Africa Gold Mines Agency which
had been founded in 1887 (l0,0O0 in £25 shares) and
intended to act as an agency dealing in stocks and
shares amongst other businesses. The directors of
the former and the new company were Hamilton, Hugh
Walters and Percy Tarbutt. Founder shareholders
included W.M. Farmer, Thomas Rudd, Hamilton, A.
Lawrie, Arbuthnot & Latham, and Daniel Minertzhagen
of the Huth firm. Arbuthnot & Latham also had a
block of shares in the Central Montrose Co. and the
Goldfields of South Africa. Huth and Lawrie also had
shares in the latter company.
3. In 1890 he was a director of De Beers, the
Bultfontein Mine, the Exploration Co., Potchefstroom
Exploration Gold Mining & Estate Co., and the Horo
Concession & Exploration Co. of Swaziland.
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director of the National Bank of the South Africa
Republic. Bell, and Harvey's 1 partner, B.W. Greenacre,
were directors of the Natal Bank. Dunn 2 and Thomson3 held
substantial blocks of shares in the Standard Bank. Thus
when the section officially decided to increase the number
of its committee to include land and mining interests in
1890, it was recognising interests which were already
represented indirectly.
Following the rapid expansion of British influence in
southern Africa during the 1880s, businessmen pressed for
an increased British presence. In the spring of 1889, for
example, the South Africa trade section convened a meeting
to discuss the desirability of a British Resident being
appointed to Swaziland. 5 F.H. Faviell and J. Carey Owen
were invited to the meeting to give an account of the
state of affairs in Swaziland. Faviell, chairman of the
Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co. 6, estimated that £2m had been
invested in Swaziland, three-quarters of which had been
raised in London. He explained that, along with other
1. Harvey was a director of the City Bank also.
2. Dunn was a director of the Alliance Bank also.
3. Thomson was a director of the London & County also.
4. SAMB 9 May 1890.
5. SAMB 4 Apr. 1889. Kruger was at this time asking for
a free hand in Swaziland, Van der Poel, op.cit., 49.
6. BT31-3527/21508, registered in Aug. 1885 to carry
into effect an agreement between David Forbes and
F.H. Faviell to acquire lands and other property in
Swaziland. Faviell then sold his agreement with
Forbes to the Forbes Reef Co. for £32,000 in fully
paid shares. Forbes received £45,000 in shares for
the rights he had secured from chief Uxnbandine. This
company was liquidated and reformed with a nominal
capital of £400,000, four times the value of the
former company, BT31-4307/27983. It took in the
Southern Forbes Reef Co. in 1890 and reformed again
in 1893 with a nominal capital of £105,000, BT31-
5748/40249. Its assets were sold to the Swazieland
(sic) Corporation in 1905.
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firms, he was prepared to contribute to the cost of
installing a Resident, as the businessmen looked upon such
a contribution as an insurance premium. Owen, of the
Swaziland Trading Co., also declared a commitment to
defraying the costs of a Resident. The result of the
meeting was a request from the London Chamber of Commerce
for a deputation to be received at the co)
The section used its unofficial network of
communication to establish the feasibility of asking for a
British Resident. Twentyman contacted Searle (of the Cape
Chamber of commerce) who suggested that Sir Hercules
Robinson, the High Commissioner and close associate of
Rhodes2, would be against the proposal. The section then
approached Baden-Powell, from whom they expected to get a
firm idea of Robinson's views. 3 Joseph Chamberlain agreed
to support the deputation, but it was refused by the CO
where it was feared that such a public event would
precipitate the entry of the Boers into Swaziland, and the
London Chamber was officially informed that an inquiry was
to be made into the situation in Swaziland. 4 Dunn
expressed his fear to the trade section that Robinson was
1. CMB 1, 11 Apr. 1889. A letter was sent to the CO
urging that a resident be appointed and a deputation
received, CO 417/37, London Chamber of Commerce to
the CO, 7 June 1889.
2. Robinson became the chairman of De Beers, as well as
a director of the British South Africa Co., and of
the Standard Bank. His political position was
Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of
British South Africa.
3. SAMB 15 & 25 Apr. 1889.
4. CO 417/37, London Chamber of Commerce to CO 1 7 June
1889, minutes by Fairfield and Herbert.
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to be sent back to South Africa to resume his post 1 in
order to conciliate the Boers 2 , and the issue was dropped
for a few months.
A rumour later in the year, that Swaziland was to be
ceded to the South Africa Republic, resulted in a large
meeting at the London Chamber of Commerce. 3
 Many
businessmen associated with Swaziland were present.
Faviell and E.B. Livingstone of Forbes Reef; Hugh
McCubbin and M. Higginson of the Havelock Gold Mining &
Exploration Co. 4 ; H.P. Atkins of the Swazieland (sic)
Gold Exploration & Land Co. 5 ; John and Horace Thorburn
and E.P. Mathers 6 ; even the secretary of the Aborigine
Protection Society, H.R. Fox-Bourne, attended to represent
the humanitarian side of imperialism. A subcommittee was
1. Robinson had been suspected of being in Rhodes'
pocket and the Cabinet had decided to terminate his
commission in January 1889, Robinson & Gallagher
op.cit., 236. Sir Henry Loch was sent out as the new
High Commissioner, Van der Poel, op.cit., 50.
2. SAMB 20 June 1889.
3. SAMB 30 Oct. 1889.
4. BT31-4104/2634l, registered in Apr. 1888, it was
largely a Liverpool concern of the firm H.& T.
McCubbin. Its nominal capital was £120,000 and in
1891 new 20 per cent preference shares were created.
It was wound up to form the Havelock Gold Mining Co.
in 1893 which had a capital of £25,000. Its
directors in 1890 were Higginson, W. Roberts, Henry
Rooke, W.J. Thomson & McCubbin.
5. BT31-4336/28157, registered in Jan. 1889 with a
nominal capital of £150,000, based on the concession
which J. Schruer had obtained from Uinbandine.
Schruer received £125,000. Atkins, a Lloyd's
underwriter, had 200 of the original shareholding.
6. The Thorburns obtained concessions from Umbandine
(for the import of iron, tobacco, diamond drills,
liquor, the manufacture of iron and liquor, and the
sole right to levy customs), which were taken up by
the Umbandine Swazieland (sic) Concessions Syndicate,
BT31-5094/34301, registered in June 1891. E.P.
Mathers, proprietor of South Africa, was trustee for
the company, the original subscribers of which
included D.W. Bell & Co..
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formed to organise a public meeting and to perform any
other necessary work.' Within a week or so a vice-
president of the London Chamber of Commerce, Sir Vincent
Kennett-Barrington, had discussed the matter informally
with Lord Knutsford, and it was agreed that the CO would
receive a private deputation if the public meeting were
called off. 2 The section accepted this offer,
particularly as it was also clear that Sir Francis De
Winter had gone out to Swaziland with powers to act on
Colonel Martin's inquiry.3
The informal arrangement between the CO and the South
Africa trade section, whereby the threat of a public
meeting was bought off with the offer of a private
deputation, is an exceptionally good example of the very
private nature of such agreements, and the way in which
the public and hidden activity of the City businessmen
interacted. The especial importance of the event,as an
indication of the secrecy of City-State relations, lies in
the fact there is no hint in the minutes written by civil
servants or the Minister on the letter from the London
Chamber of Commerce that a previous agreement had been
1. SAMB 30 Oct. 1889. On this subcommittee were the
section members such as Harvey, Macalister, Bell and
Henwood, together with those with direct interests -
Faviell, McCubbin, H.M. McClure and de Stedingk.
2. CMB 1, 14 Nov. 1889. The letter from the Chamber to
the CO on 12 Nov. 1889, CO 417/37, referred to 'an
informal statement'.
3. SAMB 11 Nov. 1889.
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made. 1 The subsequent letter from the Chamber and the
minutes written on it are equally misleading, and it is
possible that Fairfield and Bramston had no knowledge of
the understanding which had been reached a month
previously. 2 When the correspondence on the affairs of
Swaziland was printed for Parliament, 3 neither of the
letters from the London Chamber of Commerce was included,
though a much earlier letter from the Chamber sent in June
was there. 4 It is clear that the whole episode was kept
well hidden from the public and Parliament.
The deputation took place in February l89O, and was
preceded by another large meeting at the London Chamber of
1. Co 417/37, London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 12 Nov.
1889. Herbert gave the reasons why it could be
inconvenient and possible prejudicial to British
interests to publicly receive a statement of opinion
at that time, adding that Lord Knutsford was willing
to receive a deputation. It was left to Knutsford
himself to point out that a private deputation would
save them from a public meeting which would be far
worse in its effects on events in South Africa.
There is no way of telling from the minutes that
these comments were not part of a process of
decision-making but, in fact, a record of already
agreed action. Graeme, Fairfield and Bramston do not
appear to have been privy to the arrangement, to
judge from their comments.
2. Ibid., London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 6 Dec. 1889.
The CO was thanked for its letter and it was
confirmed that a deputation was desirable.
3. Par1.Paers (1890) LII (c.6200) 'Further
Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Swaziland &
Tonga land'.
4. Ibid., nos. 101 & 107.
5. SAMB 26 Feb. 1890. Baden-Powell and Kennett-
Barrington were to introduce it in general terms;
Kimber was to emphasise the imperial aspecls of the
question; Dunn, J.W. Thomson (manager of the
Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co.) and Bell were
to talk for Cape and Natal interests; de Stedingk,
Baylis and Kenrick represented the native and liquor
aspects; and Faviell and Farrant for the mining
interests.
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Commerce at which Thomas Rudd' was present. 2 It would
appear that those interests associated with Rhodes were in
favour of the British Government retaining Swaziland at
that time. 3 Dunn informed the section that if they stood
firm Swaziland would not be handed over to the Transvaal.
Dunn's confidence could not have been based on De Winton's
report. De Winton had noted that almost all the trade of
Swaziland was in British hands, but he felt that there was
no reason why it would not remain so whatever the future
of Swaziland.4 Dunn's prediction was fulfilled, neverthe-
less, in the month after the deputation when Sir Henry
Loch met Kruger at Blignant Point to thrash out the
Swaziland question. 5 Loch was praised as an able Governor
1. Chairman of Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa,
and a director of the South Africa Gold Trust, of the
Africa Banking Corporation, and of the London Joint-
Stock Bank by 1895.
2. SAME 25 Feb. 1890.
3. Apart from Rudd's presence at the meeting, a telegram
was enclosed in a letter from the British South
Africa Co. to CO, 27 Feb. 1890, CO 417/51, which was
dated 14 Feb. and strongly urged that Swaziland be
retained as the Boers intended to enter Mashona in
the winter.
4. Pan. Papers (1890) LII (c.6201) 'Report by Col. Sir
Francis de Winton', 9. He also listed the conditions
upon which the Cape Colony and Natal would accept the
cession of Swaziland to the South Africa Republic.
At that time these were mainly the establishment of
free trade in southern Africa, the extension of the
railways into the Transvaal, the extension of the
franchise to the whites in Swaziland, and a promise
that the Boers would keep out of areas under British
control, ibid., 14 & 15. A list of all concessions
claimed is appended to the report, giving the names
of the original and later concession holders, ibid.,
59-73. The South Africa trade section asked for a
copy of the report in advance of the deputation, but
there is no evidence that they were sent one, CO
417/51, London Chamber of Commerce to CO, 19 Feb.
1890.
5. Van der Poel, op.cit., 50.
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by Dunn at the general meeting of the section,' and,
although there was no time for a dinner to be given to
Loch when he returned to England, the trade section sent a
deputation to present him officially with an address.2
It was at this time that representatives of the
mining, landed and shipping interests were formally added
to the committee of the South Africa section, 3 and Dunn
was replaced as chairman by Sir Thomas Bell. 4 There is no
evidence that a struggle took place within the trade
section in order to bring about the change, any more than
there was in the West Africa section minutes when Goldie
1. SAMB 9 May, 1890.
2. SAMB 13 Feb. 1891. The memorial was received and
published in all the newspapers, SAMB 17 June 1891.
3. SAMB 20 Feb. 1891. For the mining interests they
included Rudd, John Seear of De Beers, and H.E.M.
Davies who was chairman of the Battery Reef Gold
Mining Co. (in which Rudd was the largest single
shareholder), a director and large shareholder in
Goldfields of South Africa, a director of the Mines
Trust and of the Gold Estates (Transvaal) Co.,
Davies became a director of the Africa Banking
Corporation and chairman of the South Africa Gold
Trust a few years later. For the shipping interests
two places were reserved on the committee for a
representative of the Union Steamship Co. (BT31-
209/641, established in 1856, nominal capital
increased in 1881 from £500,000 to £750,000, and
stood at £1,250,000 by 1892, always in £29 shares),
and a representative of the Castle Mail Packet Co.
(Co.No. 15671, registered in 1881 with a nominal
capital of £1,400,000 in £20 shares, by far the
largest holder of which was Donald Currie with over
3,000). The two lines became the Union Castle Mail
Steamship Co. with a nominal capital of £2m in 1900.
4. Sir Thomas Bell, originally elected to the section's
committee in 1887, was a partner in James Searight &
Co., developed an interest in South African mines and
at this time was chairman of the Montrose Gold Mine &
Exploration Co., and a director of the Central
Montrose Estate & Gold Mining Co.. The firm of D.W.
Bell & Co. held the largest single block of shares in
the Umbandine Swazieland Concessions Syndicate when
it formed in 1891.
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stood down. The trade section was re-organising itself so
as to reflect the outcome of changes in the hierarchy of
wealth and power. The members of the section were wealthy
members of the financial community whatever their original
business enterprise had been,' and, although the competi-
tion might have been fierce on the ground out in southern
Africa, the changes were represented in the South Africa
trade section in the City as a sedate game of musical
chairs.
There was a little confusion over the position taken
by the London Chamber of Commerce on affairs in southern
Africa during the interim between Dunn stepping down as
chairman of the South Africa trade section in 1891 and
Mosenthal occupying the position in 1896. Bell and F.
Dyer were the chairmen during this period. There is no
mistaking the involvement of the City in southern Africa
economically. The ubiquitous Rothschilds, who had been
brought to the assistance of Porges, Wernher & Belt on at
least two crucial occasions 2 , were to negotiate the
attempted purchase of the Delagoa Bay Railway by the Cape,
helped to raise the loan with which the South Africa
Republic could complete the Delagoa Bay railway3 and a few
months later were praised at the annual general meeting of
the British South Africa Co. for their financial
assistance. 4 They were involved in the floating of the
1. See the examples of Rudd and Davies above; also the
chairman of the Union Steamship Co., Gile8, was a
director of the Africa Banking Corporation; Currie
was also chairman of De Beers.
2. Cartwright, op.cit., 23 & 79.
3. Van der Poel, op.cit., 61 & 62. The loan was £2.5m
at 5 per cent.
4. CO 417/88, 29 Nov. 1892, contains a copy of the
company's report of the AGM.
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Rand Mines in 1893 1 , and in the following year were
important in the creation of the Transvaal & General
Association which attracted the capital of the Barings,
the Smiths, Hambro, Farquhar, Wernher, Beit, H.E.M.
Davies, Parker and Mosenthal in substantial amounts. 2 The
City clearly had confidence in the general profitability
of southern Africa. The slight confusion arose from the
unresolved question of the future of Swaziland which was
again discussed in 1892 and 1893.
The source of these discussions was the vigorous
activity of men who were not part of the wealthy elite,
particularly H.T. Van Laun, but who managed to gain some
support by cloaking themselves in the imperialistic
sentiment and economic nationalism which the City
promoted. A large meeting of the South Africa trade
section assembled to hear the details of a scheme for
creating a port for Swaziland at Sordwana Point and a
1. Cartwright, op.cit., 126, Wernher wished to spread
the risk of investing in deep-level mining. 300,000
of the 400,000 £1 shares were allotted, of which
200,000 went to Eckstein for Wernher Beit, 60,000 to
the Rothschilds, and 30,000 to Goldfields of South
Africa. Mosenthal was a director of the Rand Mines.
2. BT 31-5765/40391, the Association was registered in
1894 with £250,000 £1 shares. Lord Rothschild
originally took £25,000, John Baring nearly 7,000,
Beit nearly 4,000, and all those listed above had at
least 1,000 each.
railway from the port inland to the frontier.' Although
the section suggested that the London Chamber of Commerce
should urge the Government to allow the scheme to take
place, it baulked at declaring its active support for the
enterprise.
The question of Swaziland was raised again four
months later when E.P. Mathers replied to an article in
The Times with a letter which suggested that neither
Britain nor the Transvaal could properly govern Swaziland
so long as the rights of concessions remained in the name
of individuals. He pointed out that the rights of the
Umbandine Swazieland Concessions Syndicate were evident to
anyone who bothered to examine the records at Somerset
House. 2 This move struck, probably unintentionally, at a
great weakness of the CO. The civil servants appeared to
have very little information on the extent and nature of
British investments in Swaziland, but were very loath to
1. SAMB 11 Apr. 1892. Chatterton, Van Laun's solicitor
and a Unionist Parliamentary candidate for Crewe,
outlined the scheme to the section. The Mapotoland
Syndicate, BT31-4l09/26387, formed in Apr. 1888 had
acquired a concession which had been granted by the
Queen Regent of Mapotoland (Tongaland). Many of the
£50,000 of shares were held in Paris, Alphonse Ochs
being one of the directors. The company was dis-
solved in 1894 as it had done no business, being
unable to sell the concession. Following the forma-
tion of the Syndicate, the Admiralty had undertaken a
visit of the proposed site for the harbour, Parl.
Papers (1890) LII (c.6200) 'Further Correspondence
respecting the Affairs of Swaziland & Tongaland',
Admiralty to CO, 10 Apr. 1889.
2. The Times 12 Aug. 1892. Not only did the correspon-
dent of The_Times, Flora Shaw, favour Rhodes' point
of view, but Fairfield reveals that the newspaper's
editor approached the CO indirectly with an offer
that if the Liberal Government ceded Swaziland to the
Boers The Times would not attack the move from party
motives, CO 417/88, 240-4, a long memorandum by Fair-
field. Mathers was not disinterested either, having
3,000 shares in the Umbandine Syndicate.
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be seen to be acquiring such information. They had to
resort to privately asking the Crown Agents to gather the
information for them and hiding the possible cost of such
an exercise under a misleading sub-heading.'
In November when the executive of the London Chamber
of Commerce received a deputation from businessmen with
interests in Swaziland, 2 it was common knowledge that
Rhodes was for ceding the territory to the South Africa
Republic. 3 The day after the deputation to the London
Chamber an unsigned circular announced a City meeting with
the object of strengthening the hands of the Colonial
Secretary in the negotiations which were pending for the
protection of interests in Swaziland. 4 The result of the
meeting was the formation of the Swaziland Committee.5
None of the committee members of the South Africa trade
section were involved in this group, but John Harvey 6 of
the merchants Charles Price & Co., a director of the
1. Co 417/88, 243-4. Fairfield did not at this time
know that Mathers had shares in the Syndicate, but
that did not prevent him from ascribing mean motives
to those involved in his usual unpleasant way. The
private nature of the arrangement with the Crown
Agents was further brought out by Mr. S. Ohm's
minute on 7 Sept. 1892, ibid., back of 245, when he
asked Fairfield if it were necessary to write offi-
cially to the Agents or whether Fairfield's private
communication with Sir M. Ommanney were sufficient.
2. CMB 1, 10 Nov. 1892.
3. Financial Times 10 Nov. 1892.
4. Ibid. 12 Nov. 1892, 3; also in South Africa 12 Nov.
1892, 264. Cuttings from both papers were retained
by the CO for comment.
5. It was composed of Faviehl, Harvey, E. Escombe
(chairman of the Swaziland Gold Exploration Co.), Van
Lauri (of the Beira Railway), Lord Ribblesdale
(chairman of the Horo Concession), and Fox-Bourne of
the Aborigines' Protection Society.
6. Harvey was chairman of a number of mining companies
in the l880s - the Chile Gold Mining, the Henriette
Mining & Smelting, and the Barancannes Copper Mining.
In the l890s he was chairman of the English & Austra-
lia Copper Co., and Mysore Reefs Co. amongst others.
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Henderson & Forbes Gold Mining Co., was an elected member
of the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce. The
subsequent deputation from the Swaziland Committee to the
CO was introduced by Baden-Powell and Sir Reginald Hanson.
The deputation was told that the matter had been referred
to the Crown Agents.1
It is unclear to what extent the trade section was
involved in supporting this activity. Certainly the two
letters which were sent to the CO from the London Chamber
of Commerce 2 , before Swaziland was handed over to the
Transvaal at the end of the following year 3 , were not
discussed at a trade section meeting. 4 What is clear,
1. Daily News 24 Nov. 1892.
2. CO 417/88, London Chamber to CO, 21 Dec. 1892,
opposed the transfer of Swaziland to the S.A.R. and
asked about the intentions of the Government. This
was one of the letters which the CO received from
many chambers of commerce and were clearly a result
of Van Laun sending Out cyclostyled letters to all
the chambers of commerce, CO 417/88, 17 Oct., 23 Dec.
1892, and CO 417/109, 19 Jan., 5, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22
& 25 Apr. 1893. The second letter from the London
Chamber of Commerce to CO, 31 Oct. 1893, CO 417/109,
seems to have developed from a memorandum endorsed by
the Council in April, CMB 1, 27 Apr. 1893, halted in
mid-October, ibid., 12 Oct. 1893, but finally sent.
3. Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., 414. It is worth
noting in passing that it was the effect of Van
Laun's cyclostyled letters which elicited the
response from Ripon which is quoted in ibid., 'I do
not attach much attention to their opinion .
knowing how they are manufactured'.
4. It is difficult to assess the opinion of the section
on this issue as in May 1893 the standing committee
of the trade section was abolished in favour of
special committees for particular issues when they
arose, SAMB 16 May 1893. The section never felt
strongly enough about preventing the cession of
Swaziland to the S.A.R. to discuss it or form a
special committee on the subject. The motivation for
the two letters appears to have come from the
executive and Council, perhaps from Harvey.
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however, is that Rhodes was given a banquet by the section
in 1894 1
 and, if it had not been for the timely
intervention of the executive officers of the London
Chamber, the section would have supported the tariff
clause which Rhodes wished to introduce into his charter.2
Any possible divergence between the views of the dominant
mining interests in South Africa and those of the
executive of the London Chamber of Commerce had
disappeared by the time of the Jameson Raid when the
President of the Chamber, Rollit, immediately wrote to
Chamberlain, and visited the CO, offering any means of
information or of 'informing public opinion . . . at the
present crisis' 3 . With the election of Mosenthal as
chairman of the trade section in the same year, the
dominance of the mining-based interests was assured.4
The close relationship between the State and the City
in the last decade of the nineteenth century was a
relationship between a most powerful state and a centre of
great wealth, both of which had influence extending all
1. SAMB 1 Nov. 1894, endorsed by the council a week
later, CMB 1, 8 Nov. 1894.
2. SAMB 23 Apr. 1895. Rollit and James Chambers moved
in on the section meeting and declared the need for a
special general meeting of the Chamber, which was
held in July, ibid., 4 July 1895.
3. Co 417/195, London Chamber of Commerce to Co 1 6 Jan.
1896, and minutes upon it. There is no record of the
meeting in CMB. The section was told on 14 Jan.,
SAMB 14 Jan. 1896.
4. For example, when the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce
complained that the British South Africa Co. was
fixing prices, Seears - representing 12 mining
companies - told the section that this was the only
way to allow the mining industry to continue, and the
matter was dropped, SAME 17 July 1900.
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round the world, and the activities of both were usually
interrelated. The dominant British economic interest in a
particular part of the world, often of a monopolistic or
oligarchical nature, was usually supported by the British
state. The City businessmen associated with such
interests had continuous informal access to the relevant
government departments and were chairmen of the relevant
trade section of the London Chamber of Commerce. The
domestic aspect of the relationship between finance and
politics was equally close. The British government always
sought City advice before framing financial policy, just
as a would-be borrower seeks advice on a loan from his
bank manager before he borrows.
The relationship between finance and politics was not
simple or straightforward but subtle and complex. The
full relationship was not admitted in public by the City
or the State as both had regard for the domestic and
international audiences which were largely composed of
competing economic interests, often supported by powerful
states. The City itself was not an homogeneous block of
equally-matched, continuously-co-operating interests.
Many interests were in competition with each other at one
time or another, particularly the transport and communica-
tion interests whose charges and activities were of
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constant relevance to the profitability of all other
interests.' Some issues, such as bimetallism, divided the
City into opposing camps. The main conclusion produced
from a study of the various interests and conflicts,
however, is that, despite the competition between various
groups which constituted the City, the top strata of
businessmen often had interrelated interests. If they did
not all meet each other in one boardroom or another, the
fact that they recognised the importance of each other at
this high level is demonstrated by the success of the
London Chamber of Commerce and its various trade sections,
and by the more extreme example of the Baring crisis. The
top men of the different hierarchies in the City formed a
superior echelon which understood the limits to disagree-
ment. The top group altered with changes in the economic
1. For examples of clashes between Sutherland and the
East India and China trade section, and the bills of
lading issue, see EICMB 13 Apr. 1886, 28 June 1887,
11 Dec. 1888, 17 Mar., 11 June, & 18 Oct. 1889, 30
Oct. 1893, & 30 Jan. 1895. For similar examples for
the South Africa section and Currie, see SAMB 21 June
1881, 1 Nov. 1894, 4 Feb., 10 Mar. & 27 Apr. 1896.
Unfortunately records of the merchants' committee or
the shipping committee have not survived. Despite
such occasional antagonism, it is difficult to divide
up shipowners from merchants in a simple fashion as
merchants were directors and shareholders in shipping
firms - S.S. Gladstone was on the board of the P&O
for example, and Blame, Barsdorf and T.M. Harvey had
substantial holdings of shares in the Castle Mail
Packets Co., W.M. Farmer was deputy-chairman of the
Union Steamship Company - and shipowners were also
involved in other interests - Currie was chairman of
De Beers and had established the Namaqua Copper Co..
Also shipping firms, such as the P&O, spent a lot of
time investing money in City stocks and shares, see
Freda Harcourt, 'P&O and Opium', a paper given to the
Imperial Seminar at the Institute of Historical
Research, London, 4 Feb. 1985.
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fortunes of particular interests, and those men or
families which were part of this group over a long period
of time, such as long-established private bankers,
merchant houses or merchant bankers, were the most
influential over time.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE NAVY AND THE CITY
The expansion of the British navy and the expansion
of the British Empire went hand in hand. The larger the
Empire, the greater the navy needed to defend it; the
greater the armed forces of the United Kingdom, the easier
the spread of the influence of the British state in the
world. As the great European powers struggled to
establish areas outside Europe in which their businessmen
might make profits, that government which could most
powerfully back up its diplomacy with armed force would be
most likely to succeed. The scramble for colonies and the
naval race which had begun in the 1880s were to result in
world-wide confrontations and a more serious arms race in
the l890s.
It is tempting to see the colonial and naval
expansion as leap-frogging forward together driven by some
inherent logic. The expansion of both were costly,
however, and the willingness of Parliament to sanction
such expenditure, which had already been in doubt, was
further questioned by the business recession of the early
1890s. The battle for ideas, the need to produce
propaganda in favour of naval and imperial expansion was
as important and necessary as it had been in the previous
decade, perhaps even more so.
In the same way that the Indian and Colonial
Exhibition had sought to popularise the notion of Empire
in 1886, so in 1891 an exhibition was organized by those
who wished to promote naval expansion. The Royal Naval
and Nautical Exhibition brought together all who were
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interested in promoting naval expansion. The Queen agreed
to be its patron, and the Prince of Wales its president.
The Vice-Presidents were Admirals, including Phipps-Hornby
and Lord John Hay, and politicians who had held the
position of First Lord of the Admiralty, including W.H.
Smith. The Council of the Exhibition was over two hundred
strong, two thirds of whom were army and naval officers;
the rest were politicians, aristocrats, shipowners,
shipbuilders, arms manufacturers and a few City men,
including the Lord Mayor and Sir John Lubbock. The
preparations for the exhibition were financed mainly by
businessmen who had a direct pecuniary interest in a
larger navy - shipowners, shipbuilders, arms manufacturers
and owners of iron and steel works.'
Whilst the preparations for the exhibition were
taking place, the London Chamber of Commerce provided a
platform for Rear-Admiral Richard Charles Mayne M.P. to
give an address on 'The Protection of Commerce'. At least
eight other admirals attended the special general meeting
to hear Mayne compare the amount spent on the navy in 1860
and 1888 in terms of insurance for British trade. The
£13m spent in 1860 had been to protect exports and imports
worth £375m, whereas the £11.9m of 1888 was related to
1. Over £32,000 was guaranteed. Substantial sums of
money were pledged by prominent companies such as
Cunard, Charles Canunell & Co., Sir Thomas Sutherland
for the P&O Co., T.H. Ismay, Vickers Sons & Co., Sir
Joseph Whitworth & Co., Laird Bros., Sir Donald
Currie; and the remainder was promised by
individuals, mainly politicians - including £500 from
Lord Brassey - and admirals, taken from a printed
list of guarantors enclosed in A.B. Forwood to Sir
Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby, 16 Aug. 1890, in the Phipps-
Hornby Papers, PH1 121a.
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trade worth £670m. Mayne took the exact rate of insurance
to be 3.41 in 1860 compared with 1.85 in 1888, and on this
basis called for an increase in cruisers and battleships.1
Moves were also in progress at this time to form a
National Defence Association in the City. Goldie had
brought the matter before the Council of the London
Chamber of Commerce in December 18902, and in the
following March, having secured the backing of the
Chamber's executive, he got the Council to agree to the
formation of the Association under the auspices of the
London Chamber of Commerce, but it was to be run as a
separate organisation. 3 When the Naval Exhibition opened
in London in the summer of 1891 the City could claim to
have kept the momentum of the naval movement of the late
1880s going.
The exhibition itself was an example of the business
acumen of the guarantors. Over 2.25m visitors came to it
and with the £48,000 profit from the takings at the gate
the Royal Naval Fund for the relief of widows and orphans
of servicemen was founded. 4 The success of the exhibition
is a remarkable example of a section of industry and
business financing a huge advertising promotion of their
products and services with the support of the Royal Fami-
ly. It is also one of the more obvious examples of the
coincidence of the interests of the state and business.
The year of the exhibition was marked by an increase
1. CCJ Dec. 1890, 272.
2. CMB 1, 11 Dec. 1890. At this meeting Arnold-Forster
had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Council that
the London Chamber of Commerce should pledge money to
the Naval Exhibition.
3. CMB 1, 12 Mar. 1891; also CCJ Apr. 1891, 109.
4. Hamilton, op.cit., 92.
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in the size of the small band of politicians and officers
who pressed for a larger navy. Sir Charles Dilke was
becoming more seriously involved in the movement at this
time, and suggested to Spenser Wilkinson - a propagandist
and journalist who was rapidly rising in importance - that
they should write a popular book on the topic together.'
Sir George Sydenham Clarke's The Navy and the Nation was
published in that year, as well as his fictional account
of The Great Last War (under the pseudonym of A. Nelson
Seaforth). Eardley-Wilmot produced a work on The Navy and
the Exhibition, and began compiling his history of The
Development of Navies During the Last Half Century for
publication in the following year.
Those with a longer-standing commitment to the
British navy were also active. In Parliament Sir John
Colomb moved that details of naval estimates be given to
the House of Commons, very little information being
available to the public at this time. 2 Beresford was
hawking his latest proposals 'Proper Policy of Defence'
about the politicians. 3 Brassey, speaking at I.F.L.
meetings, recommended a Royal Commission on the defence of
the Empire. 4 The I.F.L. itself had been told by Lord
Salisbury during the summer that a kriegsverein was a more
practical and urgent form of imperial federation than a
zollverein. 5 Brassey, who had introduced the deputation,
1. S.L. Gwynn and G.M. Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt.
Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Bart., M.P. (1918), 406.
2. Parl. Deb., 3rd Series, cccv, 1948, 2 Mar. 1891.
3. For example to Balfour, Beresford to Ba.lfour, 21 Nov.
1891, Balfour Papers, BL Add. MSS 49849.
4. For example at Brighton on 4 Dec. 1891, see his
Papers and Addresses iv, 169.
5. Brassey, Papers and Addresses iv, 165-6.
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was chosen by the I.F.L. to chair a committee to prepare a
detailed scheme of imperial federation as a result of this
deputation.1
This activity to further jingoism was not initially
shared by all in the City, particularly not by Sir John
Lubbock the newly-elected president of the London Chamber
of Commerce. While the 1889 Naval Defence Act was still
being drawn up, he suggested to the Council of the London
Chamber of Commerce that international agreement should be
considered as a means of saving British property from
being captured on the high seas during war time. 2 He had
gone so far as to speak to Thomas Scrutton at the Chamber
of Shipping about the matter. The idea received some
support from Rollit and Kennett-Barrington, who agreed to
enquire unofficially if the matter might not be added to
the agenda of the ACCUK, despite the fact that the closing
date for resolutions had passed.3
Sir John Lubbock had made his point very decisively
at his first annual general meeting as president of the
London Chamber of Commerce in 1889. He declared that it
was'Lombard St. to a China orange' that the refusal of the
U.K. to sign the third part of the Treaty of Paris in
1856, which exempted private ships from capture during a
war, was one of the greatest mistakes ever made. 4 Lubbock
was evidently not in touch with the harsh realities of
1. Brassey, Papers and Addresses iv, 18.
2. CMB 1, 14 Feb. 1889; also CCJ Mar. 1889, 70.
3. The ACCUK would not allow this, the alternative was
to hope that the meeting would agree to include it
and to this end a circular was issued, CMB 1, 28 Feb.
1889.
4. The 8th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce (1890).
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modern warfare 1 , but he was soon to be informed of the
actual state of international relations. The Council,
when it had agreed to Lubbock's resolution in February,
had asked him to convey his proposal to Lord Salisbury and
attempt to gain the Prime Minister's support for the idea.
The result of this move was that Lord Lytton was consulted
as to the French opinion on the matter, and he wrote to
Lubbock in July pointing out that, as Britain had the
largest navy and carrying trade of the major powers, none
of the European powers would agree to free the British
navy from the responsibility of protecting such a trade
during war time. 2 Thus the London Chamber of Commerce
withdrew its resolution on the Declaration of Paris from
the autumn meeting of the ACCUK. 3 Lubbock would on this
occasion probably have agreed with sentiments Gladstone
once expressed, 'The history of nations is a melancholy
chapter; that is, the history of governments is one of
the most immoral parts of history'.4
In his last presidential address to the London
Chamber of Commerce in January 1892, Sir John Lubbock
related the amount spent upon armaments to the depression
of trade. Military expenditure was a blight on European
prosperity in his opinion. His speech denounced not only
the expenditure on arms, but the spirit which produced
them. He considered that such a constant expectation of
war to the knife inhibited spontaneous mercantile activity
and was a fever dangerous to British trade.5
1. See p.l84 above.
2. Hutchinson, op.cit. i, 275-6, 12 July 1889.
3. CCJ Oct. 1892 Supplement.
4. Cited by John Viscount Morley, Recollections (1917),
ii, 55.
5. The Times, 25 Jan. 1893.
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The United Kingdom as a whole would appear not to
have supported the imperialism and jingoism of the
Conservatives, as the general election in the summer of
1892 put Gladstone back in Downing Street. 1 While
Gladstone was choosing his new cabinet, The_Times was
already expressing its fears for the British navy. 2 As
1893 began, the prospect of a future under Gladstone was
almost unbearable for imperialists and jingoists. The
Times greeted the new year with the opinion that there was
a 'defect in national spirit'. 3 Lord Meath, in an attempt
to remedy such a state of affairs, had given money to
London schools on condition that it be spent on the
purchase of Union Jacks which would be paraded around the
buildings at the head of a procession to the accompaniment
of patriotic songs.4
The City saw a patriotic procession of its own in the
spring. Led by Union Jacks and to the singing of
patriotic songs, members of the Stock Exchange made their
way to a meeting at the Guildhall to declare their
opposition to home rule for Ireland. 5 In July, Beresford
was invited by the City to give vent to his feelings on
the lack of organisation in British maritime defence.6
The City was once again taking the lead in creating an
atmosphere of jingoism in England.
1. The Times 20 July 1892, the totals were Gladstonian
Liberals - 275, Parnellites - 73, Conservatives -
268, and Liberal Unionists - 46.
2. The Times 16 Aug. 1892.
3. The Times 5 Jan. 1893.
4. Ibid..
5. The Times 4 May 1893, 6; see p.2O6 above.
6. CCJ (Commerce) 12 July 1893, 128.
321
There was a reason why the naval issue had to be
taken up by the City at this time, it was not merely
pandering to the whim of Lord Charles Beresford who
happened to be back on shore with more ideas. The 1889-90
programme for building new naval ships had stated that the
naval shipbuilding programme should 'be further considered
not later than 1893 with a view to prevent any
discontinuity in new construction and more especially to
provide for laying down of new ships'. 1 If the naval
expansion begun in 1885 was to continue its rate of
growth, a Liberal Government led by Gladstone would have
to be forced to carry out a fresh injection of public
funds into the naval and armaments supply. This would
have been no easy task at the best of times: the
depression of trade during the early 1890s made the
situation seem impossible.
However, the London Chamber of Commerce was better
prepared for the work in 1893 than in 1892, having elected
a Conservative as its president for the first time, Sir
Albert K. Rollit. 2 At the City meeting in July, Beresford
recalled how the London Chamber of Commerce had been
1. CAB 37/22, 28, memorandum by White, 31 Oct. 1888.
This point was made by Lord Hood in Parliament, Parl.
Deb. (1893) 4th Series, xii, 1018, 16 May 1893.
2. He had been chairman of the Council, but was not the
Chamber's first choice as president. Judging by the
number of years for which he held the office, he was
not considered to be a bad choice. During Lubbock's
second year as president, he agreed to ask Lord
Rothschild to accept the office for 1890, but this
offer was refused, CMB 1, 25 July 1889, and 10 Oct.
1889. Lubbock agreed to be president again for 1890
and 1891, but refused 1892, CMB 1, 10 Mar. 1891.
Henry Hucks Gibbs M.P. and Lord Hillingdon were both
approached but refused the office, CMB 1, 11 Feb.
1892. Lubbock agreed to fill the office for a final
year.
322
instrumental in getting the Government to spend £20m in
1889. Glover explained to the meeting that Beresford was
going to sea again and that he had put the matter once
again into the hands of the City businessmen.'
Beresford had suggested that in order to draw up
something approaching a business-like policy in maritime
affairs, an organisation should be formed of all those
involved in the defence question. This was taken up by
the London Chamber, which invited the Chamber of Shipping,
the General Shipowners' Society, Trinity House, the
Institute of Civil Engineers, and the Institute of Naval
Architects each to send four delegates. 2 By October,
this Maritime Defence Committee was to include
representatives from the United Services Institute and
from important British ports as well.3
While the London Chamber was organising its commit-
tee, the written naval propaganda was being put upon an
organised footing. It has been suggested that the publi-
cation of Arnold-Forster's In a Conning Tower in 1888,
launched stories on invasion scares beyond the reaches of
monthly reviews and The Times4. In the summer of 1893 the
whole question of popularising the British navy was taken
in hand with the formation of the Navy Records Society.5
Its patrons were the Duke of Edinburgh and the Duke of
1. CCJ (Commerce) 12 July 1893, 128.
2. CMB 1, 21 July 1893. The CCJ (Commerce) 19 July
1893, had also supported the idea in its editorial,
'National Insurance'.
3. CMB 1, 12 Oct. 1893.
4. I.F.Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1914 (1966),
50.
5. Hamilton, op.cit., 118.
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York, its president was Spencer, and its vice-presidents
were Lord George Hamilton, Admiral Sir R.V. Hamilton, the
Marquis of Lothian and Professor J.R. Seeley) The aim of
the group was to encourage the study of the British navy
and produce histories of its past glories. This policy
was successfully carried out.
In the autumn of 1893, the London Chamber of Commerce
laid the basis for its naval agitation carefully,
beginning with a resolution to the ACCUK. It was put to
the Association by Arnold-Forster who had by then become a
Member of Parliament:
This Association desires to record its emphatic
opinion that - alike in the interests of preserving
an adequate food supply and of maintaining as far as
possible the ocean carrying trade in British vessels
- it is of urgent public importance that the navy
should be so strong as to put it in a condition of
thorough efficiency to meet any reasonable claims
that can be made upon it in time of war;
the expenditure thus incurred being regarded by this
Association as national insurance against risks,
which, if not covered in time cf peace, would, in
case of war, be far more onerous.
Having successfully obtained the endorsement of the ACCUK,
the next step for the Council of the London Chamber was to
agree officially that the navy was not adequate to defend
trade routes, and then to establish a committee which
would press for a larger navy. 3 Arnold-Forster was an
active link between the London Chamber and Parliament at
this time.4 He also concerned himself with the press.
1. Phipps-Hornby papers, PH1/120 D, 11 July 1893.
Hornby was a member.
2. CCJ (Commerce) 4 Oct. 1893, 622.
3. CMB 1, 8 Nov. 1893. The proponents of this move in
the Council were Arnold-Forster and J.J. Jackson with
the support of Rollit.
4. He had been working with Lord Walmer, General Sir
George Chesney and Duke in Parliament since early
1893.
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His activities are recorded in a letter which he wrote to
his mother the day after the London Council meeting:
I have been working hard about the navy - seeing
people, arranging matters with The Times and
completing my facts. Yesterday we succeeded in
getting the Chamber of Commerce to take the matter up
and we have appointed a committee which I hope will
prove strong and active. I have had long talks about
the present state of things with Balfour, Lord George
Hamilton and many others. Balfour is admirable about
it.
Beresford had left a copy of his proposed naval
programme, which included an estimate of the number of
ships required, with J.J. Jackson whom he had befriended
in their early meetings in the City Conservative Club in
1888. 2
 Jackson was elected as chairman of the London
Chamber's new Naval Defence Committee and, despite a
cautious warning from Colonel Hozier, the programme was
read, adopted and circulated to members of the National
Defence Committee for their private information.3
Jackson, however, sent the programme to The Times along
with details of the Naval Defence Committee, and wrote
that a prominent member of the opposition would bring the
matter forward in the House of Commons at the instance of
1. Arnold Forster, 109-110.
2. GMB 1, Naval Defence Committee meeting, 17 Nov. 1893;
see also Beresford's Memoirs (1914), 386.
3. GMB 1, 17 Nov. 1893; present at this second meeting
of the Naval Defence Committee were J.J. Jackson,
Arnold- Forster, Sir Douglas Fox - a civil engineer
elected to the Council in 1893, Colonel Henry Hozier
- the secretary of Lloyd's, Capt. G.R. Vyvyan of
Trinity House, Dr. Francis Elgar - naval architect
and engineer elected to the Council in 1893, David
Howard - a chemical manufacturer and ex officio vice-
president of the Council, W.J. Thompson - a colonial
broker, ex-vice chairman and future treasurer of the
London Chamber , and S.B. Boulton - a merchant and a
vice-president of the Chamber.
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the London Chamber of Commerce.' The Defence Committee
had also decided to convene a public meeting on the
condition of the navy. Arnold-Forster produced a
statement for use as a circular for the meeting, 2 which
was set for 12th December. 3 A pamphlet was also produced
by the Committee setting out the facts on 'The State of
Naval Defences', as collected by Arnold-Forster.4
The scale of the demands made by the naval movement
upon the fiscal system of the United Kingdom were detailed
by the The Economist, which had been so content with the
1889 Naval Defence Act. Although this journal did not
support Gladstone's activity over home rule for Ireland,5
it did feel constrained to point out the extent to which
the earlier defence acts had committed the future expendi-
ture of the Exchequer. 6 The constructions provided for in
the 1888 Imperial Defence Act and the 1889 Naval Defence
Act, had already been carried out, but they continued to
drain the public purse to the extent of £1.429m and £0.57m
respectively in 1894.	 The task which the City had
1. The Times, 21 Nov. 1893, 9. For this Jackson was
reprimanded at the next meeting of the Naval Defence
Committee by Rollit and the chairman of the Council,
Willans, GMB, 22 Nov. 1893.
2. GMB 1, 22 Nov. 1893.
3. Ibid., 27 Nov. 1893.
4. A copy is to be found in the Arnold-Forster Papers,
BL Add. MSS 50365, fbi.
5. Econ. 1 July 1893, 780.
6. Ibid., 25 Nov. 1893, 1397.
7. What seemed to annoy The Economist most, was the fact
that those people who had assured the country in 1889
that the massive expenditure on shipbuilding would
put the United Kingdom once and for all in a position
capable of taking on two powers in naval warfare,
were saying a few years later that a further large
expenditure was necessary.
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adopted appeared insuperable. If a Conservative
Government in time of plenty had had to resort to the
trick of build-now-pay-later, what hope was there for a
Liberal Government burdened by those later payments to
increase the expenditure still further?
Unlike The Economist, other City papers, such as the
Financial News, were in favour of further naval expansion,
and reiterated the insurance argument used by the London
Chamber of Commerce:
It is all a matter of insurance, and the wise country
is that which adapts its insurance to its risks.
Ours are enormous and the country is prepared to pay
the needful premiums while there is still yet time.
The Navy is our insurance fund and the Admiralty the
underwriter. Let it not fail to make the fund
commensurate with the risks.1
The Queen put pressure on Gladstone as she had done a
decade before. Lord Rosebery, in his usual style of
extremely exact politeness which he employed to excuse his
inactivity, told the Queen that the initiative had to come
from Spencer. 2 After further consultation with Rosebery,3
Queen Victoria sent Gladstone a letter which she
instructed him to read to the Cabinet. 4 In it she stated
her belief that the supremacy of the navy would always be
supported by the country, which would be opposed to
economy when practised at the expense of 'the national
force'. The existence of the British Empire depended upon
such naval supremacy, she told Gladstone, and, although
she considered herself no alarmist, no time was to be
1. FN 28 Nov. 1893.
2. Buckle, op.cit. ii, 319, 16 Nov 1 1893. Rosebery
Papers, 10065, Rosebery to the Queen, 15 Nov. 1893.
3. Buckle, op.cit. ii, 327, 24 Nov. 1893.
4. Ibid., 328, 7 Dec. 1893.
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lost. Gladstone managed to gain time by being ill and so
avoided calling the Cabinet together, 1 and Harcourt had,
during that short illness, informed the Queen that the
resolution which Lord George Hamilton was going to move in
Parliament on the naval question, was to be treated as a
vote of confidence.2
The meeting organised by the London Chamber of
Commerce, which took place in the City on 12th December
1893, has been described more than once as the climax to
the naval agitation of that year. 3 There were more than
half a dozen admirals and at least six important
representatives of the military. 4 The Lord Mayor was
prevented from presiding by illness, so the duty fell to
the president of the London Chamber of Commerce, Rollit.
The resolution, urging the Government to increase the navy
yet again, was put by C.T. Ritchie, an ex-Parliamentary
Secretary to the Admiralty, and seconded by Lord Roberts.
The Times coupled Hamilton's activity in the Commons with
the City meeting, and described them as 'significant and
even irresistible manifestations' of public opinion which
the Government could not ignore.5
1. Buckle, op.cit. ii, 327, 12 Dec. 1893.
2. Ibid., 11 Dec. 1893.
3. P. Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies (1964), 19-20.
Marder, op.cit., 194, gives a similar opinion. The
Council of the Chamber considered the meeting to have
been highly satisfactory, CMB 1, 14 Dec. 1893. It
was reported in CCJ (Commerce) 13 Dec. 1893, 1032. A
notice advertising the meeting was placed in the
London morning papers on the Friday and Monday
before, and 100 placards were placed in City and West
End clubs and commercial exchange rooms, GMB, 4 & 7
Dec. 1893.
4. The Times 13 Dec. 1893, 12.
5. Ibid..
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The City meeting and the call by the CCJ for
patriotism to be placed before party, 1 although well
supported by The Times, found no echo in the Manchester
Guardian2 which represented Liberal opinion in the north
of England. Like The Economist, the Guardian had
supported the 1889 naval expansion as a step necessary to
ensure continued British supremacy, but the demand for
another large building programme was seen as putting party
before patriotism, since the likely result of such an
expansion would, in the opinion of the Guardian, be
similar increases in the French and Russian navies.
In 1885, Key had been against increasing the navy in
one big programme, as he thought it likely to attract
shipbuilding programmes in other countries. 3 This new
programme in 1893 appeared in that same light to
Gladstone. He considered that if it went ahead, Britain
would, for the first time, be joining the arms race which
was taking place in Europe. 4 He thought that such a move
would be seen as a challenge by France and Russia. 5 Faced
with the resignation of the Board of the Admiralty, 6 and
the implacable reserve with which Rosebery treated the
possibility of Gladstone resigning 7 , Gladstone ended his
political career over this naval issue 8, unable to accept
the responsibility of leading Europe into an arms race.
1. CCJ (Commerce) 13 Dec. 1893.
2. Manchester Guardian 20 Dec. 1893.
3. P.H. Colomb, op.cit., 453.
4. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48662, 1 Jan. 1894.
5. Ibid., 5 Jan. 1894.
6. Marder op.cit., 199.
7. Rosebery Papers, 10062, Rosebery, to Spencer 15 Jan.
1894, '1 replied . . . I do not believe in the
crisis'
8. Ibid., Spencer to Rosebery, 18 Jan. 1894.
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Rosebery, who took over as Prime Minister following
the resignation of Gladstone, had long made his position
on the navy clear, most notably at a speech given to the
Leeds Chamber of Commerce in October 1888:
What class of the community is so much interested in
the value and efficiency of our fleet as the
commercial interest? We see daily discussions
carried on by great experts in regard to the value
and efficiency of our fleet . . . it means the
existence of our trade in the case of war - and on
the existenc of our trade depends our existence as a
nation
Having married into the Rothschild family, and being a
director of a bank, Rosebery was in touch with business
opinion in the City 2 ; and was evidently a man committed
to the British Empire, as his work for the I.F.L. shows.
His presence at the head of the Government ensured the
continuity of Salisbury's foreign policy. This was his
own view of his responsibilities as Prime Minister, as he
explained to the Queen:
All that he can do, which some other Liberal
ministers conceivably might not is, while pressing a
Liberal domestic policy at home to take care that the
interests of Her Majesty's Empire are maintained
abroad.
1. Rosebery Papers, 10176, i, 1, Address on Foreign and
Colonial Policy to the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, 11
Oct. 1888.
2. His close relationship with the Rothschilds was a
source of information in his work as foreign
secretary, see for example regarding Egypt, ibid.,
10135, letter from Alfred Rothschild 9 Jan. 1894;
regarding South Africa, ibid., 10130, Rosebery to
Rhodes, 27 Mar. 1894; regarding Germany, ibid.,
10100, n.d. catalogued as 1894, Nathan M. Rothschild
to Rosebery enclosing a letter from Bleichröder;
regarding Portugal, ibid., 10096, Rosebery to
Rothschild 15 July 1894. This was an aspect of his
political work which he was aware could lead to
possible public embarrassment, see ibid., 10081,
Rosebery to Granville, 12 Nov. 1884.
3. Rosebery Papers, 10066, to the Queen, 14 May 1894.
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The first meeting of the reconstituted Liberal
Cabinet in March was mainly occupied by a discussion of
the navy estimates, and it was agreed that 7 new
battleships, 20 new cruisers, 40 new destroyers and 30 new
first class torpedo boats should be built.' This
programme provided solace to the business community, whose
feelings Rollit had made clear to the House of Commons2,
but provoked a critical response from a member who
represented very different interests. The founder of the
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, William R. Cremer, a
Liberal, viewed the naval movement as contrived by a few
mainly Conservative party supporters:
He had carefully watched the mode in which the scare
had been manufactured. It began some months ago with
articles in certain reviews. The cry was then taken
up by Party organs; newspapers began to write about
it; and one solitary meeting was held at the
Guildhall in support of the proposal.3
Certainly, the success of the 1893 campaign would
seem to be out of proportion to the energy that went into
it. It is doubtful whether the City and Conservative
promoters of the navy imagined that the result would have
been the resignation of Gladstone as well as the new large
shipbuilding programme . The explanation of the victory
is probably to be found partly in the feelings raised by
Gladstone's Irish policy and the consequences of such a
policy for the British Empire, and partly in the effect of
the increase in imperialism and the naval expansion which
had already taken place during the 1880s. The British
Empire having grown so rapidly, the need for a large navy
1. Rosebery Papers, 10065, to the Queen 8 Mar. 1894.
2. Pan. Deb. 4th Series, xix, 1829, 19 Dec. 1893.
3. Parl. Deb. 4th Series, xxii, 732, 20 Mar. 1894.
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was urgent in order to protect and consolidate those
gains. As Ripon complained in a secret memorandum to
Rosebery in 1892:
I have before me almost daily at the Colonial Office
proofs of the enormous increase of our
responsibilities involved in Lord Salisbury's Africa
policy; responsibilities of vast extent, undefined
in their character and far reaching in their
consequences. From most of them we cannot now draw
back.'
The strength of support for the naval programme in
the City 2 , was probably increased by a dislike of
Gladstone. Gladstone would have appeared, to the
promoters of Empire and a strong British navy, to be the
rallying point for those who opposed the expansion of
Empire and navy. Though much was done to expand the
Empire without going directly to Parliament, the cost of
the colonies and the associated wars and naval armaments
to protect them had to come before the Commons at some
time. Gladstone represented the ideas and policies of the
1860s and 1870s when it was difficult to achieve any
support for jingoism or imperialism. He stood for peace,
retrenchment and reform; the reduction, not the augmenta-
tion, of taxation.
If Edward Hamilton is to be believed, the typical
Liberal Unionist of 1888 saw Gladstone as the
personification of all that was wrong or dangerous, and
was haunted by fears that the rights of property were no
longer safe in his hands. 3 Nathan Rothschild saw him as
1. Rosebery Papers, 10132, 25 Sept. 1892.
2. There had also been some support from the Liverpool
Chamber of Commerce which endorsed the action of the
London Chamber with a resolution, CMB 1, 11 Jan.
1894.
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48648, 21 Feb. 1888.
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'a continual danger to the State", and the talk against
him in the directors' parlour of the Bank of England was
very strong indeed. 2 When Gladstone was re-elected in the
1890s feelings must have been even stronger, as
demonstrated by the burning of the Irish Bill in front of
the Guildhall to the strains of 'Rule Britannia'. By
August 1893, Edward Hamilton records that there was not a
single director of the Bank of England who was politically
friendly towards the Government. 3 Gladstone's refusal to
receive a deputation of influential 'Irish capitalists'4
could not have endeared him to the City business
community. The only word for the feeling of the
proprietors of The Times towards him was 'hatred'.5
What is surprising about the success of the Spencer
programme, which envisaged spending more than £30m over
five years and which regarded the British Empire and the
British mercantile fleet as an integrated defence problem
for the first time, is the fact that it did not quench the
fervour of those who had been prominent in promoting it.
Rosebery had taken care to ensure that Beresford was
satisfied with the programme 6 , yet three groups were
formed in 1894 with the express purpose of furthering the
1. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48647, 31 Aug. 1887.
2. See above,pp.247-8.
3. Hamilton Diaries, BL Add. MSS 48661, 11 Aug. 1893.
4. Ibid., 48660, 10 Mar. 1893.
5. Ibid., 48657, 3 Jan. 1892.
6. Rosebery had asked Beresford to call into see him at
the FO in February, even before he was Prime
Minister, Beresford Papers, NMM, 21 Feb. 1894.
Rosebery subsequently wrote to Beresford to ask him
if the programme was satisfactory, ibid., 21 Mar.
1894. He replied that it was, Rosebery Papers,
10092, Beresford to Rosebery, 23 Mar. 1894.
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capability of the British navy. One was formed by the
London Chamber of Commerce, one grew out of the I.F.L.;
and the third was the Navy League.
The most important of the three was the Naval Defence
Standing Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce,
although it has received no attention from historians.
The NDSC deserves pride of place as it first brought
together all the promoters of the British navy. It was
attached to a body which represented the enormous wealth
and influence of the City, and which had already proved
itself the only consistent promoter of a larger navy.
The NDSC was formed as a result of Rollit bringing a
resolution before the Council of the London Chamber in
March 1893. He suggested that the committee be composed
of representatives from the chambers of commerce of the
U.K., the Chamber of Shipping, and various co-opted
members. 1 Rollit, Admiral Colomb, Goldie, Eardley-Wilmot
and T.F. Blackwell met in June to form the committee, and
they drew up a list of people who were to be invited to
join. These included some admirals - Phipps-Hornby, Sir
John Commerrell, Sir R. Vesey-Hamilton; a couple of
military men - Ltn.-General Sir Andrew Clarke and
Commander G.R. Bethel MP; and representatives from the
Chamber of Shipping, shipowners, Lloyd's, and the ACCUK.2
The chief topic to which this new committee addressed
itself was the question of the manning of the navy. The
growth in the number of ships had created a manpower
shortage. By November 1894 the NDSC, with Sir Geoffrey
1. CMB 1, 8 Mar. 1894; also CCJ Apr. 1894, 14.
2. GMB 2, 20 June 1894.
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Phipps-Hornby at its head', had formed a subcommittee on
manning 2 , and had sent out a questionnaire to naval offi-
cers asking for their views on the existing situation3.
The second group formed to promote the navy in 1894
was the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee. The
I.F.L. had dissolved itself at the end of 1893 by a bare
majority on a postal vote. 4 It was suggested that the
defence group within the League had engineered its des-
truction 5 . The truth of this suggestion is borne out by
the fact that the new defence group took the I.F.L. emblem
and gave itself a name very similar to the League's.
During August and September of 1894 a battle raged in the
letter columns of The Times between the I.F.L. faithful -
Labillire, Sir Frederick Young, and F. Faithful Begg, and
the defenders of the new I.F.(D).C. - Sir John Colomb and
its secretary, A.H. Loring who had also been the secretary
of the I.F.L..6 The I.F.(D).C. was mainly concerned with
establishing a secure imperial defence by encouraging the
colonies to contribute more to the costs of such a policy.
The third naval group which formed in 1894, the Navy
League 7 , is generally better known than the other two.
1. He had been asked to join the committee by Admiral
Colomb, Hornby Papers, PHI/120 D, Colomb to Hornby,
21 June 1894; see also Egerton op.cit., 393.
2. GMB 2, 6 Nov. 1894; also CCJ Nov. 1894, 158.
3. GMB 2, 22 Nov. 1894.
4. Labillire, op.cit., 224; see p.2l3 above.
5. Tyler, op.cit., 207, records the views of G.W. Rudsen
who was present at the final meeting; see also the
letter from Faithful Begg in The Times 11 Sept. 1894.
6. All the letters were brought together in an
I.F.(D).C. pamphlet, Under_Fire (1895). A copy is to
be found in the Arnold Forster Papers, BL Add. MSS
50356, f 783.
7. Its records are kept at the headquarters of the Sea
Cadet Association in London.
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The idea for this organization originated in the pages of
the _!!_Gazette. Spenser Wilkinson 1 had written
articles on 'The Command of the Sea', which when
published in the Gazette had elicited a letter from 'Four
Average Englishmen' who declared their willingness to form
a navy league along the lines of that advocated in
Wilkinson's articles 2 . A preliminary conference, of
subscribers to the provisional fund and others, met in the
Westminster Palace Hotel in December, when a resolution
forming the League was passed and a provisional committee
formed. 3 The chair of this meeting was taken by Henry
Cust MP, and Beresford sent an encouraging telegram.
The object of the Navy League was to secure a
national policy of 'The Command of the Sea'. The first of
its general aims was the spreading of information which
demonstrated the vital importance to the British Empire of
the naval supremacy upon which depended its trade, and
national existence. 4 The executive met weekly and the
first general meeting of the Navy League was held in
January l895.	 The League was dependent for its
1. Henry Spenser Wilkinson (1853-1937), fellow of All
Souls, Oxford was on the staff of the Manchester
Guardian 1882-92, and the Morning Post 1895-1914. He
became Chichele Professor of Military History in
1909. His papers are at Aldershot, the Ogilby Trust,
OTP 13. Further papers and printed works exist at
All Souls, Oxford. His books include Imperial
Defence (1891), and Thirty-Five Years (1933). His
correspondence with Lord Roberts is in the Roberts
Papers at the National Army Museum, London.
2. Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, 189.
3. Navy League Executive Minute Book, 1894-5.
4. Ibid..
5. Ibid., Jan. 1895.
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influence, at least during its first few years of life,
upon the personnel who made up the NDSC of the London
Chamber of Commerce, and it had to turn to the City for
its finances.'
At the NDSC the main members of the committee at the
end of 1894 were Phipps-Hornby, P.H. Colomb, and Sir E.
Ommanney - all admirals, Captain Eardley-Wilmot, Lt.
Crutchley, J.J. Jackson, Goldie, S.B. Boulton, Lt.-Gen.
Sir Andrew Clarke, Maj. Flood Page, and Arnold-Forster.
The committee was not large, but it included most naval
propagandists of prominence both inside and outside
Parliament. The main conclusions it drew from the replies
received to the questionnaire on the manning issue were
that the number of naval officers and men should be
increased and a large naval reserve be trained. 2 These
views were quickly passed on to the First Lord of the
Admiralty by a private deputation from the London Chamber.
The situation was considered to be too delicate for a
public deputation. 3 The resolutions which were presented
by the deputation asked to know exactly how many men were
employed in the navy, and forcefully made the point that
no money was at that time allocated for technical
training.4
The CCJ eventually published the news of the deputa-
tion in March in its editorial on 'The Naval Estimates'5.
1. See p.339 below.
2. GMB 2, 6 Dec. 1894.
3. Ibid., 8 Jan. 1895.
4. Ibid., subcommittee meeting. These two resolutions
had been laid before the Council of the London
Chamber in January, CMB 1, 10 Jan. 1895.
5. CCJ Mar. 1895.
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It boasted of the influence the London Chamber had exerted
on successive governments through its public meetings, and
explained that such action was continuing 'quietly and
unobtrusively' by means of the NDSC. According to the CCJ
the main points put by the deputation were the maintenance
of a strong navy as set out in the Naval Defence Act, the
question of manning, and the defence of coaling stations,
particularly Gibraltar.' The NDSC had been supported at
the deputation by the chief officers of the London Chamber
and members of its Council. Thus a new stage in the work
of the London Chamber of Commerce towards a larger and
stronger navy had begun. It was no longer only a question
of keeping the naval programmes rolling with major
campaigns every five years; now appeared the possibility
of private annual deputations backed by detailed
information from the navy itself, and served by a
committee which could bring to bear the skills of the best
naval propagandists in Britain.
The annual report of the London Chamber for 1893-4
referred to the history of the City's activity on the
naval issue since 1885. The December meeting of 1893 was
compared with the meeting of May 1888 in terms of the
effect it had had on the Government of the day. 2 The
report's description of the NDSC and its efforts to
1. In the summer of 1894 the services committee in
Parliament organised a deputation to Rosebery on the
state of Gibraltar as a naval base and coaling sta-
tion. This deputation was also kept as private as
possible, Rosebery Papers, 10095, letter from Ches-
ney, 28 June 1894, and printed memorandum ibid.,
10096, another letter from Chesney 10 July 1894 lis-
ting the 50 or more MPs in favour of the deputation.
2. The 12th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce, 25-27. It was also published in the CCJ May
1984 Supplement.
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educate public opinion revealed that the first six of a
series of pamphlets on the navy had already been issued
under the auspices of the London Chamber.'
The Navy League, by contrast, was a weak organisation
dependent for its strength on the experience and influence
of members of the London Chamber's NDSC. J.J. Jackson had
been elected chairman of the executive of the Navy League
at its first general council meeting in January 1895.2
Spenser Wilkinson, having met Sir Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby
at an NDSC meeting, was deputed by the League to invite
Phipps-Hornby to become president of the Navy League, 3 and
he was elected to the post in February l895.	 Captain
Eardley-Wilmot also became a member of the Navy League's
executive in February. 5 Arnold-Forster kept in touch with
the League6, as did Sir Charles Duke.7
Such experienced hands in the game of naval
propaganda, who also had contacts in the City, contrasted
with the other Council members of the Navy League. For
1. The 12th Annual Report, 54.
2. Navy League Executive Minute Book (henceforth NLMB),
14 Jan. 1895.
3. Hornby was absent from the next NDSC meeting, so
Wilkinson had to invite him by letter, NLMB 8 Feb.
1895.
4. Hornby agreed, NLMB, Organisation & Finance
Committee, 15 Feb. 1895, and was elected at the
adjourned meeting of the general council, ibid., 21
Feb. 1895.
5. Ibid., executive meeting, 25 Feb. 1895.
6. Ibid. 20 May 1895, and was probably one of the MPs
who agreed to put questions on the naval question.
7. Ibid. 13 May 1895. He helped them to form some sort
of parliamentary committee which would ask
prospective candidates whether they would pledge
themselves on the naval question if elected, ibid.,
10 June 1895. This appears to have had little more
than propaganda value.
339
example, when the Council wished to hold a public meeting
in the City 1 J.J. Jackson, a member of the subcommittee
formed to organize the event 2 , had to explain that there
could be no successful public City meeting until the
League had established its credibility by attracting a
sufficiently large number of subscribers. 3 In this
respect the Navy League was in a worse position than the
I.F.L. had been nearly a decade before, as the I.F.L. at
least had important politicians in its ranks even if it
had few branches or subscribers.
Finance for the League, like that of the I.F.L., did
not come from a large number of subscribers. Alfred
Harmondsworth offered the League £100 if they could find
nine other similar offers, and was also willing to help
the League's propaganda by making his newspaper offices
available for this purpose. 4 The financial difficulties
of the League, however, continued and the executive
decided that the secretary should approach the City on the
question. 5 Without the support of the City and its
existing naval propaganda organisation, the Navy League
would clearly not have survived a year or more. It even
relied on circularising the members of the London Chamber
of Commerce in order to sell its literature.6
1. NLMB 28 Jan. 1895.
2. Ibid. 30 Jan. 1895.
3. Ibid. 21 Feb. 1895.
4. Ibid. 4 Feb. 1895.
5. Ibid. 20 May 1895; in July Admiral Cluse and Capt.
Eardley-Wilmot agreed to approach Messrs. Barnato,
Beit and Robinson on the subject of assisting the
finances of the League, ibid. 7 Oct. 1895.
6. Ibid. 15 Feb 1895.
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The reason for the existence of all three groups,
which produced propaganda and lobbied for a stronger
British navy, was not merely a reflection of the success
of the 1893 campaign. There were important political and
economic reasons why the idea of a strong navy needed to
be preserved and promoted in the middle and late 1890s.
On the domestic front, opposition to the increases in
British armaments was beginning to form, the franchise had
been further extended and the independent Labour Party was
becoming a reality, while the costs of the previous naval
programmes persisted and had to be brought before
Parliament each year. In terms of imperial federation,
the role of the Imperial navy was important in the
relations between the U.K. and its colonies, and the
promotion of imperial federation was associated with the
possibility of devolving more of the costs of defence
expenditure on to the colonial budgets. Internationally,
foreign economic competition had increased, and in the
jostling for political influence and economic advantage it
was the strongest state which could afford to be the
roughest and risk serious confrontation.
At its simplest, the domestic problem for those who
wished to see a larger and stronger navy was the lack of
public support for such a policy. Taxation was already
relatively high, and the depression of the early 1890s had
highlighted the limited potential of the British fiscal
base. The Times reaction to such a state of affairs was
to suggest a change in the constitution, and so place
expenditure on the armed forces beyond the reach of
democracy:
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If the House of Commons and the country were not
habitually hypnotised by party passions and
influences, it ought to be an established axiom, a
principle as indefeasible as the most sacred of
constitutional doctrines, that the expenditure on new
construction in our Navy should never in any year be
less than that, not merely of any foreign navy, but
of any two foreign navies. Such a principle should
be regarded as the very palladium of our national
security, above and beyond all party controversy, as
the irreducible minimum of defensive preparations for
our Empire and our commerce, and therefore as the
inferior and impossible limit of economy, impassable
alike by the Treasury, the Goverijment the
Legislation, and even the country itself.
A practical way of doing this occurred to The Times a week
or so later, the creation of a special Navy Stock to be
placed upon the stock market which once launched would
place the increase in the navy beyond the reach of
immediate Parliaments
Until such a time came, the danger for promoters of
the navy was that the lack of interest in imperial
greatness, shown by the majority of voters, might turn
into a positive desire for socialism or 'collectivism',
such as was suggested at annual gatherings of the Trades
Union congress. 3 This was the alternative direction in
which voters might move. Strikes, 'the suicidal conflicts
between capital and labour' 4 , were conspicuous at this
time, and the Old Age Pension Bill reached a second
reading in Parliament 5. More people were on poor relief
in London in the winter of 1893-4 than had been the case
for the preceding 21 years. 6 The Times feared that money
1. The Times 5 Jan. 1894.
2. Ibid. 16 Jan. 1894.
3. Ibid. 8 Sept. 1894. This editorial was prompted by a
meeting of the TUC in Norwich at the time.
4. Ibid. 16 Jan. 1894.
5. Ibid. 5 Apr. 1894.
6. Ibid. 26 Dec. 1893.
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would be spent upon 'popular boons to powerful classes'
instead of the 'business-like' management of imperial
defence • 1
In order to ensure that the majority of electors
voted for the navy it was necessary that a spirit of
nationalism be fostered, or at least be presented as an
alternative to socialism. Rosebery, as Liberal Prime
Minister, declared the 'little-England faction' in the
Liberal party dead. He hoped that the working class would
be interested in the maintenance of the imperial system
and British commercial supremacy, and inspired by the
animating sentiment of national pride and national duty.2
When Parliament was dissolved in the summer of 1895, the
Conservative Party and Liberal Unionists were presented as
'the National Party . . . massed beneath the Union Jack'.3
The Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists were
well-organised for the 1895 general elections, in the
sense that nowhere did a Liberal Unionist and a Conserva-
tive stand for the same seat. This gave them seventy-six
uncontested seats. 4 What The Times called 'a revolt
against the "New Radicalism" 5 resulted in an overwhelming
1. The Times 23 Jan. 1894.
2. Ibid. 26 Oct. 1894.
3. Ibid. 8 July 1895.
4. Ibid. 15 July 1895.
5. Ibid. 19 July 1895.
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victory for the Conservatives and their allies.'
The Navy League Journal began publication at 2d. a
copy during the summer, just before Parliament was
dissolved. The League had already published a great mass
of literature, which included leaflets addressed to the
working man, such as 'EnlandEx2ects'. 2 After the
success of the Conservative and Unionist parties at the
polls, it was the Navy League which launched the idea of
placing a wreath before Nelson's Column on Trafalgar Day.3
Within a few years the League sought to capture completely
the area around the column in Trafalgar Square from
'politicians, socialists, and professional agitators' and
have them banned from using the plinth of the column as a
platform for their meetings. 4 Arnold-Forster had already
succeeded in persuading Parliament to carry out the novel
idea of flying the Union Jack over the Victoria Tower.5
In 1896 several London Clubs agreed, at the suggestion of
the Navy League, to hoist Union Jacks on Trafalgar Day.6
The elections might have put the national party into
power with a large majority, but they had not brought an
1. The Times 31 July 1895,
Conservatives - 340 ) Unionists 411
Liberal Union - 71 )
Radical	
- 177 ) Separatists 259
Anti-Parnell - 70
Parnellites	 - 12
The Times 26 July 1895, called it the most decisive
victory since 1832.
2. NLJ, No. 1, July 1895.
3. The idea originated from Arnold White, NLMB 7 Oct.
1895. The Mayor of Dublin was asked to place a
wreath on Nelson's Column in Dublin in the following
year, NLMB 1 Sept. 1895.
4. NLMB 25 Sept. 1899, Arnold White again.
5. Arnold-Forster, 96.
6. NLMB 19 Oct. 1896.
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end to the need for the promotion of nationalism if an
already strong navy was to be strengthened. The Times had
warned in October 1895 that the country should remember
that the social democrats and the Independent Labour Party
were sure to recover from their defeat at the polls.' The
long drawn-out struggle between employers and the
shipbuilders in Belfast and the Clyde over the attempt to
decrease wages lasted throughout the autumn and on into
the winter. 2 The war message from President Cleveland on
the question of the Venezuela boundary, and the telegram
sent by the German Kaiser following the Jameson Raid early
in the new year came, according to the Bankers' Magazine,
at a very opportune moment for strengthening the
hands of the British Government. The nation has been
thoroughly roused by it, and newspapers of all
political shades have joined in repudiating the
Kaiser's claim to a right to interfere in the
Transvaal; and the necessary measures for
strengthening the fleet and lang forces will now be
arranged without any opposition.
Even more fortunate for the Government was the £4m budget
surplus, mainly as a result of the first annual collection
of the new estate duties, with which it could easily pay
the £21.75m navy and the £18m army estimates.4
Despite such advantages, voices raised in opposition
to the escalating expenditure on armaments began to find
organisations to support them. The demonstration in Hyde
Park at the end of July, preliminary to the International
1. The Times 12 Oct. 1895.
2. Ibid. 16 Oct., 13 Nov., 12 and 28 Dec. 1895; and 23
Jan. 1896.
3. BM 1896, 194. A naval squadron was sent to Delagoa
Bay, The Times, 8 Jan. 1896.
4. The Times 1 Apr. 1896.
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Congress of Socialist Workers and trade unionists, had at
the top of its list of resolutions and statement that the
object of war was the control of markets.' In March an
organisation had been formally constituted to act 'as an
effective antidote to the Jingo, the militarist, and the
sham-patriotic sentiment' by a different group of the
British public. 2 The Increased Armaments Protest
Committee wished to arrest the expansion of Empire for its
own sake, to suppress the Jingo spirit in Whitehall and on
the fringes of the Empire, and to create closer ties with
the U.S.A. and France. 3 It pointed out that, if war debt
was included in the calculations, three-quarters of the
existing public expenditure was spent on the costs of past
wars or preparations for new ones, the annual expenditure
on the navy having more than doubled since l884. The
committee was not against patriotism, but against spending
money to help fill the pockets of 'concession-hunters,
company-promoters, and stock-exchange gamblers' and the
wealthy classes, rather than spend it on much-needed
domestic reforms.5
Although the Protest Committee talked of 'a
conspiracy of financiers, speculators, politicans and
aristocrats' 6 it was not against Empire, patriotism or
1. The Times 25 July 1896.
2. Increased Armaments Protest Committee, Empire, Trade
and Armaments (1896), 1. The president of the group
was R. Spense Watson, Esq. LL.D., its executive
included three MPs - Sir Wilfred Lawson, H.J. Wilson,
& R.A.Allison, and a number of ministers of religion.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 7.
5. Ibid., 24.
6. Ibid., 1.
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Christianity', and may be contrasted with the sentiments
of the Labour Leader, the ILP's newspaper, which
characterised the expanding British Empire as an economic
venture facilitated by missionaries, explorers and the
armed forces 2 . The Labour Leader suggested that if peace
was to be preserved capitalism should be put down before
militarism.3
The fact that by 1896 expenditure on the navy was
becoming simply a race with other countries, was clear
even to those who were for Empire and a strong navy. This
was reflected in a Punch cartoon at the end of the year
which depicted Neptune auctioning the command of the Sea.
The caption was 'Going One Better'. France, as Marianne,
had just bid £8m and the reaction of John Bull was to
bellow, 'Guineas'.4
When Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office began
to talk of the colonies as vast estates to be developed,
the CCJ immediately took up the subject of this 'New
Forward Policy', and while it was cautious about who
should take on the responsibility of developing the
colonies, there was one aspect of the forward policy about
which it was in no doubt - the Imperial Naval Policy.
1. Interestingly, it distinguished between the British
economic and political empires, making the point that
the British Empire, for all the expenditure it
demanded, had not attracted more trade than had the
economic empire, ibid., 21.
2. Labour Leader, 5 May 1894, 7.
3. Ibid., in the context of the Russian Czar's proposal
for a peace conference.
4. Punch 19 Dec. 1896, 290.
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The development of the national estate would be mere
futile effort, unless there is carried out to the
full, in actual practical effect, a well-ordered
policy of defence - favoured alike by the Mother
Country and the greater colonies. Absolute security
against hostile aggression for all the provinces and
the pathways of our Empire, will alone establish and
enhance that sense of integrity and that prestige
without which the profitable devlopment of our great
Empire is a sheer impossibility.
In 1896, the London Chamber began to employ more
forcefully the food supply argument for a stronger navy.
Protection of the nation's food supply in time of war was
a potentially emotive point upon whose importance all
inhabitants of the U.K. would agree. The topic was taken
up at the instigation of a formal letter from Lloyd's2,
although the Council of the London Chamber had already
agreed to the NDSC forming a subcommittee on the topic
before the letter from Lloyd's arrived. 3 Circular letters
were sent out to gather information on the question.
Beresford gave a speech to the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce in August which even The Times considered to be
alarmist.4 The main point of the address was the manning
levels of the navy, and Beresford demanded a public
inquiry into the matter, declaring that if businessmen ran
their businesses as the navy was run they would be
bankrupt within three months. 5 The Liverpool Chamber
naturally turned to the City for support on the issue6,
and Jackson presented a resolution to the Council of the
1. CCJ Nov. 1895.
2. ivi 3, 6 Feb. 1896.
3. CMB 2, 9 Jan. 1896. The implication of this is that
the matter had already been communicated privately.
4. The Times 31 Aug. 1896.
5. Ibid..
6. CMB 2, 8 Oct. 1896.
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London Chamber in November.' In December the Council
agreed that Goschen should be asked to accept a deputation
from the City, 2 and the NDSC met to arrange the
details.3
Despite Goschen's initial attempt to put off the
deputation, 4 he eventually agreed and the NDSC brought
together its information on the food supply, manning
levels and the training of the reserve, not forgetting 'an
efficient programme of shipbuilding'. The deputation was
introduced by Rollit. Jackson, Arnold-Forster and Edward
Lee attended as members of the NDSC, with Lord Chelmsford
representing the Royal Institution and Captain Crutchley
the Royal Naval Reserve. 5 Jackson reported back to the
Council that the Chamber had every reason to be satisfied
with the manner in which the deputation was received.6
The deputation was a confidential affair, following the
precedent established under the previous Government. 7 It
seems at this time that the NDSC of the London Chamber was
almost an accepted advisory body to the Admiralty,
representing, as it did, most of those interested in
promoting the strength of the British navy.
In March the London Chamber met to receive an address
from Stanley Machin on the 'Food Supply in Time of War'8.
Machin was chairman of the Bakery and Allied trades
1. CMB 2, 12 Nov. 1896; also CCJ Nov. 1896, 209.
2. CMB 2, 10 Dec. 1896; also CCJ Dec. 1896, 233.
3. GMB 3, 21 Dec. 1896, 12 & 22 Jan. 1897.
4. GMB 3, 21 Dec. 1896.
5. CCJ Feb. 1897, 43.
6. iTd., 42.
7. The 15th Annual Report of the London Chamber of Com-
merce, 11.
8. CCJ Apr. 1897, 82. It took place on 17 Mar. 1897.
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section of the London Chamber. The chairman of this
meeting, Marston, was chairman of the Preserved Food trade
section. A resolution urging the Government to consider
the question of the national food supply was passed and
subsequently sent on to the First Lord of the Admiralty.1
In the same month the Navy League Journal published an
article aimed at boys in elementary schools, to whom it
explained that a weak navy meant no supper, no breakfast,
no work or very low wages. 2 The British boy was told that
in order to avoid such a catastrophe he could help by
taking the article home and begging his mother or father
to read it. In the following month a resolution was
passed in the Commons which was very similar to that
proposed at the meeting of the London Chamber, namely that
the possible danger to the food supply suring a war
deserved the attention of the Government. 3 The Economist,
which was in no mood to let even a hint of protectionism
pass unchallenged, condemned the resolution as an
ingenious creation of the protectionists and put forward
the very argument which those in the City who had promoted
the issue wished to hear:
All we have got to do, to make ourselves secure, is
to maintain our supremacy at sea. As long as we
command the sea, we may quite as safely eat Russian
or American wheat as that of our own ploughlands.4
Thus an argument had been established for having a
strong navy which would stand as long as Britain continued
to import a substantial portion of its food supply, and
1. CCJ Apr. 1897, 93.
2. NLJ Mar. 1897, 11.
3. NLJ July 1897, 9.
4. Econ. 10 Apr. 1897, 527.
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which could be employed to strike fear into the hearts of
every man, woman and child on the islands. Discussions
over the importance of the Empire might come and go, but
there was little chance of arguing that bread was not
something which was well worth defending. A rise in the
price of bread had been enough to start bread riots in
other countries, and was a matter of daily importance to
the working class in the U.K.. The use of the food supply
argument in the promotion of a larger navy was a masterly
stroke in the campaign to make the naval expenditure
palatable to that substantial section of the British
working men who had a vote. It was one which Beresford
was quick to adopt and preach to the East End workers.'
It might be argued that the naval review of 1897,
which marked the Queen's Jubilee 2 , also marked the high
point of British power and dominance in the world. At the
annual general meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce,
the state of the navy was described as one of the most
important questions affecting the trade of the U.K..
Everyone felt that the British Navy ought to be not
only the strongest in the world but strong enough to
resist attacks from any other two or three foreign
navies combined.
Lord Salisbury, as a guest at the thirty-seventh annual
banquet of the ACCUK held in February, felt able to
paraphrase the much-quoted speech which Chamberlain had
given to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce in the
1. NLJ June 1897, 4. His address to the workers of
Canning Town took place on the 22 May 1897.
2. Marder, op.cit., 281.
3. CCJ Apr. 1897.
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previous October.' It is a declaration which does not
receive the same attention from historians as does
Chamberlain's, despite the fact that the latter was only
the Colonial Secretary and was addressing a single Chamber
of Commerce in his constituency whilst Salisbury, as Prime
Minister and Foreign Secretary, was addressing the annual
meeting of all the chambers of commerce of the U.K.. It
was a speech of conviction in the absolute importance of
British business abroad to the formulation of foreign and
war policy:
I believe that all machinery, at all events of the
external part of our Government, is in its intention
and its object directed for the purposes of
maintaining and facilitating British trade. (Hear,
hear). We have heard, and we rejoice at the great
achievements of our Army and Navy, how they have
never failed us under any stress to which they may
have been put. But the object of all this action is
that the various parts of the world may be kept open
to the exploration, to the industry, to the
enterprise of Britons; may be saved from that
encircling band of hostile tariffs which causes us to
know, when we hear that a territory has fallen into
foreign occuption, that it is really robbed from
British trade.
What must other businessmen and politicians in other
countries have thought when they read such declarations?
Their conclusions might have been somewhat similar to
those reached by the Militr Wochenblatt a couple of years
before when it reviewed the writings of Spenser Wilkinson:
1. CCJ Nov. 1896, 201, Chamberlain's speech had begun:
'All the great Offices of State are occupied with
commercial affairs. The Foreign Office and the
Colonial Office are chiefly engaged in finding new
markets, and in defending old ones. The War Office
and Admiralty are mostly occupied in preparations for
the defence of these markets, and for the protection
of our commerce.'
2. CCJ Mar. 1897 Supplement.
352
Through all his writings runs the endeavour to
restore its old greatness to his country. He makes
no secret whatever of this, and aims at nothing less
than making England so powerful that she would be not
only independent of all other States in all
situations, but also in a position everywhere to
speak with a decisive voice. This amounts, to little
less than the dominion of the world . . .
Certainly, the fact that the Anglo-Belgium and Anglo-
German commercial treaties of 1862 and 1865 were not
renewed in the month following the naval review of 1897
suggested to Kaiser Wilhelm the ruin of German business,
and he concluded that a German fleet should be built
without delay.2
The German navy scheme was announced in the autumn,3
and the reaction of the London Chamber of Commerce was to
prepare a statistical comparison of 'Navies and
Commerce' 4. On the basis of naval expenditure in relation
to the tonnage of mercantile shipping owned, the figures
for France, Germany and the U.K. were compared. It was
calculated that around O.8m tons of merchant shipping were
owned by French businessmen and the French state spent
£1O.75m a year on its navy; Germany spent less than half
of that, £4.2mprotecting nearly twice the tonnage of
merchant shipping, l.5m tons; the U.K. was spending
£21.25m a year to protect 8m tons of shipping. The
Journal emphasised the fact that the U.K. only spent twice
as much as France on merchant shipping tonnage which was
ten times as large as that of France. A new target for
1. NLJ Oct. 1895. The Mi!itr Wochenblatt was the
leading German military paper.
2. Sir E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy
(1964), 25.
3. Ibid., 28.
4. CCJ Nov. 1897.
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British naval expenditure was arrived at by taking the
changing German situation into account:
But with the growth of the German mercantile marine,
it will perhaps be as well to expand our expenditure
to 26 millions . . . particularly when the German
Empire is being urged to adopt a 'Naval Programme' of
some magnitude.'1
At the beginning of 1897 the CCJ had criticised the
outcry against German economic competition as exaggerated,
using in its argument statistics based on the amount of
foreign trade per person for each country. Belgium came
first with £341 of trade per person, the U.K. next with
£161.5, followed by France with £91.3 and Germany with
£71.4. 2
 The comment ended with a warning that as German
industry was well-organised, and the German state was
prepared to give assistance for the development of German
foreign trade, the competition with Germany was only
beginning. By the end of 1897 from a naval point of view,
the CCJ had demonstrated that this competition had begun
in earnest and for that reason the British navy should be
expanded further.
The relationship between business interests and the
strength of the navy was not limited to the obvious need
for the protection of shipping and trade, and the intimi-
dation of distant natives when they objected violently to
the behaviour of the British within their territories.
The degree of security which the navy provided was ref lec-
ted in the prices offered and taken in the City. Apart
from the question of insurance premiums, which were
1. CCJ Nov. 1897.
2. CCJ Jan. 1897.
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directly affected by the threat of war, there was the
general and elusive notion of credit.
Credit was based on confidence, and it was this broad
aspect of City business life which reflected the strength
of the state's armed forces in a sensitive way. This
relationship between financial credit and national credit
had been commented upon by the CCJ at the time of the
Delagoa Bay incident in 1889:
The profits of capital being constantly reduced, both
on commercial investments and on securities, its
holders are becoming more enterprising than ever, and
are constrained to go further afield in search of
higher remuneration. This is the origin of the
speculative movement of modern times . . . This
movement deserves to be recognised in its full
significance by Her Majesty's Government. The power
and status of the British Empire depends fully as
much on its financial strength as on its industrial
resources . . . Credit is the basis of all modern
commercial operations, whilst national credit is
fully as valuable to the individual as to the
community. 1
The relationship was here presented as reciprocal. The
argument presented regarding Delagoa Bay, was that the
British Government should be prepared to carry out similar
protection of British financial investment anywhere in the
world regardless of the rights of sovereignty. The claims
of capital investment were to supersede the political
claims of sovereignty. While this simple rule was not
officially recognised, the British Government was
committed to protecting British life and property abroad,
and its ability to do this was partially reflected in the
prices of overseas investment stocks and shares.
The success of the City's campaign for a larger navy
had a continuously-multiplying, positive effect upon City
1.	 July 1889.
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business. The more secure and confident the investor and
businessman in the ability of the state to cushion them
from the unpleasant, unexpected hindrances to their
growing prosperity and profits, the more active and
enterprising their behaviour. As British capital and
entrepreneurs pressed further afield so a larger navy was
more necessary, as the armed forces available increased so
could confidence and enterprise expand also. This is not
to say that the strength of the state's armed forces was
the sole factor in business calculations, but in an age of
imperialism and fierce international competition it was a
major consideration which was essential, if not
sufficient, to ensure the growth of the City's economic
interests abroad.
By 1898 the City had helped to create a state of
naval preparedness and growth which achieved that sense of
security Rollit had referred to at the defence meeting of
a few years before as 'that confidence which is the very
basis of our commerce'.' In January Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach had declared that even 'if necessary at the cost of
war that door shall not be shut' against British merchants
and enterprise in China by the other powers 2 . The
Spanish-American war later in the year was viewed with
equanimity, considering that 80 per cent of trade with the
Phillippines was conducted by British businessmen. 3 This
composure, this confidence, was the prize which years of
campaigning for a larger navy had won.
1.	 CCJ (Commerce) 13 Dec. 1893, 1Q2.i.	 MaLdeL, Op.C1t., 3ui; see p.zIu above
3.	 CCJ Apr. 1898.
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This body has occupied itself with the problem of
national defence as far back as 1888, and the Chamber
may legitimately claim some share in the preparation
of public opinion which demanded and obtained the
passing of the Naval Defence Act, whereby our naval
and other defences have been so far improved that
both the late events in China and the present
Americo-Spanish complications have taken place
without raising any anxiety in the mind of the
British public, and even with a minimum of
disturbance to that most sensitiye of financial
barometers, the London Money Market.
The year which marked this great demonstration of the
business advantages of a powerful navy, also saw the
relationship between the City and the navy symbolised by
the building of a new first class battleship, the London,
and for the first time in the annals of the City
Corporation a Lord Mayor of the City officially
entertained representatives of the Royal Navy at a banquet
at the Mansion House.2
The naval estimates for 1898 recognised the German
navy as a new factor in the calculation of British defence
capabilities, as was the French penchant for cruiser-
construction. 3 It was, however, the activity of the
Russians in the spring of 1898 which most alarmed the
Admiralty and caused a supplementary building programme to
be proposed by Goschen. 4 Fear that the Conservative and
1. CCJ Apr. 1898. Compare this with the situation a
dozen or so years previously when the price of
Russian securities had dropped 15 per cent, EM 1885,
473.
2. R.J. Hayward, 'London and the Royal Navy'
Transactions of The Guildhall Historical Association,
Dec. 1950, 68. There is no mention made by Haywood
of the public meetings or the committees of the
London Chamber of Commerce of the 1880s and 1890s.
3. CAB 37/46,20, 17 Feb. 1898, Navy Estimates and
shipbuilding programme 1898-9, 3-4. The programme
consisted of three battleships, four large command
cruisers and four sloops.
4. CAB 37/47,39, 6 June 1898, Russian naval construction.
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Unionist Government were not going to introduce this sup-
plementary vote in order to meet the Russian expansion
prompted the NDSC to pass a resolution and ask that the
London Chamber send a deputation to Goschen) The in-
terest in the condition of the navy was maintained by the
Chamber inviting Brassey to speak on 'The Manning of the
Navy and the Mercantile Marine', which he did in July.2
The Navy League, meanwhile, was not faring too well.
It had not made much headway, except through the good
offices of the prominent members of the NDSC. Beresford
had refused to be its president in 1896. The City
meeting which the League desired to convene had been
arranged eventually by J.J. Jackson, who secured the
assistance of Beresford to provide an address on the Navy
League4, and the agreement of Rollit to chair it, 5 but the
formation of a branch of the Navy League in the City was
postponed. 6 Nonetheless, substantial financial support
was obtained from a number of City Livery Companies. 7 The
League was considering merging with the Unity of Empire
Lecturers, or the British Empire League, in 1896 8 and was
clearly not standing on its own feet with any real
1. GMB 3, 16 June 1898. The idea of a deputation was
firmly rejected by Willans as chairman, but the
meeting supported an address to be given by Brassey.
2. Ibid. 5 July 1898; also CCJ July 1898, 147.
3. NLMB 24 Feb. 1896. Hornby had died and Vesey
Hamilton had taken over the post as chairman of the
executive, NLMB 20 May 1895.
4. Ibid. 9 Mar. 1896.
5. Ibid. 16 Mar. 1896.
6. Ibid. 5 July 1897. J.J. Jackson had also asked the
NL to join the London Chamber's deputation to the
Admiralty, ibid. 7 Dec. 1896.
7. The Annual Report of the Navy League for 1897.
8. NLMB 16 Mar. 1896.
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confidence. Branches had been formed in Liverpool and
Glasgow in 1896 and 1898 with the help of Beresford and
the local chambers of commerce,' but at the end of the
decade it was having more success founding branches in
public schools. 2 In contrast the German Navy League had
attracted over 14,000 members from hundreds of cities and
towns in its first year of existence.3
The most effective piece of work which was carried
out under the auspices of the League in the late 1890s was
the conference held at the Royal United Service Institute
in June 1898, which was convened to consider the position
of the U.K. in case of war with regard to the adequacy of
the navy and the food supply. 4 At the conference, most of
the topics which had been raised in the previous fifteen
years were addressed by most of the major figures who had
contributed to the naval movement during that time.5
The subject of the food supply to Britain had been
taken sufficiently seriously by the Government, in the
summer of 1898, for a memorandum on the subject to be
prepared for the cabinet by C.T. Ritchie. 6 The conclusion
which Ritchie arrived at, leaving aside the unlikely event
1. NLJ Apr. 1896, June 1898.
2. In 1900 it had branches in Harrow, Malvern College,
Merchant Taylors' and six other schools, NLJ Jan.
1900. In May 1899, the total number of branches in
the U.K. had only reached 31 and in the colonies 10,
NLJ May 1899.
3. NLJ Feb. 1899, 25.
4. Minutes of the Proceedings at the Navy League Confer-
ence . . . (1898).
5. With the exception of Beresford. Sir John Colomb
spoke on 'Coaling Stations' and John Glover on the
'Insurance of Ships', Crutchley, Arnold-Forster and
Dilke also spoke amongst others. Hozier of Lloyd's
was present.
6. CAB 37/47, 40, 9 June 1898, 'Food supply in time of
war'.
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of a blockade of the U.K., was that corn would still get
through during war time but at a higher price, and that it
was wiser to trust to the Admiralty's arrangements than
involve the country in any special measures. This was the
opinion of the London Chamber of Commerce also, and a
letter from the Agricultural Committee for a National
Wheat Store drew no response from its Council.'
The Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee had not
been meeting with much support since its formation. The
Committee had suggested that the self-governing colonies
should be invited to consider the propriety of their
contributing to the maintenance of the Royal Navy, on
the understanding that steps will be taken to afford
them a share in its administration corresponding to
their contribution.2
Lord Salisbury's comment on this proposal referred to the
'evil of a divided control of the Navy' 3 and The Times in
stronger language concluded that the Committee's scheme
would 'shatter the whole fabric of the British
Constitution from top to bottom' 4 . It would have been
easier, in the opinion of The Times, to create a Zo!!-
verein than a Kriegsverein, 5 thus completely reversing the
arguments of earlier years.
The 1897 Colonial Conference was a disappointment for
the I.F.(D).C. because the assembled representatives could
1. CMB 2, 13 Jan. 1898. Edward Lee of the Bakery trade
section had put the resolution of his section, which
recommended the formation of a National Reserve of
Food, to the NDSC, GMB 3, 8 June 1898, but he twice
failed to attend subsequent Council meetings to press
the point, CMB 2, 7 & 28 July 1898.
2. The Times 2 Oct. 1895.
3. Ibid. 7 Sept. 1895.
4. Ibid..
5. Ibid., 2 Oct. 1895.
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not even agree on a stronger imperial defence. 1 The
British Empire League, constituted by the City, seemed to
have been more effective in promoting the defence aspect
of imperial federation at this time. Goschen received a
deputation from the League in the summer of 1898, which
impressed upon him the desirability of enrolling colonial
seamen in the Royal Navy Reserve.2
The Peace Conference held in the Hague in May 1899
brought the familiar paradoxical argument from the City;
on the one hand a policy of the peaceful settlement of
international disputes, on the other an urgent warning
that the U.K. could not 'slacken its efforts to make its
defensive forces as nearly as possible invulnerable'.3
The guarantee of peace was only one aspect of the
importance of maintaining large armed forces, as the
president of the London Chamber, Albert G. Sandeman, made
clear at the annual dinner in his euology to the principal
guest, the Duke of Devonshire:
• • . we owe it largely to his Grace personally (as
President of the Committee of National Defence) that
measures have been taken by the Government by which
our Navy and Army are in a stronger and better
position now than they have ever been before, both as
regards efficiency and adequacy. This is at once a
guarantee for peace and an assurance (the cost of
which the commercial community have never grudged)
for the maintenance of our material interest in all
quarters of the globe, which are bound p in our
continued commercial prosperity. (Cheers).
The City's main concern was the economic reality which lay
behind the delicate balancing of diplomacy. As the CCJ
1. Kendle, op.cit. 29.
2. United Empire vi (1915), 341.
3. CCJ June 1899 'Peace and Commerce'.
4. CCJ May 1899, 83.
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was to say amidst the strife of the second South Africa
war,
It is being realized, especially amongst the
commercial community, that 'British prestige' is no
empty phrase, but must be maintained at all costs, as
any loss in this respect must react on those material
interests which lie at the base of our commercial
supremacy.1
The outbreak of the war in South Africa in 1899
raised new questions about the state of the country's
armed forces. The Times published a letter from Sir J.
Wolfe Barry, who asked what the result would be if some-
thing untoward were to happen in India, China or Egypt
whilst the U.K. was engaged in the conflict with the
Boers. 2 Comparing the state's armed forces to business
capital, he described the existing state of affairs as one
in which the nation was trying to carry on a largely
increased business with insufficient working capital. His
suggestion was that a movement should begin amongst the
influential classes in the City to organise a representa-
tive committee to study the question systematically, with
the help of the press. His own immediate solution was to
increase the army by 100,000 men.
The NDSC of the London Chamber met a fortnight later
to put the suggestion into operation 3 , a task to which it
was perfectly suited by experience. Representatives were
invited from the other chambers of commerce - three from
the ACCUK and one each from Liverpool and Glasgow - and in
order to adapt itself more completely to the work it
changed its name from the NDSC to the Naval and Military
1. CCJ Feb. 1900, 'War and Commerce'.
2. The Times 8 Nov. 1899.
3. GMB 3, 30 Nov. 1899.
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Defence Committee. The action was approved by the
Council' and the CCJ took up the issue in the spring of
the following year.2
The strategy of the new committee was to give no
publicity to the matter until the war in South Africa was
over, and then to insist on a thorough enquiry by
businessmen into the administration of the government
which had brought the situation about. 3 This decision did
not prevent the London Chamber from keeping up its
tradition, formed in the 1890s, of sending a deputation on
the state of the navy to a new government when it formed.4
Neither did it inhibit the London Chamber from celebrating
its most frequent speaker on naval issues, Lord Charles
Beresford. A complementary dinner was given in his honour
in January 1900, at which he took the opportunity of
indulging in reminiscences and recording the debt which he
felt was owing to the London Chamber of Commerce for its
role in the naval movement of the last two decades of the
nineteenth century.
I remember well the time when Admiral Hornby and one
or two other naval officers, including myself, came
to the London Chamber of Commerce and read certain
papers showing the strength of the fleet as it was.
But the line we took as naval officers, would have
been of no great avail in this country without the
support of one of the great Chambers of Commerce,
devoid of party feelings - (hear, hear) - with
thoroughly national ideas, and composed of
business men, not content with mere broad statements
but wanting to know why these statements were made.
(Cheers). A Community of that sort, having taken up
the agitation, impressed its importance upon the
minds of the people; and as the London Chamber of
1. CMB 2, 11 Jan. 1899.
2. CCJ Mar. 1900, 'National Defence'.
3. GMB 3, 21 Dec. 1899.
4. GMB 3, 7, 28 & 30 Jan. 1901.
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Commerce undertook the duty, it is primarily to the
action of the London Chamber of Commerce that we owe
the present sati9factory condition of Her Majesty's
Fleet. (Cheers).
As the City looked forward to the new century, and
the competition and possible conflict which lay ahead, its
resolve to dominate world business remained s strong as
ever, if not stronger than it had been twenty years before
when the idea of a vigorous imperialist policy and a
hugely-expanded navy were considered unlikely
possibilities. It looked forward to a time when nations
would fight not with the sword or the rifle but through
the medium of the Custom's Office, 2 'a commercial conflict
the end and full results of which cannot be forecasted'3.
Whatever the challenge the City was not to be deterred,
'every nerve must be strained, not only to maintain our
present trade supremacy, but, as far as possible, to
develop and expand that supremacy' 4 The only way in which
the City would feel such business expansion to be safe
would be, no doubt, through the further expansion of the
British Army and the Navy.
1. CCJ Feb. 1900, 7; reprinted in No. 35 of the London
Chamber of Commerce Pamphlet Series, a copy of which
survives in the Naval History Museum, P.292.
Beresford gave this opinion on subsequent occasions
also, see for example his speech in 1902 which was
recorded in No. 38 of the same Pamphlet Series.
2. CCJ June 1899. This prophesy was repeated on
subsequent occasions, see for example, ibid.. July
1899.
3. Ibid. July 1899 'The Tariff Policy of Germany'.
4. Ibid. Jan. 1901, 'Commerce in the New Century'.
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CONCLUS ION
The rise of the City of London to a powerful position
at the centre of international finance and trade was not
an inevitable or automatic process. The very nature of
the business practices which contributed to this rise made
the City's rapid growth vulnerable. The economic
activities of the City - trade, insurance, shipping,
banking and broking - were becoming more interconnected'
and the greater proportion of the money which financed
these activities was held on short notice or demand. 2 As
a consequence the whole structure was the more fragile the
larger it grew. When competition threatened its dominant
economic position, the City demanded more support from the
State and produced its own peculiar brand of nationalism
in order to justify the policies it proposed.
1880-1890
At the beginning of the 1880s, protectionism
signalled threats to the continued growth of the City's
business interests on three fronts: the challenge of
foreign economic competition was represented by the
commercial treaty negotiations with France; the
possibility of losing easy access to the British Empire
was indicated by the imposition of the Canadian tariff;
1. The variety of directorships enjoyed by top
businessmen, and the extent to which different
interests supported each other on major issues
reflected this fact. British trade had become
essentially a business based on borrowed capital,
according to W. Bagehot, Lombard Street (1910), 15.
2. Ibid..
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and at home, the industrial and agricultural interests who
felt they could benefit from British tariff-protection
were beginning to organise themselves. The reaction of
the City was to form the London Chamber of Commerce, which
sought to buttress the dominant position of the City by
mobilising opinion as a weapon with which to influence
government and promote the City's views on topical issues.
The main aim of the Chamber was to press for a
forward foreign policy and imperial federation, as well as
the necessary naval expansion to sustain such policies.
The idea of imperial federation was as popular with
protectionists as with the City, the former wishing for an
imperial customs union surrounded by a common tariff wall,
the latter for a free trade form of federation which would
facilitate the City's economic domination of the Empire.
The struggle between these two perceptions of federation
took place within the Imperial Federation League, and the
Congresses of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire which
were convened by the London Chamber. The details of the
imperialism which the City promoted originated in the
trade sections of the London Chamber of Commerce. These
were run by well-informed and well known businessmen
concerned with the particular geographical area or
interests which the sections represented. The City's
strategy was to present its own interests as 'national
interests', the imperialism and imperial federation for
which it campaigned being referred to as a 'national
commercial policy'.
The City was in no doubt as to the reasons for the
imperialism of others in the mid-l880s. The scramble for
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colonies was seen as developing out of the industrial
expansion arid capital accumulation within the countries
involved, so constituting an aspect of the overall
competition for trade and capital investment opportunities
further afield. The City's pursuit of imperial federation
was intended to bring together the naval, financial and
industrial experience of the old country and the territory
and raw materials of the new in such a way as to maintain
the dominance of the former over the latter. British
naval expansion was seen as a necessary insurance for the
protection of business and capital investments abroad in
general, and in the Empire in particular. Economic
considerations were clearly the basis of the City's
political and ideational activities.
The lack of general support in Britain for
imperialism and imperial federation made the City's
activities important, urgent and difficult. It had to
shape ideas and the meaning of terms in order to justify
state support for City interests abroad, whilst
simultaneously deprecating undesirable state interference
in business affairs at home. This delicate operation took
place within the context of demands made by other economic
groups for state support which would harm the City's
interests. Proposals for protectionism or socialism were
condemned as selfish class legislation by the City which
relied heavily on the metaphysics of 'natural laws' in
order to present its own interests as those of the nation
as a whole. The same arguments were applied to
competition from economic groups in the Empire and in
foreign countries. Three basic, although contradictory,
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elements were all necessary to support the policy of
imperialism and naval expansion which the City promoted:
the responsibility of Britain to civilise, which lent
general moral support; economic nationalism, which warned
of the dangers of leaving such a duty to another power;
and 'free trade' which suggested a disinterested
objectivity with which only the British were favoured.
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the
leading role which the London Chamber of Commerce took in
publicising the causes of imperialism, naval expansion and
the Empire. There was no substantial support from the
public for the Imperial Federation League, and the other
major chambers of commerce were unenthusiastic about these
general issues during the 1880s. Dublin was perhaps the
most responsive to invitations to promote the Empire as it
feared the possibility of Irish home rule.' Manchester,
Glasgow and Liverpool had not deigned to join the
Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United
Kingdom. 2 Liverpool did send representatives to the first 	 -
Congress organised by the City in 1886, but had made no
1. See, for example, the Chamber's address to the Lord
Lieutenant, June 1881, Report of the Council to the
members at the general annual assemblies or meetings
(1880-9); or the address to the Earl of Aberdeen,
1887, ibid.. For a general view, see L.M. Cullen,
Princes and Pirates: the Dublin Chamber of Commerce,
1783-1983 (Dublin, 1983). Edinburgh Chamber of
Commerce, although not a major chamber of commerce,
did take up the question of naval expansion and
imperial federation earlier than other chambers,
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce Minute Books, 20 Nov.
1884 - a resolution urging the Government to maintain
naval supremacy; ibid., 7 June 1885 - a resolution
urging a close connection between the mother country
and the colonies. Lord Rosebery became a member of
this Chamber in 1885, ibid., 24 Sept. 1885.
2. Manchester became a member of the ACCUK in 1898,
Liverpool in 1900 and Glasgow in 1909.
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effort to help in organising it. 1 Glasgow was only active
through its president who happened to have a close
relationship with the London Chamber in any case.2
Manchester felt that the issues involved were political,
and did not attend a Congress until 1896. Birmingham,
whose Chamber one of the most prominent protectionists,
Samson S. Lloyd, had founded, was only lukewarm in its
1. Minute Book of the Council of the Chamber of Commerce
(June 1883-Jan. 1890), 24 June & 29 July 1885. When
the London Chamber had asked for support over the
Suez Canal issue in 1884, the Liverpool Chamber had
considered it a political issue and refused to
comment, ibid., 30 Jan. 1884. For a general view of
the Chamber, see W.A. Gibson Martin, A Century of
Liverpool's Commerce (Liverpool, 1950).
2. Sir James Bain often attended Council meetings of the
London Chamber, 103rd Report of the Directors of the
Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers in the City of
(1886), 65, 13 July 1885. Glasgow had
supported the London Chamber over the Suez Canal,
101st Report ... (1884). For a general view of the
Chamber, see C.A. Oakley, Our Illustrious Forebears
(Glasgow, 1980).
3. Proceedings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce,
1885-1890, Ordinary Meeting of Directors, 30 Sept.
1885, 30 June 1886; the Chamber did accept an
address arranged by the I.F.L., ibid., 26 Oct. 1887.
Proceedings ... 1890-94, 16 Dec. 1891 & 20 Jan. 1892;
the Chamber thought that the naval defences were
being earnestly considered sufficiently and so
refused to respond to the London Chamber's letter,
ibid., 13 Dec. 1893. Proceedings ... 1894-1902, 22
Apr. 1896, the vote to respond to the London
Chamber's invitation was very close, 11 votes to 9 in
favour. For general information, see Elijah Helm,
Chapters in the History of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce (n.d.).
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support of his protectionist view of imperial federation.'
Although the major chambers might support individual
examples of imperialism, particularly in West Africa, 2 it
was left to the City's chamber of commerce to lead the
ACCUK and launch a campaign in the early 1880s for
imperialism and free trade imperial federation.
The formulation and promotion of ideas was no mere
intellectual game, but part of the City's efforts to
accumulate yet larger amounts of capital within a
structure where time was money and a loss of confidence
meant pecuniary loss. There could be no end to the war of
ideas in which the City was engaged, because it was based
upon the conflict between different economic interests.
Battles to capture particular meanings might rage and
subside, but the periods of calm were usually merely lulls
between engagements, with one side or the other waiting
until it felt that it had a slight advantage or being
1. The Birmingham Chamber of Commerce Report for 1878
(1879), 8, the Council regretted to observe that one
result of the continued depression of trade was the
raising of doubts about the soundness of free trade
policy. G. Henry Wright, Chronicles of the Birming-
ham Chamber of Commerce, 1813-1913, and of the Bir-
mingham Commercial Society, 1783-1812 (Birmingham,
1913), 312, refers to a special general meeting of
the Chamber in October 1885 which regretted that the
Council had not submitted their reply to the Royal
Commission on the Depression of Trade for the
Chamber's approval. Chamberlain refused to become
president of the Chamber, and his reply stated his
opposition to protectionism, referring to a special
general meeting of the Chamber which had received a
depuation from the National Fair Trade League in
March 1887, ibid., 328.
2. Barrie M. Ratcliffe, 'Commerce and Empire:
Manchester and West Africa, 1873-95', Journal of
Imperial & Commonwealth History vii (1978-9),
314; and Hynes, op.cit..
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driven on by circumstances. The success or defeat of
particular ideational positions involved the livelihood of
those competing, and for the City, existing profits and
future expansion were at stake.
The way in which economic considerations and the
formation of arguments and ideas were linked, can only be
fully understood in terms of how both of them articulated
with the process of government policy-making and the
City's efforts to influence it. An attempt has been made
in this thesis to explore these connections by examining
the relationship between the City and the State. The
connection between the economic, the political and the
ideational is revealed through an examination of the
private and the public aspects of the City-Whitehall
relationship. The two most important points about this
subtle, complex relationship are, first, that its private
aspect consists largely of understandings between the
wealthiest businessmen involved in a particular issue and
the highest-placed, political decision-makers; and,
second, that there was a conscious attempt made, when
shaping the public aspect, to mask the fact that the
private relationship existed.
The relationship between business and politics is
difficult to understand precisely because there was a
hidden as well as a public side to it. Apart from social
connections taking place outside Westminster, of which the
cultivation of politicians and civil servants by the
Rothschilds is one good example (these are worthy of an
interesting piece of research on their own), many
unrecorded agreements were arrived at within the precincts
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of Parliament and Whitehall. Examples given in this study
include informal interviews with ministers and
parliamentary under secretaries' and conversations between
civil servants and businessmen. 2 Such contacts could
occur at a variety of levels in the decision-making
process, and they could be kept secret from different
audiences; these contacts ranged from verbal agreements
not referred to in the minutes of civil servants or in the
minute books of the London Chamber of Commerce, to the
omission of parts of the correspondence printed for
Parliament. Not all businessmen and civil servants were
privy to private agreements. Where state support for
business abroad was concerned, the most prominent
businessmen with City connections generally had a close
but hidden relationship with the relevant top political
decision-makers. Examples of provincial businessman
without a City background being outside this relationship
include that of Alfred Jones, who initially had to rely on
Sutherland to further his interests through the latter's
contacts with ministers and civil servants, or the way in
which the Africa Association was handicapped because it
did not even know how to go about applying for a royal
charter, let alone how to present its case most
favourably.
Looked at from the point of view of the control of
information, the relationship between the City and the
1. For example, that given at the FO to the West Africa
section in 1884.
2. For example, those at the FO between Pauncefote and
businessmen such as Matheson, Goldie, and later
Jones; and between Swanzy and Hemming at the CO.
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State sometimes seemed to be weighted in the City's
favour, in the sense that it was easier for City
businessmen to recognise the hierarchy of politicians and
civil servants, as well as keep in touch with political
vicissitudes through those who were Members of Parliament,
than it was for the politicans and civil servants to keep
abreast of developments in the world of business.
Examples of the difficulties which politicians experienced
include Herbert's mistaken belief that Rhodes and North
were behind Gifford's application for a charter for the
amalgamation of the two companies in which he, Gifford,
was involved, or the way in which the Government was duped
over the ownership of the Rudd concession. Such
experiences may have led to an increased reliance on the
relationship which politicians and civil servants had with
long-established businessmen such as Betram Currie,
Lubbock, the Barings, the Rothschilds and Matheson.
The City could also be seen to come out best in its
relationship with Westminster from the point of view that
the convening of public meetings and statements by the
City could be used to embarrass governments as well as
support them. Through connections with British chambers
of commerce abroad, both inside and outside the Empire,
the City could begin agitating for a policy with a call
for help from seemingly beleagured British interests. It
could also activate British chambers at home on occasion.
The political role of the City had to be finely judged,
however, as it had to appear to be arguing the case on
economic grounds, and economic grounds that were in the
interests of the nation as a whole. It could not afford
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to be overtly political, although it was proposing
political action, and only when policies which it
considered disastrous appeared likely to succeed did it
resort to out-and-out political activity. The Irish home
rule question is an outstanding case of this sort.
Government action appears to have recognised the
demands of the City for more state support and imperial
expansion abroad. There was a change in the publicly
declared policy of the British government during the
l880s. The despatch of the Salisbury telegram to China in
1886 marked a more open commitment to British business
expansion abroad, which the granting of royal charters
endorsed. When Lord Salisbury acknowledged 'the deep
connection between the conduct of commerce and the conduct
of the Government' of Britain at the end of the decade,'
he was making the declaration to a world which was already
aware of his willingness to support the expansion of
British investment abroad.
Lord Salisbury also declared in his speech to the
London Chamber that the greatest duty of the state was to
provide the material to defend British business expansion
around the world. This was a tribute to the success of
the City's efforts to ensure the continued growth of the
navy. It is arguable that the state's provision of armed
force to protect British possessions and enterprise abroad
was the most important aspect of the City-State
1.	 CCJ Mar. 1889, 57; The Times 28 Feb. 1889, 10.
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relationship. Without such might, neither City business
nor the policies which it proposed could have been
sustained. Whereas the City could float companies which
would finance, at least in the short term, the expansion
of the Empire, extensions of British interests abroad
could not have been effected at all if there had not been
a rapidly-expanding, powerful navy to buttress these
moves. There would have been little growth in the private
profits of the City without the huge growth in public
expenditure on the navy.
1890-1900
The tendency for City interests to become integrated
was demonstrated in the late 1880s and early 1890s by the
addition of a further tier of City finance which brought
together merchants, bankers and others, as a result of
the explosion of trust company formations.' Wealthy
businessmen and businesses became involved in finance
when they passed a certain size, whether the original
enterprise had been primarily concerned with shipping in
West Africa or mines in South Africa. The variety of
directorships which prominent members of the City held,2
continued to reflect this integration which took place in
association with the rapid expansion of City business.
1. For an example of a successful trust company, see The
London Trust Co. Ltd. 1889-1967, Guildhall Library.
For relations between private bankers and trust
companies, see Cassis, op.cit., 176.
2. A place on the board of an established insurance
company might be taken as the usual mark of entry
into the City finance community.
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Membership of the top echelon of the City business
hierarchy, and the establishment of informal relations
with Whitehall, did not necessarily mean that a
businessman had a secure position for life. His position
depended upon business success and could change with
circumstances. Changes in the leadership of the West
Africa and South Africa trade sections of the London
Chamber of Commerce during the 1890s demonstrated changing
positions in the hierarchy. If particularly long-standing
members of the City community, such as the Baring family,
were faced with ruin which also threatened the whole
structure, the community could make extraordinary efforts
to protect its own, as the Baring crisis showed.
Finance was an important part of the relations
between the great powers at this time, both as regards
Europe as well as more distant lands. The relations
between the City and Whitehall were closer in the 1890s
than in the previous decade and continued to be
characterised by contrasting official and hidden
activities. The arrival of Chamberlain at the CO
encouraged this relationship further, although the City
was quick to make clear that it did not want the state to
engage in business which would be better done by private
enterprise.
The momentum of the movements which the City had
promoted in the 1880s was maintained and accelerated in
the last decade of the century. Protectionism was
temporarily vanquished; opposition to bimetallism found
effective expression in the formation of the Gold Standard
Defence Association; support for free-trade imperial
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federation was organised by the City with the successful
establishment of the British Empire League; and the naval
expansion was maintained through the activities of the
Naval Defence Standing Committee of the London Chamber of
Commerce.
Declaration of state support for British business
abroad became more strident as the strength of the navy
increased relative to that of other powers. However much
the City protested that economic competition between
countries was replacing warfare, its promotion of an ever-
expanding British navy indicated a more profound faith in
armed force as the final arbiter of conflict and as the
basis of secure economic expansion.
After all is gold the basis of our unchallenged
credit? Our credit is, it may be maintained, really
based upon our strength, and the fighting power of
our army and navy has more to do with upholding that
credit t1an any stores of gold however large they
might be.
Opposition to the rapid extension of Empire and the
equally fast rise in public expenditure on the navy 2 was
growing in the last decade of the century and these
policies did not attract widespread support, for example
the Navy League was an even weaker body than the I.F.L.
had been in the previous decade. Therefore, the vigour
with which the City sustained the justification for its
policies was just as necessary and important in the 1890s.
The acceptance of the City's solution to the threat of
famine in war-time - the maintenance of a stronger navy
rather than tariff protection for agriculture - is a
significant example of success in this battle for ideas.
1. Bankers' Journal 17 May 1899.
2. See Appendix.
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The same contradictory set of concepts continued to
constitute the City's particular form of nationalism. The
myth of free trade was perpetuated, the monopolistic
practices and oligarchical structures in which many major
City businesses were involved being defended on the
grounds of efficiency. 'Free trade' 1 and economic
nationalism continued to be propagated together with the
view that warfare in support of imperialism was a victory
over barbarism. If the City's liberty, or the protection
of its expansion was interfered with by 'democracy', then
democracy had to be set aside in those areas.2
Domestic unemployment was considered as no more than a
problem of surplus population which could be drained away
by state-aided emigration. The City argued for an
outward-looking, aggressive expansion of the British state
in the service of morality in general, and national
interests in particular. Those national interests, which
the state was to support but not interfere with, were the
expanding economic interests of the City of London.
1. The limits of the meaning of 'free trade' were tested
to breaking point by N. Lubbock when he demonstrated
the degree to which a determined, well-organised
minority interest could influence the London Chamber
of Commerce, providing it did not injure the
interests of the majority of senior members of the
City.
2. Wheji it was in the Jntersts of the City such .as the
entranchisement or uitianclers in trie SOuth Atrica
Republic the.Citv could be a fervent adherent of the
aemocratic principle.
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APPENDIX
The Yield of the Staple Taxes
Source: J.F. Rees, A Short Fiscal and Financial History
of England, 1815-1918 T1921), 234-5
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